Submission to the Western Australian Parliamentary Inquiry into the
Guardianship and Administration System
Date: 17 Apr 2026
Author: Tasman Stewart
Executive Summary
This submission is informed by direct personal engagement with the guardianship
framework in Queensland, undertaken with the intention of replacing a state-appointed
decision-maker with a private individual arrangement.
That experience revealed not only procedural complexity, but deeper structural
concerns relating to transparency, accountability, and financial incentives within the
system.
While guardianship frameworks serve a necessary protective function, the combination
of decision-making authority, limited external oversight, and user-funded financial
administration creates a risk environment where accountability is weakened, and
individual autonomy may be unnecessarily diminished.
Reform is required to ensure that systems designed to protect do not, through structure
or incentive, drift toward control without sufficient scrutiny.
Scope of This Submission
This submission is grounded in personal experience assisting an individual (referred to
here as “Sandra”) who was subject to state-based guardianship and financial
administration arrangements in Queensland.
I was asked to assume the role of advocate and decision-maker in place of the State.
This involved progressing toward formal application, gathering supporting material, and
engaging with the evidentiary and procedural requirements necessary to effect that
change.
While that process was ultimately not completed due to external circumstances, it
provided a direct and practical understanding of how such systems operate.
Sandra has since been supported by an alternative organisation, and her circumstances
have improved. That outcome reinforces the importance of ensuring that pathways
away from state control are both viable and accessible.
Key Themes
Autonomy and the Use of Substituted Decision-Making
Guardianship systems necessarily involve the removal or limitation of individual decision-making authority. However, the framework appears to default toward broad substituted decision-making rather than actively preserving autonomy where possible. In practice, this can lead to:
e decision-making powers that exceed what is strictly necessary
e insufficient exploration of less restrictive alternatives
e limited pathways for individuals to regain control
Accountability is directly engaged here. Where authority is exercised without regular justification or review, the erosion of autonomy risks becoming systemic
rather than exceptional.
Transparency and Visibility of Decisions
A consistent concern is the limited transparency surrounding decisions made on behalf of individuals.
There appears to be no uniform requirement that decisions be: e clearly explained in accessible language
e documented in a way that supports meaningful review
e communicated in a manner that enables understanding and challenge
Without transparency, accountability cannot function. Decisions that are not visible
are, in effect, insulated from scrutiny.
Barriers to Advocacy and Challenge The process of attempting to replace a state-appointed guardian highlighted significant barriers to engagement, including: e complex procedural requirements e high evidentiary thresholds e limited guidance for individuals acting outside professional frameworks
- an apparent institutional preference for maintaining existing arrangements These barriers collectively discourage legitimate challenge and reduce the
practical ability of individuals or their supporters to influence outcomes.
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An accountable system must be one that can be meaningfully engaged with, not
one that resists participation through complexity.
Funding Model and Structural Incentives
A central issue — and one that influences all others — is the funding model
underpinning financial administration.
In both Queensland and Western Australia, while personal guardianship functions are state-funded, financial administration is largely funded through fees charged to the individual whose assets are being managed. This creates a structural dynamic in which: e the State (through the Public Trustee or equivalent) exercises control over an individual’s financial affairs, and
e derives revenue from the provision of that control Regardless of intent, this arrangement introduces an inherent tension.
Where an entity both:
e holds decision-making authority over a person’s assets, and
e benefits financially from continued management of those assets, questions of independence and conflicts of interest arise, with direct implications
for accountability.
This is not a matter of individual conduct, but of system design. Even well intentioned actors operate within the incentives created by the structure around
them.
If funding for protective services is inadequate, that is properly a matter for government to resolve through transparent budgetary processes — not through
arrangements that place the financial burden on those subject to control.
Institutional Accountability and Oversight
The combination of decision-making authority, limited transparency, and embedded financial incentives is compounded by the absence of clearly visible,
independent oversight.
Where the State: e acts as decision-maker, and
° participates in or influences review mechanisms
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there is a risk that accountability becomes internalised rather than external.
Effective accountability requires separation — not only in principle, but in operation.
Systemic Analysis
Taken together, these issues reflect a system that has not fully adapted to
contemporary expectations.
Guardianship frameworks have historically been built around a protective model, prioritising the ability to make decisions on behalf of individuals. However, in practice, these frameworks can operate in ways that resemble a control model, particularly where oversight is limited (or non-existent) and avenues for challenge
are constrained.
Modern approaches, however, emphasise: e supported decision-making ° proportionality of intervention
e preservation and restoration of autonomy
Where older structures persist without sufficient reform, gaps emerge between
intention and outcome. Accountability is the mechanism that bridges this gap.
Without: e clear justification of decisions e transparency of process e independent review e and practical pathways for challenge
authority risks becoming self-reinforcing.
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Recommendations
Recommendation 1: Establish Supported Decision-Making as the Default
Require that all less restrictive alternatives be actively considered and documented
before full guardianship is imposed.
Decision-making authority should be proportionate, targeted, and subject to
ongoing reassessment.
Recommendation 2: Mandate Transparent, Accessible Decision Records
All significant decisions should be: e recorded in plain language e provided to the individual and any recognised advocate e structured to enable independent review
This should be treated as a core accountability mechanism.
Recommendation 3: Reform the Funding Model for Financial Administration
Transition toward a model where financial administration functions are: e fully funded by the State
e not reliant on fees extracted from the individual
At a minimum, introduce: e independent oversight of fee structures e clear separation between financial incentives and decision-making
authority
Protective systems should not derive operational funding from those they control.
Recommendation 4: Establish Independent External Oversight
Create or strengthen an oversight body that is: e structurally independent of operational entities e empowered to investigate, review, and direct corrective action
e accessible without undue cost or complexity
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The effectiveness of an independent oversight body will depend on its composition and the diversity of expertise it brings. Consideration should be given to including: e Asenior legal practitioner or retired judicial officer, to ensure procedural fairness and legal integrity e Anindependent medical or psychosocial professional, with experience in capacity assessment and supported decision-making, and not employed by or directly accountable to the State in this context e Asenior representative from the community or not-for-profit sector, with demonstrated experience in advocacy for vulnerable individuals e An individual with lived experience, or a representative of those who have been subject to guardianship or administration orders e Afinancial oversight expert, to provide scrutiny of financial administration
practices, fee structures, and asset management
The body should be structured to avoid concentration of influence from any single sector, particularly where that sector is directly involved in the operation of
guardianship or administration services.
Recommendation 5: Introduce Mandatory, Time-Limited Orders
All guardianship and administration orders should: e operate for defined periods e require active renewal based on current evidence
e include a presumption of restored autonomy where appropriate
Continuation of any order should require clear justification, rather than occurring
by default.
Consideration should also be given to enabling the independent oversight body to:
e initiate or recommend reviews where concerns arise
e identify cases where continued orders may no longer be justified
e provide an additional safeguard where individuals are unable to effectively
advocate for themselves
This ensures that the continuation of restrictive arrangements is subject to ongoing,
independent scrutiny.
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Recommendation 6: Improve Access to Advocacy
Ensure individuals and their supporters have: e clear pathways to participate in decisions e access to independent advocacy
e simplified mechanisms to challenge or vary orders
Recommendation 7: Separate Operational and Review Functions
Where the State acts as guardian or administrator, oversight must be clearly
separated both structurally and operationally.
Internal review is not sufficient to ensure accountability.
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Final Reflections
Guardianship systems exist to protect individuals at their most vulnerable. That purpose
carries significant responsibility.
Based on direct engagement, there is a clear need to strengthen the relationship between authority and accountability — ensuring that decisions are transparent, justified,
and open to meaningful scrutiny.
At its core, the system should reflect a basic expectation held across the community —
that individuals are treated fairly, transparently, and with respect for their autonomy. I|n
practical terms, this aligns with what is often described as a “fair go”: a system that can
be understood, questioned, and, where necessary, challenged without undue barrier.
This is not an abstract standard. It is a practical one. It requires that decisions are explained in a way that makes sense to the person affected, that processes are visible rather than obscured, and that avenues for review are not only available in theory, but
accessible in reality.
Where these elements are present, confidence in the system follows naturally. Where they are absent, even well-intentioned actions can be experienced as distant, opaque, and beyond reach. In systems where the State exercises significant control over an individual’s affairs, the absence of these safeguards risks shifting the experience from
protection toward control.
Ensuring that this balance is maintained is central to preserving both the integrity of the
system and the trust placed in it.