Submission to the Joint Committee of

Public Accounts and Audit regarding

the Inquiry into the administration of

the National Disability Insurance

    Scheme (NDIS)

                       February 2026

About the Submitter

JFA Purple Orange is an independent, social-profit organisation that undertakes systemic policy analysis and advocacy across a range of issues affecting people with disability and their families.

Our work is characterised by co-design and co-production, and includes hosting a number of user-led initiatives.

Much of our work involves connecting people with disability to good information and to each other. We also work extensively in multi-stakeholder consultation and collaboration, especially around policy and practice that helps ensure people with disability are welcomed as valued members of the mainstream community.

Our work is informed by a model called Citizenhood.

JFA Purple Orange

104 Greenhill Road

Unley SA 5061 AUSTRALIA

Telephone: +61 (8) 8373 8388

Email: admin@purpleorange.org.au

Website: www.purpleorange.org.au

Facebook: www.facebook.com/jfapurpleorange

Contributors

Cathy Cochrane, Senior Policy Leader

James Murphy, Policy and Research Leader

Selena Maddeford, Manager – Policy and Projects

Tracey Wallace, Interim CEO

Acknowledgment of Country

JFA Purple Orange acknowledges the Traditional Owners of Country throughout Australia. We work on many Aboriginal lands, including Kaurna Country, where our head office is located. We extend our respect to all Aboriginal peoples on the lands where we work, live, and learn. We are committed to walking together and building relationships grounded in the self-determination of First Nations peoples.

Recognition of disability community

We recognise that JFA Purple Orange exists to advance the rights of people with disability. All our work aims to create a more inclusive world where people with disability have access to the same opportunities as everyone else.

Contents

Summary and recommendations ……………………………………………………………….. 5
Introduction …………………………………………………………………………………………… 10

2.1. Problematic scope of this Inquiry ……………………………………………………….. 12

Foundations of NDIS critical to inform its future …………………………………………. 13

3.1. Original promise still holds true ………………………………………………………….. 13

3.2. The Social Model of Disability ……………………………………………………………. 14

3.3. Inclusion is not segregation ………………………………………………………………. 15

Missteps in NDIS implementation …………………………………………………………….. 18

5.1. Scheme forecasts overlooked significant unmet need ………………………….. 18

5.2. Poor performance of NDIA Board ………………………………………………………. 19

5.2.1.   Insufficient Board oversight of quality outcomes ................................... 20

5.2.2.   Insufficient Board oversight of Scheme sustainability ........................... 22

5.2.3.   Insufficient Board oversight of systems and processes ........................ 24

5.2.4.  Balancing multiple Board roles .............................................................. 27

5.2.5.  Increase Board transparency ................................................................ 27

5.3. Missing Tier 2 ………………………………………………………………………………….. 28

5.4. Issues that hamper ILC success ………………………………………………………… 30

A new way forward for the NDIS………………………………………………………………. 32

6.1. Genuine co-design is critical ……………………………………………………….. 32

6.2. Place accountability at the core ……………………………………………………….. 33

6.3. Establish clear roles without conflicts …………………………………………. 34

6.4. Let participants author their own plans …………………………………………. 36

6.5. Apply clear principles on what supports can be purchased …………….. 37

6.6. Balance natural and formal safeguards …………………………………………. 39

Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………………………. 41
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1. Summary and recommendations

This submission acknowledges that there have been a range of mistakes and problems created in the way successive governments have rolled out and managed the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) and these have unnecessarily increased the cost of the Scheme. But we cannot emphasise strongly enough that poor implementation does not turn a good idea into a bad one. The NDIS was, and remains, a fundamentally good idea that should be defended and strengthened to ensure it delivers its original promise. Our collective focus should be on fixing the problems and building a stronger Scheme that delivers higher quality supports and better outcomes for participants while being cost-effective and sustainable for taxpayers and society.

Our submission is presented in three parts. First, we urge the Committee to reflect on the origins of the NDIS and its core tenets of dignity and inclusion for Australians with disability. Understanding the origins and the path the NDIS has taken to date is crucial to charting a better course forward that holds true to the fundamental essence of the Scheme while protecting it for future generations. The Social Model of Disability should underpin this with the recent regression to the outdated tropes of the Medical and Charity models firmly rejected. The NDIS is an insurance scheme for the benefit of all Australians and not a ‘welfare’ measure or a ‘care’ system. Importantly, inclusion does not mean segregation or ‘special’ provisions, which are inevitably more expensive because they fail to leverage existing resources in our communities.

Second, we highlight some of the missteps in the implementation that have negatively impacted the Scheme’s roll out and increased costs. We note that the initial modelling for the NDIS was problematic due to underestimating the level of unmet need at the time and a reliance on known costs that were largely associated with outdated models. This has resulted in an unrealistic benchmark and misconceptions about the reasonable costs of the Scheme. The NDIA Board has also fallen short of its responsibilities in ensuring the Scheme fulfils its legislated functions and in not providing sufficient oversight. The Committee should examine how the Board failed to ensure the NDIA had fit-for-purpose processes and systems that identified, prevented, and remedied issues of waste, misuse, and fraud over many years. Further, all levels of government have failed to deliver what the Productivity Commission envisaged as Tier 2 supports. While this is now broadly acknowledged, it has until now had a significant impact on driving demand for individual NDIS plans and thereby increasing costs. Well-designed and comprehensive Foundational Supports should help overcome this in the future.

The final section focuses on the future of the NDIS. We strongly believe the Federal Government should establish an overarching genuine co-design process that involves people with disability and subject matter experts in decision making about sensible reforms. Additionally, we offer a few ideas that we believe should be considered in this co-design process, including the need for increased focus on accountability, establishing clear roles in the Scheme and eliminating conflicts of interest, letting participants ‘author’ their own plans according to their assessed budget as part of a simplified participant pathway that eliminates line-by-line adversarial negotiations, applying clear principles to determine the supports that can be purchased, and investing in creating cost-effective natural informal safeguards for participants alongside stronger formal oversight mechanisms.

We recommend:

Recommendation 1: The Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit should expand its Terms of Reference to include the impact of political actors, especially ministers, on the administration of the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) and its performance regarding the quality of supports provided to participants, outcomes achieved, mitigation of Scheme risks, and management of financial sustainability.

Recommendation 2: The Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit should reflect on the content of the landmark ‘Shut Out’ report and its core tenants of dignity and inclusion in considering how the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) has been rolled out and managed, including how unnecessarily rigid rules have both failed to adhere to these values and often led to more expensive supports than necessary.

Recommendation 3: The Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit should ensure this Inquiry adopts the Social Model of Disability and avoids deferring to outdated understandings of disability based on the Medical and/or Charity Models of Disability. Likewise, the Committee should emphasise that the future course of the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) should be based on the Social Model of Disability and not a regression to outdated approaches and systems.

Recommendation 4: The Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit should examine the consequences of practices and policies of discrimination, segregation, and exclusion under the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) including their immediate and long-term cost implications. It should make recommendations about ending discrimination, segregation, and exclusion in the NDIS as part of building a higher-quality, more cost-effective, and, ultimately, more sustainable Scheme.

Recommendation 5: The Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit should recognise how flaws in the assumptions underpinning the Productivity Commission’s 2011 modelling of projected NDIS costs, largely due to underestimating the level of unmet need at the time and a reliance on known costs that were largely associated with outdated models, have resulted in an unrealistic benchmark and misconceptions about the reasonable costs of the Scheme. It should consider and make a recommendation about how a new realistic benchmark can be modelled.

Recommendation 6: The Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit should examine how, and to what extent, the NDIA Board currently assures itself the National Disability Insurance Agency (NDIA) is fulfilling its legislated functions in ways that are fully consistent with the National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013.

Recommendation 7: The Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit should examine how, and to what extent, the NDIA Board currently assures itself about the reliability of data and financial projections it receives and make recommendations to address the apparent shortcomings to protect the future of the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) for all Australians.

Recommendation 8: The Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit should closely examine the role of the Board in the apparent failure of the National Disability Insurance Agency (NDIA) over many years to identify and fix inadequate systems and processes resulting in extremely high levels of waste, fraud, and financial leakage from the NDIS. It should make recommendations to improve the Board’s identification and mitigation of risks within the Agency and Scheme.

Recommendation 9: The Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit should ensure its recommendations reflect a clear balance between the multiple roles of the National Disability Insurance Agency (NDIA) Board and give equal weight to matters of financial sustainability and the quality of participant outcomes capable of advancing the life chances of participants, which reduces costs over the long term.

Recommendation 10: The Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit should consider and make recommendations about how the National Disability Insurance Agency (NDIA) Board can increase the level of public transparency regarding its work and deliberations to help ensure public confidence in its role is maintained and enhanced.

Recommendation 11: The Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit should consider how an additional public disclosure requirement could be added to Section 145 of the National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 so that advice from the Independent

Advisory Council to the National Disability Insurance Agency (NDIA) Board is made available publicly.

Recommendation 12: The Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit should recommend the Federal Government establishes a genuine co-design process involving lived experience and subject matter experts in decision making to develop, trial, adjust, roll out, and evaluate Foundational Supports, including Thriving Kids, because this approach offers the best chance of success. The sustainability of the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) will be significantly enhanced if Foundational Supports are well designed and effectively rolled out through a constructive partnership with the disability community.

Recommendation 13: The Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit should consider how the Information, Linkages, and Capacity Building (ILC) program can be strengthened into the future, including, but not limited to, an increased funding allocation, financial certainty for organisations, and a clear overarching public-facing strategy. The Committee should also seek to understand why organisations with ILC-funded projects are facing an unknown future come 30 June 2026 – for the third year in a row – and make recommendations to avoid any recurrence of this issue in the future.

Recommendation 14: The Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit should consider the many benefits of establishing genuine co-design processes involving lived experience and subject matter experts in decision making for the success of reform processes and make a clear recommendation that the Federal Government adopt this approach regarding the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) and Foundational Supports.

Recommendation 15: The Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit should recommend ways to rebuild trust between the Federal Government, including its agencies, and the disability community with a focus on working together to achieve better outcomes for the quality and sustainability of the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS).

Recommendation 16: The Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit should examine the adequacy of oversight and accountability mechanisms in the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) and make recommendations to ensure these are placed at the core of the Scheme.

Recommendation 17: The Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit should recommend a recalibration of key roles and responsibilities in the National Disability

Insurance Scheme (NDIS), including, but not limited to, the roles of Local Area Coordinators (LACs), NDIA planners, support coordinators, and plan managers in order to make the Scheme more cost-effective and sustainable.

Recommendation 18: The Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit should examine the complex and expensive participant pathway currently operating in the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) and recommend participants ‘author’ their own plans based on their assessed budget with available support from their Local Area Coordinator (LAC), who is trained in best-practice supported decision making.

Recommendation 19: The Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit should examine the complex, adversarial, and expensive process for approving supports in NDIS plans through the current lists approach and make recommendations to simplify the rules and replace the lists with clear principles that encourage innovative and lower-cost solutions.

Recommendation 20: The Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit should recognise the cost-effectiveness of informal natural safeguards for people with disability living in inclusive neighbourhoods and communities and consider ways these can be enhanced alongside adequate investment in strong formal oversight and accountability mechanisms.

2. Introduction

JFA Purple Orange welcomes the opportunity to provide this submission to the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit regarding its inquiry into the administration of the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS).

We understand the Committee is examining the National Disability Insurance Agency’s (NDIA) delivery of the NDIS with reference to the management of financial sustainability risks, and claimant and provider compliance with requirements; as well as the monitoring, measurement, and reporting of NDIA performance. Further, the Committee will also examine the regulatory performance of the NDIS Quality and Safeguards Commission (NDIS Commission), and the Department of Health, Disability, and Ageing’s policy advice to the government. We note that this Department was only constituted in its current form last year with the Department of Social Services taking the lead policy advice role for disability and the NDIS prior to this.

JFA Purple Orange acknowledges there have been a range of mistakes and problems created in the way successive governments have rolled out and managed the NDIS and these have unnecessarily increased the cost of the Scheme. But we cannot emphasise strongly enough that poor implementation does not turn a good idea into a bad one. The NDIS was and remains a fundamentally good idea that should be defended and strengthened to ensure it delivers its original promise. Our collective focus should be on fixing the problems and building a stronger Scheme that delivers higher quality supports and better outcomes. Winding back or dismantling parts of the NDIS now would discard the enormous value already created from the investment so far. A full or partial return to block funding will bring new and different expenses with little evidence to suggest it will be cheaper over the long term. The primary reason that these types of service provisions seemed cheaper prior to the NDIS is because there was so much unmet need and poor service quality.

We despair at characterisations that suggest there is a single choice between a ‘free-market free-for-all’ or a rigid, government-controlled, block-funded, one-size-fits-all service provision. We believe there is a credible middle path that can deliver high-quality outcomes for participants who have genuine choice and autonomy to live good ordinary lives while ensuring the financial sustainability of the Scheme. Clear straightforward processes, fit-for-purpose oversight mechanisms, and strong accountability are critical to this middle path; all of which have been lacking in the NDIS to date. We implore all members of this Committee, and parliament more broadly, to work together, and alongside the disability community, to improve the NDIS and

ensure it fulfills its promise to enable Australians with disability to live valued meaningful lives in our communities – something that enriches all of us.

Compounding successive governments’ poor implementation of the NDIS has been the chaotic, disjointed, and often inept way they have also sought to run various ‘reform’ processes. Despite commitments to genuinely co-design changes to the Scheme, people with disability have largely been sidelined with governments and ministers taking charge, then failing to match their rhetoric with results. The NDIS has now been under ‘reform’ for more than half its 12-and-a-half-year lifespan, kicked off by Stuart Robert when he assumed the role of Minister for the NDIS on 29 May 2019 and carried forward by ministers Linda Reynolds, Bill Shorten, Amanda Rishworth, and Mark Butler. The disability community and broader Australian public can be forgiven for wondering why the experiences and outcomes for participants seem to be getting worse and the political rhetoric about cost overruns continues into its tenth year.[1]

In our view, this is because the approaches taken to ‘reform’ so far have not worked as well as they should have, and we respectfully argue it is well past time to adopt a genuine comprehensive co-design process that includes lived experience and subject matter expertise in decision making, implementation, and evaluation to ensure the NDIS is fit-for-purpose now and into the future. The co-design that has occurred in recent years has been on specific matters and in piecemeal ways – there has not been a comprehensive, cohesive, overarching co-design approach for the whole Scheme. It is people with disability and their families who have the most experience of the Scheme’s benefits and problems, the deepest understanding of how it currently works, and the greatest stake in its success. They should be trusted to help lead, design, and deliver the sensible changes that are needed to create a high-quality sustainable Scheme that achieves its original promise.

Our submission is presented in three parts. First, we focus on the foundations of the NDIS and why it came into being. Understanding the origins and the path taken to date is crucial to charting a better course forward that holds true to the fundamental essence of the Scheme. Then we address problems with implementation. Third, we look forward, emphasising that a genuine co-design process offers the best chance of delivering sensible change that improve the quality and sustainability of the NDIS. We also offer a few ideas that we believe would help strengthen the Scheme and save money, which should be considered in that co-design process. Our submission is informed by feedback we have received from people with disability,

[1] On 20 January 2017, then Treasurer Scott Morrison asked the Productivity Commission to undertake a study of NDIS costs. See further Productivity Commission, ‘National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) Costs: Study Report’, October 2017, available at https://assets.pc.gov.au/inquiries/completed/ndis-costs/report/ndis-costs.pdf.

families, and other stakeholders about their experiences and we acknowledge the ongoing and valuable contributions that the South Australian disability community makes to our work.

2.1. Problematic scope of this Inquiry

While the scope of this Inquiry is comprehensive in relation to the public service’s roles in the administration of the NDIS, it excludes political actors who have had a significant impact on how well the NDIS has been implemented and managed, as well as the conduct of subsequent ‘reform’ processes, as described above. The roles of successive governments – predominately federal but also state and territory governments – and their ministers should not be overlooked.

Additionally, many previous parliamentary committees have examined a smorgasbord of matters related to the NDIS over a dozen years, yet they have seemingly been unable to direct governments to solutions that would have prevented the problems that many now use to argue the NDIS has failed.

We are very concerned that the narrow scope of this Inquiry may hamper its ability to accurately pinpoint the root causes of many issues and, therefore, their solutions. Instead, it enables current and former politicians to avoid their share of scrutiny while only placing the public service under the microscope. We strongly urge the Committee to expand its scrutiny to include all actors who have significantly impacted the administration of the NDIS, especially ministers. Otherwise, there is a risk that policy design flaws are overlooked with the focus only on day-to-day operations, or of a perception forming that the public service is being ‘scapegoated’ for broader government failings.

3. Foundations of NDIS critical to inform its future

Understanding the origins of the NDIS and the path taken to date is crucial to charting a better course forward that holds true to the fundamental essence of the Scheme. In this section, we highlight some of the core foundations of the NDIS that we believe should inform how the Committee undertakes its work and the recommendations it makes. We emphasise the groundbreaking work of the ‘Shut Out’ report in encapsulating the need for change away from the outdated approaches of the past, and the importance of the Committee’s work reflecting the Social Model of Disability and that segregated models have no place in a genuinely inclusive society.

3.1. Original promise still holds true

The NDIS has many ‘parents’ and ‘grandparents’, but, in our view, the landmark ‘Shut Out’ report released in 2009 best encapsulates why the Scheme is needed and the essence of what it should achieve. We implore each member of this Committee to take the time to read and reflect on the content of this report and its call for fundamental change. Its core tenets of dignity and inclusion for all Australians with disability should underpin the work of this Inquiry. We do not suggest that the NDIS has, to date, done justice to the change the report called for, but we strongly believe this should continue to motivate and guide how the Scheme evolves into the future. As a person with disability shared in a submission to the ‘Shut Out’ report team:

We desire a place within the community! This place is not just somewhere to lay down our heads, but a place which brings comfort and support with daily living, friendship, meaningful work, exciting recreation, spiritual renewal, relationships in which we can be ourselves freely with others. And out of this, great things may flourish… Perhaps then we will belong and our gifts (perhaps meagre, perhaps spectacular) freely shared. And from there will flow all the delights and tragedies of a life lived in the community, shaped not by exclusion and oppression but by everyday ordinariness (whatever that might be)![2]

The NDIS has sought to achieve these core tenets of dignity and inclusion through a commitment to reasonable and necessary supports based on choice and a goal of advancing participants into meaningful social, economic, cultural, and community participation. Yet, we

[2] Australian Government, ‘Shut Out: The Experience of People with Disabilities and their Families in Australia’, 2009, p. viii, available at https://disability.royalcommission.gov.au/system/files/exhibit/DRC.1000.0001.0001.pdf.

have seen numerous examples of the NDIA failing to properly uphold these, even when doing so would be much cheaper. One example is the requirement for supports to be ‘disability specific’, which undermines the goal of social participation and genuine community inclusion. For example, when participants request support to participate in mainstream community-based art or music activities, this has been rejected because they are not considered to be a disability-specific support. Anecdotally, Local Area Coordinators (LACs) and NDIA planners have then suggested to many participants that more expensive art and music therapies would be an alternative way to fund these activities because they are deemed disability-specific and within the rules. Other participants have then followed this lead and also sought funding for art and music therapies for non-therapeutic reasons. This approach is failing to achieve the goal of community participation and has directed many participants into more expensive supports than they were seeking. It is but one example of how rigid rules have led to poorer participant outcomes from more expensive supports.

The NDIS has long suffered from the mischaracterisation of it as a ‘welfare’ measure. Now, with responsibility for the NDIS moved to the Department and Minister for Health, there is an equally concerning pattern of mischaracterising the Scheme as a ‘care’ system and viewing disability as a ‘problem’ to be ‘fixed’ rather than an ordinary part of human diversity. This is in line with the outdated Medical and Charity Models of Disability rather than the contemporary Social Model of Disability. To be clear, the NDIS is an insurance scheme, and it is intended to provide a broad range of supports that enable Australians with disability to take up their rightful place as equal, included, and contributing citizens with the same opportunities to pursue their interests and reach their full potential as all others. As the Social Model of Disability makes clear, people with disability are not ‘damaged’ or inherently ‘vulnerable’ and in need of others’ care and charity. Instead, disability arises from the widespread barriers that exist in a world not designed to include everyone. These barriers may be physical, systemic, social, communicational, or attitudinal and should be the primary target of change and reform. It is essential Committee

members undertake this Inquiry in line with the Social Model of Disability and avoid deferring to outdated understandings of disability based on the Medical and Charity Models of Disability.

At JFA Purple Orange, we characterise the benefits of the NDIS to individuals in two broad categories: transactional and transformational. To understand the difference, we consider the nature of the consequences of disability. First, there are consequences that impact on daily life that result in the need for practical supports, such as for toileting, that reoccur over time. These are transactional benefits. Second, there are consequences that impact on life chances that require supports designed to create permanent positive change, for example speech therapy, that will enable the pursuit of life goals. These are transformational benefits. While it may, broadly speaking, be possible to characterise transactional benefits as part of a system of ‘care’ (although not recommended), this terminology is wholly inadequate in describing what the NDIS was designed to achieve. Hence, our reiteration that the NDIS is an insurance scheme designed to deliver transformative benefits in the lives of people with disability, which reflects the fact that any Australian could acquire a disability at any stage of life and benefit from these supports to enable them to live a good ordinary life in their community. For more information about transactional and transformational benefits, we urge Committee members to engage with the papers in our NDIS Review Conversation Series,[3] which are available here.

3.3. Inclusion is not segregation

Further to the above discussion about the importance of dignity and inclusion to the NDIS, it is essential to underscore what these are not: dignity and inclusion are not any form of segregation or separate ‘special’ settings and programs. ‘Special’ provisions are inherently more expensive than making mainstream settings and programs work for everyone and, therefore, they undermine the sustainability of the NDIS. The NDIS should be part of a broader strategy to end the segregation of people with disability in any setting, including in housing,

[3] JFA Purple Orange, ‘NDIS Conversation Series’, 2023, available at https://purpleorange.org.au/news-resources/ndis-conversation-series.

education, and employment. Segregated and congregated services will not advance people with disability into meaningful contributing lives in community in the way well-orchestrated inclusive alternatives do. Separate ‘special’ disability-focused services, programs, and settings reinforce a community perception that people with disability are best served by having separate ‘special’ stuff. This has been termed ‘othering’.

The broader context here is important. The progress Australia has made toward deinstitutionalisation has unfortunately not resulted in an end to the segregation of children or adults with disability. Indeed, in numerous instances, it has simply heralded the creation of new forms of exclusion, marginalisation, and inequality in Australia, particularly in housing, education, and employment. Children and adults with intellectual disability and those with multiple or complex disabilities or high support needs are more likely to be funnelled into segregated and congregated settings and services. These settings are highly institutionalised in their character, and this has serious impacts on the quality of life for those relegated to these offerings. They have significant impacts on each person’s quality of life and the opportunities available to them as they move through life stages – from infancy to childhood to adolescence to adulthood to older age.

The findings from the Disability Royal Commission (DRC) offer a compelling argument in terms of understanding why people are drawn into segregated disability-specific settings. The Final Report recognises that people with disability and their families are systematically taught there are no safe or viable mainstream options, forcing them to access segregated settings, something that can be described as ‘coercive choice’.[4] Often, people with intellectual disability are funnelled from ’special schools into a sheltered workshop, known as an Australian Disability Enterprise (ADE) and a group house; a trajectory that Catherine McAlpine, CEO of Inclusion Australia, calls ‘The Polished Pathway’.[5] Not only does this Pathway severely limit a person’s opportunities and prospects for taking up meaningful valued roles in our communities, it perpetuates underlying messages that people with disability do not belong in community, are lesser or defective, and it is okay to devalue people and treat them as second-class citizens. These messages are deeply entrenched in society and are a consequence of the legacy of institutionalisation and ongoing policies and practices of segregation.

It is in this broader context, and because of this context, that people with disability and their families are forced to turn to segregated disability-specific settings and services. When

[4] Disability Royal Commission, ‘Final Report, Volume 7: Inclusive education, employment, and housing - Summary and recommendations’, 2023, p.65, available at https://disability.royalcommission.gov.au/publications/final-report. [5] See, for example, Catherine McAlpine’s speech to the NDIS Jobs and Skills Summit on 17 August 2022, at https://www.inclusionaustralia.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/The-Polished-Pathway-Final.pdf.

mainstream options continue to operate in ways that are inaccessible, exclusionary, and/or discriminatory, these options are taken away. People become exhausted and disillusioned by repeated poor and unsafe experiences and begin to perceive segregated options as ‘easier’ to deal with. It cannot be left to the disability community alone to shoulder the responsibility to change this reality. It requires all levels of government – and Committees like this one – to take a strong position against disingenuous claims, particularly those of sector lobbyists with vested interests, that segregated options can constitute ‘choice’. ‘Choices’ made in a context where safe, high-quality, and inclusive alternatives are not available are not genuine choices.

Notwithstanding this, it is important to note that people with disability can and do have positive meaningful relationships with their peers who also have disability. These relationships do not constitute segregation or congregation and are not an excuse for such policies and practices. We fully support the funding of peer networks, associations, and similar, and emphasise the value of these opportunities in the lives of people with disability. There is a clear distinction between funnelling people into segregated disability-specific settings in the absence of any ordinary alternatives being available, compared to the availability of peer networks and spaces led by and for people with disability. The latter is generally a freely chosen association that can exist among a smorgasbord of options and form only one aspect of a person’s life, as opposed to being shut out of community altogether as a consequence of segregation. Many families with various cultural heritages gather for positive community fellowship without being restricted to only living, learning, and working with people who share that particular characteristic in segregated settings – such an approach would rightly appal most Australians. Peer networks and similar provide genuine opportunities to develop freely given meaningful connections and facilitate a sense of identity, belonging, value, and respect. They support the growth and mutual support that leads to self- and group-advocacy to enable positive life experiences. However, they should also never detract from full and meaningful inclusion in mainstream community life.

5. Missteps in NDIS implementation

We now turn to some of the problems that have undermined the implementation of the NDIS resulting in lower quality supports for participants, poor management of risks and reduced sustainability. As we have already acknowledged, there have been many mistakes and problems created in the way successive governments have rolled out and managed the NDIS, and these have increased the cost of the Scheme. Poor implementation of the NDIS does not mean the Scheme is a bad idea or should be wound back in any way. Instead, it means the focus should be on working together to make sensible changes that will improve the quality and sustainability of the Scheme. Below, we raise some of the issues that have impacted the implementation and administration of the Scheme.

5.1. Scheme forecasts overlooked significant unmet need

From the beginning, forecasts about the likely cost of the NDIS failed to properly account for the high levels of unmet and unfunded need among both people who were receiving some support within state government block-funded systems but not having their needs properly met, and people who were excluded entirely, particularly those relying on family or other informal supports. These inaccurate forecasts, particularly those in the 2011 report of the Productivity Commission, have created a perception among some that the need that is now evident cannot be ‘real’ because it was not predicted and, therefore, many people must be defrauding the system. While we do not doubt there is some inappropriate claims and activities in the NDIS, in large part the gap between predictions and reality is attributable to the inaccurate initial understanding of the level of community need that was not being met. Throughout history, people with disability have been segregated and excluded from communities and their needs rendered invisible to government systems and data collection. Therefore, this modelling is a problematic benchmark to continue to compare current and future costs of the Scheme to.

It would be very useful for the Committee to recognise this and make recommendations about the credibility of continuing to refer to these predictions, as well as to consider the potential opportunities to undertake a new, more robust, assessment of the current level of met and unmet need in the Australian community. This should occur in line with today’s reasonable community expectations of the level and quality of support required to live a good ordinary life rather than against the bare minimum required for the shared, segregated, institutionalised, block-funded services of the past. Arguably, the costs of the latter were too influential in the original cost projections for the NDIS because it was all that was known at that time. Almost 15

years on from the Productivity Commission’s original modelling, there would be significant value in independently modelling needs and realistic costs based on the information that is now available.

5.2. Poor performance of NDIA Board

The NDIA Board oversees the work of the Agency and is one of the most important roles in the administration of the NDIS. Yet this role has fallen well short of what has been needed and what is reasonably expected of a Board. Rather than providing strong leadership and governance, the Board has taken a backseat to Ministers and Agency executives. This has had significant consequences for the cost of the NDIS. As the Committee will be aware, the main functions of the Board are set out in Section 124 of the National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 as ensuring ‘proper, efficient and effective performance of the Agency’s functions’ and determining ‘objectives, strategies and policies to be followed by the Agency’. The Agency’s functions under Section 118 of the Act include delivering the NDIS in a way that:

Supports ‘the independence, and social and economic participation, of people with disability’;
Enables ‘people with disability to exercise choice and control…’;
Ensures ‘the decisions and preferences of people with disability are respected and given appropriate priority’;
Promotes ‘the provision of high quality and innovative supports that … maximise independent lifestyles and inclusion in the community’; and
Ensures a ‘reasonable balance is achieved between safety and the right of people with disability to choose to participate in activities involving risk’.

The current Board arrangements do not appear to be adequately fulfilling these governance obligations or preventing the NDIA pursuing activities that are inconsistent with its legislated functions. Currently, the voice of the Board seems to have a lower profile than the role

articulated in the Act. The following subsections of this submission, below, provide examples of apparent insufficient Board oversight that we believe warrant close investigation in this Inquiry. Importantly, our input is not a criticism of any individual Board members; rather, the focus of our feedback is to reflect on how the current Board arrangements have not led the NDIA to deliver the Scheme’s intended outcomes and financial stewardship, and to urge the Committee to seek to understand why and make recommendations that will ensure this changes.

5.2.1. Insufficient Board oversight of quality outcomes

It is currently unclear how the Board assures itself that the NDIS is effectively, and to the greatest extent possible, advancing people with disability into lives of independence and genuine social and economic participation, per its legislated functions listed above. The same is true of progressing individual choice and control. Likewise, it is unclear if or how the Board seeks to understand the quality of provider supports or the extent of innovation in the market. There is, however, significant evidence of the NDIA deploying practices, making decisions, and measuring outcomes in ways that are contrary to fulfilling these legislated functions and we describe a few instances below.

Board governance has not been strong enough to ensure the NDIS achieves transformational outcomes for many participants. Instead, successive Boards have presided over a Scheme that is highly transactional, where participants receive something rather than nothing, but the ‘something’ is often not the supports that will make a critical difference to their life chances. In some instances, as mentioned earlier in this submission and explained further below, the less impactful support that is provided in a plan is more expensive than the type of support that would make a greater difference in a participant’s life. The Board does not appear to have addressed this misalignment between plan decision making and NDIA functions in any meaningful way.

Regarding advancing people into social and economic participation in the community, the NDIA is known to make decisions to fund supports that are segregated from community rather than those that are more likely to build connections and foster genuine inclusion. There continues to be a default assumption in NDIA decision making about funding for home and living supports that forces participants into group living arrangements not of their choice with quasi-block funded Supported Independent Living (SIL) supports that prevent independent choice and autonomy. In its governance role, the Board has not ensured the NDIA has pursued alternative models of home and living support that would align more closely with NDIA functions. Nor has it sought to test and challenge the imagined financial constraints of individual support and choice

through innovation. For example, it is hard to see any evidence of Board leadership in directing the NDIA to purposefully advance Independent Living Options (ILO) as a core part of the Scheme and as a critically important alternative to the group house model that is expensive, inflationary, and does not deliver on Scheme values of choice inclusion.

As mentioned earlier, the NDIA has also shown a preference for costly one-to-one therapy with a professional rather than cheaper mainstream community activities that are not regarded as disability-specific supports despite the obvious perverse outcome this produces. This unnecessarily directs people into therapy settings rather than genuine community participation. In other words, it is costing more to deliver worse outcomes. This should raise concerns for the Board not only in relation to effective outcomes but also the effective management of NDIS resources and the prevention of waste. Further, the NDIA’s measurement of social participation does not consider the nature or quality of participation, only the rate, therefore poor-quality activities of ‘community tourism’, whereby a person is taken to a community setting but does not actually participate in community life, are countered in social participation statistics as if they constitute genuine social participation.

A similar picture emerges regarding economic participation, albeit with somewhat more reliable data. According to the latest ‘NDIS Quarterly Report’, only 23 per cent of participants of working age in the Scheme for at least two years had a paid job.[6] This statistic has barely moved in eight years from 22 per cent on 30 June 2018.[7] There continues to be entrenched low expectations for the employment outcomes of people with disability in Australia more broadly, with recent data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) counting only 60.5 per cent of people with disability of working age as part of the labour force (working or available to work) compared to 84.9 per cent for people without disability.[8] Addressing discrepancies like this was one of the reasons the Productivity Commission recommended the establishment of a new national disability scheme in its 2011 Report. Indeed, the assumed ‘significant economic and employment effects’ of a scheme was a major element of how the Productivity Commission justified its creation,[9] hence the focus on economic participation in the legislated functions. This

[6] National Disability Insurance Scheme, ‘NDIS Quarterly report to disability ministers’, 30 September 2025, available at https://www.ndis.gov.au/about-us/publications/quarterly-reports. [7] National Disability Insurance Agency, ‘Employment Outcomes: 30 June 2018 - NDIS participants, their families and carers’, p.23, available at https://dataresearch.ndis.gov.au/reports-and-analyses/outcomes-and-goals/employment-outcomes-participants-their-families-and-carers. [8] Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), Disability, Ageing, and Carers, Australia: Summary of Findings: 2022, released 4 July 2024, available at https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/health/disability/disability-ageing-and-carers-australia-summary-findings/latest-release#disability. [9] Productivity Commission, ‘Disability Care and Support,’ Report no.54, 2011, p.960, available at https://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/completed/disability-support/report.

increased economic participation was supposed to help offset the costs of the NDIS and make it more sustainable, but this has not been given the required level of attention.

In addition to misaligned practices, decisions, and outcomes, the NDIA is also failing to deliver participant outcomes commensurate with the level of expenditure in the Scheme, which now approaches $50 billion per year. We would expect the Boad to have a stronger mandate to direct the NDIA in achieving the transformational outcomes required by the legislated functions, improve cost-effectiveness, and to have greater oversight of shortcomings in order to work with the Agency’s executive leadership to rectify these. To this end, we urge the Committee to examine what processes the Board undertakes and what information it seeks from the NDIA to satisfy itself that the legislated functions of the Agency are being fulfilled purposefully and effectively and are resulting in the participant outcomes required.

5.2.2. Insufficient Board oversight of Scheme sustainability

Subsection 4(17) of the Act also directly requires the Board, among others, to have ‘regard to the need to ensure the financial sustainability’ of the NDIS. Again, it is unclear how the Board assures itself of the sustainability of the Scheme or that the projections that the NDIA relies on to anticipate costs are accurate. Instead, there is ample evidence to demonstrate a track record of projections that do not materialise as expected. This problem was highlighted extensively in the Australian Government Actuary’s ‘Independent Actuary Peer Review Report’[10] of the Scheme Actuary’s ‘Annual Financial Sustainability Report’ (AFSR)[11] provided to the Board in October 2023. We describe some of the issues below to demonstrate the questionable nature of some of the information provided to the Board and the apparent failure of the Board to fully scrutinise this, resulting in consequences for Scheme sustainability.

Among the Independent Actuary’s concerns are the differences between the projections and outcomes on a number of key participant indicators related to sustainability: ’Last year, new

[10] Guy Thorburn, Australian Government Actuary, Independent Actuary Peer Review Report of the Annual Financial Sustainability Report 2022-23, 16 October 2024, available at https://www.ndis.gov.au/about-us/publications/annual-financial-sustainability-reports. [11] David Gifford, Scheme Actuary, National Disability Insurance Scheme, ‘Annual Financial Sustainability Report 2022-23’, available at https://www.ndis.gov.au/about-us/publications/annual-financial-sustainability-reports.

entrants were 22% higher than expected and exits, for reasons other than death, were 40% lower than expected. The number of participants receiving SIL is now 12% higher than expected.’[12] Although only five per cent of participants receive SIL supports, their plans account for 30 per cent of total funding in participant plans[13] so any variation in projections related to participants with SIL supports produces greater cost impacts for the Scheme. As described above, SIL supports is one of the main areas where NDIA decision making is contrary to legislated functions and inflating the cost of the Scheme.

Further, the Independent Actuary questioned the Scheme Actuary’s assumption that the number of potential new entrants with ‘previously unmet need’ (PUN) is finite and will no longer be a factor in projections after three years (by 2026):

There is a significant level of judgement behind the hypothesis that there will be no new entrants with a PUN after three years. I have not received any analysis to support this assumption. Defence Superannuation schemes have a similar cohort of claimants. The analogous cohort in these schemes submit retrospective invalidity claims. The past decade has seen the number of such claims increase steadily, with some claims being made many decades after the incidence of the disability. Previous assumptions that the numbers would reduce in the short term have consistently proven to be wrong.[14]

Hence, the Independent Actuary found: ‘The uncertainty surrounding new entrant assumptions and their assumed moderation is a key contributing factor to my conclusion that the Baseline projection is more likely to understate, rather than overstate, future costs.’[15]

The Independent Actuary also raised similar concerns about the reliability of moderating growth projections in recent Financial Sustainability Reports, concluding: ‘This moderation has so far failed to materialise, and the projections have been increased each year since 2019.’[16] Therefore, the Independent Actuary expressed concern that the current projection about Scheme sustainability is also likely to be unreliable:

I believe that this projection faces a similar risk as all projections since 2019, that is, that the assumed moderation does not materialise. Until the assumed

[12] Guy Thorburn, Australian Government Actuary, Independent Actuary Peer Review Report of the Annual Financial Sustainability Report 2022-23, 16 October 2024, p.9, available at https://www.ndis.gov.au/about-us/publications/annual-financial-sustainability-reports. [13] Ibid, p.6. [14] Ibid, p.16. [15] Ibid, p.5. [16] Ibid, p.12.

moderating experience shows a greater presence in the data, there remains a risk that the Baseline projection understates what might occur.[17]

Additionally, the Independent Actuary pointed out a significant gap between projected Agency operational costs and current budget allocations per the forward estimates in the 2023-2024 Federal Budget: ‘projected operational expenses … are 37% higher than budgeted expenses in 2026-27. To the extent that forecast outcomes are dependent on agency resourcing in the medium term, these differences will need to be reconciled.’[18]

Recognising the above sample of concerns raised in the independent peer review of the projections relied upon to forecast moderations in future Scheme demand and costs, it would appear the Board would be expected to have significant concerns – even alarm – about the reliability of the information it is provided and the impacts this will have on the future of the NDIS. There needs to much greater urgency in addressing the poor quality of data and projections to ensure the future of the Scheme and its capacity to deliver high-quality outcomes for participants is protected. Consequently, we urge the Committee to examine this very closely.

5.2.3. Insufficient Board oversight of systems and processes

As we are sure the Committee is aware, there has been significant political rhetoric and public discourse about fraud in the NDIS. Of course, we share concerns about any misuse or misconduct in the Scheme and wholeheartedly support actions against this. However, given the degree to which NDIS cost increases are now attributed to fraud and other nefarious behaviour within the Scheme, it seems prudent to question if and how the Board provided sufficient oversight of the Scheme over the many years in which this problem apparently grew and developed. A key part of the role of any Board is to ensure an entity is cognisant of all its risks and ensure it is not exposed to high levels of fraud. Hence, we urge the Committee to consider both the extent to which cost increases are genuinely linked to fraud rather than wasteful

[17] Ibid. [18] Ibid, p.9.

systems that are not fit for purpose and, to the extent there is fraud, how the Board has responded in order to prevent and remedy this.

One specific concern arises from the acknowledgement of ‘immature’[19] systems and processes within the NDIA. This raises an obvious question as to if and how the Board satisfied itself that the Agency’s systems and processes were not exposing the Scheme to excessive risk over many years. To this end, we draw the Committee’s attention to a range of statements made in evidence to a Senate Estimates hearing in 2024. In doing so, we recognise that all systems, including those of governments, are at a level of risk in terms of being targeted for fraud. The question we pose is whether the Board’s risk identification process was sufficient in recognising the problems, if the level of risk was within reasonably tolerable parameters, and, if not, as would appear to be the case based on political rhetoric, what steps the Board took to ensure unacceptable levels of risk were mitigated and system weaknesses fixed. Below, is a small sample of statements John Dardo, Deputy Chief Executive Officer, Integrity Transformation and Fraud Fusion Taskforce, gave to Senate Estimates in June 2024 that seem to support the contention that insufficient attention was paid to problems with systems and processes over many years, allowing the level of waste, fraud, and other financial loses in the NDIS to reach extraordinarily high levels without an appropriate response:

Statement regarding how payments have been processed over many years:

As we look at many of these claims and many of these providers, what we’re seeing is that the behaviours have been going on for years. It’s just that we’re better now at seeing them and preventing or stopping them.[20]

Statements regarding immature NDIA systems:

The systems are so immature that some of the channels that participants could claim through require no ABN, no description, no word—nothing. They can put on a dollar amount and they get paid. So, until we actually go and do integrity work, it’s impossible to find out what they’re actually claiming for. I’ll give you an example. A participant on a $480,000-a-year plan divides that up by 12, claims $40,000 a year, puts that in as a claim every month—40,000 bucks every month. When we do the integrity work, we find out that he actually only has costs of $20,000 a year, but because his plan is $480,000, he claims the whole amount, and the other $20,000 goes to his mortgage or his bank account or his cost of

[19] John Dardo, Deputy Chief Executive Officer, Integrity Transformation and Fraud Fusion Taskforce, at ‘Community Affairs Estimates Committee’, Hansard Draft, 3 June 2024, p.103. [20] Ibid, p.96.

living. I can’t break that down into how much he spends on alcohol or on a pet or on something else, because there is no way to unpack that. What I would say is that what we can tell you with certainty is that the minimum error rate is five per cent. That’s the minimum error rate. Those errors don’t include identity fraud, fraudulent invoices, false statements, collusion and all the other stuff.[21]

There are weaknesses in the design of the system that need to be addressed. We cannot prosecute or audit our way out of this.[22]

Statement about the extent of fraud:

There are some providers that are really just fraudsters, criminals or criminal syndicates, and they’re using the NDIS for cash flow. There are some participants and providers that are the same thing. We have participants who have set up businesses to pay themselves to look after themselves … it’s not clear that it’s a provider or a participant or a nominee, because it’s all intermingled. The family group has set up three entities, and they’re paying each other to look after each other … There are some things there that are very intermingled between a provider and a participant. The conflicts of interest are pretty extreme.[23]

Such descriptions of the internal systems and processes demonstrate a lax approach to establishing fit-for-purpose operations and risk identification and mitigation since the creation of the NDIS. Hence, the problems of waste and fraud can be described as symptomatic of Agency, Board, and Ministerial failures to ensure appropriate secure operational systems and processes were established and maintained, rather than fraud being the root cause of the financial leakage from the Scheme. Examining what Board deliberations and activities have taken place over the duration of the NDIS to address the ongoing problems resulting from systems and processes that are not fit for purpose, resulting in excessive levels of waste fraud, is likely to be very informative for the Committee in determining the extent to which current Board arrangements are sufficient and consistent with legislative requirements and principles of effective governance. Indeed, it appears successive NDIA boards have simply not been up to their task and have failed to fulfil their statutory obligations. Incidentally, the same can clearly be said of successive Agency and ministerial leaders. In short, how could these immature systems and processes have been allowed to operate for so long without being fixed?

[21] Ibid, pp.101-102. [22] Ibid, p.105. [23] Ibid, p.96.

5.2.4. Balancing multiple Board roles

The preceding three sections have covered the NDIA Board’s roles in ensuring the delivery of high-quality impactful supports to participants, the sustainability of the Scheme, and the need for fit-for-purpose operational systems and processes within the Agency. We believe it is critically important that Board arrangements allow each of these objectives to be fulfilled simultaneously and with appropriate balance. Any one of these functions must not distract from the others. The Board needs to ensure tight fiscal oversight is maintained and Scheme funds are properly accounted for and not wasted. But any outcome that elevates the accountability of the Board for financial sustainability without giving equal attention to pursuing the delivery of high-quality impactful supports that advance the life chances of participants, will be counterproductive and lead to even higher costs. Delivering genuinely transformational benefits for participants will increase their independence, create natural safeguards, and ensure authentic social and economic participation in mainstream community life; each of which is essential for long-term Scheme sustainability.

5.2.5. Increase Board transparency

The Committee should also consider how to introduce increased transparency of the Board’s work and deliberations to increase public confidence in the effectiveness of the NDIS in delivering on the Scheme’s promise. Otherwise, there continues to be a risk that the quality of the Scheme is neglected while all the focus is on financial sustainability, yet the increase in poor

participant outcomes and ineffective supports will lead to even greater costs over the medium- to long-term. Such a vicious cycle will be utterly counterproductive on all measures of NDIS performance including sustainability.

In light of the above examples, we believe there is clear scope for greater public transparency regarding how the NDIA Board has responded over the life of the NDIS. We appreciate that it would be inappropriate to disclose everything that goes before the Board, but increased information release would support a more informed, engaged, and ultimately trusting relationship between the NDIA, participants, and the broader community. This could take the form of a summary of key matters before the Board and decisions taken. It would provide the Board with a stronger public profile, thereby enhancing its leadership role in relation to the Scheme. This transparency could extend to interactions between the Board and the Independent Advisory Council, which is established under Section 143 of the Act to advise the Board. Section 145 requires the Board to share a copy of this advice with Ministers together with a statement of the Board’s response. We suggest the Committee consider if and how this advice and the response could also be released publicly to ensure accountability and transparency.

5.3. Missing Tier 2

As has now been widely recognised, the decisions of governments – federal, state, and territory – to withdraw funding for a range of essential services under the guise of the NDIS roll out left many children and adults with disability without the supports they required and caused significant additional demand for individual NDIS plans. Originally, the Productivity Commission envisioned a comprehensive set of Tier 2 supports that would exist alongside Tier 3 individual plans. The NDIS Review recommended governments fulfil their responsibility to appropriately

invest in Tier 2, or what it called Foundational Supports, and there appears to be a commitment to do this despite the ongoing bickering between the Federal and state and territory governments about money. This is welcome and, if done well, we believe it will lead to better outcomes for people with disability and enable many to have all or some of their support needs met outside the NDIS. Nevertheless, as this is yet to occur, any consideration of the costs and administration of the NDIS to date needs to account for the significant mistake of government’s withdrawing funding from Tier 2 supports. Additionally, the extent to which mainstream services are available depends on a person’s location. Accessibility, affordability, and a lack of information and navigation support to clearly identify options are additional barriers that lead people to seek individual plans.

Like for reforms of the NDIS itself, the Federal Government should establish a comprehensive genuine co-design process for Foundational Supports, including the Thriving Kids initiative announced last year. To design these only with the state and territory governments as has been indicated so far will result in a poorer outcome. The community input into the NDIS Review appears to be cited as a substitute[24] for genuine co-design – or, indeed, anything beyond the most minimal community consultation. To be clear, the NDIS Review did not present an options paper or consult the disability community on specific recommendations, including regarding Foundational Supports, prior to releasing its Final Report. Arguably, public consultation for the Review focused too much on (the important task of) hearing about problems, grievances, and poor experiences people have had with the NDIS and not enough on (the equally important task of) deeply interrogating ideas and potential options for positive reforms. Regardless, those consultations during 2023 are useful but inadequate to inform the development of Foundational Supports now. Likewise, the consultation on Foundational Supports conducted through the Department of Social Services (DSS) in December 2024 will be useful and relevant but is also not an adequate substitute for a substantive co-design process to develop Foundational Supports. Correcting course on Tier 2 supports will require all levels of government to work together and in partnership with the disability community to chart the best path forward.

[24] For example: “The final program design will be … informed by … the significant community input received through the Independent Review of the NDIS…”, see page 1 of Department of Health, Disability, and Ageing, ‘Thriving Kids – Fact Sheet’, 22 August 2025, available at https://www.health.gov.au/resources/publications/thriving-kids-fact-sheet?language=en.

5.4. Issues that hamper ILC success

One element of the Tier 2 vision that has been rolled out is the Information, Linkages, and Capacity Building (ILC) program. However, while it has achieved many benefits, it is not having the extent of impact it could. The funding allocated to the ILC program is tiny compared to the overall cost of the NDIS. The 2025-26 Budget indicated the ongoing annual funding for the ILC program will be just $150 million per year compared to almost $50 billion for the NDIS. The Committee should consider the potential for much greater impact to be achieved through ILC projects with an increased funding allocation to support projects that demonstrate successful outcomes. We welcome the commitment that the redesigned ILC program will enable longer funding periods and more financial certainty for high-performing projects, however the Committee should note this has not been a feature of how the program has been managed to date.

In fact, for the third year in a row, organisations currently delivering important ILC-funded projects are facing significant uncertainty about the continuation of their work. There has not been an open ILC grant round advertised since September 2023, therefore projects are being sustained on short-term extensions or ad hoc grants. Many of these are slated to end on 30 June 2026, although the Department has opened an expression of interest process for six-month extensions. The ongoing delivery of high-quality projects is best achieved when there is funding certainty at least six months ahead of when current funding runs out. This provides stability for program participants, ensures experienced staff can be retained, and allows time for activity planning. This will not be the case again for any forthcoming extensions, as mentioned above. Given the way similar scenarios have been handled in the past two years, organisations are understandably nervous about another repeat of the same difficult circumstances and void of information. Again, the lack of certainty going forward remains a source of concern and distress for people with disability, their families and allies, employees, and organisations. For some participants in ILC project activities, particularly peer support groups, this connection may be the only link a person has to community and information. At a time of significant change in the NDIS and other areas, losing these connections will be catastrophic. The Committee should seek to understand this issue and make recommendations to avoid any further repeat.

Further, the ILC program has recently lacked an overarching public-facing strategy. Organisations have largely had to guess what streams of funding may become available when and lodge grant applications accordingly. With the first grant round under the redesigned approach said to be imminent, it is concerning that no overarching strategy or framework for this has been released publicly to provide organisations and the community with a fulsome picture of the Federal Government’s vision for ILC going forward, what funding streams will be available and when, and, if any previous streams are to be excluded, what alternative options to continue valuable projects are available. Similarly, to enable pre-planning, it would be very useful to understand who will be eligible for funding under the new program. The design of the ILC program to date has excluded small local entities, such as peer groups, that have much to offer but not the structures, resources, or skills to compete with larger organisations in competitive processes. The Committee should seek to understand the Federal Government’s vision for the ILC program and make recommendations about the need for an overarching public-facing strategy to be released as soon as possible.

6. A new way forward for the NDIS

The previous two sections of this submission have addressed the origins of the Scheme and the problems in its implementation. This section turns its attention to the future. We strongly believe the Federal Government should establish an overarching genuine co-design process that involves people with disability and subject matter experts in decision making. We also offer a few ideas (from among many) about how the NDIS can be strengthened and made more financially sustainable that could act as a starting point for considerations. During the 2023 Review of the NDIS, JFA Purple Orange presented a Conversation Series[25] discussing the best way forward for the NDIS. As an organisation, we have had a longstanding engagement and deep interest in the Scheme and broader policy space over many years now and have drawn on some of this work here.

6.1. Genuine co-design is critical

The Federal Government is yet to release a formal response to the NDIS Review. Its reform processes, which have taken many different names over the past four years, continue to be disjointed and confusing. Successive Budget Papers also demonstrate the expense of what appears to be a strategy of spending money to save money[26] that has not demonstrated clear commensurate results. What savings have been made seem to be mainly from reducing the plans of participants rather systemic improvements to the administration or quality of the Scheme. Many people with disability feel fatigued and distrustful of those making decisions, which is exacerbated by repeated unfulfilled promises to genuinely co-design changes with the disability community.

We believe the best approach to reforming the NDIS is to implement an overarching genuine co-design process that involves lived experience and subject matter expertise in decision-making, implementation, and evaluation to ensure the NDIS is fit-for-purpose now and into the future. As the Committee is likely aware, genuine co-design is an inclusive, collaborative process whereby a diverse range of people with relevant knowledge, lived experience, and

[25] JFA Purple Orange, ‘NDIS Conversation Series’, 2023, available at https://purpleorange.org.au/news-resources/ndis-conversation-series. [26] Over its past four budgets, the Federal Government has allocated hundreds of millions of dollars to various National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) reform processes: in 2022-23, a budget measure titled Plan for the National Disability Insurance Scheme; in 2023-24, a measure called Improving the Effectiveness and Sustainability of the National Disability Insurance Scheme; in 2024–25, another measure, this time called Getting the NDIS Back on Track; and in 2025-26, yet another measure, Strengthening the National Disability Insurance Scheme.

interests come together in partnership with governments to provide advice and make decisions about a project, policy, or program. It will ensure reforms benefit from a full diversity of input into decision making throughout the entire roll out phase. This provides many benefits not just to the development of the program but also for the buy in of intended beneficiaries and the broader community as the new approach is established. Nevertheless, we continue to be concerned many of the processes that governments are currently referring to as co-design fall well short of best practice and do not include active involvement of intended beneficiaries in decision making. The Committee may find our Guide to Co-Design with People Living with Disability, which was itself co-designed, helpful in considering the essential steps required in undertaking genuine co-design processes. It is available via our website.[27]

6.2. Place accountability at the core

Unfortunately, oversight and accountability took a backseat in the roll out of the NDIS. While the Scheme was created in 2013, the NDIS Quality and Safeguards Commission (NDIS Commission) was not set up until five years later in 2018. This meant the NDIS Commission missed the opportunity to grow and mature alongside the NDIA and NDIS and seems to have been playing catch up ever since. It also meant the NDIA and governments did not receive advice as early as they might have about problems in the roll out of the Scheme and with the poor-quality systems and processes that were being embedded in it. This failure to design the

[27] See https://purpleorange.org.au/library/guide-to-co-design-with-people-with-disability/.

Scheme with oversight and accountability at its core has been a significant contributor to the problems that many now use to claim the NDIS has failed.

There needs to be much greater focus on oversight and accountability in the NDIS going forward. This needs to be fit-for-purpose and have a clear link between actions and outcomes. Too much of the regulation in the NDIS currently involves tick-and-flick paperwork rather than purposeful oversight. Critically, ‘auditing’ a disability support provider to make sure it is compliant with quality and safeguarding expectations must go beyond a review of documentation. Observation is much more important. Oversight must include people visiting sites to observe what happens and speak with NDIS participants. This is more likely to reveal the quality and character of the supports being provided than the presence of relevant documentation. There also needs to be greater attention given to building and retaining a high-quality workforce. Notwithstanding this, the workforce issues that affect the NDIS are not an inevitable result of the NDIS itself. Rather, they are a consequence of poor design and implementation of oversight and accountability mechanisms.

6.3. Establish clear roles without conflicts

There is currently too much confusion about who does what in the NDIS. This is compounded by conflicting roles where the same person is expected to serve both the NDIA and the participant even when the interests of each diverge. These conflicted and confused roles are particularly evident in the planning process. Currently, Local Area Coordinators (LACs) are expected to both support participants and act on behalf of the NDIA as planners and arbiters of who gets what budget allocations and supports. This results in poor quality outcomes in both roles leading to a lack of trust, more conflicts and disputes, and increased referrals of decisions to review and appeal processes. We strongly believe NDIA delegates/planners should be the ‘agent of the Scheme’ and LACs should be the ‘agent of the participant’. LACs should not be official or unofficial NDIA delegates or planners and there should be no overlap between the two roles.

The role of an LAC should be to stand alongside the person with disability, supporting them to access information, make decisions, and connect to their community. The decision to make

LACs conduct NDIA administration and planning has not only led to significant inefficiencies in the planning pathway but has also hampered their ability to undertake the traditional LAC role, which is to support people to connect to and utilise mainstream community services and supports. The latter has increased costs and further exacerbated the drive for individual NDIS plans. LACs should be based in local communities and have local knowledge and relationships to help people with disability access the mainstream services they need and make authentic community connections. Indeed, we have written at length[28] about the need to disentangle the roles of NDIA delegates/planners and LACs and how restoring the traditional LAC role would boost the cost effectiveness of the NDIS.

Another example of unclear and conflicting roles is intermediaries. Despite becoming a billion-dollar industry, support coordination and plan management are ill-defined and confusing to many participants. They are categorised as capacity building supports even though both have a perverse incentive not to build participants’ capacity because if they do, they will no longer be needed. Conflicts of interest are rampant and costly especially in the support coordination role where it is common for referrals to be made to related service providers. Intermediary roles are a product of too much complexity in the NDIS but also operate in ways that bring even more complexity and expense into the Scheme.

Restoring the traditional LAC role will help pave the way to also address the issues with intermediaries. LACs should assume the parts of the support coordination and plan management roles that align with being an ‘agent of the participant’ (LACs having been freed up to do this through no longer having their current roles on behalf of the NDIA, per above). The NDIA should undertake the invoice data entry role of plan management (outsourcing invoice data entry/capture and charging each individual plan for this so-called ‘support’ is expensive and unnecessary). A redefined support coordination role for complex formal support needs should operate on the supply/provider side of the Scheme with a focus on ensuring support continuity, managing relationships between providers, and similar (this is what others are referring to as a ‘case manager’ role but we suggest avoiding this dehumanising term). Addressing these overlaps and conflicts will increase the cost-effectiveness of the Scheme.

Recommendation 17: The Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit should recommend a recalibration of key roles and responsibilities in the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS), including, but not limited to, the roles of Local Area

[28] See https://purpleorange.org.au/library/ndis-review-conversation-series-paper-no-2/.

Coordinators (LACs), NDIA planners, support coordinators, and plan managers in order to make the Scheme more cost-effective and sustainable.

6.4. Let participants author their own plans

Each NDIS participant should be the ‘author’ of their own plan (or, in the case of a child, their parent/s or guardian/s should be). It should reflect their authentic choices based on their individual goals. This approach would increase participants’ ownership of their plans and reduce the adversarial tone of planning that encourages disputes. Instead, the current complex and expensive participant pathway results in NDIS plans that are largely ‘owned’ by the NDIA and often disliked or rejected by the participant. This will continue to be the case under the NDIA’s proposed approach to ‘new framework’ planning set to start later this year. Complexity in the NDIA’s processes inevitably increases its control and inflates the costs of formulating plans while restricting participants’ choices.

As we have written elsewhere about a simple pathway[29] and assessment tool[30] , we believe the NDIA should adopt a straightforward participant pathway whereby the NDIA assesses eligibility and provides the person with an indicative budget based on their needs and circumstances, then allows the participant to develop their own draft plan covering the supports they choose to prioritise, before the NDIA checks and calibrates the final plan and budget. At the end of the plan, the NDIA evaluates the impact of the plan alongside the participant, asking what has achieved results and what has not, then, based on this information and the person’s updated circumstances, provides an indicative budget for the next plan, and the process repeats. At the check and calibration point, the NDIA can ensure the new plan reflects the learnings from the previous plan about what each support did or did not achieve. A person could choose what, if any, informal or formal supports they need to draft their plan. Informal support might be from a family member while the primary formal support role would be provided by the person’s LAC within the bounds of the redesigned role described in the previous subsection.

We note that there has recently been conjecture that too much is expected of NDIS participants, particularly those with intellectual or cognitive disability. This is a result of the inadequate and poor-quality support that is being provided to them, not because agencies and professionals need to take more control and double down on outdated modes of substitute decision making. As the Disability Royal Commission emphasised, there is an urgent need for Australia to embed

[29] See https://purpleorange.org.au/library/ndis-review-conversation-series-paper-no-1/. [30] See https://purpleorange.org.au/library/ndis-review-conversation-series-paper-no-3/.

supported decision-making approaches across all systems and processes. Unfortunately, the roll out of the NDIS has increased the number of Australians subjected to formal substitute decision-making mechanisms such as guardianship. These formal mechanisms are more expensive over the medium- to long-term than implementing supported decision making through well trained workers. In this instance, LACs should be trained to implement best-practice supported decision-making processes to enable participants to be the author of their own plan.

With participants assuming authorship of their plans within their assessed budget, the number of corrections, disputes, reviews, and appeals to the Administrative Review Tribunal (ART) based on arbitrary or misinformed NDIA decisions will inevitably reduce, saving many millions of dollars every year. We acknowledge that the way the NDIS has operated so far has resulted in a set of expectations about budgets and plans that may not be fulfilled for every participant under this approach. However, allowing participants to author their own plans and enact their choices, rather than engaging in item-by-item adversarial negotiations with poorly trained planners, who we are regularly told lack an adequate understanding of the experience of disability, will offset this and ensure expectations adjust over time. It will also eliminate the inconsistent decision making of planners about what supports a person can have because people are choosing, within rules, how to use their funding. We recognise that relinquishing any amount of control will be anathema to many politicians and bureaucrats, but asserting government control over everything is expensive. The goal should be to exercise as little control as is needed to administer the NDIS in a reasonable, cost-effective, and safe manner that achieves beneficial outcomes for participants while upholding their right to choice, dignity, and inclusion.

6.5. Apply clear principles on what supports can be purchased

In 2024, the Federal Government introduced a lists approach to what NDIS participants could and could not use their plan budgets for. This added additional complexity to the Scheme and has several financial risks associated. Lists remove the capacity to consider the most cost-effective option to achieve the best outcome for the participant. Participants are prevented from

accessing innovative, low-cost solutions that could meet their needs more cheaply than traditional supports. The list of allowed supports effectively functions as a ‘shopping list’ with participants more likely to receive a support because it is on the list rather than because it represents value for money for their needs. With the ‘lists’ encouraging a ‘tick-and-flick’ approach, narrow thinking is more likely to result in missed opportunities to proactively access supports that will reduce needs later. Currently, the NDIA cannot see the forest for the trees – in other words, it is so focused on arguing line-by-line points that it misses the bigger problems that actually drive Scheme inflation.

Instead, we strongly believe a principles-based approach will be more cost effective and deliver better results over the longer term. Principles are more likely to encourage innovation than arbitrary lists. They are also easier to understand and reduce grey areas. We suggest the following four principles as an example of how a principles-based approach could be applied, although this is only a starting point that should be considered as part of a genuine co-design process:

Principle 1: The support advances or maintains the participant’s independence and enhances the participant’s choice and control over their own life.
Principle 2: The support facilitates the participant’s social and economic participation by advancing them into meaningful roles in mainstream community life – including opportunities for employment, education, community, civic, and cultural engagement – and does not involve placing the person in a new segregated, congregated, or exploitative setting.
Principle 3: The support represents value for money in the context of the participant’s plan and is not manifestly unreasonable relative to the benefits it delivers. In considering value, a support that is expected to reduce the need for other more expensive supports (either now or in the future) may be deemed reasonable even if it has upfront costs.
Principle 4: The support is legally and ethically acceptable. It must not be unlawful in Australia, and it must not be likely to cause harm to the participant or others beyond what is a reasonable dignity of risk.

With the focus on an assessed budget and greater flexibility and freedom to use this to access supports that work best for individual needs, this will not have an inflationary effect. Indeed, arguing line-by-line supports is more likely to inflate what is included in a plan. With a fit-for-purpose invoicing system, which, as described above, the NDIA does not currently have, the Agency would be able to provide greater oversight of how plan funds are actually being spent. Additionally, also mentioned above, a fulsome evaluation of the impact of each plan on the participant’s life will reveal what is cost-effective and where spending problems exist.

6.6. Balance natural and formal safeguards

People are more likely to be safer when they are connected to their neighbourhood, local community, and social groups based on their interests and goals. Being an active member of local community life, and the mutually valued relationships that emerge from that, is a compelling safeguard. Freely given relationships of mutual support and benefit offer the greatest protections and safeguards for us all, and it should be no different just because a person has a disability. When people know other people, they are safer because someone else will check in and/or notice when something is wrong. Natural informal safeguards are not separate to or outside the remit of the NDIS. The NDIS has a critical role in advancing social, economic, and cultural participation and investing in supports that create opportunities for authentic freely given relationships to emerge. Critically, for an examination of the administration of the Scheme, investing in natural safeguards is extremely cost-effective because it leverages existing resources that are already present in communities. Retrograde steps to re-institutionalise and exclude people with disability from their rightful place in our communities will undermine this and require extra investment in formal agencies and safeguards.

Nevertheless, formal safeguards still have critical roles to play in providing assurance and accountability within an integrated safeguarding framework. Purposeful regulatory, compliance, and reporting mechanisms are all essential to the proper functioning of the NDIS. These need to cover proactive mechanisms, such as worker screening and organisational auditing, and reactive measures, including complaints procedures and incident investigation processes. Both the NDIA and the NDIS Commission have responsibilities to provide oversight of participant welfare and of organisations and individuals delivering supports and services funded by the Scheme. As we have described elsewhere,[31] it is critically important the NDIS works to boost cost-effective natural safeguards as well as ensuring there are strong formal regulatory and oversight mechanisms in the Scheme.

Recommendation 20: The Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit should recognise the cost-effectiveness of informal natural safeguards for people with disability

[31] See https://purpleorange.org.au/library/ndis-review-conversation-series-paper-no-6/.

living in inclusive neighbourhoods and communities and consider ways these can be enhanced alongside adequate investment in strong formal oversight and accountability mechanisms.

7. Conclusion

Thank you for the opportunity to contribute a submission regarding the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit’s Inquiry into the Administration of the NDIS.

The NDIS has been an extremely beneficial innovation in Australia but unfortunately numerous missteps in successive governments’ implementation of the Scheme have impacted the quality of supports it delivers, had an inflationary impact on costs, and rendered it vulnerable to political attack. We implore the Committee to focus on how to fix these problems of implementation rather than on winding back all or part of the Scheme, which will inevitably create more, just different, costs in the NDIS and broader government systems. It is critically important that the origins of the NDIS and the key tenets of dignity and inclusion continue to sit at the centre of the Scheme and inform its evolution. There are numerous cost issues that arise from how the Scheme is designed that will not be recognised or understood if the Committee focuses too heavily on the day-to-day administration of the Scheme. As such, we urge the Committee to adopt a broad lens over all elements of the Scheme including expanding the scope of this Inquiry to examine all important actors, not just the public service.

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