INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY RIGHTS SERVICE NSW (IDRS)

SUBMISSION TO THE JOINT STANDING COMMITTEE ON THE NATIONAL DISABILITY

INSURANCE SCHEME

Inquiry into the Integrity of the National Disability Insurance Scheme

Submitted by: Intellectual Disability Rights Service NSW (IDRS NSW)

Date: April 2026

Contact: redacted

Address: 89 York St, Sydney, NSW, 2000

Phone: redacted

Email: redacted

Classification: Public Submission

Intellectual Disability Rights Service Submission – April, 2026 Page 1

Table of Contents

About the Intellectual Disability Rights Service NSW ………………………………………………… 3

Executive Summary ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 3

Recommendations at a Glance……………………………………………………………………4

Term of Reference 1: Nature and Extent of Non-Compliance, Fraud, and Sharp Practices .. 5 1.1 The Scale of the Problem 1.2 Categories of Non-Compliance Observed by IDRS (a) Fraudulent Claiming and False Invoicing (b) Plan Management and Financial Control Misuse (c) Sharp Practices and Coercive Provider Behaviour (d) Exploitation in Accommodation and SIL (e) Exploitation of Thin Markets (f) Defective and Exploitative Service Agreements 1.3 Structural Drivers of Non-Compliance 1.4 Particular Vulnerability: Participants in the Criminal Justice System (a) Fraudulent Billing During Periods of Custody (b) Support Coordinator Non-Compliance in Custodial Settings (c) NDIS Planning Failures for People in Custody (d) NDIS Supports Used Punitively in the Justice System

Term of Reference 2: Impacts on NDIS Participants and Their Families ………………………. 13 2.1 Physical and Psychological Harm 2.2 Plan Depletion and Abandonment 2.3 Silencing and Suppression of Complaints 2.4 Impact on Families and Carers 2.5 Disproportionate Impact on People with Intellectual Disability 2.6 Impact on Participants in the Criminal Justice System

Term of Reference 3: Effectiveness and Adequacy of Government Integrity Measures …. 16 3.1 The NDIS Quality and Safeguards Commission 3.2 The NDIS Integrity Roadmap and 2023–2024 Reforms 3.3 The NDIS Pricing Framework 3.4 Independent Advocacy: A Critical but Underfunded Safeguard

Term of Reference 4: Legislative and Other Reforms Required …………………………………. 19 4.1 Legislative Framework 4.2 Systemic and Policy Reforms

Summary of Recommendations ………………………………………………………………………….. 21

References and Supporting Materials ………………………………………………………………….. 24

Intellectual Disability Rights Service Submission – April, 2026 Page 2

About the Intellectual Disability Rights Service NSW

The Intellectual Disability Rights Service NSW (IDRS) has operated in New South Wales since 1980 which includes the Ability Rights Centre - an independent community legal centre for people with disabilities throughout NSW as well as the Justice Advocacy Service (JAS), which provides specialist disability advocacy to people with cognitive disability who are involved in the criminal justice system across NSW. IDRS provides free legal advice, advocacy, casework, community education and systemic reform work to and for people with disabilities across NSW.

IDRS specialises in working with people who have an intellectual disability, including those who also have associated conditions such as autism spectrum disorder, brain injury, and psychosocial disability. Our client base includes some of the most marginalised individuals in Australian society, many of whom are NDIS participants who face compounding barriers to exercising choice and control over their lives.

Over the past decade, IDRS has observed and documented a significant and escalating pattern of non-compliance, exploitation, and sharp practices directed at NDIS participants with intellectual disability. This submission draws on that direct casework experience, legal expertise, and the evidence base from the broader disability rights and legal sector. We also note that the people with disability we support and represent, are the majority users of the NDIS scheme, being around 65% of participants at any time.

IDRS notes the critical importance of this Inquiry and endorses the urgent need for legislative and regulatory reform to protect the most vulnerable NDIS participants. We have endeavoured to comment on systemic issues and provider conduct in general terms, in accordance with the Committee’s guidance on adverse comment.

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Executive Summary

IDRS finds that non-compliance, fraud, and sharp practices within the NDIS are systemic, pervasive, and disproportionately affect people with intellectual disability-a cohort defined by heightened susceptibility to exploitation, limited capacity to self- advocate, and dependence on supports that are, in many cases, controlled by the very providers perpetrating harm.

This submission addresses the four terms of reference and makes fifteen specific recommendations for legislative, regulatory, and policy reform. Our key findings are:

• Non-compliance and sharp practices are widespread, sophisticated, and under- detected, with the NDIS Quality and Safeguards Commission lacking adequate investigative capacity and enforcement powers.

• People with intellectual disability experience a distinct and heightened form of vulnerability in the NDIS marketplace, which existing consumer protection frameworks fail to adequately address.

• The current regulatory architecture-premised on a market model and individual choice-is structurally misaligned with the support needs and decision-making profiles of many people with intellectual disability, particularly those involved in the justice system.

• Successive government integrity measures have been necessary but insufficient. The NDIS Integrity Roadmap and associated legislative reforms represent important progress that must be accelerated and deepened.

• Independent accessible advocacy, including IDRS’s own work, is a critical but chronically underfunded safeguard that must be expanded as a matter of priority.

Recommendations Overview

IDRS makes the following 18 recommendations to the Joint Standing Committee on the National Disability Insurance Scheme:

Legislative Reforms (Term of Reference 4.1)

• Recommendation 1 Mandatory Registration for High-Risk Supports: Amend s 73B NDIS Act to require registration for all providers of SIL, supported accommodation, behaviour support, and community nursing delivered to participants with intellectual disability.

• Recommendation 2 -Independent SIL Assessment: Remove provider self-assessment of SIL support needs. Introduce mandatory independent needs assessment and an annual independent review of each participant’s SIL arrangement.

• Recommendation 3 -Mandatory Advocate Access in SIL: Legislate a right of access for independent advocates and legal representatives to all SIL and supported accommodation settings, including on an unannounced basis where participant safety requires it.

• Recommendation 4 -Plan Manager Conflict of Interest Prohibition: Prohibit plan managers from holding a provider relationship with the same participant they manage. Mandate disclosure of all related-party transactions.

• Recommendation 5 -Real-Time Payment Integrity System: Fund and mandate implementation of a real-time data analytics system to detect and flag anomalous billing patterns before NDIS payments are processed.

• Recommendation 6 -Expanded Commission Enforcement Powers: Expand the Commission’s civil penalty and infringement notice powers. Increase staffing and resources for proactive compliance inspections, particularly in SIL settings.

• Recommendation 7 -Accessible Complaints Process: Require the Commission to provide Easy Read complaint forms and funded advocacy support for all complainants with intellectual disability. Establish a specialist Intellectual Disability Complaints Stream.

• Recommendation 8 -Extended Worker Screening Coverage: Extend the NDIS Worker Screening Check to all direct support workers delivering services to participants with intellectual disability, including those employed by unregistered providers.

• Recommendation 9 -Mandatory Service Agreement Standards: Legislate minimum content and format requirements for all NDIS service agreements, including accessibility requirements (Easy Read), mandatory cooling-off periods, capacity assessment obligations, conflict of interest disclosure, and prohibition on tenancy terms in SDA agreements.

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Systemic and Policy Reforms (Term of Reference 4.2)

• Recommendation 10 -Substantially Increased Advocacy Funding: Substantially increase Commonwealth funding for the National Disability Advocacy Program, with dedicated allocations for legal advocacy and for organisations serving people with intellectual disability.

• Recommendation 11 -Funded Supported Decision-Making: Develop and fund a Supported Decision-Making Framework for NDIS participants with intellectual disability, including funding for independent SDM supporters as a plan line item.

• Recommendation 12 -Outcome-Based Funding Trials: Commission trials of outcome- based or block-funding models in SIL and community access supports, to replace hourly rate billing and reduce over-servicing incentives.

Criminal Justice System Interface Reforms (Term of Reference 4.1(g))

• Recommendation 13 – Justice System Billing - Develop notification obligations with corrective services, and Support Co-ordinators, to the NDIA upon reception and release of participants, to trigger a review of legitimate billing requirements during the period of incarceration.

• Recommendation 14 -Mandatory Release Planning: Require relevant NDIA planners, Liaison Officers and Support Coordinators to build reviewed/new plans, confirm supports, and referrals during the 12 weeks prior to release for sentenced participants. Build an automated system of notification from a participants plan in this situation to NDIA Planner.

• Recommendation 15 -Culturally Safe Planning for First Nations Participants: Develop, in partnership with First Nations peak bodies, a culturally safe planning protocol for First Nations NDIS participants in the justice system, including preferential referral to Aboriginal-specific support coordinators where requested.

Transparency and Accountability

• Recommendation 16 -Disaggregated Data Publication: Require the NDIA and Commission to publicly publish complaint and incident data disaggregated by disability type, including intellectual disability, on a quarterly basis.

• Recommendation 17 -NDIS Act Review Mechanism: Introduce a statutory 3-year review mechanism for integrity provisions in the NDIS Act, with mandatory consultation with peak bodies representing people with intellectual disability.

• Recommendation 18 -Disability Royal Commission Implementation: Urgently implement Recommendations 9.5, 16.1, and 17.2 of the Disability Royal Commission Final Report as they relate to advocacy, provider oversight, and safeguarding people with intellectual disability in the NDIS.

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Term of Reference 1: Nature and Extent of Non-Compliance, Fraud, and Sharp Practices

1.1 The Scale of the Problem

The NDIS Commission’s own data illustrates the scale and complexity of integrity failures in the Scheme. In 2022-23, the Commission received over 25,000 complaints and more than 9,700 reportable incident notifications. The Australian Federal Police and the NDIS Commission’s Fraud Fusion Taskforce have identified billions of dollars in suspected fraudulent or non-compliant payments since the Taskforce’s establishment in 2023.

A 2023 report by the NDIS Review Panel (’Getting the NDIS back on track’) found that the Scheme’s market-based model had created conditions conducive to provider overreach, market failure, and exploitation. The Panel noted that thin markets, information asymmetry between providers and participants, and inadequate regulatory oversight had all contributed to a significant integrity deficit.

The ANAO’s 2023 performance audit of the NDIA’s management of fraud highlighted that the Agency lacked a comprehensive fraud risk framework, inadequate data analytics capacity, and insufficient coordination with law enforcement agencies. The ANAO found that less than 1% of payments were reviewed for compliance before processing.

1.2 Categories of Non-Compliance Observed by IDRS

Through casework and systemic advocacy, IDRS has documented the following categories of non-compliance affecting people with intellectual disability:

(a) Fraudulent Claiming and False Invoicing

IDRS has observed cases in which supports were billed more than those delivered, supports were claimed for periods when participants were hospitalised, on holidays, or otherwise unavailable, and supports were invoiced as higher-intensity (and higher-cost) line items than those actually provided. In one category of case observed by IDRS, participants in group accommodation settings were billed for individual supports that were simultaneously claimed for multiple participants-a practice sometimes described as ‘double-dipping.’

ILLUSTRATIVE CASE STUDY | False Invoicing in a Group Setting

A man in his thirties with moderate intellectual disability and limited verbal communication lived in a shared supported accommodation setting with three other participants. His family noticed his NDIS plan was nearly depleted six months into a twelve-month plan period. When IDRS assisted the family to obtain payment records, they found the provider had billed for one-to-one personal care during hours when a single worker was rostered across all four residents. Supports were also claimed on several dates during a period when the participant had been hospitalised following a medical episode. The provider had not notified the participant’s guardian of the hospitalisation. IDRS’s Ability Right’s Centre assisted the family to lodge a complaint with the NDIS Commission and request an urgent plan review from the NDIA. The participant was left without community access funding for the remainder of the plan year while the matter was investigated.

Note: Details are illustrative, drawn from IDRS casework patterns. All identifying information has been generalised.

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Plan Management and Financial Control Misuse

People with intellectual disability who have appointed plan managers or supported decision- making arrangements are particularly vulnerable to financial exploitation. IDRS has encountered cases in which plan managers or support coordinators have approved invoices from related-party providers without participant knowledge, extracted administrative fees not disclosed in service agreements, and retained funds by discouraging participants from e xercising their right to change providers.

ILLUSTRATIVE CASE STUDY | Related-Party Plan Management

A young woman with Down syndrome lived independently with periodic support. Her plan manager was a company operated by the same director as her primary support provider. Over eighteen months, the plan manager approved all invoices from the related support provider without query, including for supports the participant later told IDRS’s Ability Rights Centre (ARC) she had not received or had refused. When the participant’s mother engaged ARC after the plan was exhausted, ARC found that the plan manager had not disclosed the corporate relationship to the participant or to the NDIA. The participant had never been provided with a copy of her plan, her service agreement, or her payment records. Ability Rights Centre assisted the family to make a complaint to the Commission and to apply for plan reassessment. The conflict of interest was not detected by either the NDIA payment system or the Commission until IDRS raised it directly.

Note: Details are illustrative, drawn from IDRS casework patterns. All identifying information has been generalised.

Sharp Practices and Coercive Provider Behaviour

Sharp practices documented by IDRS in the context of intellectual disability include:

• High-pressure service agreements presented with inadequate time for review, often to participants without independent representation or supported decision-making arrangements in place.

• Inducements such as accommodation upgrades, food, gifts, or social inclusion activities used to discourage participants from querying billing or changing providers.

• Over-servicing, particularly in supported independent living (SIL) arrangements, where providers self-assess ’reasonable and necessary’ hours and participants lack the capacity to verify or contest them.

• Restrictive practices being imposed without authorisation and disguised as therapeutic support, often billed as behaviour support under the NDIS.

• Bundled service agreements that prevent participants from disaggregating services and exercising genuine choice.

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ILLUSTRATIVE CASE STUDY | High-Pressure Service Agreement and Inducements

A man in his forties with intellectual disability and autism had recently exited the family home following the death of his primary carer. He was approached by a provider offering SIL accommodation and was taken on a tour of the property, given a meal, and shown his prospective room-all before any service agreement was presented. The agreement, a 22-page document in standard font with no Easy Read version, was presented the same afternoon and the participant was told it needed to be signed before he could move in the following week. No guardian or nominee was present. The participant, who has very limited reading ability, signed the agreement. When IDRS’s Ability Rights Centre (ARC) later reviewed it, the agreement contained a clause permitting the provider to charge a four-week cancellation fee if the participant chose to leave, bundled the SIL and day program into a single non-separable service, and included terms purporting to restrict the participant from having overnight visitors without provider approval-a term IDRS considers inconsistent with the participant’s rights under the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) and NSW tenancy law.

Note: Details are illustrative, drawn from IDRS casework patterns. All identifying information has been generalised.

(d) Exploitation in Accommodation and SIL

Supported Independent Living (SIL) arrangements present the highest risk environment identified by IDRS. Participants in SIL are often simultaneously dependent on their provider for accommodation, food, personal care, and day programming. This total dependency creates a coercive environment in which complaints about service quality or billing are structurally suppressed. IDRS has observed:

• Participants being discouraged or actively prevented from contacting external advocates.
• Service agreements signed on behalf of participants without lawful authority (including by providers rather than appointed guardians or nominees).
• Withholding of plan information from participants and their families.
• Use of informal restrictive practices that are not reported under the NDIS (Restrictive Practices and Behaviour Support) Rules 2018.

ILLUSTRATIVE CASE STUDY | Advocate Access Denial and Restrictive Practices in SIL

A woman in her late twenties with intellectual disability and a history of anxiety lived in a SIL property operated by a large, registered provider. Her mother contacted IDRS’s Ability Rights Centre (ARC) after the participant’s phone was removed by staff following an incident-an action the provider described informally as a ‘therapeutic strategy’ but which had not been authorised under a behaviour support plan and was not reported as a restrictive practice. When ARC wrote to the provider requesting access to speak with the participant, the provider responded that visits from external parties required 48 hours’ notice and management approval. ARC advised this policy was inconsistent with the participant’s rights and with the NDIS Practice Standards. The participant subsequently disclosed to ARC that she had been told by a staff member that contacting advocates would result in her ’causing trouble’ and potentially losing her place at the property.ARC assisted the participant to make a complaint to the Commission and to engage a

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behaviour support practitioner.

The informal phone restriction was subsequently identified as an unregistered restrictive practice and was the subject of a Commission compliance notice.

Note: Details are illustrative, drawn from IDRS casework patterns. All identifying information has been generalised.

(e) Exploitation of Thin Markets

The NDIS Review Panel identified ‘thin markets’-regions and support types in which genuine provider competition is absent-as a major driver of exploitation. In rural and remote NSW, many IDRS clients have access to only one or two SIL or community access providers. In these contexts, the market premise of participant choice is effectively fictitious. Providers in thin markets can impose below-standard services at maximum NDIS price limits with virtual impunity.

Participants in thin or limited markets feel unable to question or challenge service agreements because doing so could place their supports at risk. People with intellectual disability in such markets are acutely vulnerable to this form of structural coercion.

ILLUSTRATIVE CASE STUDY | Thin Market Coercion in Regional NSW

A family in regional NSW contacted IDRS on behalf of their adult son with intellectual disability and complex communication needs who received SIL and community access supports from the only registered disability accommodation provider operating within 80 kilometres. The provider had progressively reduced community access hours over six months while continuing to bill at the original rate, citing staff shortages. When the family raised the discrepancy, the provider indicated that if the family was dissatisfied, they were welcome to explore alternatives-knowing there were effectively none. The family was concerned that making a formal complaint would result in their son being given notice to leave the property. IDRS’s Ability Rights Centre assisted with a formal complaint to the Commission and negotiations with the NDIA for emergency plan support. The thin market context substantially delayed resolution, as the Commission’s compliance resources were concentrated in metropolitan areas. The participant experienced a lengthy period with severely reduced supports while waiting for the case to be resolved.

Note: Details are illustrative, drawn from IDRS casework patterns. All identifying information has been generalised.

(f) Defective and Exploitative Service Agreements

Service agreements are the primary contractual mechanism through which NDIS participants engage providers. IDRS submits that the current service agreement landscape is a significant and under-addressed vector for non-compliance and exploitation, particularly for people with intellectual disability.

In March 2026, the NDIA conducted focus groups with advocacy organisations as part of its Service Agreements Improvement Project, delivered in partnership with the NDIS Quality and Safeguards Commission and the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC). The resulting NDIA Service Agreements Insights: Advocates report (March 2026) (the NDIA Insights Report) confirms systemic and serious problems with service agreements that directly align with IDRS’s casework experience. Key findings include:

• Providers often rush the service agreement process, giving participants little time to review or understand terms before signing, and many participants feel pressured to sign quickly so that supports can commence.
• Many service agreements are written in complex or legalistic language, making them inaccessible to people with intellectual disability, CALD communities, and people with limited literacy.
• Some providers use generic, purchased templates not tailored to participants’ individual needs, with agreements primarily structured to manage provider risk rather than protect participant rights.
• Providers do not consistently verify whether a person signing on behalf of a participant has legal authority to do so-a critical gap where participants with intellectual disability have guardians, nominees, or appointed decision-makers.
• Cancellation policies are frequently not clearly explained, and cancellation charges that reduce plan funding can expose participants to unacceptable levels of risk.
• Service agreements for Specialist Disability Accommodation have in some cases improperly included tenancy-related terms, conflating housing and support relationships in ways that further entrench participant dependence on providers.
• Participants with positive relationships with providers feel unable to challenge problematic terms for fear of losing their supports.

Of particular significance for people with intellectual disability, the NDIA Insights Report found that where a person does not understand a service agreement, genuine informed consent cannot be given, and that agreements signed by people who lack capacity due to cognitive impairment may not be legally enforceable. Despite this, there is no consistent requirement for providers to assess decision-making capacity, engage supported decision- making processes, or involve lawfully authorised decision-makers before service agreements are executed. The Report also confirmed the view of advocate focus group participants that service agreements alone do not provide adequate protection and must be backed by effective oversight and enforcement.

The involvement of the ACCC in the NDIA’s service agreement reform project signals acknowledgment that some service agreement practices may engage the unfair contract terms provisions of the Australian Consumer Law (ACL), Schedule 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth). IDRS supports this framing and recommends that the Committee examine the application of ACL protections to NDIS service agreements as a matter of priority.

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ILLUSTRATIVE CASE STUDY | Unenforceable Service Agreement and Unlawful Authority to Sign

IDRS’s Ability Rights Centre (ARC) was contacted by a guardian appointed by the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NCAT) for a man with intellectual disability and acquired brain injury. The guardian had recently been appointed and discovered that the participant had been residing in a supported accommodation setting for over a year under a service agreement signed by a staff member of the previous support coordination organisation-an entity with no lawful authority to execute agreements on the participant’s behalf. The agreement included a term purporting to allow the provider to increase the daily SIL rate by up to 15% annually without renegotiation. It also imposed a six-week exit notice period and a financial penalty for early termination. When ARC reviewed the agreement, it identified multiple terms likely to constitute unfair contract terms under the Australian Consumer Law and terms inconsistent with the NDIS Pricing Arrangements and Price Limits. Despite the clear legal problems with the agreement, the provider declined to renegotiate its terms. IDRS assisted the guardian to pursue the matter through the NDIS Commission and to seek NDIA review of the pricing arrangements.

Note: Details are illustrative, drawn from IDRS casework patterns. All identifying information has been generalised.

1.3 Structural Drivers of Non-Compliance

IDRS submits that non-compliance is not simply the result of ’bad actors’ but is facilitated by structural features of the Scheme:

• The NDIS pricing framework, based on hourly rate limits, creates strong incentives to maximise billable hours rather than participant outcomes.
• The information asymmetry between participants (particularly those with cognitive and communication disabilities) and providers is profound and structurally embedded.
• Service agreements-the primary contractual mechanism in the Scheme-are systematically skewed toward provider interests and frequently inaccessible to people with intellectual disability, as confirmed by the NDIA Insights Report (March 2026).
• Provider self-reporting of incident and compliance data creates a system in which the entities most likely to be non-compliant are least likely to generate regulatory attention.
• The proliferation of unregistered providers operating below the Commission’s regulatory threshold is a significant gap: unregistered providers are not subject to NDIS Practice Standards, worker screening requirements, or mandatory reporting obligations.
• People with intellectual disability who are involved in the criminal justice system face compounded vulnerabilities: they are disproportionately represented in the custodial population, are at high risk of provider exploitation during periods of incarceration when oversight is minimal and are frequently released from custody without supports in place due to systemic failures in NDIS planning and coordination.

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Particular Vulnerability: Participants in the Criminal Justice System

IDRS operates the Justice Advocacy Service (JAS), which provides specialist disability advocacy to people with cognitive disability who are involved in the criminal justice system across NSW.

JAS works with NDIS participants who are on remand, serving custodial sentences, or engaged with police and courts. Through JAS, IDRS has observed a distinct and serious pattern of NDIS non-compliance, fraud, and neglect affecting this cohort, which is almost entirely invisible in the existing integrity and oversight architecture.

People with intellectual disability are significantly over-represented in the NSW custodial population. The NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research and the Disability Royal Commission have both documented the structural pathways by which intellectual disability, inadequate support, and justice system involvement intersect. IDRS submits that the NDIS integrity framework has almost entirely failed this cohort, for the following reasons:

(a) Fraudulent Billing During Periods of Custody

JAS has documented numerous instances in which NDIS support workers and support coordinators have continued to bill participants’ plans during periods when those participants were in custody and receiving no supports. In some cases, providers have claimed for attendances at court proceedings as a pretext for billing, without any genuine support being delivered. Core budget allocations have been exhausted within months while participants were in full-time custody, leaving them without any funded supports upon release—the period at which support is most critical to preventing reoffending.

ILLUSTRATIVE CASE STUDY | Fraudulent Billing During Custody-Core Budget Exhausted

IDRS’s Justice Advocacy Service (JAS) assisted a participant with intellectual disability who had been in custody for an extended period. During his time in custody, a service provider exhausted his entire NDIS core support budget. The provider also claimed Supported Independent Living funding during periods when the participant was accommodated in a Link2Home emergency housing arrangement—not in the SIL setting for which funding was allocated. In addition, a support worker was documented as attending multiple court appearances to observe audio-visual link proceedings—with those attendances billed to the participant’s plan—without providing any support to the participant. The participant’s guardian subsequently advised JAS that over $7,000 had been billed to the participant’s plan during his period of custody. Upon release, the participant had no funded supports, no accommodation, and no support coordinator. JAS understands the participant subsequently returned to custody for offences of a similar nature.

Note: Details are illustrative, drawn from IDRS casework patterns. All identifying information has been generalised.

(b) Support Coordinator Non-Compliance in Custodial Settings

JAS has observed a persistent pattern in which support coordinators assigned to participants in custody fail to make any contact with their clients during the period of incarceration, while continuing to claim support coordination fees from participants’ plans. Support coordinators have in some cases failed to: set up required therapeutic supports (including occupational therapy and behaviour support) that participants had funding for and had consented to;

Integrity of the National Disability Insurance

engage with the participant’s justice support team to coordinate release planning; or ensure that supports were operational before the participant’s release date.

In some instances, JAS has observed support coordinators using derogatory language about participants and characterising their disability-related behaviour as deliberate non- compliance, rather than recognising it as a manifestation of disability. This reflects a fundamental failure of the practice standards to which registered support coordinators are held and raises serious questions about NDIS Commission oversight of support coordination quality.

ILLUSTRATIVE CASE STUDY Support Coordinator Inaction and Exploitation-First Nations Participant

IDRS’s Justice Advocacy Service (JAS) assisted a First Nations participant with intellectual disability who was in custody. JAS had concerns that the participant’s assigned support coordinator was taking advantage of them. When JAS met with the support coordinator to assist with establishing required supports, the coordinator stated he was unable to set up occupational therapy or behaviour support and did not believe the participant would engage-despite the participant having funding for these supports and having given consent for referrals. The support coordinator could not identify any active support services the participant was engaged with, yet was continuing to claim support coordination fees. The support coordinator referred to the participant using demeaning and racist language, including characterising their engagement with the justice system in terms that denied the role of disability and structural disadvantage. JAS identified a suitable Aboriginal-specific support coordinator, obtained the participant’s informed consent in writing, and submitted a change request. The plan manager refused to action the change despite the signed consent documentation. After escalation, the original support coordinator was reinstated by an NDIA Justice Liaison Officer, overriding the participant’s expressed choice. The original support coordinator never met with the participant in custody to obtain updated consent. The referrals to occupational therapy and behaviour support established by JAS were never followed through. The participant subsequently returned to custody for further offences of a similar nature. IDRS submits this case illustrates how systemic failures in support coordination oversight, plan management accountability, and culturally unsafe practice directly contribute to reoffending and ongoing harm for First Nations participants with intellectual disability.

Note: Details are illustrative, drawn from IDRS casework patterns. All identifying information has been generalised.

(c) NDIS Planning Failures for People in Custody

JAS has observed multiple instances of NDIS plans being developed without any direct contact between the planner and the participant-plans sent by post to people in custody or in community, with goals drafted from third-party correspondence rather than direct engagement. This practice results in plans that do not reflect the participant’s actual goals, circumstances, or support needs, and which may include incorrectly attributed informal supports or fail to account for the absence of family or community networks.

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For First Nations participants, planning failures frequently include the assignment of support coordinators without regard to the participant’s expressed preference for an Aboriginal-specific or culturally safe coordinator. This compounds the existing distrust of government systems experienced by many First Nations people, particularly those who are members of the Stolen Generations or whose families have been subject to child removal. JAS has observed cases where such failures have caused participants to disengage entirely from the NDIS, forfeiting supports to which they are entitled.

ILLUSTRATIVE CASE STUDY | Plan Developed Without Participant Contact-First Nations Woman in Justice System

IDRS’s Justice Advocacy Service (JAS) assisted a First Nations woman with intellectual disability who was involved with the justice system and had no prior contact with the NDIS. The participant did not have a phone; JAS had specifically requested that all NDIA communications be directed through the JAS advocate to ensure the participant could be meaningfully involved in her planning. The NDIA planner made a single unsuccessful call to JAS and did not follow up. The participant subsequently received an NDIS plan in the post. The plan had been developed using language extracted from JAS advocate emails-attributed to the participant as her own goals in her own words-when in fact the participant had never spoken with the planner. The plan incorrectly identified informal supports the participant did not have. A support coordinator was assigned without the participant’s input, despite the participant having specifically requested an Aboriginal-specific coordinator. The participant, who had already experienced significant barriers to engaging with government services due to the trauma of the Stolen Generations, disengaged from the NDIS because of these failures. JAS notes that the process of identity verification for the NDIS access application itself caused distress, as the proxy form required the participant’s birth parents’ names and place of birth-information she did not have and which was connected to her experience as a member of the Stolen Generations.

Note: Details are illustrative, drawn from IDRS casework patterns. All identifying information has been generalised.

(d) NDIS Supports Used Punitively in the Justice System

JAS has observed instances in which NDIS supports have been incorporated into bail conditions in ways that are coercive, inappropriate, or inconsistent with the voluntary and participant-directed nature of NDIS funding. Bail conditions requiring a person to ‘follow the instructions of [named organisation]’ effectively convert a disability support relationship into a compliance mechanism of the criminal justice system. This fundamentally mischaracterises the NDIS and creates a situation in which a provider’s instructions carry legal force-a coercive power that is entirely inconsistent with participant choice and control and that creates opportunities for abuse.

JAS has further observed instances in which the failure to provide adequate NDIS supports-including failures to implement behaviour support plans or maintain appropriate staff ratios-has contributed directly to police being called as a behaviour management mechanism. The use of police in this way has, in some cases, resulted in criminal charges against participants for behaviour that could and should have been managed through properly resourced disability support.

In just the Newcastle region of NSW, JAS has documented a 30% increase in referrals for people with intellectual disability in supported accommodation, where the Police have become involved as a behaviour support mechanism, due to inappropriate responses by inadequately trained staff, or where behaviour support plans or other supports have not been implemented.

JAS has also observed, corroborated by Justice Health and Corrective Services Statewide Disability Service, the increasing level of disability and support needs of people on remand due to community service failures.

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Term of Reference 2: Impacts on NDIS Participants and Their Families

2.1 Physical and Psychological Harm

Non-compliance and exploitation cause direct and serious harm to people with intellectual disability. IDRS has observed clients who have experienced significant physical harm as a result of inadequate or absent personal care supports that were nonetheless billed to the Scheme. Psychological harm resulting from financial exploitation, coercive provider relationships, and the experience of having one’s plan depleted without benefit is severe and often compounded by participants’ difficulty in communicating distress or accessing help.

2.2 Plan Depletion and Abandonment

A critical impact of fraud and over-servicing is plan depletion—the exhaustion of a participant’s NDIS funding before the plan period ends. When a participant’s plan is depleted, they are left without funded supports for the remainder of the plan year. For a person with intellectual disability who relies on those supports for basic daily living, plan depletion is not merely a financial inconvenience but a direct threat to health, safety, and wellbeing.

IDRS has observed multiple cases in which participants’ plans were depleted within months, leaving them without attendant care, community access, or therapeutic supports. In some cases, participants were left in situations of neglect or risk while their families sought emergency NDIA review—a process that is itself frequently inaccessible to people without strong advocacy or legal support.

ILLUSTRATIVE CASE STUDY | Plan Depletion and Abandonment

A teenager with intellectual disability and challenging behaviours had recently transitioned from the school system to the NDIS. His annual plan included funding for support coordination, community access, and behaviour support therapy. Within seven months, his plan was exhausted. His mother contacted Ability Rights Centre (ARC) after discovering that the support coordinator—who was employed by the same organisation as the behaviour support practitioner—had approved invoices for behaviour support reports that had never been provided to the family, and for community access hours during school holidays when the participant was interstate with family. The participant had no funded supports for the final five months of his plan year. His behaviours escalated significantly during this period, resulting in a hospital presentation. The family made multiple calls to the NDIA seeking emergency funding, but were unable to navigate the process without assistance. The matter illustrated how plan depletion caused by fraud has cascading consequences for participants with complex support needs.

Note: Details are illustrative, drawn from IDRS casework patterns. All identifying information has been generalised.

Integrity of the National Disability Insurance

2.3 Silencing and Suppression of Complaints

Participants with intellectual disability who experience non-compliance or exploitation face structural barriers to making complaints. The NDIS Commission’s complaints process requires written submissions, navigation of a complex regulatory framework, and sustained follow-up—all of which are extremely challenging for many people with intellectual disability, particularly without advocacy support. IDRS regularly acts for participants who have not been able to engage with the Commission’s formal process without intensive legal and advocacy assistance.

Additionally, the coercive power of SIL and accommodation providers—who control participants’ living arrangements—means that many participants with intellectual disability are genuinely afraid to complain, and some have reported being threatened with loss of accommodation when they have raised concerns.

The NDIA Insights Report (March 2026) further confirms the psychological and structural barriers to complaint-making. Advocates told the NDIA that many participants feel uncomfortable acknowledging they do not understand something, fear being taken advantage of if they disclose confusion, and worry that questioning a provider will place their existing supports at risk. For people with intellectual disability—who may depend on a single provider for accommodation, meals, and daily care—these barriers are not merely inconvenient but can render the entire complaint and rights-enforcement framework functionally inaccessible.

ILLUSTRATIVE CASE STUDY | Complaint Suppression in Supported Accommodation

A woman in her fifties with intellectual disability had lived in the same SIL property for eleven years. She contacted IDRS’s Ability Rights Centre (ARC) through a community health worker after disclosing that staff had been entering her room at night without consent and that she had been charged for meals she had not received. When asked why she had not complained sooner, she explained that a previous resident had made a complaint and had subsequently been asked to leave the property. She had no other housing options. She told the ARC advocate she did not know she was allowed to make a complaint without telling her provider. The NDIS Commission’s complaint form required a written submission; the participant had significant literacy difficulties and had no Easy Read materials or advocacy support available to her locally. ARC assisted her to make a complaint and supported her throughout the process. The investigation took eleven months. During this time, the participant continued to live in the same property, subject to the conduct she had complained about. The outcome was a compliance notice and a requirement that the provider develop a complaints policy in accessible formats—with no compensation or remediation offered to the participant.

Note: Details are illustrative, drawn from IDRS casework patterns. All identifying information has been generalised.

2.4 Impact on Families and Carers

Families of people with intellectual disability, particularly ageing parents and siblings who have assumed informal caring and advocacy roles, experience profound distress when they become aware of exploitation of their family member. In addition to the primary harm suffered by the participant, families bear secondary burdens including time and cost of pursuing complaints and reviews, emotional trauma from discovering the extent of

Integrity of the National Disability Insurance

Exploitation, and loss of trust in the Scheme and its providers. On many occasions families have told us that one or both parents have had to leave permanent work, in order to care for their family member due to inadequate support, or abused supports, in their Plans.

The evidence base for these impacts includes the submissions of peak bodies including People with Disability Australia (PWDA), the First Peoples Disability Network (FPDN), and Carers Australia to predecessor inquiries, as well as the findings of the Royal Commission into Violence, Abuse, Neglect and Exploitation of People with Disability (the Disability Royal Commission), Final Report (September 2023).

ILLUSTRATIVE CASE STUDY | Family Impact - Discovery of Long-Term Financial Exploitation

An elderly couple contacted IDRS’s Ability Rights Centre (ARC) after their son with intellectual disability, who had been living in supported accommodation for eight years, was briefly hospitalised and they gained access to his room for the first time. They discovered he had very few personal possessions despite his plan having included an allowance for daily living items, and that his bank account-to which his provider had held informal access-had a near-zero balance. When ARC assisted the family to obtain payment records, they identified a pattern of unexplained charges over several years, including charges for items their son could not use due to his disability. The family had not previously been provided with any financial statements or payment summaries. The father, then aged 79, described the experience of discovering the exploitation as the most traumatic of his life. The process of making complaints to the Commission and seeking NDIA review, which extended over 14 months, was described by the family as unnavigable without ARC Solicitor’s assistance. The matter was resolved only after ARC escalated it. Families should not need a solicitor to navigate complaints through the commission and NDIA.

Note: Details are illustrative, drawn from IDRS casework patterns. All identifying information has been generalised.

2.5 Disproportionate Impact on People with Intellectual Disability

The Disability Royal Commission Final Report found that people with intellectual disability are among the most likely to experience violence, abuse, neglect, and exploitation in disability services. The Commission heard extensive evidence that intellectual disability-particularly when accompanied by communication differences-substantially increases susceptibility to exploitation and substantially decreases the likelihood of abuse being detected, reported, and addressed.

IDRS submits that this heightened vulnerability must be specifically recognised in the Committee’s recommendations and in any legislative reforms. Generic integrity measures calibrated to the ‘average’ NDIS participant will systematically under-protect people with intellectual disability.

2.6 Impact on Participants in the Criminal Justice System

The impacts of NDIS non-compliance on participants involved in the criminal justice system are among the most severe and least visible documented in IDRS’s casework. Participants in custody face a compounded harm: they are unable to access their NDIS supports, are often unaware that their plan funding is being depleted by providers billing fraudulently or without authority and are released without any support infrastructure in place-conditions which directly increase the risk of reoffending.

IDRS’s JAS program has identified the following specific impacts on this cohort:

• Release from custody without any funded supports, due to plan depletion during the custodial period, leaving participants without accommodation assistance, daily living support, or therapeutic services at their moment of greatest vulnerability.
• Reoffending directly attributable to the absence of supports that should have been established by a support coordinator during the custodial period-particularly for participants with intellectual disability whose offending behaviour is related to unmet support needs.
• Participants remaining in custody on remand for longer than necessary because support coordinators have failed to establish the accommodation and support arrangements required as conditions of bail.
• Bail conditions incorporating NDIS support arrangements in ways that are coercive and inconsistent with the voluntary nature of NDIS funding, creating a risk of bail breach simply through the exercise of participant rights.
• For First Nations participants, the additional and compounding harm of culturally unsafe planning, discriminatory practice by support coordinators, and disengagement from the NDIS as a direct result of those failures-with downstream consequences for health, safety, and justice involvement.

IDRS submits that the Scheme’s failure to protect and effectively support participants in the criminal justice system constitutes a significant integrity deficit with profound human consequences. It is also a significant driver of ongoing justice system costs that fall on state and territory governments. The Committee is urged to make specific recommendations addressing this cohort.

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Term of Reference 3: Effectiveness and Adequacy of Government Integrity Measures

3.1 The NDIS Quality and Safeguards Commission

The NDIS Commission was established under the National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) (NDIS Act) and commenced operations in NSW on 1 July 2018. Its functions include registering and regulating providers, handling complaints, overseeing behaviour support and restrictive practices, and managing the NDIS Worker Screening Check.

IDRS acknowledges that the Commission has undertaken meaningful work since its establishment and that its operational capacity has expanded. However, IDRS submits that the Commission’s effectiveness remains substantially limited by:

• Insufficient investigative resources relative to the scale of the regulated sector.
• An enforcement toolkit that is weighted heavily toward education and compliance notices, with civil and criminal penalties used sparingly and inconsistently.
• Limited data analytics and intelligence-sharing arrangements with the NDIA, the ATO, and law enforcement.
• An over-reliance on self-reporting and complaint-driven detection, which structurally disadvantages participants who lack capacity to complain.
• An appeals and review process that, despite improvements, remains inaccessible for many people with intellectual disability without intensive advocacy support.

3.2 The NDIS Integrity Roadmap and 2023-2024 Reforms

The Albanese Government’s NDIS Integrity Roadmap and the amendments introduced by the National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Getting the NDIS Back on Track No. 1) Act 2024 (the 2024 Reforms) represent the most significant legislative integrity intervention in the Scheme’s history. IDRS acknowledges the following as positive steps:

• The introduction of a new participant registration framework and the expansion of registration requirements to certain unregistered providers.
• The strengthening of the Commission’s investigative and enforcement powers, including expanded civil penalty provisions.
• Reforms to Supported Decision Making and the role of nominees under the NDIS Act.
• The establishment of the NDIS Fraud Fusion Taskforce, which has demonstrated the value of cross-agency intelligence sharing.

However, IDRS submits that the 2024 Reforms, while necessary, are insufficient in several critical respects, as set out in Section 4 below.

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3.3 The NDIS Pricing Framework

The NDIS Pricing Arrangements and Price Limits (formerly the Support Catalogue and Price Guide) set maximum price limits for NDIS supports. The pricing framework has been identified by multiple reviews-including the NDIS Review and the Tune Review (2019)-as a driver of both over-servicing and market distortion.

IDRS notes that the current framework’s reliance on hourly rate limits creates perverse incentives for time-based billing regardless of outcomes. A shift toward outcome-based or block-funding models in certain support categories, combined with robust outcome measurement, would reduce the financial incentive for over-servicing.

3.4 Independent Advocacy: A Critical but Underfunded Safeguard

The NDIS Act recognises the importance of advocacy, and successive governments have funded the Information, Linkages and Capacity Building (ILC) framework and the National Disability Advocacy Program (NDAP) to support independent advocacy. However, IDRS submits that independent legal advocacy-of the kind provided by IDRS and other community legal centres-remains grossly underfunded relative to demand.

The Disability Royal Commission Final Report specifically recommended (Recommendation 9.5) that governments substantially increase funding for independent advocacy services for people with disability, with particular attention to legal advocacy and crisis advocacy for those at highest risk of abuse and exploitation. IDRS urges this Committee to make a consistent recommendation.

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Term of Reference 4: Legislative and Other Reforms Required

4.1 Legislative Framework

IDRS submits that the following legislative reforms are required to strengthen NDIS integrity and protect people with intellectual disability:

(a) Mandatory Registration for High-Risk Supports

Section 73B of the NDIS Act should be amended to require registration for all providers delivering high-risk supports to participants with intellectual disability, including supported independent living, supported accommodation, community nursing, and behaviour support. The current risk-tiered registration framework contains significant gaps that are being exploited.

This reform aligns with Recommendation 16.1 of the Disability Royal Commission Final Report and the recommendations of the NDIS Review Panel.

(b) Stronger Financial Controls and Plan Management Regulation

IDRS recommends amendment of the NDIS Act and associated rules to introduce:

• Mandatory disclosure obligations for plan managers regarding related party transactions.
• Expanded Commissioner powers to freeze and recover plan funds where fraud or significant non-compliance is established.
• A real-time payment integrity system to flag anomalous billing patterns before payment is processed, building on the Commission’s existing Data Analytics Integrity Program.
• Prohibition on plan managers holding provider and plan management functions for the same participant (conflict of interest).

(c) Reforms to Supported Independent Living Regulation

IDRS submits that SIL requires a dedicated and strengthened regulatory framework, including:

• Mandatory independent assessment of participant support needs and agreement with SIL plans, removing provider self-assessment.
• Mandatory access provisions for independent advocates and legal representatives in all SIL settings.
• Regular, unannounced compliance inspections of SIL properties by the Commission.
• Prohibition on SIL providers also acting as plan managers or support coordinators for the same participant.
• Strengthened oversight of restrictive practices, with automatic notification to the participant’s nominee/guardian and the Commission upon use of any regulated restrictive practice.

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(d) Improved Complaints Accessibility

The NDIS Commission’s complaint process must be made accessible to people with intellectual disability. IDRS recommends:

• Mandatory Easy Read versions of all Commission information, complaint and reporting forms.
• The Commission to fund access to independent advocacy assistance for complainants with intellectual disability as a matter of practice.
• Introduction of a dedicated Intellectual Disability Complaints Stream within the Commission, staffed by personnel with specialist training.
• Extension of the time limit for lodging complaints to allow for cases where exploitation is only discovered after a significant delay-a common pattern in intellectual disability cases.

(e) Mandatory Service Agreement Standards and Protections

The NDIA’s current Service Agreements Improvement Project, in partnership with the Commission and the ACCC, is a welcome initiative. However, IDRS submits that voluntary improvements to service agreement templates will be insufficient without legislative or regulatory mandating of minimum standards. The NDIA Insights Report (March 2026) specifically found that if service agreement templates are not mandatory, some providers will continue to use unfair or unbalanced agreements.

IDRS recommends the following legislative and regulatory reforms to service agreements:

• Mandate minimum content requirements for all NDIS service agreements, to include: clear statement of supports to be delivered; alignment with the participant’s NDIS plan goals; participant rights and provider obligations; transparent and plain- language cancellation policies; a clear complaints pathway including NDIS Commission contact details; disclosure of any conflicts of interest; and the authority under which any third-party signatory is acting;
• Require all service agreements to be provided in accessible formats-including Easy Read-for participants with intellectual disability or communication support needs, as a condition of provider registration.
• Introduce a mandatory minimum cooling-off period of not less than five business days after execution of a service agreement, during which participants may cancel supports without penalty-consistent with the consumer protection approach recommended by advocates in the NDIA Insights Report.
• Require providers to take reasonable steps to assess a participant’s decision-making capacity before a service agreement is executed, and to engage lawfully authorised decision-makers or supported decision-making supporters where appropriate.
• Prohibit service agreements for Specialist Disability Accommodation from including tenancy-related terms-a practice identified in the NDIA Insights Report as occurring in the sector and which creates unlawful conflation of housing and support rights.
• Empower the ACCC and the NDIS Commission to jointly investigate and act regarding service agreements that may constitute unfair contract terms under the Australian Consumer Law.

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• Require providers to give participants a copy of their signed service agreement at the time of execution, and to re-explain key terms (including cancellation policies) after commencement of supports.

(f) Worker Screening

The NDIS Worker Screening Check, established under the NDIS Act and the NDIS Worker Screening Act 2020 (Cth), represents an important baseline integrity measure. However, IDRS observes several gaps:

• The Check does not apply to all workers delivering supports to people with intellectual disability, particularly in unregistered settings.
• Clearance decisions do not always account for the full spectrum of relevant prior conduct, including findings of the Guardianship Division of the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal and Adult Safeguarding investigations.
• The portability of clearances between states and territories requires further harmonisation.

IDRS recommends that the Worker Screening framework be extended to all workers providing direct supports to NDIS participants with intellectual disability, regardless of whether the employing provider is registered.

4.2 Systemic and Policy Reforms

(a) Independent Advocacy Funding

IDRS strongly recommends that the Committee recommend substantially increased Commonwealth funding for independent disability legal services and advocacy organisations, with a specific allocation for organisations serving people with intellectual disability. Current NDAP funding levels are inadequate to meet demonstrated demand, and many IDRS clients have waited months for assistance.

(b) Supported Decision-Making

The National Decision-Making Principles and the National Plan to Respond to the Abuse and Exploitation of People with Cognitive Disability 2016-2026 both emphasise supported decision-making as a protective mechanism for people with cognitive disability. IDRS recommends that the NDIA develop and fund a structured Supported Decision-Making Framework for NDIS participants with intellectual disability, including:

• Funding for trained, independent supported decision-making supporters as a line item in participants’ plans.
• Training for NDIA participant facing staff, especially planners, in how to engage with participants who use augmentative and alternative communication (AAC) or who have limited verbal communication.
• Inclusion of supported decision-making assessments in plan reviews for participants in SIL or high-risk support environments.

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(g) Reforms Addressing the Criminal Justice System Interface

IDRS submits that the NDIS integrity framework requires dedicated reforms to address the particular vulnerability of participants who are involved in the criminal justice system. The current framework makes no specific provision for custodial settings, for culturally safe planning for First Nations participants in the justice system, or for the accountability of support organisations who continue to claim fees for participants in custody without delivering services.

IDRS recommends the following reforms:

• Develop notification obligations with corrective services, and Support Co-ordinators, to the NDIA upon reception and release of participants, to trigger a review of legitimate billing requirements during the period of incarceration.
• Require relevant NDIA planners, Liaison Officers and Support Coordinators to build reviewed/new plans, confirm supports, and referrals during the 12 weeks prior to release for sentenced participants. Build an automated system of notification from a participants plan in this situation to NDIA Planner.
• Specific training and accreditation requirements for support coordinators working with participants in the criminal justice system, including mandatory competency in working with First Nations people with disability.
• Expanded funding and mandate for specialist justice disability advocacy services, as a critical safeguard for participants in custody.
• Requirement that NDIS planners conduct planning meetings in person or by video with the participant-not by correspondence or through third parties-for all participants in custodial settings, with interpreters and communication supports provided as required.
• Development, in partnership with First Nations peak bodies of a culturally safe planning protocol for First Nations NDIS participants involved in the justice system, including preferential referral to Aboriginal-specific support coordinators where the participant requests this.

IDRS submits that the NDIA and the Commission must substantially improve their collection, analysis, and publication of data relating to:

• Complaint outcomes disaggregated by disability type, including intellectual disability.
• Reportable incident outcomes, including serious injury and unexplained death.
• Compliance actions and their outcomes, including the value of funds recovered.
• Provider registration cancellations and banning orders.

Greater transparency in this data would enable the sector, including IDRS, to provide more effective systemic oversight and public accountability.

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Summary of Recommendations

Rec. 1	Mandatory Registration for High-Risk Supports
Amend s 73B NDIS Act to require registration for all providers of SIL, supported accommodation, behaviour support, and community nursing delivered to participants with intellectual disability.
Rec. 2	Independent SIL Assessment
Remove provider self-assessment of SIL support needs. Introduce mandatory independent needs assessment and an annual independent review of each participant’s SIL arrangement.
Rec. 3	Mandatory Advocate Access in SIL
Legislate a right of access for independent advocates and legal representatives to all SIL and supported accommodation settings, including on an unannounced basis where participant safety requires it.
Rec. 4	Plan Manager Conflict of Interest Prohibition
Prohibit plan managers from holding a provider relationship with the same participant they manage. Mandate disclosure of all related-party transactions.
Rec. 5	Real-Time Payment Integrity System
Fund and mandate implementation of a real-time data analytics system to detect and flag anomalous billing patterns before NDIS payments are processed.
Rec. 6	Expanded Commission Enforcement Powers
Expand the Commission’s civil penalty and infringement notice powers. Increase staffing and resources for proactive compliance inspections, particularly in SIL settings.
Rec. 7	Accessible Complaints Process
Require the Commission to provide Easy Read complaint forms and funded advocacy support for all complainants with intellectual disability. Establish a specialist Intellectual Disability Complaints Stream.

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Integrity of the National Disability Insurance

Extended Worker Screening Coverage

Rec. | Extend the NDIS Worker Screening Check to all direct support workers delivering 8 services to participants with intellectual disability, including those employed by

unregistered providers.

Mandatory Service Agreement Standards

Legislate minimum content and format requirements for all NDIS service agreements, including accessibility requirements (Easy Read), mandatory cooling- of periods, capacity assessment obligations, conflict of interest disclosure, and prohibition on tenancy terms in SDA agreements.

Rec.

Substantially Increased Advocacy Funding

Rec. | Substantially increase Commonwealth funding for the National Disability 10 Advocacy Program, with dedicated allocations for legal advocacy and for

organisations serving people with intellectual disability.

Funded Supported Decision-Making

Rec. | Develop and fund a Supported Decision-Making Framework for NDIS participants 11 with intellectual disability, including funding for independent SDM supporters as

a plan line item.

Outcome-Based Funding Trials

Rec. | Commission trials of outcome-based or block-funding models in SIL and

12 community access supports, to replace hourly rate billing and reduce over- servicing incentives.

Justice System Billing

Rec. | Develop notification obligations with corrective services, and Support Co-

13 ordinators, to the NDIA upon reception and release of participants, to trigger a review of legitimate billing requirements during the period of incarceration.

Intellectual Disability Rights Service Submission — April, 2026 Page 28

Integrity of the National Disability Insurance

Mandatory Release Planning

Require relevant NDIA planners, Liaison Officers and Support Coordinators to build reviewed/new plans, confirm supports, and referrals during the 12 weeks prior to release for sentenced participants. Build an automated system of notification from a participant’s plan in this situation to NDIA Planner.

Rec. 14

Culturally Safe Planning for First Nations Participants

Rec. | Develop, in partnership with First Nations peak bodies, a culturally safe planning protocol for First Nations NDIS participants in the justice system, including preferential referral to Aboriginal-specific support coordinators where requested.

Rec. 15

Disaggregated Data Publication

Rec. | Require the NDIA and Commission to publicly publish complaint and incident data disaggregated by disability type, including intellectual disability, on a quarterly basis.

Rec. 16

NDIS Act Review Mechanism

Rec. | Introduce a statutory 3-year review mechanism for integrity provisions in the NDIS Act, with mandatory consultation with peak bodies representing people with intellectual disability.

Rec. 17

Disability Royal Commission Implementation

Rec. | Urgently implement Recommendations 9.5, 16.1, and 17.2 of the Disability Royal Commission Final Report as they relate to advocacy, provider oversight, and safeguarding people with intellectual disability in the NDIS.

Rec. 18

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References and Supporting Materials

Legislation

• National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth)

• National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Getting the NDIS Back on Track No. 1) Act 2024 (Cth)

• NDIS (Restrictive Practices and Behaviour Support) Rules 2018 (Cth)

• NDIS Worker Screening Act 2020 (Cth)

• National Disability Insurance Scheme (Provider Registration and Practice Standards) Rules 2018 (Cth)

• Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth)

• Australian Consumer Law (Schedule 2, Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth))

Reports and Reviews

• NDIS Review Panel, Working Together to Deliver the NDIS: Independent Review into the National Disability Insurance Scheme Final Report (2023), Commonwealth of Australia

• National Disability Insurance Agency, Service Agreements Insights: Advocates (March 2026), NDIA – IDRS participated in this consultation

• Royal Commission into Violence, Abuse, Neglect and Exploitation of People with Disability, Final Report (September 2023), Commonwealth of Australia

• Australian National Audit Office, National Disability Insurance Agency’s Management of Claimant Compliance with NDIS Claim Requirements (Auditor-General Report No. 48, 2024–25), ANAO

• Australian National Audit Office, Effectiveness of the NDIS Quality and Safeguards Commission’s Regulatory Functions (2025)

• Productivity Commission, Review of the National Disability Insurance Scheme Costs (2017), Commonwealth of Australia

• David Tune AO PSM, Review of the National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013: Removing Red Tape and Implementing the NDIS Participant Service Guarantee (2019), Department of Social Services

• Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, People with Disability in Australia (2024), AIHW

Key Sector Submissions

• People with Disability Australia, Submission to the NDIS Review Panel (2023)

• First Peoples Disability Network, Submission to the Disability Royal Commission (2021)

• National Disability Services, Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on the NDIS- NDIS Integrity Inquiry (2025)

• Community Legal Centres Australia, Submission to the NDIS Review Panel (2023)

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• Intellectual Disability Rights Service NSW, Justice Advocacy Service Program Report (2025)

• NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, Intellectual Disability and the NSW Criminal Justice System (2021)

• Australian Institute of Criminology, Disability and the Criminal Justice System (2022)

Other References

• NDIS Quality and Safeguards Commission, Annual Report 2022–23 (2023)

• NDIS Quality and Safeguards Commission, NDIS Practice Standards (2021)

• Department of Social Services, National Plan to Respond to the Abuse and Exploitation of People with Cognitive Disability 2016–2026 (2016)

• Australian Human Rights Commission, Equal Before the Law: Towards Disability Justice Strategies (2014)

• United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No. 1: Article 12 -Equal Recognition Before the Law (2014)

© Intellectual Disability Rights Service NSW, April 2026. This submission may be reproduced with attribution.

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