NDIS Amendment (Integrity and Safeguarding) Bill 2025

Date: 5 February 2026

Apolline Kohen Committee Secretary Standing Committee on Community Affairs The Senate Parliament House Canberra ACT 2600

By email: Community.Affairs.Sen@aph.gov.au

Dear Secretary,

RE: NDIS Amendment (Integrity and Safeguarding) Bil 2025

Thank you for correspondence of 4 December 2026 inviting Aruma’s submission on the NDIS Amendment (Integrity and Safeguarding) Bil (‘the Bill’). Responding to your invitation:

• Aruma’s detailed consideration of the Bill is provided in Annexure 1;
• Aruma consents to the publication by the Committee of our submission; and
• I am available to appear before the Committee if required, and extend an additional invitation for Committee members to meet informally with the National Disability Insurance Scheme(‘NDIS’) participant members of Aruma’s Human Rights Advisory Committee about their ‘lived experience’ views on the safeguarding intentions of the Bill.

Aruma’s Position in One Sentence

Aruma supports the passage of the Bill subject to guidance strengthened enforcement powers will be exercised proportionately, alongside National Disability Insurance Agency(‘NDIA’) pricing and participant plan adequacy, for participant safety improvement without collapsing already fragile not-for-profit provider capacity.

Summary of Aruma’s position

• Aruma supports the Bill, subject to two considerations. First, the new powers being exercised proportionately and in stages, aligned with a graduated enforcement model, and matched with pricing, participant plan adequacy. And second, workforce uplift for not-for-profit providers to meet and ideally exceed new regulator expectations. The Explanatory Memorandum confirms significant uplifts to civil penalties (including up to 10,000 penalty units for

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serious contraventions), new offence tiers, expanded banning orders, a new anti-promotion regime, shorter information-gathering timeframes, and clarified plan-variation powers.

These tools are powerful, and supported by Aruma, however they should only be applied following careful consideration of the current NDS price flaws and participant plan inadequacies, which warrant remedy by the NDIA.

• The Commission’s published Compliance and Enforcement Policy1 (Nov 2022) sets out a responsive, risk‑based ‘pyramid’ of interventions: education and guidance at the base, escalating to compliance notices and enforceable undertakings, and reserving civil penalties and prosecution for the most serious or persistent non-compliance. To preserve trust, procedural fairness and continuous improvement, the Bill’s stronger sanctions must be applied within that graduated model and accompanied by public reporting that demonstrates how lower-tier measures were attempted (or why they were not) before litigation or maximum penalties.

• Penalties without pricing reform risk collateral damage. Core supports delivered by accredited not-for-profit providers remain under-priced by the NDIA by approximately10% against the cost of safe, regulatory compliant service delivery. Imposing ‘mature-market’ penalties on an immature, under-funded system creates structural imbalance and unintended service exits - especially in complex supports and thin market; which ultimately harms participants.

• Just Culture - not silence. Mature Health regulators operate to protect the public. However, rather than prosecuting, they routinely encourage early disclosure and verified remediation where risk has been controlled, thereby fostering learning and safer systems. NDIS regulation should formally incentivise self-reporting and fixes with lower-tier responses, reserving penalties for serious harm, recklessness, or repeated non-compliance.

• Oak Tasmania shows the new reality: systems, not intentions. The Federal Court’s $1.1m penalty against a not-for-profit provider illustrates that regulators and courts now judge whether systems reliably deliver safe support. Values are not safeguards; working systems are. This shift in regulatory reality confirms why penalties must be phased with capability and pricing uplift.

• Plan variation (s47A) clarity is welcome - use it with caution. Aruma supports confirming NDS participant plans can be increased or decreased, to remove non-evidence-based supports and to add funding when justified. Practice

1 NDIS Quality and Safeguards Commission 2024, Compliance and Enforcement Policy: Version 2.0, NDIS Quality and Safegards Commission, Penrith, NSW.

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should ensure procedural fairness and evidence standards, noting Aruma’s experience that many cuts are later reversed or increased once full evidence is assembled (Change of Circumstances).

Thank you for inviting Aruma’s consideration of the Bill. Aruma looks forward to assisting the Committee’s deliberations.

Yours sincerely

dr martin laverty chief executive

Annexure 1 — Amendments and Recommendations

Serious contraventions and penalty ceilings (multiple clauses; includes Items 30–41 and amendments to sss 73B, 73J, 73V, 73ZC, 73ZM)

Amendment (summary):

• The Bill introduces serious contravention settings, enabling maximum civil penalties up to 10,000 penalty units (higher for bodies corporate via multipliers) for breaches such as serious contraventions of the Code of Conduct (s 73V), threats to cause detriment to another person (s 73ZC), and non-compliance with compliance notices (s 73ZM). A new tiered offence structure (fault-based and strict liability) is inserted for certain conduct.

Recommendations:

1.1 Proportionality and pyramid adherence:

require the Commission to evidence use (or justified non-use) of lower-tier measures (education, audits, conditions and enforceable undertakings) before litigation or maximum penalties, and to publish annual tier-by-tier enforcement data.

1.2 Target the problem, not the whole organisation:

where issues are localised (site/program/practice), prefer targeted sanctions to preserve safe capacity in other services.

1.3 Learning focused compliance:

imbed a safe-harbour approach where early disclosure, full cooperation, independently verified remediation results in a lower-tier response; reserve penalties for egregious/persistent non-compliance.

Anti-promotion orders (new sss 73ZOA–73ZOC; Items 75–79)

Amendment (summary):

• Creates anti-promotion orders restricting regulated promotional conduct that undermines the Act’s objects/principles, with the Minister empowered (Category D rules) to prescribe conduct types; decisions are merits-reviewable.

Recommendation:

2.1 Define regulated promotional conduct tightly.

2.2 Align tests with Australian Consumer Law addressing misleading/deceptive conduct.

2.3 Avoid chilling legitimate information for participants.

Information-gathering timeframes

Section heading: ss 56, 73F; Items 85–90

Amendment summary:

• Permits shorter-than-14-day deadlines where the Commissioner reasonably believes delay would significantly increase the risk of serious harm, with reasonableness conditions and discretion to extend. Mirrors changes to registration condition (s 73F) to supply information and documents within specified periods.

Recommendation:

3.1 Retain a 14-day baseline for non-urgent matters; require written reasons for shortened periods. 3.2 Preserve privacy/privilege and Australian Privacy Principle compliance for more frequent data-sharing. 3.3 Provide pragmatic extensions for voluminous or legacy records.

Evidentiary certificates

New section: s 199C; Item 93

Amendment summary:

• Allows the Commissioner to issue certificates as prima facie evidence of specific registration facts in civil/criminal proceedings, reducing burden of proof for non-controversial matters.

Recommendation:

4.1 Keep scope narrow and transparent (registration dates, classes, status). 4.2 Publish practice guidance. 4.3 Ensure Courts retain discretion to test evidence if contested.

Plan variations

Schedule 2 — Increase or decrease total funding

Amendment summary:

• Confirms NDIA plan variations can increase or decrease total amounts, and introduces a 90-day cooling-off framework for withdrawals, plus digital claiming changes.

Recommendation:

5.1 Support the variation power as an integrity tool, paired with procedural safeguards: published evidence standards, notice and reasons, accessible review, and de-identified reporting on reductions later reversed or increased after fuller evidence (e.g., Change of Circumstances). This mitigates unintended harm from templated or “unannounced” adjustments - especially in community participation and Early Childhood Intervention streams.

Lessons from Oak Tasmania: systems, not intentions, are now the regulator’s test

The Court’s $1.1m penalty against Oak Tasmania (a not-for-profit) shows that the Commission and Courts assess whether provider systems reliably deliver safe support and timely reporting.

What this means for the Bill: Use the new tools, but stage their use, calibrate penalties, and reward disclosure and remediation. Otherwise, the sector risks chilling self-reporting and destabilising complex supports right when participants most need continuity.

Human rights, reasonable obligations, and market maturity

A rights-based regulatory system protects participants when obligations are reasonable and proportionate to resourcing, capability and market maturity—principles repeatedly emphasised in adjacent reforms in aged care. Embedding proportionate, transparent pathways to remedies while avoiding open-ended or punitive obligations that cannot be reasonably met is essential to improve quality without losing capacity.

Recommendation:

7.1 The Minister should table a pricing/workforce/capability uplift statement alongside Bill commencement, linking prices to the Bill’s expanded obligations so enforcement uplift is matched by capacity uplift. (This is consistent with the proportionality approach in the Attorney General Department’s Guide.)

Closing Statement

Aruma supports passage of the Bill subject to:

• Proportional, staged enforcement aligned to a graduated model;
• Penalty calibration to size/culpability/harm/remediation, avoiding ‘stacking’ administrative breaches into existential totals;
• Just Culture protections to encourage disclosure and verified fixes;
• Safeguards and data transparency for plan decreases and shortened information requests; and
• NDIA Pricing, NDIS participant plan adequacy and workforce uplift for participant safety improvement, without collapsing provider capacity.

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