Submission to the Senate Community

Affairs Legislation Committee

Inquiry into the National Disability Insurance Scheme

Amendment (Integrity and Safeguarding) Bill 2025

Author: Alyson Lewis, Propel Pathways Pty Ltd (Organisation submission)

Date: Friday 6 February 2026

Executive Summary

This submission is made by Alyson Lewis in her professional capacity as Director of Propel

Pathways Pty Ltd and draws on direct operational experience within the National Disability

Insurance Scheme (NDIS) across Support Coordination, compliance review, safeguarding

escalation and provider conduct review.

The proposed National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Integrity and

Safeguarding) Bill 2025 seeks to strengthen regulatory enforcement powers, expand

banning order capability, increase penalties and broaden information gathering powers.

These reforms are intended to improve participant safety and Scheme integrity.

While the intent of the Bill is supported, this submission raises concerns that enforcement

expansion without corresponding structural reform risks reinforcing existing systemic

weaknesses within the Scheme. In particular:

• safeguarding failures are frequently only detected after downstream review processes
• systemic underfunding of Support Coordination reduces early detection of misconduct
• pattern-based fraud and misconduct often occurs undetected until retrospective analysis
• regulatory expansion without procedural safeguards risks impacting ethical small providers and safeguarding professionals
• participant safety is compromised when early warning roles are under-resourced

Recent operational experience demonstrates that provider misconduct and non-compliant billing patterns were not detected through regulatory monitoring, but only became visible following detailed document review and pattern analysis conducted at Support Coordination level.

This submission argues that safeguarding in the NDIS cannot be achieved through enforcement expansion alone. It requires upstream detection capability, properly resourced Support Coordination and procedural protections to ensure regulatory power is applied proportionately and fairly.

Introduction, Author Standing and Scope

1.1 Introduction

This submission is made by Alyson Lewis of Propel Pathways in response to the Inquiry into the National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Integrity and Safeguarding) Bill 2025.

This submission is based on direct frontline operational experience identifying provider misconduct, systemic billing irregularities, safeguarding failures and compliance risks affecting participants.

The submission is provided to assist the Committee in understanding how proposed legislative changes will operate in real-world safeguarding environments.

1.2 Author Standing

This submission is made drawing on concurrent professional roles:

• Director of Propel Pathways Pty Ltd, delivering Support Coordination and compliance review services
• NDIS Support Coordinator engaged in direct participant safeguarding and provider oversight
• Evidence-based documentation reviewer identifying systemic behavioural and billing patterns
• Professional engaged in escalation of provider misconduct and safeguarding risks
• Holder of a Bachelor of Laws (LLB), which informs the analytical and legislative interpretation approach applied when reviewing Scheme conduct, compliance behaviour and systemic risk patterns.

Standing is based on sustained operational exposure to real-time Scheme implementation and risk detection, rather than theoretical or policy-only engagement.

1.3 Scope of Submission

This submission addresses:

• Practical implications of expanded enforcement powers
• Impact of regulatory expansion on safeguarding detection
• Relationship between Support Coordination funding and participant safety
• Real-world examples of misconduct only detectable via pattern review
• Risks of regulatory overreach without procedural balancing mechanisms

2. Systemic Safeguarding Reality: Misconduct Is Often Only Detected Retrospectively

2.1 Pattern-Based Misconduct Does Not Present as Single Events

Recent operational experience demonstrates that provider misconduct frequently occurs through:

• repeated low-level non-compliant claims
• provider travel misuse patterns
• cancellation billing irregularities
• staff payment vs claim mismatches
• systematic pattern behaviour rather than single breaches

These patterns were not detected through existing regulatory monitoring and were only identified after documentation review across multiple claim periods.

This reflects a systemic reality: safeguarding failures often emerge through pattern recognition, not single-event detection.

2.2 Current Regulatory Systems Are Primarily Reactive

In practice:

• Regulators often respond to complaints
• Safeguarding occurs after harm risk emerges
• Financial misuse is frequently detected post-payment

This creates reliance on downstream actors to detect systemic misconduct.

2.3 Support Coordinators Function as De Facto Early Warning Safeguards

In real-world practice, Support Coordinators frequently identify:

• unsafe provider behaviour
• emerging exploitation patterns
• funding misuse

• service delivery misrepresentation
• participant risk exposure However, this occurs without formal recognition of Support Coordinators as safeguarding actors within the Scheme’s regulatory architecture. Critically, the current funding structure for Support Coordination directly limits the capacity to perform these early detection safeguarding functions. While Support Coordination is formally positioned as a connection and implementation support, in practice it operates as an early warning safeguarding mechanism within a system where regulatory detection is frequently reactive rather than preventative. Underfounding of Support Coordination therefore does not simply impact workforce sustainability. It directly disadvantages participants. Where Support Coordination funding is insufficient:
  • early warning safeguarding activity is reduced
  • pattern-based misconduct is less likely to be detected early
  • non-compliant billing may continue for extended periods
  • unsafe provider conduct may remain unchallenged
  • participants may remain exposed to financial exploitation or unsafe supports for longer periods. Recent operational experience demonstrates that serious provider misconduct and systemic non-compliant claiming patterns were not identified through routine regulatory oversight, but only became visible following detailed multi-period document review and pattern analysis. This type of review is time-intensive and cannot be conducted effectively within constrained Support Coordination funding structures. In this context, underfunding Support Coordination creates a structural safeguarding gap. Participants who require higher levels of coordination support are often those most exposed to provider misconduct risk, yet funding models do not consistently account for the safeguarding complexity associated with high-risk provider environments.

If early detection safeguarding functions are not adequately resourced, the Scheme risks

continuing to operate as a downstream correction model, where enforcement action occurs

only after participant harm or financial loss has already occurred.

Accordingly, the Committee should consider the relationship between Support Coordination funding adequacy and participant safeguarding outcomes as a core integrity issue, not a workforce or administrative issue.

Underfencing Support Coordination Creates Safeguarding Risk

3.1 Early Detection Requires Time, Data Review and Pattern Analysis

Misconduct detection requires:

• Cross-period invoice review
• Worker payment comparison
• Travel pattern assessment
• Participant service verification
• Documentation timeline consistency

These are not administrative tasks, they are safeguarding functions.

3.2 Underfunding Reduces Early Detection Capacity

When Support Coordination funding is insufficient:

• Less time is available for compliance review
• Pattern detection is reduced
• Participants remain exposed longer
• Misconduct becomes systemic before detection

This creates a direct safeguarding risk.

3.3 The Bill Expands Enforcement, But Not Detection Capacity

The Bill introduces expanded enforcement powers, increased penalties and broader regulatory tools intended to deter and respond to misconduct within the Scheme.

This intent is supported. Strong enforcement powers are necessary where serious misconduct, exploitation or systemic fraud is present.

However, the Bill primarily strengthens the Scheme’s capacity to respond after misconduct has occurred. It does not materially address the system’s ability to detect risk early enough to prevent participant harm or financial exploitation from occurring in the first place.

Integrity Requirements

In practice, Scheme integrity depends not only on the strength of enforcement mechanisms, but on the system’s capacity to identify emerging risk patterns before harm becomes entrenched.

3.3.1 Integrity Requires Detection, Not Only Enforcement

Effective integrity systems operate across three layers:

• Early detection
• Prevention and intervention
• Enforcement and penalty

The Bill significantly strengthens the third layer. It does not proportionately strengthen the first two.

Without strong early detection systems, enforcement will continue to operate primarily as a retrospective corrective tool, rather than a preventative safeguarding mechanism.

3.3.2 Early Detection in the Current NDIS Environment Occurs Informally

Current operational experience demonstrates that early detection frequently occurs through:

• Support Coordinator invoice and documentation review
• Participant and family reporting
• Plan manager claim scrutiny
• Provider peer reporting
• Pattern recognition across service delivery timelines

These are not formalised early warning systems. They are informal detection mechanisms operating without structured resourcing, protection or integration into regulatory intelligence frameworks.

3.3.3 Pattern-Based Misconduct Requires Time-Intensive Review

Serious provider misconduct often does not present as single high-risk events. Instead, it frequently appears as:

• repeated small-scale non-compliant claims
• systematic provider travel misuse
• cancellation billing pattern irregularities
• service delivery misrepresentation across multiple claims
• gradual escalation of non-compliant behaviour

These patterns are typically only identifiable through multi-period document analysis and

behavioural pattern review.

This type of safeguarding work is time-intensive and requires both funding capacity and

system recognition to be performed effectively.

3.3.4 Under-Resourcing Early Detection Disadvantages Participants

Where early detection functions are under-resourced:

●​ misconduct continues for longer periods

●​  financial loss to participant plans increases

●​  unsafe provider behaviour persists undetected

●​  participants remain exposed to risk for extended periods

●​ enforcement action occurs only after harm has occurred

Participants most at risk are often those with complex support needs, reduced self-advocacy

capacity, or reliance on multiple providers.

3.3.5 Regulatory Enforcement Without Detection Reform Creates Structural Risk

If enforcement powers are expanded without strengthening early detection capability:

●​  regulatory action will remain largely complaint-driven

●​ misconduct will continue to be identified retrospectively

●​  safeguarding will continue to rely on informal sector labour

●​  participant protection will remain uneven and dependent on individual advocacy

   capacity

This risks reinforcing the current downstream correction model rather than transitioning the

Scheme toward proactive safeguarding.

3.3.6 Detection Capacity Is a Core Integrity Issue

Early detection is not an operational or workforce issue. It is a core integrity issue.

A Scheme that can only detect misconduct after financial loss or participant harm has

occurred cannot be considered fully safeguarded, regardless of the strength of post-breach

enforcement powers.

3.3.7 Consideration for the Committee

The Committee may wish to consider whether integrity reform should include:

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• formal early detection architecture
• integration of frontline safeguarding intelligence into regulatory systems
• recognition and resourcing of pattern-based misconduct detection
• structured information sharing between frontline actors and regulators

Strengthening enforcement without strengthening detection risks limiting the effectiveness of integrity reforms.

4. Risks of Regulatory Overreach Without Procedural Safeguards

4.1 Expanded Banning Powers

Expansion beyond providers to consultants and sector actors risks capturing:

• Independent compliance reviewers
• Evidence analysts
• Whistleblowing professionals

This may create a chilling effect on ethical reporting.

4.2 Anti-Promotion Powers: Risk of Over-Breadth

If poorly defined, this could unintentionally impact:

• Advocacy communications
• Participant education
• Ethical criticism of systemic issues

4.3 Information Gathering Powers

Shortened response timeframes may create risk where:

• Providers lack administrative infrastructure
• Participants experience service disruption
• Procedural fairness is compromised

5. Criminalisation Risks: Workforce Reality

The introduction of criminal penalties for the delivery of supports in circumstances where registration requirements apply is intended to strengthen Scheme integrity and deter deliberate non-compliance.

This intent is supported. Where individuals or organisations knowingly and recklessly deliver supports outside required regulatory frameworks, strong enforcement tools are appropriate.

The Impact of Criminalisation Measures on NDIS Participant Access to Supports

However, the practical workforce structure of the NDIS must be acknowledged to ensure that criminalisation measures do not produce unintended consequences for participant access to safe and ethical supports.

Criminalisation settings that do not reflect workforce reality risk:

• reducing workforce availability in regional and rural areas
• limiting participant choice and continuity of supports
• disproportionately impacting ethical independent workers operating in good faith
• discouraging entry into the disability workforce due to perceived regulatory risk

The NDIS Workforce Is Not Structurally Uniform

The NDIS workforce operates across multiple models, including:

• large registered provider organisations
• small registered providers
• unregistered independent support workers
• hybrid or transition workforce models
• rural and community-based informal workforce pipelines

In many regions, particularly rural and regional areas, independent workers represent a significant proportion of the available workforce and may be the only available workforce in some communities.

Criminalisation settings that do not account for this workforce distribution risk reducing service availability for participants.

Regional and Rural Workforce Realities

In regional, remote and rural environments:

• workforce pools are significantly smaller
• participant travel distances are greater
• registered provider availability may be limited or non-existent
• participants may rely on a small number of trusted independent workers

If criminal risk settings discourage independent workforce participation, participants in these areas may experience:

• service withdrawal
• increased service gaps

• forced provider changes
• loss of continuity of care and support relationships This is particularly significant for participants with complex needs or trauma backgrounds, where continuity is a safeguarding factor.

5.3 Good Faith Independent Workers vs Deliberate Non-Compliance

There is an important distinction between: Deliberate non-compliance for financial gain and Good faith workers operating within complex and evolving regulatory frameworks. Many independent workers:

• enter the sector to meet local workforce shortages
• operate transparently with participants and plan managers
• rely on guidance from participants, coordinators and plan managers
• may not have access to formal compliance infrastructure Criminalisation frameworks should be clearly targeted at deliberate misconduct, not regulatory misunderstanding or administrative error.

5.4 Participant Choice and Control Implications

Participant choice and control is directly linked to workforce diversity. If independent workforce participation reduces:

• participant choice narrows
• market competition reduces
• pricing pressure increases
• participants may be forced into provider relationships that do not align with their needs Integrity reform must balance enforcement with participant market access.

5.5 Workforce Fear Effects and Sector Entry Risk

If criminalisation settings are perceived as disproportionate or unclear, there is risk of:

• workforce exit from the sector
• reduced new workforce entry

• increased reliance on large providers only
• reduced flexibility in participant support models

Over time, this may reduce Scheme adaptability and responsiveness to participant needs.

Safeguarding Consequences of Workforce Reduction

Workforce reduction is not only a service availability issue. It is a safeguarding issue.

Where workload supply is reduced:

• participants may accept unsafe or unsuitable providers due to lack of alternatives
• participants may remain with poor providers to avoid service loss
• early safeguarding reporting may reduce due to provider concentration

This creates systemic safeguarding risk.

Legislative Design Considerations

Criminal provisions may be most effective where they:

• clearly target deliberate and reckless misconduct
• distinguish between systemic fraud and administrative or regulatory error
• provide education and transition pathways for workforce compliance
• recognise workforce supply realities in implementation

Workforce Reality as a Participant Protection Issue

Workforce sustainability is not solely an industry concern. It is directly linked to participant safety, continuity of supports and genuine choice and control.

A sustainable integrity framework must balance: Strong enforcement against deliberate exploitation With Protection of ethical workforce participation and participant access to safe supports.

Cooling Off Period: Autonomy vs Protection Balance

The introduction of a cooling-off period for participants seeking to withdraw from the NDIS is intended to provide an additional safeguarding mechanism. The intent to ensure that participants do not exit the Scheme due to coercion, misunderstanding or temporary crisis is acknowledged and supported.

Risk Management and Participant Autonomy

For some participants, particularly those experiencing external pressure, financial vulnerability or temporary decision-making instability, a cooling-off period may provide an important protective buffer.

However, the practical operation of a mandatory cooling-off period must be carefully balanced against participant autonomy, decision-making rights and the operational realities of transitioning between support systems.

If not carefully designed and applied, cooling-off provisions may create unintended risks for participants.

6.1 Risk of Delayed Transition to Mainstream or Alternative Supports

In practice, participants may seek to exit the Scheme because they:

• have stabilised and no longer require funded supports
• are transitioning into employment or education environments with alternative supports
• are moving into mainstream service systems
• are relocating or changing life circumstances
• wish to self-manage support arrangements outside NDIS structures

If exit decisions are delayed through mandatory cooling periods, participants may experience:

• delayed access to alternative support systems
• duplication of administrative processes
• unnecessary continuation of Scheme obligations
• delays in financial or service planning

For participants attempting to move toward independence, unnecessary delay may operate counter to the Scheme’s empowerment objectives.

6.2 Autonomy as a Safeguarding Principle

Participant autonomy is itself a core safeguarding principle.

Safeguarding frameworks that unintentionally override participant decision-making risk creating environments where participants feel controlled rather than supported.

For Participants With Disability

For participants with disability, particularly those who have historically experienced reduced autonomy, the ability to make informed exit decisions is a critical component of dignity, self-determination and recovery from system dependency.

Safeguarding should protect participants from coercion and exploitation, not restrict informed and voluntary decision-making.

Risk Of Administrative Complexity And Exit Barriers

If cooling-off processes are not operationally simple, participants may experience:

• confusion regarding exit timelines
• uncertainty regarding funding and service continuity
• conflicting advice from providers or agencies
• extended administrative engagement during periods of transition

Participants already navigating complex life transitions may experience increased stress and administrative burden during exit processes.

Risk Of Unintended Retention Effects

If poorly implemented, cooling-off mechanisms may unintentionally create system retention pressure.

Participants may feel:

• discouraged from initiating exit processes
• uncertain about whether exit decisions will be respected
• concerned about re-entry complexity if needs change

This may reduce participant confidence in exercising genuine choice and control.

Differential Impact On Participant Cohorts

Cooling-off periods may impact participant groups differently.

Higher impact may occur for:

• young adults transitioning to independence
• participants moving into employment or education
• participants exiting early intervention supports
• participants with episodic or fluctuating disability
• participants who have achieved functional stability

A one-size cooling-off approach may not reflect participant diversity.

6.6 Safeguarding Requires Informed Decision Support, Not Delay Alone

Cooling-off periods are most effective when paired with:

• accessible decision support
• clear explanation of exit implications
• voluntary reconsideration opportunities
• ability to expedite exit where participant capacity and intent are clear

Delay alone does not create safeguarding. Informed support does.

6.7 Implementation Considerations

Cooling-off provisions may be most effective where they:

• allow for participant-requested waiver where capacity and intent are clear
• include supported decision-making during cooling periods
• ensure clear and simple administrative processes
• allow urgent exit where participant safety or wellbeing requires it
• provide clarity regarding re-entry pathways if participant needs change

6.8 Autonomy and Protection Must Operate Together

Effective safeguarding requires balancing protection from exploitation with protection of autonomy.

Participants are safest in systems where they are informed, supported and empowered to make decisions, including decisions to exit the Scheme.

7. Structural Risk: Enforcement Without Upstream Reform

Strengthening enforcement powers is an important component of Scheme integrity. Where serious misconduct, exploitation or systemic fraud occurs, strong regulatory tools are necessary and appropriate.

However, enforcement reform that is not accompanied by upstream detection, prevention and system design reform risks creating structural consequences that may undermine participant outcomes and Scheme sustainability.

If enforcement expands without corresponding upstream detection and prevention reform, the Scheme risks reinforcing a reactive compliance model rather than transitioning toward proactive safeguarding.

7.1 Enforcement Alone Does Not Prevent Harm

Enforcement mechanisms primarily operate after misconduct has occurred.

Without strong early detection and prevention capability:

• harm may occur before regulatory intervention
• participant funding may already be lost
• unsafe service relationships may already be established
• safeguarding responses become retrospective rather than preventative

Integrity systems that rely predominantly on post-breach enforcement cannot fully protect participants.

7.2 Market Exit Risk: Disproportionate Impact on Ethical Small Providers

Increased regulatory risk without increased structural support may disproportionately impact:

• small ethical providers
• independent support workers
• regional and community-based providers
• new entrants to the disability sector

Large providers typically have compliance infrastructure, legal support and administrative capacity to absorb regulatory complexity.

Smaller ethical providers often operate with limited administrative support while still delivering high-quality participant-centred services.

If regulatory risk increases without support mechanisms, smaller ethical providers may exit the market due to:

• perceived regulatory exposure
• administrative compliance burden
• cost of compliance infrastructure
• uncertainty around enforcement interpretation

7.3 Ethical Provider Exit Does Not Equate to Risk Reduction

If ethical providers exit:

• participant choice narrows
• provider market concentration increases
• participants may have fewer options to leave poor providers

• price and service competition reduces
• innovation in participant-led service models may reduce This may unintentionally strengthen the market position of larger providers without necessarily improving participant outcomes.

Participant Choice and Control Is Directly Linked to Market Diversity

Choice and control is not only a legal principle, it is a market function. If provider diversity reduces:

• participants may be forced into limited provider options
• continuity of trusted support relationships may be disrupted
• participants may tolerate poor service to avoid losing supports
• safeguarding reporting may decrease where provider alternatives are limited Reduced market diversity can increase safeguarding risk rather than reduce it.

Informal Safeguarding Burden May Remain Unchanged

If upstream detection systems are not strengthened, enforcement expansion alone will not reduce informal safeguarding labour currently carried by:

• Support Coordinators

• participants and families

• plan managers

• ethical providers reporting peer risk Without detection reform:

• pattern-based misconduct may still be detected late

• frontline actors will continue performing informal compliance functions

• safeguarding labour will remain displaced downstream

Enforcement Without Detection Reform Risks Reinforcing the Downstream Correction Model

If enforcement expands without detection reform, the Scheme may continue to operate as: Detect harm then Investigate then Enforce then Recover where possible. Rather than: Detect risk early then Prevent harm then Intervene early then Enforce where necessary.

Section Heading

7.7 Structural Integrity Requires Balanced Reform

Sustainable integrity reform requires simultaneous strengthening of:

• early detection capability
• prevention and intervention systems
• enforcement and penalty frameworks

Focusing on enforcement alone risks creating a system that is strong at punishment but limited in prevention.

7.8 Structural Risk to Scheme Sustainability

If ethical providers exit, informal safeguarding labour remains under-resourced and early detection remains fragmented, the Scheme risks:

• increased safeguarding incidents
• reduced participant confidence
• workforce contraction
• increased regulatory burden without proportional risk reduction

Over time, this may impact Scheme sustainability and participant trust.

7.9 Strategic Opportunity for Reform

The current reform process presents an opportunity to move the Scheme from:

• Reactive compliance enforcement to
• Integrated safeguarding and early detection integrity systems.

This would align integrity reform with participant protection and long-term Scheme sustainability.

8. Participant-Led Contracting: Choice and Control Must Extend to Service Agreement

Structures

8.1 Choice and Control Must Extend Beyond Provider Selection

The National Disability Insurance Scheme is built on the foundational principle of participant choice and control. In practice, this principle is commonly interpreted as the ability of participants to choose between providers.

However, true choice and control must extend beyond provider selection to include meaningful influence over the contractual terms governing service delivery.

At present, the dominant market model within the NDIS is provider-led contracting, where providers draft service agreements that participants are asked to accept with limited negotiation capacity. While many providers operate ethically, this structural model does not reflect the intended participant-led design of the Scheme.

8.2 Market Reality: Provider-Led Contracting Is Structurally Embedded

In the current market environment: - providers typically draft service agreements - participants are asked to accept provider terms - negotiation is often limited or discouraged - participants may feel pressured to accept terms to avoid service disruption This creates an imbalance between the intended participant-led Scheme design and the practical operation of service contracting.

8.3 Comparison to Other Service Environments

In most industries, the party purchasing a service sets the expected outcomes, performance standards and contractual expectations. Employers set employment contracts. Clients set consultancy deliverables. Government sets procurement standards. It is uncommon in other sectors for the service provider to unilaterally dictate how services will be delivered without meaningful client influence over service standards, performance expectations and accountability mechanisms.

Within the NDIS, however, service agreements frequently operate as provider-authored

documents that define service delivery terms, cancellation conditions, charging structures

and operational boundaries with limited participant input.

8.4 True Choice and Control Requires Participant-Led Contracting Capacity

If the NDIS is to operate as a genuine choice and control model, participants must have the

ability to:

• influence contractual service standards
• set reasonable performance expectations
• define communication and reporting expectations
• influence cancellation and billing terms
• establish participant-specific safeguarding expectations

This does not require participants to draft legal contracts independently. However, it requires

structural support for participant-led contracting and normalisation of participant negotiation

rights.

8.5 Safeguarding Implications of Provider-Led Contracting

Provider-drafted agreements can unintentionally:

• limit participant ability to challenge poor service delivery
• normalise provider-favourable billing structures
• create barriers to exiting unsafe or unsuitable services
• reduce participant confidence in exercising choice

Where participants feel contractually locked into services, safeguarding risk increases.

8.6 Relationship to Integrity and Safeguarding Reform

If safeguarding reforms focus only on enforcement and penalties, but do not address

structural power imbalances in service contracting, participant vulnerability may persist.

Participant-led contracting models would:

• strengthen early safeguarding expectations
• improve transparency of service standards
• support early dispute resolution
• reinforce participant authority within the Scheme

8.7 Support Coordination as Participant Contracting Support

Support Coordinators are often the only actors supporting participants to understand and negotiate service agreements.

However, this function is not formally recognised and is not consistently resourced.

Strengthening participant contracting capability requires recognition that contract literacy and negotiation support are safeguarding functions.

8.8 Recommendation

The Committee should consider mechanisms to support participant-led contracting within the NDIS, including:

• recognition of participant rights to negotiate service agreement terms
• development of participant-led service agreement templates
• support for participant contract literacy and negotiation
• regulatory guidance reinforcing participant authority in contracting relationships

8.9 Structural Outcome

If participants are positioned as true purchasers of services, consistent with the design intent of the NDIS, service agreements will better reflect participant needs, risk tolerances and safeguarding expectations.

This strengthens Scheme integrity by embedding safeguarding at the point of service design, rather than relying solely on enforcement after harm occurs.

9. Recommendations

9.1 Recognise Early Detection as a Core Integrity Function

The Committee should recognise that Scheme integrity depends on early detection, prevention and enforcement operating together.

The Committee should consider recommending:

• Development of a formal early detection safeguarding framework within the NDIS
• Integration of frontline safeguarding intelligence into regulatory risk monitoring systems
• Structured pathways for early risk reporting from Support Coordinators, plan managers and participants
• Formal recognition of pattern-based misconduct detection as a safeguarding activity

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9.2 Recognise Support Coordination as Safeguarding Infrastructure

The Committee should recognise Support Coordination as a core safeguarding and early warning function within the Scheme.

This should include:

• Formal recognition of Support Coordination within safeguarding architecture
• Protected escalation pathways for good-faith safeguarding reporting
• Recognition of compliance review and pattern detection work as safeguarding activity
• Integration of Support Coordination intelligence into regulatory detection systems

9.3 Align Support Coordination Funding With Safeguarding Risk

The Committee should consider recommending funding models that reflect safeguarding complexity.

This may include:

• Risk-weighted Support Coordination funding for participants exposed to high-risk provider environments
• Recognition of time-intensive compliance review and document analysis
• Recognition of multi-provider safeguarding complexity
• Consideration of funding mechanisms that support proactive safeguarding activity

9.4 Balance Expanded Enforcement Powers With Procedural Safeguards

The Committee should consider recommending procedural protections to ensure enforcement powers are applied proportionately and fairly.

This should include:

• Clear legislative thresholds for enforcement escalation
• Codified natural justice protections
• Transparent evidentiary standards
• Clear appeal and review pathways
• Independent oversight of urgent enforcement actions

9.5 Clarify Anti-Promotion Provisions

The Committee should consider recommending regulatory guidance clarifying that anti-promotion provisions do not restrict:

• Participant advocacy
• Compliance reporting
• Participant education
• Good-faith systemic criticism

Safeguarding and Compliance Education

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9.6 Protect Ethical Safeguarding and Compliance Actors

The Committee should consider mechanisms to protect individuals acting in good faith to

safeguard participants and Scheme integrity.

This may include protection frameworks for:

• Compliance consultants
• Evidence reviewers
• Safeguarding specialists
• Independent auditors
• Whistleblowers acting in good faith

9.7 Implement Outcome-Based Safeguarding Performance Metrics

The Committee should consider recommending development of metrics that measure

Safeguarding effectiveness, not only enforcement activity.

Metrics may include:

• Early detection of misconduct rates
• Reduction in participant exposure to unsafe providers
• Time from risk identification to regulatory intervention
• Prevention-based compliance effectiveness
• Participant safety outcome indicators

9.8 Strengthen Upstream Detection and Intelligence Capability

The Committee should consider recommending investment in:

• Pattern-based fraud and misconduct detection analytics
• Cross-agency information sharing systems
• Early warning reporting mechanisms
• Structured integration of frontline safeguarding intelligence

9.9 Balance Criminalisation With Workforce Sustainability

The Committee should consider the interaction between criminal enforcement settings and

workforce sustainability.

This may include monitoring:

• Impact on rural and regional workforce supply
• Impact on independent workforce participation
• Impact on participant choice and continuity of supports
• Distinction between deliberate misconduct and regulatory misunderstanding

9.10 Support Participant-Led Contracting and Safeguarding Authority

The Committee should consider mechanisms that support participant authority within service contracting relationships.

This may include:

• Participant-led service agreement templates
• Contract literacy and negotiation support
• Regulatory guidance reinforcing participant negotiation rights
• Recognition of contract negotiation support as a safeguarding activity

10. Closing Statement

The intent of the Bill to strengthen integrity and safeguarding within the National Disability Insurance Scheme is supported.

However, operational experience demonstrates that misconduct and participant risk are frequently not detected through regulatory monitoring alone, but instead emerge through detailed pattern review, documentation analysis and frontline safeguarding activity.

Where early detection functions are under-resourced, misconduct may continue for extended periods before regulatory intervention occurs, increasing both participant harm risk and financial loss to participant plans.

If integrity reform focuses primarily on enforcement after breach, the Scheme risks continuing to operate as a downstream correction model rather than transitioning toward proactive safeguarding and prevention.

True Scheme integrity requires:

• Early detection capability
• Properly resourced frontline safeguarding roles
• Balanced enforcement powers with procedural safeguards
• Protection of ethical sector actors contributing to early risk detection
• Recognition of workforce sustainability as a participant protection issue
• Strengthening of participant authority within service relationships

Safeguarding is strongest when risk is prevented, not only when it is punished.

If integrity reforms strengthen detection, prevention and enforcement together, the Scheme

will be better positioned to deliver on its core purpose: protecting and empowering people

with disability while maintaining long-term Scheme sustainability.

The current reform process represents an opportunity not only to strengthen enforcement

capability, but to build a fully integrated safeguarding architecture that prevents harm before

it occurs.

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