NDIS Amendment (Integrity & Safeguarding) Bill

Number: No. 2

National Disability Services

About National Disability Services

National Disability Services (NDS™) is Australia’s peak body for disability service organisations, and Australia’s biggest and most diverse network of disability service providers. Our valued members collectively operate several thousand services for more than 300,000 Australians with disability and employ a workforce of more than 100,000 people.

NDS is committed to a sustainable and diverse disability service sector, underpinned by the provision of high-quality, evidence-based practices and supports that strengthen, safeguard and provide greater choice for people with disability in Australia.

Acknowledgement of Country

NDS acknowledges the Australian Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples as the Traditional Custodians of the lands, waters and skies where we live, learn and work. We pay our respects to Elders past, present, and future and honour the enduring cultural authority, knowledge systems, and Ways of Knowing, Being and Doing that continue to strengthen communities across Australia.

Contents

About National Disability Services ……………………………………………………………………… 2

Contents ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 3

1.0 Executive Summary …………………………………………………………………………………… 5

2.0 Scope of submission …………………………………………………………………………………. 7

3.0 Market stewardship and reform ……………………………………………………………………. 7

4.0 Schedule 1 – NDIS Commission amendments …………………………………………………. 8

Upholding Scheme integrity …………………………………………………………………………… 8

Part 2 - Increased penalties …………………………………………………………………………. 10

Part 6 - Information gathering ………………………………………………………………………. 13

Double jeopardy and multi-regulator exposure ………………………………………………… 14

5.0 Schedule 2 – NDIA amendments …………………………………………………………………. 14

Part 1 – Withdrawing from the Scheme (Section 29A) …………………………………………. 15

Part 2 – Electronic claims and information requests (Sections 45 and 45A) …………….. 16

Part 3 – Plan variation (Section 47A) ………………………………………………………………. 18

Implementation and regulatory design considerations ………………………………………. 19

6.0 Summary of recommendations ………………………………………………………………….. 19

Contextual recommendations ……………………………………………………………………… 19

Schedule 1 – NDIS Commission amendments …………………………………………………. 20

Schedule 2 – NDIA amendments …………………………………………………………………… 20

7.0 Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 21

National Disability Services 3

• Contact ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 22

National Disability Services

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1.0 Executive Summary

National Disability Services (NDS) welcomes the opportunity to make a submission to the

Senate inquiry into the National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Integrity and Safeguarding) Bill No. 2. As Australia’s peak body for disability service organisations, NDS supports reforms that strengthen safeguarding, uphold Scheme integrity, and protect people with disability from violence, abuse, neglect and exploitation.

NDS is committed to a high-quality, diverse and sustainable provider market that delivers safe, evidence-based and person-centred supports. The Bill is introduced in a context of ongoing and overlapping reform, weak market stewardship, and increasing operational risk for providers. Providers are responding to simultaneous changes across planning, pricing, workforce, claiming, audit and compliance settings, often with evolving guidance and short implementation timeframes. In this environment, the design and implementation of integrity and safeguarding reforms is particularly important.

Schedule 1 – NDIS Commission amendments

Schedule 1 of the Bill substantially strengthens the NDIS Quality and Safeguards Commission (NDIS Commission) powers. NDS supports the general intent of these amendments to deter misconduct and strengthen Scheme integrity.

Effective safeguarding depends on whether reforms operate across the full NDIS market. In the current context, the Bill’s expanded enforcement and penalty powers risk having limited impact unless they are applied operationally to the 94 per cent of providers operating outside the registration framework. A rich compliance dataset exists for registered providers and enforcement activity is concentrated in this part of the market. Without proactive, intelligence-led compliance and systematic detection of misconduct across the full market, strengthened penalties alone are unlikely to deliver meaningful deterrence or improved participant safety. NDS considers that Scheme integrity cannot be achieved unless the amendments in the Bill demonstrably reach the entire market.

NDS also raises concerns about the scale of proposed increases to civil penalties. Comparisons with adjacent work health and safety and aged care legislation are not

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straightforward. The significant escalation of maximum penalties raises questions of

proportionality and true alignment with comparable regulatory regimes.

The Bill also expands the Commission’s ability to compel information and shortens

response timeframes in certain circumstances. While NDS recognises the need for timely

access to information to manage serious risk, sector experience indicates that broad or

unclear requests can create delays and divert resources away from service delivery during

crisis. Clear operational guidance is needed.

Schedule 2 – NDIA amendments

NDS broadly supports the intent of the amendments in Schedule 2, which seek to

strengthen Scheme administration and integrity. However, NDS identifies material

implementation and design risks that may adversely affect participants, providers and

market stability if not adequately addressed.

Key concerns include payment withholding linked to information requests, uncertainty

around the scope of information providers may be required to supply, and the explicit

confirmation that plan variations may reduce funding without clear constraints or

safeguards.

Across Schedule 2, many matters with significant practical and financial implications are

left to NDIA operational guidance rather than being clearly articulated in legislation or the

NDIS Rules. While operational flexibility is important, reliance on guidance alone

increases the risk of inconsistent application and reduced confidence in the Scheme.

Clear regulatory scaffolding and appropriate transition arrangements are necessary to

support effective and fair implementation.

Overview of recommendations

This submission makes recommendations across Schedule 1 and Schedule 2 of the Bill,

informed by member experience and policy analysis. NDS’s recommendations focus on:

• Strengthening safeguarding and integrity through risk-proportionate regulation applied to the full NDIS market

• Ensuring enforcement and penalty settings are evidence-based, proportionate and aligned with comparable regimes
• Introducing clear safeguards to support consistent and appropriate use of information-gathering and administrative powers
• Reducing implementation risk and unintended consequences arising from Schedule 2 amendments

NDS supports reforms that strengthen participant safety and Scheme integrity while sustaining a capable, diverse and viable provider market. With targeted refinements, the Bill can better achieve these objectives.

2.0 Scope of submission

NDS supports strong, fair, evidence based safeguarding that protects participants and sustains a diverse and quality capable provider market.

This submission builds on NDS’s previous submission on consultation for Bill No. 2, and analysis of market stewardship and Scheme administration. NDS provides sector insights and recommendations for key issues related to the need for coordinated reform, sconsiderations of the NDIS Commission Amendments in Schedule 1 and recommendations for each Part within Schedule 2 relating to the National Disability Services Agency (NDIA).

Implementation risks and unintended consequences have been reviewed and recommendations provided against each proposed schedule.

3.0 Market stewardship and reform

Weak market stewardship and ongoing, complex system reform is creating material operating risk within the sector. Providers are implementing overlapping reforms across planning, pricing, workforce, claiming, audit requirements and new enforcement settings—often with evolving guidance and short lead times. Risks posed by weak and disconnected market stewardship, disparate regulatory administration, and uncoordinated reform agendas are increasingly evident. The Bill’s expanded penalties are

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landing in a context where providers already absorb risk and costs due to administrative weaknesses within the Scheme’s parts and the uncoordinated whole.

As stated in the Bill’s Explanatory Memorandum “The NDIS Review concurred that the Scheme is fragmented and that quality and safeguarding is not coordinated or consistent.” Effective oversight requires a system-wide focus on accountability, implementation discipline and outcomes. A clear roadmap of integrated reforms actions is needed from government.

The introduction of the Bill comes at a critical time when quality providers — those who prioritise participant safety, invest in workforce capability, and maintain strong governance — are being squeezed out by a one-size-fits-all pricing approach, significant regulatory requirements, and ongoing reform uncertainty. Costs are not borne equally across the market. Registered providers carry the weight of compliance, safeguarding, and workforce development. Yet pricing does not reflect these investments. Additional regulatory requirements (see information collection in particular) and rising costs (see impacts of increased penalties) will exacerbate quality provider sustainability and further skew the market.

NDS has identified two priority actions that would support a sustainable, diverse provider market. NDS is calling for a pricing supplement to be introduced for supports delivered by registered providers in a cost neutral way. Secondly, any further one size fits all pricing must be avoided and staged differentiated pricing must begin. This can be delivered through current NDIA systems and is a critical first step in implementing differentiated and independent pricing, payment reform and effective stewardship of the NDIS market.

4.0 Schedule 1 – NDIS Commission amendments

Upholding Scheme integrity Risk-proportionate regulation There is a lack of whole of market oversight and transparency. Approximately 94 per cent, around 260,000, of providers are unregistered with the NDIS Commission. This reduces

transparency and limits the system’s ability to lift quality, track outcomes or manage risk.

Upholding scheme integrity requires risk-proportionate registration of the full market, and

NDS once again calls for this in the context of the goals of Bill No. 2.

Implementation within the full market

In the present context, the new measures must be applied operationally to the full market.

Weak market stewardship has directly contributed to service withdrawals, thin market instability and increased crisis responses, while systemic shortcomings in identifying and managing market risk have allowed participant harm, fraudulent practices and misuse of public funds to persist. A genuine approach to risk-proportionate regulation of the full market is required.

A rich compliance data set exists for the registered provider market, with extensive reporting and regulatory intelligence held by the NDIS Commission. Providers’ experience is that this data has driven a disproportionate regulatory focus on registered providers, where minor administrative or human errors attract compliance action and potential fines, while reports of participant harm, exploitation, and sharp practice in other parts of the market have historically received less attention or been treated as out of scope.

Whilst the full market is answerable to the NDIS Code of Conduct, regulation within the unregistered market relies on complaints to the NDIS Commission about Conduct. NDS members, particular those from the Northern Territory and surrounding areas, have expressed concern that complaints about abuse, fraud and poor practice of unregistered providers have historically been dismissed by the NDIS Commission’s officers as out of scope up or seemingly unaddressed (State of the Disability Sector Report, 2022). The operational approach of the NDIS Commission in receiving and responding to these complaints has only started to shift in the last 6 months. To date, of the 224 fines served to the sector since 2020, 205 fines relate to breaches of the conditions of registration. The remaining infringement notices relate to contraventions of the Code of Conduct. Eight of these were to registered providers and 11 to providers of unknown registration status due to names being withheld. On the available data it is plausible that fines have only been served on registered providers.

Part 2 - Increased Penalties

NDS supports the introduction of serious contraventions amendments for ‘significant failure’ and ‘systematic pattern of conduct’ and their application throughout the amendments. The decisions on these matters, and indeed the final categorisation of the action as serious, rests appropriately with the courts.

However, the proposed penalty increases are extreme — serious contraventions may attract fines up to $16.5 million for corporations, with a single contravention attracting $3.3 million penalty for corporations.

$16.5 million and Work Health and Safety legislation

A direct comparison to Work Health and Safety (WHS) legislation is referred to determine the upper limit of the penalty. However, there are key differences in how WHS legislation and the NDIS Act 2013 are applied.

Although actual harm is not required for prosecution, the WHS framework confines the most severe penalties to circumstances involving recklessness, serious risk, or fatal outcomes. This contrasts with the Bill’s application of higher penalties to subordinate legislative breaches without an explicit harm or material risk threshold.

Additional Considerations

Additionally, the application of WHS law does not operate through cumulative or stacked

penalties for the same conduct. Instead, alleged breaches are classified into a single

offence category, with penalty severity determined by clearly defined thresholds relating

to risk, recklessness, or harm. This approach contrasts with emerging NDIS enforcement

settings, where multiple regulatory and penalty mechanisms may be applied to the same

facts, raising concerns about proportionality, comparability and duplication in the context

of a raised ceiling for NDIS contraventions.

Misalignment with Aged Care Act 2024

While the Bill introduces some aspects of alignment with the Aged Care Act 2024, this is

not the case for the proposed penalty increases for serious contraventions. By

comparison, maximum civil penalties for serious breaches of core provider duties in the

Aged Care Act are set at approximately $1.5 million per contravention. This highlights the

scale of the proposed NDIS penalty ceiling and reinforces the need for greater

proportionality.

Economic impacts

The level of potential financial penalties will have impacts on providers who will never face

compliance action or civil proceedings. This includes increased costs of insurance, and

the increased difficulty to secure insurance. Enquiries by NDS indicate significant impacts

for the sector, and the likelihood of some insurance products being either unavailable to

the disability provider market or requiring conditions that providers are unable to meet.

Fines and compliance action can also impact the ability of a provider to successfully seek

loan products for innovative projects.

Limited evidence base for penalty increases

Almost all enforcement matters to date have been uncontested - no jurisprudence exists

to support the claim that penalties are too low. Infringement notices, where they have

been issued, carry a heavy weight. Providers have paid fines rather than dispute the

details, for example, when behaviour support plan delays have related to challenges in

“Cost of doing business”

The existing penalty framework is considerably more than the cost of doing business. The proposed increases would push this balance well beyond proportionality.

In a market where 63 per cent of providers made a loss or broke even, and 81 per cent identify NDIS prices as unsustainable (State of the Sector Report 2025), the rationale provided that the current settings may be seen as the cost of doing business is inaccurate and misrepresents the reality of the market. It also mischaracterises the work and intent of quality providers, many of whom absorb significant unfunded costs to maintain participant safety and continuity of care. Seventy-seven per cent of providers reported delivering unfunded safeguarding supports—such as crisis responses, coverage during plan gaps, and disaster continuity—at an average annual cost of almost $500,000 per provider. These are the real costs of operating within a system where essential safeguarding is not adequately funded and unexpected plan cuts require providers to take on unbillable costs.

NDS accepts that a stronger deterrent is needed to shape the market and deter bad actors. However, the proposed settings carry unintended consequences for all providers and put the disability sector out of alignment with care and support providers.

NDS calls for: - Genuine alignment with WHS and aged care serious contravention penalty settings - Review of higher penalties to require demonstrated harm or material risk, not administrative noncompliance.

Part 6 - Information gathering

NDS appreciates that there are circumstances where the Commissioner needs to seek information and specific documents on a shorter timeframe to uphold the safety of participants and the integrity of the Scheme. These amendments are additions to the requirements for registered providers.

Shorter request periods (section 56)

NDS acknowledges that there will be circumstances in which the Commissioner needs to obtain information quickly in order to assess or respond to potential risks to participants. Providers are already subject to short response timeframes for nonurgent information requests—often as short as five days—and generally comply with these requirements.-urgent information requests—often as short as five days—and generally comply with these requirements.

However, meeting shortened timeframes can be challenging where requests are broad, unclear, or where timely clarification from the NDIS Commission is not readily available. This experience creates legitimate concerns about the application of the amended timelines and associated civil penalties. NDS reiterates its previous recommendation that any requests issued on shortened timeframes should include direct contact details for a Commission officer familiar with the matter and able to provide prompt clarification. Consideration needs also to be given to the work involved in crisis management at the provider level. There is an opportunity to work collaboratively in these situations in place of adding additional burdens and requests that may impact on service delivery.

Information and documents (73F(2)(i))

NDS supports the use of targeted requests for specific documents where they are clearly linked to a regulatory purpose. However, there are risks where requests extend beyond the reasonable scope of a provider’s role, seek information a provider may not reasonably hold or control, or are issued in a standardised manner without regard to relevance or

person centred practice.

Without clear limits, such requests can result in regulatory

overreach, inappropriate demands for confidential or third party information, and

inconsistent application across the market. Clear operational guidance is needed to

confine document requests to material within a provider’s reasonable scope, ensure proportionality, and support consistent and fair use of these powers.

In summary, it is important to note that information gathering changes may have the

greatest impact on day-to-day operations for quality providers. To ensure proportionate and effective implementation, NDS recommends that the exercise of expanded information‑gathering powers and shortened response timeframes be supported by clear Rules‑level safeguards and operational guidance. This should limit requests to information providers may reasonably be expected to hold, recognise confidentiality and third-party information constraints, and ensure requests are targeted at managing immediate risk rather than broad or open-ended document production. Clear operational parameters are essential to prevent overreach, support consistent application, and ensure these powers strengthen participant safety without creating unnecessary compliance burden or service disruption.

Double jeopardy and multi-regulator exposure

The Bill expands criminal offences and civil penalties but does not address overlap with other regulatory regimes, including work health and safety, aged care, and state-based incident oversight bodies. Sector experience already demonstrates the risk of parallel enforcement action arising from the same underlying facts, exposing providers to duplicated processes, inconsistent outcomes, and heightened compliance burden without clear safeguards against cumulative punishment.

NDS recommends that statutory mechanisms that require coordination between regulators before enforcement action is initiated, including an explicit protection against double punishment for the same conduct.

5.0 Schedule 2 – NDIA amendments

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Schedule 2: Administrative Provisions

NDS recognises that Schedule 2 of the Bill is intended to clarify and strengthen existing administrative provisions within the NDIS Act, with a focus on participant safety, Scheme integrity, and more efficient administration. NDS broadly supports the intent of these amendments.

However, NDS considers that several provisions raise implementation and design risks that may have unintended consequences for participants, providers, and market stability if not accompanied by clearer safeguards, constraints, and transitional arrangements.

Consistent with NDS’s longstanding focus on market stewardship and continuity of supports, we emphasise that administrative and integrity reforms must be designed and implemented in a way that does not inadvertently disrupt service delivery, exacerbate payment delays, or shift disproportionate financial risk onto providers. In this context, the practical impact of Schedule 2 will depend not only on the amendments to the Act, but on how key matters are addressed through the NDIS Rules and NDIA operational guidance.

Where provisions affecting payments, plan funding, and service continuity rely heavily on administrative discretion, without clear regulatory scaffolding, there is an increased risk of inconsistent application, delayed payments, and unintended impacts on providers and participants. These risks are particularly acute in constrained or thin markets.

Part 1 – Withdrawing from the Scheme (Section 29A)

NDS supports the introduction of a 90-day cooling off period for participants seeking to withdraw from the NDIS, including the requirement for the CEO to provide information about the consequences of withdrawal and the discretion to extend the cooling off period where appropriate. These measures provide important safeguards to ensure withdrawal decisions are informed, voluntary, and do not expose participants to unnecessary risk.

NDS notes, however, that the Bill does not address how providers will be informed of a participant’s intention to withdraw, or how provider obligations should operate during the cooling off period. In the absence of clear arrangements, there is a risk that providers may reduce or cease supports based on an assumption that a participant has exited the

Scheme, even though they remain legally eligible and entitled to funded supports during this period.

This risk is heightened for participants who may temporarily disengage from supports while considering withdrawal, or who require ongoing assistance to maintain safety and wellbeing during periods of transition. The risk is further compounded where the cooling off period is extended more than once, as providers may have limited visibility of a participant’s status over an extended period, increasing the likelihood of inadvertent withdrawal of supports.

NDS recommends that implementation arrangements, including the NDIS Rules or NDIA operational guidance, clearly specify provider obligations during the cooling off period and establish appropriate notification mechanisms to support continuity of supports until a withdrawal takes effect.

Part 2 – Electronic claims and information requests (Sections 45 and 45A)

NDS supports efforts to modernise and streamline claiming processes, including the use of electronic claim forms. However, NDS has ongoing concerns regarding the cumulative administrative burden placed on providers and the risk that changes to claiming and information requirements may exacerbate existing payment delays.

The Bill enables the CEO to approve multiple forms or representations for claims and to refuse payment where claims are not submitted in the approved manner. While flexibility in form design may support administrative efficiency, NDS notes the risk that multiple or substantially different claim forms, particularly where providers deliver multiple support types, could increase complexity and confusion. This increases the likelihood of administrative errors and delayed payments.

Of greater concern are the amendments to section 45A, which would allow the NDIA to withhold payment where requested information is not provided within the specified timeframe. Although the Bill provides that the timeframe must not be less than

• 14 days and may be extended, it does not specify the scope or limits of the information

that may be requested, beyond what the CEO reasonably requires.

NDS members have consistently reported experiences where providers are asked to

supply information they would not reasonably be expected to hold, where requests are

made incrementally without clarity about what is required to resolve a claim, and where

delayed payments place pressure on providers’ ability to continue delivering supports.

NDS also notes that the amendments do not require information requests to clearly

specify what information is required to resolve a claim, creating a risk that providers are

unable to understand when a request has been satisfied and payments can proceed.

These pressures can have direct consequences for participants and families through service disruption. The risks are particularly acute for smaller providers, plan managers, and providers operating in thin or fragile markets, where cash flow disruption can quickly lead to service reduction or market exit.

NDS also notes that paragraph 45A (3) appears to allow the CEO to approve claims made in alternative formats, including in writing. Clarifying how and when such alternative claim

methods may be used would assist providers to navigate backdated or exceptional claims without unnecessary delay.

NDS recommends that safeguards be strengthened through legislation or the NDIS Rules

to clearly specify the types of information that may reasonably be required to support a claim, confirm that providers cannot be expected to supply information they do not reasonably hold or were not aware they were required to collect, and establish clear processes for circumstances where requested information cannot be provided through no fault of the provider or participant.

NDS also emphasises the importance of a clearly articulated transition period, supported by guidance and system readiness. In particular, plan managers and intermediaries may require system changes to capture new information requirements, which could be significant depending on the final design of the claiming framework.

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Part 3 – Plan variation (Section 47A)

NDS notes that Part 3 of Schedule 2 is described as a clarifying amendment, confirming that plan variations may involve increases or decreases in total funding. While NDS acknowledges the intent to clarify the operation of existing provisions, we are concerned that explicitly authorising funding reductions through plan variations, without corresponding safeguards, creates a risk of unintended reductions in participant supports.

Currently, neither the Act nor the NDIS Rules clearly specify the circumstances in which a plan variation may result in reduced funding, nor do they require such reductions to be linked to a demonstrable and material change in a participant’s circumstances. In the absence of such constraints, there is a risk that plan variations may be used to reduce funding without a reassessment of support needs.

NDS members have raised concerns about situations where plans are significantly reduced without any evident change in participant circumstances, placing providers in the position of delivering supports that are no longer adequately funded or withdrawing services in ways that undermine continuity of care and participant outcomes.

NDS also emphasises the importance of ensuring that any plan variation resulting in reduced funding is undertaken with the participant, with appropriate decision support where required, and with transparent communication about the reasons for the change.

Implementation and Regulatory Design Considerations

Across Schedule 2, NDS notes that several matters with significant implications for providers and participants, particularly in relation to payments, plan funding, and service continuity, are not specified in primary legislation or the NDIS Rules and are instead left for NDIA operational guidance.

While operational flexibility is important, reliance on guidance alone increases the risk of inconsistent application, limited transparency, and reduced confidence in the Scheme, especially where decisions have material financial or service impacts.

Consistent with NDS’s role as the peak body representing disability service providers, we emphasise the importance of reforms that support a quality, capable, and sustainable provider market. A quality market is one in which providers can deliver safe, effective, and person-centred supports, maintain workforce capability, and operate with sufficient certainty to ensure continuity of services for participants.

Clear regulatory settings, supported by appropriate safeguards at the Rules level, would assist in reducing payment delays, avoiding unfunded service delivery, and supporting consistent implementation across the Scheme. This is critical to maintaining participant choice, confidence, and outcomes under the NDIS.

6.0 Summary of recommendations

Contextual recommendations

1. Introduce a pricing supplement for supports delivered by registered providers in a cost neutral way

• Avoid further one size fits all pricing and begin staged differentiated pricing.

• Government, the NDIA and the NDIS Commission deliver a clear roadmap of integrated reform actions.

Schedule 1 – NDIS Commission amendments

• Implement risk-proportionate registration of the full market.

• Apply powers within existing and amended legislation to the full market.

• Adjust increased penalties for genuine alignment with WHS and aged care serious contravention penalty settings.

• Review of higher penalties to require demonstrated harm or material risk, not administrative noncompliance.

• Ensure information collection requests issued on shortened timeframes include direct contact details for a NDIS Commission officer familiar with the matter and able to provide prompt clarification and allow for collaboration where applicable.

• Ensure that expanded information-gathering powers and shortened response timeframes are supported by clear Rules-level safeguards and operational guidance.

• Incorporate statutory mechanisms that require coordination between regulators before enforcement action is initiated, including an explicit protection against double punishment for the same conduct.

Schedule 2 – NDIA amendments

• Ensure that implementation arrangements, including the NDIS Rules or NDIA operational guidance, clearly specify provider obligations during the cooling off period and establish appropriate notification mechanisms to support continuity of supports until a withdrawal takes effect.

12.

Strengthen safeguards for information requests relating to claims through

legislation or the NDIS Rules by clearly specifying the types of information that may

reasonably be required to support a claim, confirming that providers cannot be

expected to supply information they do not reasonably hold or were not aware they

were required to collect, and establishing clear processes for circumstances where

requested information cannot be provided through no fault of the provider or

participant.

13.

Provide a clearly articulated transition period for Schedule 2 changes, supported by

guidance and system readiness, to allow providers and intermediaries time to

adapt to new requirements.

14.

Amend the Act or the NDIS Rules to clearly define the circumstances in which plan

variations may result in reduced funding, require that any reductions be linked to a

genuine and material change in a participant’s circumstances, and include

safeguards to prevent unintended service disruption or unfunded service delivery.

7.0 Conclusion

NDS supports the intent of the Bill to strengthen safeguarding and Scheme integrity across

both Schedules. However, aspects of the proposed penalty escalation, information

gathering powers, and enforcement design, risk unintended consequences if not

accompanied by clear safeguards, proportionality, and coordinated implementation within the full market.

In Schedule 1, concerns arise from penalty settings that exceed comparable care and

safety regimes and the potential for overlapping regulatory action on the same facts. In

Schedule 2, administrative and integrity reforms relating to payments, claims, and plan

management carry material implementation risks that may disrupt service continuity and

shift financial risk onto providers without adequate safeguards.

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Targeted Refinements

NDS therefore calls for targeted refinements to ensure proportional penalty settings,

coordination between regulators, clear limits on information requests, and Rules level

guidance to support consistent and fair implementation. With these adjustments, the Bill

can strengthen participant safety and integrity outcomes while sustaining a capable and

viable provider market.

Contact

• Michael Perusco
• CEO
• National Disability Services
• Phone:
• NDS website

Friday, 6 February 2026

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