
6 February 2026

To: Secretariat, Community Affairs Legislation Committee
Re: Inquiry into the National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Integrity and Safeguarding)
Bill 2025
Dear Secretariat,
I wanted to make a detailed submission addressing life and death amendments we missed out on last
time the moment this Bill was tabled. The fact I am rushing to get any submission completed by the
deadline is a direct result of the overwhelmingly negative impact the 2024 amendments have had on
my life, function, and capacity, as it has on the lives of so many of us.
Last time, we said people would die. We were disparaged for doing so and our warnings ignored.
But dying, they are.
Section 3(1)(a) means developing solutions with us and giving due weight to those we propose.
I therefore put forward these critical amendments, some of which are drawn from 2024 submissions by
legal experts and members of the community, and those previously outlined with my co-authors, with
my views on key elements of this bill. I trust these will be given due consideration and welcome any
opportunity to address these further at a hearing.
Lastly, I urge that this inquiry be extended.
Whilst NDIS Commission matters involved prior consultation, NDIA matters have not previously been
consulted on and go to the heart of some of the biggest dangers not addressed through amendments
before passage of the NDIS Bill 2024.
The proposed amendments to Section 45 should therefore be rejected until such time as the
outstanding safeguards addressed herein are accepted and moved by Government.
Yours sincerely,
Cat Walker
   Cat Walker                           6 February 2026                           Page 1 of 11

Recommendation

The Government move amendments enshrining the following urgent safeguards not addressed prior to passage of 2024 Bill or addressing emerging issues and risks to participant safety or outcomes in implementation by the NDIA

To date, these reforms have been characterised by features which echo or replicate the same malign policy, ignorance of harms and strategic knowledge avoidance as Robodebt.
This is the case even in the absence of any current or future automation or partial automation, regardless of any claims to ‘human-in-the-loop’ safeguards. Such ‘safeguards’ cannot overcome unsafe policies: “Discretion isn’t enough if we can’t interrogate business rules for ethical issues, bias or other faulty assumptions.”
More importantly, the discretion argument is moot if New Framework Planning proceeds without the ability for a needs assessor, delegate, or indeed, the Tribunal, to invalidate an outcome divorced from the reality of a participant’s needs. Consistency ≠ quality or equity.
This Parliament neglected to do its job properly last time. The Executive Government has demonstrated it will pursue the harshest and most restrictive interpretation of these reforms, even to the death of the very participants we said would be at highest risk.
This is your chance to fix it. These amendments are proposed with the direct intent of mitigating consequences warned of and now being witnessed, and other imminently foreseeable harms.

Opposed items of NDI Bill 2025

Schedule 2, Item 5: Proposed ss 45(3A) to (3E)

I oppose this provision for all the reasons highlighted in the few submissions I have read. We require urgent safeguards against NDIA overreach, not greater powers facilitating it.

Schedule 2, Items 11 and 12: Proposed s 47A(1B)(aa)

I oppose such a wide power without guardrails to ensure it can only be used for compensation. NDIS plans are required to be developed with the participant.
This power can and will be used to circumvent that in a manner adverse to the participant, which will inevitably end up in reviews and unmet support needs. At what cost will those “savings” come in the years that follow?

Proposed amendments to NDI Bill 2025 to mitigate current and foreseeable harms, adverse outcomes, and inevitable legal challenges

Repeal ss 10(4) to (8) of the NDIS Act 2013 and substitute the previous definition and boundaries of s 34(1)(f) into s 10(4) as per Supports for Participants Rules 2013

The 2013 Rules were subject to exposure drafts and comply with the CRPD. The 2024 NDIS Supports rules – and to date, any changes to them – were not, and do not.
More importantly, the 2013 rules permitted tailored and flexible responses to individual needs, including support needs which were – and remain – the difference between life and death.
The 2024 Section 10 rules, as we warned they would, have already resulted in preventable death. This Parliament has the ability to fix this with the urgency it demands.

Align Section 10 to the dominant purpose of support by reference to the relevant obligation

Every single member of this Committee – and the Parliaments which will vote on this Bill and passed the last – enjoys the privilege of a principles-based rule subject to a dominant-purpose test.
I am talking about the principles-based Parliamentary Business Resources framework.
It is the height of hypocrisy for Parliament to subject participants to harsher restrictions on the support they require to live their lives with dignity and break down barriers to their full inclusion and participation in society than Parliamentarians are subject to when claiming your own expenses.
Why should NDI participants be subject to rules which demonstrably treat us as second-class citizens less trustworthy with public resources intended for a specific purpose than all of you?
Why were we denied any attempt whatsoever at building existing principles in the Act – and an approach as simple as the ‘Can I Buy It’ checklist into the claiming process – before our rights were stripped on the assumption NDIA participants are more likely to misuse funds they need to live their lives on an equal basis with other Australians than elected officials are, when officials have a substantially lower purpose threshold to meet?

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It is equally unreasonable for Parliament to wash its hands of proper Parliamentary scrutiny of the limits you have placed on the size and shape of our worlds by delegating these prescriptive limitations on our lives to subordinate legislation – at the whims of the Minister and behest of the Department and Agency.
The disability community and legal experts urged a principles-based definition of NDIS support in Section 10, and subsequently, in the Section 10 rules. The Department’s ongoing excuses for refusing this, insisting that Section 10 requires lists of things and services, lack any evidence and are refuted by legal submissions on the 2024 Bill.
Attached to this submission – and I request is published with it for context – is my 2025 contribution regarding Section 10. At the end is the alternative Section 10 my co-authors and I proposed in Submission 183 to the second inquiry on the NDIS Bill 2024. On pages 2-3 are details I lack time to address here, which expose the real intent of Section 10 we were denied the opportunity to make submissions on before it passed in 2024. Our alternative was always less rights-restrictive. Parliament has a constitutional and international obligation to consider such options.
I remain as willing as I was in 2024 to explore the ways in which such an approach could be operationalised for compliance purposes, including at a public hearing on this Bill. The Executive has demonstrated it has no interest in doing so unless Parliament forces them to.

Subsections 28(2)(b)(iii) and 32D (2)(c)(iii) of the NDIS Act 2013 must be repealed; s 34 (1) aa should also be repealed to substitute a definition which aligns with the participant’s overall disability and incorporates the factors in the current legislative note

If the disability requirements at s 24(1)(c) faithfully consider the cumulative impact of all permanent impairments – as we were assured during debate and consultations despite all evidence to the contrary – it should be impossible for an individual to meet both the disability and early intervention requirements.
I lack time to interrogate this at length. I would welcome the opportunity to do so at a hearing, as it is evident to me that many MPs and Senators failed to fully understand the implications of the whole-person issues many of us raised last time.
As this issue cuts across all other serious concerns – and indeed, exposes holes in any purported actuarial forecasts or impacts on other systems – I implore this Committee take seriously the despair and urgency with which the disability community is asking this Parliament to fix the harms of the last Bill before passing this one: It is not only providers who place our lives at risk, but the legislation and the Executive Government implementing it.

Insert an equivalent definition of conduct applicable to the NDIA as Section 11AB and associated equivalent penalties applying to the NDIA and providing redress for detriment caused by defective NDIA administration

The absence of such equivalent standards of conduct and associated redress for participants sends a clear message to the Agency and participants alike that equivalent conduct by the Agency is permissible and participants are not entitled to expect the same standards of conduct or freedom of harm resulting from NDIA acts or omissions.

Cat Walker 6 February 2026 Page 4 of 11

Insert subsection 30(2A): CEO must state particulars of evidence which lead CEO to believe a

participant may no longer be eligible and reasons for proceeding with eligibility assessment

I have further evidence to provide to the Committee in relation to lack of procedural fairness and am out of time to outline this. In summary: This Committee must legislate against the current and ongoing reverse-onus fishing expedition. ‘Improvements’ made to the letters in 2025 have failed to address key issues.
I have additional concerns about inappropriate conversion of s 24 adult participants to s 25 access and potential intent to exit participants needing NDIS support for life out on this basis without any evidentiary basis they will not need ongoing NDIS support for their lifetime.

Insert specific review rights for Sections 45 and 46 into Section 99

In 2024, my co-authors and I stated:
```
    It is extremely concerning to realise that the pre-payment review plan rolled out by the Scalable
 Integrity Responses Branch in recent months – and protections against the scenario highlighted
in this case study – has specifically been omitted from the new powers inserted at proposed
```
Section 45(4), let alone from having an associated reviewable decision.

At present, we have a situation which allows the Agency to be judge, jury and executioner, potentially leaving participants without supports they may well be entitled to, no recourse to challenge the decision, and the risk of being pursued by private debt collectors on behalf of unpaid providers.

The Agency will report this as the number and value of “non-compliant” claims successfully stopped, without any mechanism for the validity of such claims to be scrutinised… Would the Agency be so quick to call this a success if they waited until the payments were made and reported on the number and value of debts raised against participants?

That seems doubtful, and the fact remains that keeping the Agency’s fingerprints off of debts arising from cancelled claims for support already received could have dire consequences such as those we saw in Robodebt.

As the impacted individual put it:
```
      "In addition this episode has taken a toll on my [partner] who has scrupulously
    accounted for expenditure over 10 years and now feels like [they are] somehow at
       fault and also worries if we can't resolve this we will be saddled with the debt to the
     Service Provider (into several thousand dollars)."

    If the Agency believed in the “integrity" of its Integrity program, it would have recommended it
```
be legislated.
```
    It is essential that the Committee recommends amendments to enable scrutiny and legal
```
challenge of this approach, including robust review rights for all decisions that are currently taking advantage of a non-reviewable No Man’s Land to avoid scrutiny of compliance activities…

When all current reforms are being shaped to an arbitrary 8% target, a claimed “error rate” of 5% is a very attractive weak spot to squeeze perceived savings from.

We therefore must ask the question: Is this current program about genuine compliance, or is it going harder as part of an overall push to reach this ultimate KPI through any means necessary?

Recent correspondence shared with me demonstrates that Crack Down On Fraud is morphing into Crack Down On Legitimate Claims for Prescribed Disability Shop™ Assistive Technology.
Predictably, the informal ‘reconsideration’ in the absence of statutory review rights confirmed the decision. The participant is now out of pocket. This is exactly what we said would happen:

At this point, it is worth revisiting the Robodebt testimony of whistleblower Colleen Taylor – awarded an Order of Australia Medal just today – of what she observed when the level of human involvement was restricted in favour of scale and savings, while still in the manual phase…
```
  Ms Taylor expressed her earnest concern, “…as a Compliance unit, we should not be the ones stealing from our customers.” When asked about that comment in oral evidence, she responded:

     “Well, if we know there’s no debt, and yet we’re sending a debt notice out to someone, isn’t that stealing?” 11

  `redacted` 
```
Even in the context of cancelled claims rather than debts raised, Ms. Taylor’s perspective is an important one when discussing the Agency’s stated 5% error rate, with no scrutiny of the risk that some of these determinations may well be wrong, or the consequences for participants who are left out of pocket, in debt or without support if their claims are cancelled incorrectly.
It is therefore disturbing to see in DHDA’s Additional Estimates published today, the note that Other Gains to the value of more than a billion dollars is attributed to “In-kind services contributions from state and territory governments, Scheme payment cancellations, reversal/write back of provisions.”
As we concluded in Submission 183 in 2024:

The Government may have recognised her as Colleen Taylor OAM today, but did they understand what she was trying to teach them?
When it comes to Section 46, and approaching two years after the “media firestorm” my co-authors and I referenced in Submission 183, there is still no evidence the NDIA’s decision-making in relation to Section 46 would withstand judicial scrutiny.
Again, I lack time to reference all submissions and oral evidence of legal experts urging this Parliament to enshrine review rights for the Section 46 “compliance event” – which administrative law expert Dr. Darren O’Donovan explained to this Committee is the “birth of the debt”, among other adverse consequences for participants.
Instead, I refer to Dr. O’Donovan’s plain language explanation of the equivalent Robodebt situation in Rick Morton’s Mean Streak,4 with one important exception:

4 Rick Morton, Mean Streak (Harper Collins, 2024), 175-176.

Cat Walker 6 February 2026 Page 6 of 11

Ryman’s ‘Right of Review’ and Its Impact on Welfare Recipients

Ryman and his team also introduced a new ‘right of review’ designed to trick a welfare recipient into thinking a Centrelink decision could be re-examined by a (usually) competent Authorised Review Officer (ARO).

Under an ordinary review, a customer could test their case internally and then take it to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for a fair(er) hearing. This official step was moved even further away from a person, if they even knew how to ask for it properly.

‘The customer has the right to request a reassessment of income details at any time,’ Ryman’s process map says. ‘A reassessment is undertaken as part of the intervention process. The customer still has the right to exercise the formal review and appeal rights after this period.’

Darren O’Donovan explains the chilling effect of this clinical statement.

‘So unless you asked for an authorised review officer to do a review, magic words right, unless you specifically asked for that you were getting checked by some lackey in the compliance unit,’ his said.

These intentional frustrations mirror the maddening dimensions of K’s ordeal in Kafka’s The Trial. In K’s increasingly knotty legal drama there are no charge sheets and no legal records of the case, because the Court has simply deemed it unnecessary to release them either to the public or, indeed, the defendant or his counsel. That any plea could be constructed at all was done entirely by guesswork, based on inferences drawn from various interrogations which were themselves held in obscure locations hidden in a snarl of staircases and corridors.

The exception is that, as Miles Browne of Victoria Legal Aid told this Committee in 2024, “Well, in Robodebt, at least people could seek a review of their debt. In other words, the Parliament has “simply deemed it unnecessary” for the participant to have any defence whatsoever.
Yet, at the time of writing, and despite my bringing this to the Agency’s attention, there remains a completely false and misleading claim regarding seeking review of a debt on the NDIS website:5

We have safeguards in place to support participants

We understand that managing an NDIS plan can be complex. That’s why we’ve put safeguards and fair processes in place to support participants before a debt is raised…

We consider individual circumstances before raising a debt. Participants can request a review, waiver, or write-off if needed.

This is patently false. This is exactly the process Dr. O’Donovan was referring to in Mean Streak – and while it is no doubt the result of consistent criticism about the absence of s 46 review rights, it has the express effect of lulling NDIS participants into a false sense of security with no formal review right when they get the same answer.
Mean Streak won the Prime Minister’s literary award, and yet NDIS participants are being exposed to the risk of substantially greater debts – or payment cancellations – without the same rights as Robodebt victims to challenge them. Really, Albo?

5 The NDIS supports transition period is ending (3 October 2025). Captured changes available upon request.

Insert an additional function of the NDIA at s 118(1)(bb) to ensure all activities relating to s

118(1)(ba) comply with the CRPD, are ethical, and uphold the highest standards of procedural fairness in all processes relating to participants with regard to disability-related procedural accommodations and vulnerability indicators

While I have highlighted key points, I urge this Committee to review the joint Submission 183 to the NDIS Bill 2024 I co-authored with Uli Cartwright and Kath Madgwick in full.
As the members present on this Committee in 2024 already know, publication was delayed due to right of reply that was ultimately declined. Given what was subsequently revealed about unlawful historic debts raised against participants, this is a conversation we still need to have.
I make this submission in my personal capacity. However, and having now concluded my two-year term on the NDIA’s Participant Reference Group, I will say this:

a. Since we made that submission, I have been involved in approximately six sessions on integrity processes, including debts.

 b. I stand by every concern I have previously raised and the lack of procedural fairness inherent in the Agency’s approach to systems, business rules, and processes which are now rolling out at scale without any independent scrutiny to protect the rights of participants.

c. I have consistently raised important questions in good faith. None of these have ever been adequately answered, including by current and former senior executives.

  d. I do not believe the NDIA can be trusted to self-assess the fairness of any changes made based on the historical debt review. I believe all findings and information it is based on should be made publicly available as a matter of urgency, including to support debate on this Bill.

   e. I do not have any faith in the NDIA’s capacity to prevent harm or self-assess compliance with the NDIS Act or ‘lessons’ from the Robodebt Royal Commission.

     f. I believe review rights for Section 45 and 46 determinations are urgently required and that failure of this Parliament to enshrine them in the current Bill will see harm, death, and consequences amounting to far more billions in downstream impacts and the possibility of class actions, including the potential for misfeasance actions should such harm ensue.6

42. Section 45 and 46 review rights can prevent these predictable outcomes. Refusing to move and pass them again is a choice all of Australia will pay for. The proposed amendment to s 118 would assist in improving accountability of NDIA decision-making enough to render them somewhat less frequently required.

I am willing to provide any further evidence that would assist in addressing the concerns we raised in 2024, that I have been unable to cover in this submission.

Exclusive: Misfeasance case paves way for robodebt action. Rick Morton, The Saturday Paper (31 January 2026).

Cat Walker 6 February 2026 Page 8 of 11

Insert requirement for Minister to comply with Gunning Principles before making further

Transitional Rules under the Back on Track Act 2024 or any category of NDIS rules affecting the rights or obligations of participants under the NDIS Act 2013

44.

The Gunning Principles must apply to public consultation and cannot be substituted for or be fulfilled by DRO consultation alone: Participants and their families have a right to be consulted. As Dr. O’Donovan recommended in 2024:

At a minimum, propose we adapt the standard process of disallowance to reflect a commitment to co-design, scrutiny and transparency. In a scheme marred by the dark governance of closely held or redacted information, an enforceable duty to consult will anchor the scheme’s future in the community not bureaucratic venues.

The duty to consult should reflect the Gunning Principles, namely:

Consultation must occur when proposals are still at a formative stage, not when issues have been predetermined.

There must be sufficient information to give ‘intelligent consideration’

Information regarding the proposal must be sufficiently available, accessible, and easily interpretable for consultees to provide an informed response.

There is adequate time and ‘conscientious consideration’ must be given to the consultation responses before a decision is made.

These are a proven mechanism for upholding the rights of people with disability to agency and impact assessment. They have been judicially recognised as a ‘prescription for fairness’ in policy-making.

1 Formulated by Stephen Sedley QC (as he then was) in R v London Borough of Brent ex parte Gunning [1985] 84 LGR 168. 2 R (Moseley) v LB Haringey [2014] UKSC 56. See for instance: See for instance the United Kingdom case of R (KE) v Bristol City Council [2018] EWHC 2103 (Admin)

45.

Disregarding this recommendation in 2024 as an enforceable means of invalidating rules which fail to comply with these basic tenets, has allowed the Executive to demonstrate it will not only continue as it wishes unless forced to comply, but go to even greater lengths to avoid accountability, as demonstrated in the choice to silo 2025 engagement and cross-sector discussion even within the few parts of the sector engaged (per the graphic on p.6 of the Getting the NDIS Back on Track - New NDIS Rules - Engagement strategy published in February 2025).

46.

The intent is obvious: To keep us all from having any genuine influence until it is too late. This does not comply with the objects of the Act, or indeed, the international obligations at issue.

7 Dr Darren O’Donovan, Submission No 56 to Community Affairs Legislation Committee, Inquiry into the National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Getting the NDIS Back on Track No. 1) Bill 2024 [Provisions] (May 2024) 8-9.

Cat Walker 6 February 2026 Page 9 of 11

Insert requirement for public consultations on subordinate legislation to include full exposure drafts of instruments and explanatory statements

This has not occurred to date: At the time of writing on 6 February 2026, the New Framework Rules ‘consultation’ has been open for two of the planned six weeks with only some of the draft explanatory statements and none of the draft rules themselves – nor has information about the budget method, tool or further information on updates to s 10 NDIS Supports rules.

Insert at s 211(3): A person, body or organisation may submit a dissenting consultation report to the Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Delegated Legislation during the disallowance period

This section should further provide that:

Any such dissenting reports are to be tabled in the Senate during the disallowance period.
Dissenting reports raising human rights issues are to be brought to the attention of the Joint Committee on Human Rights for consideration during the disallowance period.

This section is proposed on the basis that consultation statements to date substantially sanitise feedback received, including on material risks to participants which have since resulted in preventable deaths. I am willing to appear at a public hearing to discuss this point in detail.

Insert a requirement that NDIS rules may not commence until after the disallowance period

It is not acceptable for the disallowance period to be democratically useless if Parliament is reluctant to interfere with implementation of rules which have been delegated to the Executive Government against the Handbook position that “rules which have a significant impact on human rights and personal liberties” and “procedural matters which go to the essence of the legislative scheme” are “generally implemented only through Acts of Parliament.”

All elements of the assessment tool including the PECQ must be published

Insert subsection 32L(4)(ab) to ensure assessors must have regard to information or reports provided by the participant

Proposed subsection 32L(10)

Assessed need for any ancillary support to be funded under the NDIS in order to carry the intended outcome of an NDIS support into effect

Proposed subsection 32L(11)

Requirement for quarterly independent evaluation sampling quality and accuracy of needs assessments, to be published within 30 days

Proposed subsection 32L(12)

Needs assessment must relate assessed needs to findings of material fact with disclosure of any information held by the Agency supporting those facts

Proposed subsection 32L(13)

Assessor or CEO may override needs assessment if reasonably necessary to capture complex needs and/or facilitate a tailored and flexible response to individual needs of the participant