National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 1085
I am an occupational therapist working in disability research and tertiary education. I am also the parent of a child with a milder disability who has never qualified for the NDIS. While my own family may benefit from the development of broader foundational supports, I am making this submission because of my concern for people who currently rely on the NDIS and the risks this bill creates for them. This submission addresses the proposed changes to eligibility, planning and decision-making powers in the bill, and their likely impact on the proper and evidence-based administration of the scheme
My primary concern with this bill is that it is not centred on ensuring people receive reasonable and necessary supports. Instead, it appears to be driven by a cost reduction agenda, with key mechanisms – such as eligibility tightening and the proposed new planning framework – being used as blunt levers to reduce expenditure rather than to improve the accuracy and fairness of support decisions.
The 2023 Independent Review set out a clear roadmap with 26 recommendations and 139 actions, with one explicit instruction: they must be implemented as a whole. This reflected the complexity of the scheme and the need for coordinated, staged reform. The current approach does not follow that roadmap. Instead, key elements are being selected and implemented in isolation, without the sequencing or supporting structures that the review identified as essential. The absence of foundational supports before changes to eligibility and planning is one clear example, but it is not the only one. More broadly, there is no transparent plan showing how the full set of recommendations will be implemented as intended. The proposed changes are also inconsistent with the Productivity Commission’s earlier advice that scheme sustainability should not be pursued through blunt cost containment measures, but through careful, evidence- based design and administration of supports, with ensuring well-being and rights as the overarching principles (Productivity Commission, 2017).
From a policy and implementation perspective, this piecemeal approach creates foreseeable gaps, where people lose support before alternatives exist, and risks returning to the kind of “underfunded, unfair, fragmented, and inefficient” system that the original Productivity Commission identified and that the NDIS was designed to replace.
It also undermines confidence that reform is being carried out in a coherent and evidence-based way. Scheme design and administration should not be driven by targets to reduce participant numbers or average plan values. It should be driven by the application of the reasonable and necessary criteria, consistently and transparently applied. There has been no clear explanation of how those targets were determined based on participant need. That raises serious concerns about whether decision- making will remain grounded in individual assessment.
National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 1085
I am particularly concerned about the direction of the proposed planning framework and how functional capacity will be assessed under the expanded powers in this bill. Functional assessment is an area of established professional practice, supported by a strong evidence base and clinical standards. The detail of these changes is not fully set out in the bill, yet the expansion of discretionary powers creates a pathway for more centralised and standardised approaches to be introduced through rules or administrative practice. This risks reducing the nuance needed to properly understand individual support needs. In the current context, where there are clear pressures to reduce costs, there is a real risk that these changes will be used as cost-containment mechanisms rather than to improve assessment quality. That would undermine the integrity of the scheme and is likely to result in less accurate decisions, more disputes, and increased appeals, adding further cost and strain to an already overburdened system.
This connects directly to another major concern: the lack of accountability for existing systemic and administrative failures. Successive governments have overseen persistent issues within the scheme, including inconsistent decision-making, delays, poor plan quality, and a high volume of appeals. A substantial proportion of those appeals are upheld, indicating that initial decisions are often incorrect. Participants experience extended periods without appropriate support, and resources are spent defending the NDIA and correcting avoidable errors. Multiple parliamentary and Senate inquiries have highlighted similar systemic failures, alongside the findings of the Royal Commission into Violence, Abuse, Neglect and Exploitation of People with Disability, which identified broader systemic failures and set out recommendations that should inform all future disability policy and reform. Addressing these issues and embedding those recommendations should be the foundation of any changes to the scheme, yet this is not reflected in the current approach.
The bill does not set out clear accountability mechanisms, performance targets, or a plan to address these systemic weaknesses. Instead, it proposes to expand and concentrate decision-making powers within the same system, without demonstrating that those powers are currently being exercised in a way that is consistent, transparent, and fair. That raises concerns not only about the present administration, but about the precedent being set for future governments and ministers. The design of the NDIS depends on trust that decisions are grounded in evidence and applied consistently. That trust is currently under strain.
The process itself also raises questions about good faith. The pace of these reforms, the absence of foundational supports, and the limited transparency around key evidence all point to a bill that is being advanced too quickly for its scale and impact. Major structural changes to the scheme should be careful, staged, and evidence-led. That is not what is occurring here. Coupled with reports of hopes to reduce the powers of the
National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 1085
Administrative Review Tribunal, this further suggests a shift away from transparency and independent oversight, and reinforces concerns that these changes are not being pursued in good faith.
There is also a broader issue of how decisions are being framed. Public support for reform appears to be influenced by a strong narrative around fraud and misuse. The evidentiary basis for the larger claim has not been transparently provided. This matters because it shapes public understanding and creates the impression that large-scale reductions are justified on grounds that are not supported by available evidence Further, the bill does little to address these concerns of fraud and .
I also acknowledge that people like my own child, who have not qualified for the NDIS, need better access to supports. Strong, well-designed foundational supports are essential, and the cost reduction targets do at least recognise these supports must be provided elsewhere. But they must be properly established and functioning before any reduction in NDIS access occurs. Otherwise, people will be left without suitable support in either system. Treasury and the public also need to understand the design and comparative costs of these state-based systems before signing off on large-scale changes that will fundamentally reshape where and how disability support is delivered.
At its core, my concern is straightforward. The NDIS should be administered properly, as should alternative disability support systems. Decisions should be based on reasonable and necessary criteria, informed by robust assessment of functional capacity, and applied consistently. This bill, in its current form and context, does not give confidence that this is the objective being pursued. It risks entrenching cost-driven decision-making in a way that is inconsistent with both the intent of the scheme and Australia’s obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Together with the economic imperative, which appears largely overlooked, meeting Australia’s human rights obligations was one of the central foundations of the scheme. Both of these principles are now being eroded.
I ask the committee to consider the following questions.
On what basis has the government proceeded with eligibility and planning changes without first implementing the agreed roadmap from the 2023 Independent Review, and where is the transparent plan for doing so?
How are these recommendations informing the proposed Planning Framework?
What concrete accountability framework, targets, and timelines will be put in place to address the known systemic and administrative failures in the scheme, including the high rate of appeals and the ongoing cost of incorrect decisions, and the systemic failures found by the government’s own enquiries?
How will the right to a fair and efficient appeals process be ensured?
National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 1085
In the absence of clear, costed, and publicly available plans for foundational supports, how can the parliament or the public properly weigh the alternatives before this bill proceeds? What modelling has Treasury undertaken on the comparative cost of these alternatives, as well as the downstream costs of shifting support away from the NDIS into health and crisis-based services? This modelling should consider both the economic benefits that would be lost and the downstream cost shifting, particularly given the established return of $2.25 to the economy for every dollar invested in the NDIS.
I am asking the committee to reject this bill until foundational supports are properly planned and in place, to require full transparency on the implementation of the Independent Review recommendations, to be contingent on clear and transparent information about the proposed Planning Framework, to require the government to release comprehensive economic modelling including downstream impacts, and to establish clear accountability measures to address systemic failures before any expansion of powers or changes to participant access and support are implemented.
We all want the NDIS to be sustainable, for people with disability to receive appropriate disability-related supports, for Australia to meet our rights obligations, and for society to enjoy the social and economic benefits of appropriate disability support being provided. Apart from pursuing blunt cost-cutting levers and shifting costs, the bill undermines these objectives.
References
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. (2023). Working together to deliver the NDIS: Independent Review into the National Disability Insurance Scheme – Final Report. Commonwealth of Australia. https://www.ndisreview.gov.au/sites/default/files/resource/download/working- together-ndis-review-final-report.pdf
Productivity Commission. (2017). National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) costs: Study report (1740376501).
Productivity Commission. (2011). Disability care and support: Productivity Commission inquiry report (Report No. 54). https://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries-and-research/disability- support/report/
Per Capita. (2021). False economy: The economic benefits of the National Disability Insurance Scheme and the consequences of government cost-cutting. https://percapita.org.au/our_work/false-economy-the-economic-benefits-of-the-ndis- and-the-consequences-of-government-cost-cutting/