National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment

(Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission to the Senate Community Affairs Legislation Committee - June 2026

About the Submitter

This submission is made in personal capacity. It does not represent views held on behalf or within my employer organization, as all observations expressed here come from individual professional experience; since I am currently taking an extended leave period independently submitting this document.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 1497

Young People Leaving Care: An Invisible Cohort in This Bill

Late Diagnosis and Delayed NDIS Access

A significant proportion of the young people you work directly supported were assessed as having disability while still under statutory care despite displaying clear indicators throughout childhood. In several cases, young adults received no access until age nineteen or twenty years old. The assessments often occurred hastily without adequate knowledge leading plans either being very large due accumulated unmet need due lack genuine understanding of individual’s situation. This inconsistency is systemic failure gatekeeping assessment functions that precede entry into NDIS The bill does acknowledge dynamic provisions will make worse.

Parental Responsibility Provisions Are Harmful For Care Leavers(Schedule Part)

Schedule One Part Six strengthens requirement decision-maker consider what families parents informal supports can reasonably be expected to provide before approving funded support intent ensure NDIS does duplicate inform networks already deliver. For young leaving system this provision operates vacuum there family safety net available parents supervision personal care transport emotional support assistance daily activities Informal network assumed exists simply doesn’t exist cohort. Legal guardian was State when they leave guardianship ends. Bill contains carve-out acknowledgement reality alternative framework for young whose cannot called upon Applying parental formal-support lens year-old care leaver reduces their costs NDIS removes funds shifts those emergency housing services hospital departments justice Centrelink watched sequence occur It not saves money moves enormous human cost.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 1497

Plan Auto-Renewal Without Review (Schedule 1, Part 5)

Schedule 1, Part 5 introduces automatic plan renewal, replacing the existing practice of plan continuation where it rolls over as an identical copy at its end date but without any unspent funds. For young people transitioning out of care, it’s particularly concerning because this transition from structured statutory environments into independent living represents one of life’s most significant changes that can affect how they are supported in terms of services needed during placement versus those after leaving support placements due to differing circumstances which should be addressed through meaningful review mechanisms rather than automatically continuing unchanged when entering fundamentally different situations such as unstable housing conditions requiring buffer resources like unspent funding buffers removed without replacement.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 1497

training requirements, and in many instances a clear disconnection between the evidence provided and the outcome produced. It reflects a system in which the quality of the plan depends heavily on which planner or assessor happens to be assigned–a lottery that has enormous consequences for vulnerable people. I havealsoobservedprofessionalsconductingassessmentsof,andwritingformal recommendations about,youngpeopletheyhavenevermet,speakensto,orreadbeyondareferral summary.Ihaveseennear-identicalgenericlanguageandidenticallrecommendation appearingacrossreportsforindividualswithentirelydifferentpresentations,histories,and needs.Theseevaluationsformeethebasisofplansthatmaythengovernthesupports availabletoayounghersonyears.SchedulePart3,introducesaframeworkforautomated administrative decision-makingintheplanningprocess.Neitherofthese measuresaddressestherootcauseoftheinconsistencyIdescr ibe.Raisingthereassessment thresholdmeansaninaquateplan,oncainplace,isharderto correctthroughtheadministrative process.Automatingdecision-makingshiatdependsontheproductivityofinputsdoesnot improvethoseinputsscaleswhatevererrorsoriconsistentnessexistsinthearse ssessmentproce s.TheBillshouldaddressplanneraccountability;mandatedemonstratedcompetencyinspecific disability presentationsandrequirerecordedengagementwithclinical evidence.Itdo none of these things. The peop le I have watched conduct generic assessments o f young people theyhave never met will continue to do so under this legislation.T heiroutputswill simplycarrygreaterweight,behardertochallenge , andfeedintoana utomated proces thatproducestheoutcomesatspeedandscale.

4.Lack o transparencyandSupportCoordinationFailuresIhaveregularlysupportedyoungpeoplewho hadnomeaningfulunderstandingofi heirNDIS plan:whatitcontained,whateywereentitledto,hoytheirfundingwasbeingusedor who wasresponsiblefor what.In several instances,I hav ebeenpresentwhenayoungperson discoveredthatasignificantportionoft hieirplanbudgethadbeenspentwithoutthe ir knowledgeormeaningfullinvolvementindecisionsabouthowithewas used.Su pport coordinatorshaavecentralroleine nsuringparticipants understandandcanexercise their entitlements.Imyexperience,thequalityofsupport coordinationforthescott has beendeeplyvariable.Idahosupportcoordinat orswho providegenuine-engaged participant-centred support.Ida alsoobservedsupp ort coordina tors whofunctionprimarily asadministrativeintermediaries forproviders,donotmaintainmeaningfulrelationshipswith theyou ngpeop le onthecereloadsanddonote n surethose young people under standwhat thierplanscontainorthowtheir fundingis beingdirected.TheBilldoesnotsubstantivelyaddressthe qualityaccountabilityort ransparencyo bligations ofsu pp ort coo rdinator s.Forte mostvulnerablepartici pants-those withoutfamilyadvocates , withouthetlteracyorc apacitytoself-manageihheiplans, andw ithoutotherprofessionals activelymonitoringthesituation–this isacriticalgap.

5.ProviderExploitationOfVulner ableYoungPeople

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 1497

Patterns I Have Observed Directly

Over my decade of work in this field, I have observed a consistent pattern of provider behaviour targeting young people with large NDIS plans, particularly those leaving the statutory care system, that in my assessment is systematic and has caused serious harm to individuals I have worked with and sought to protect. I have directly observed or had reported to me by young people I support:

• SIL, SDA and STA providers moving young people between properties without consent, without adequate notice, and without regard for the participant’s expressed preferences or their rights under residential tenancy legislation. Young people are repositioned within provider properties in ways that appear designed to maximise provider income rather than to meet participant need or preference.
• Providers making explicit commitments to young people about accommodation permanency, support arrangements and household composition, which are then broken repeatedly and without consequence. The young person has no practical recourse because they do not understand their rights, often have no independent advocate, and have learned that making complaints produces no change.
• Support coordinators failing to provide basic transparency about plan contents, budget usage, and participant entitlements. Young people I have worked with have discovered significant portions of their funding had been spent without their knowledge or involvement in any decision about its use.
• Workers and assessors writing formal reports and recommendations about young people they have never met, have not spoken with, and know only from a referral summary. I have seen near-identical language and recommendations appear in reports for individuals with entirely different presentations and circumstances. These reports directly influence plan outcomes.
• NDIS pay rates drawing experienced workers away from state-funded services including child protection, youth justice, and community support, hollowing out the services this cohort simultaneously depends on and reducing the quality and continuity of their broader care.

Provider Cycling Through Business Structures

I have observed, on multiple occasions, providers and individuals operating within the NDIS space who, upon coming to the attention of regulators or receiving adverse media coverage, close their business and relaunch under a new entity name –often within a matter of weeks– continuing to deliver the same services to the same participant cohort.Ihave seenthis cycle occur more than oncewiththesameindividuals. I havemadecomplaintsthroughthe properNDIS protocolsin relationto provider conduct Ihave personally witnessedor that has beensreported tomebyyoungpeople Isupport.Inthesubstantial majorityof instances,I amnot awareofofany enforcement action having followedfrom those complaints. Schedule 2 o fhe Bill introducesnew civil penalties , expanded mandatory registration requirements,and enhanced complianceand enforcem ent powersfor he NDIA ( Schedule 2 Parts1 an d2). I do not oppose these measures inp rinciple.However,i haveserious reservations aboutwhether providing additionalpowers t othest e m esameregulatory frameworkthat demonstrably failedt oatxon th epowers it already held will produce materially different outcomes for participants. TheN DIS Qualityandsafeguards Commissionalreadyheld broad powerstoinvestigate registeredan dunregisteredproviders throughoutther periodih ave beenworking in this field.Publicly available data suggeststha therate off enforce mentactionrelativeto complaintslodgedhasbeenasmall fractionoff one percent.The cycling oftprovider businesses ihav

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 1497

Described occurred within regulatory environment.

The Bill does not explain why enforcement culture with additional powers will respond differently: The problem observed from my child protection practitioners’ work includes housing shortages leaving young people without suitable choices but placed under integrity concerns providers due to vacancies when others don’t have availability precisely because reputable ones are at capacity gaining access through these shortfalls rather than assessment suitability. This isn’t criticism individual workers navigating impossible circumstances; it’s an observation about underlying failure no amount provider registration or civil penalty reforms can address while shortage remains.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 1497

From my perspective working directly in this space for a decade, the primary drivers of scheme cost and participant harm are:

• A for-profit market structure that rewards volume and billing over participant outcomes;
• A planning and assessment system that is inconsistent, insufficiently accountable, frequently disconnected from genuine knowledge of the individual participant;
• A regulatory framework that has chronically under-enforced the powers it already held;
• A failure to adequately fund the mainstream services – health, mental health,housing, child protection,youth justice—that the NDIS was drawn into substitutingfor;and
• The near-complete absence of a specific funded framework for young people leavingthe statutory care system who sit at the intersection of disability complex trauma,and systemic failure across multiple services simultaneously. The Bill’s response to these drivers is to restrict participant access(Schedule Partsof Parts 8), raise barriers to reassessment( Schedule ,Part ), automateplanning decisions(), expand the powersof the same regulator whose enforcementperformance generated many problems being addressed.None touches structural causes.TheBill projects $3. billion savings four years.ThesearefromNDISbudgetlineonly.Thereis no whole-of-governmentcostaccounting I have been able identifyin publicly available material accompanying.BillyoungpeopleI work do notdisappear when their funding reduced or removed.They present emergencydepartmentsThey cycle throughjustice sys Theyaccess crisis housingTheir unmetneeds cease exist they migrate other government budgets part calculation.Productivity Commission’s original case NDISThe Committee should ask whether this Bill subjected equivalent analysis if so requestanalysis be made publicavailable.

RequestsCommitteeOn basis observations concerns set out above respectfullyasked Committee consider following:

1 That bill amended include explicitframework recognisingspecific circumstances youth transitioning fromstatutory caresystem including appropriate carveout informal support provisions inSchedule Part individuals legal guardian State2That committee examinewhether Schedule Plan suspension revocation noncontactshould includemandatory minimum safeguards requiring NDIAttempt contact known providers and coordinators before suspending plan prohibitingrevocation ofparticipant status complex needs participants without independent review 3Thatcommittee examinenecessaryreview trigger young people undergoing significant life transitionsincluding transition statutory care living

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 1497

• That the Committee examines whether Schedule 2’s expanded enforcement powers are accompanied by adequate resourcing. A clear account should explain why the same regulatory body uses new powers differently than existing ones held, and accountability mechanisms must include meaningful public reporting.

The Government is asked to present an entire government cost analysis including projected downstream costs o Centrelink state mental health hospital emergency services housing services for participants whose plans will become reduced or access removed due to plan reductions.

The Government needs proof a regulated-for-profit delivery model produces better outcomes compared with notforprofit community-controlled publicly delivered alternatives. The legislation does not address structural reform needed here as part of this bill.

The automated decision-making framework operational detail from schedule three Part two must first be made available publically before passing current form, allowing disability communities assess how decisions are made what data used and how participants can meaningfully seek review on automation results.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 1497

Note: This submission is made in a personal capacity and does not represent the views of my employer or the organization within which I work.