Submission 1640

About Me

My name is Todd Winther. I am a Brisbane-based Australian academic, political commentator, and disability policy specialist. I have an academic background in political leadership, party politics, and disability policy, and I have taught these subjects at multiple universities. I am also an NDIS Participant who has a severe form of Cerebral Palsy.

I thank the parliament for the opportunity to present my many concerns regarding the proposed National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026.

Putting the Proposed Bill in Its Proper Context

As both an NDIS participant and a professional in the sector, I believe these reforms fail to address the needs of participants and the workforce, and their likely practical effects will be highly detrimental. The Bill lacks support and is universally criticised by individuals with expertise or experience in the disability sector. It disregards the Scheme’s foundational principles, which are intended to empower people with disabilities to actively participate in their communities in line with their goals and aspirations. Although there are occasional instances of fraud and abuse by a minority within the Scheme, these do not justify the severe measures proposed in the Bill.

If this Bill is enacted, people with disabilities will be compelled to remain at home and, in some cases, placed at risk, due to the government’s arbitrary reduction of support without consideration of the consequences of this inequitable policy change. Should individuals attempt to engage with their communities, they will encounter limited opportunities to develop their capacity and maintain independence, which was a central aim of the original Scheme, and is disregarded by this Bill.

Instead, the Bill appears to promote segregation, dependence, and the alienation of people with disabilities. If the proposed Bill passes without significant amendments, the NDIS will be reduced to a policy framework devoid of its intended outcomes, effectively returning participants to the marginalisation experienced in the mid to late 20th century, when people with disabilities were often excluded from public life.

The original NDIS legislation was introduced in 2013 under significant political pressure and on an accelerated timeline to align with the then-government’s electoral objectives. At that time, I expressed concerns regarding the implementation of the NDIS as a writer for the ABC’s now- defunct disability portal, RampUp. While the Government enjoyed considerable praise from the media and the community at large, there was limited recognition of the potential economic and political ramifications of rushing the implementation of the NDIS. The current Bill represents a poor attempt to address these initial mistakes, employing overly simplistic measures that fail to account for the complexities inherent in developing effective public policy for people with disabilities. It is far too late to put the toothpaste back in the tube.

Submission 1640

Successive governments of both political persuasions have consistently made policy decisions that have further deteriorated the Scheme throughout its lifespan, gradually diluting its initial benefits. These decisions often receive limited public scrutiny, in part because media coverage has shaped prevailing narratives that are not always accurate.

The proposed Bill continues this historical trend and accelerates it. For participants, the practical effects of these reforms are immediately evident in daily life and will result in dire consequences, particularly in access to equipment and services, as well as in the ability to participate in employment and society. The proposed Bill does not prioritise people with disabilities or their contributions. Their broader economic value is not consistently acknowledged in public policy discussions, as illustrated in this proposed Bill.

It was developed amid hysterical media coverage and misinformation. and only seeks to address concerns raised from this overpowering noise. As a result, the proposed Bill focuses solely on the overall costs of implementing the Scheme, neglecting the economic and social benefits of the NDIS for both people with disabilities, and the wider community.

Below, I provide suggestions for amendments that may mitigate many of the Bill’s negative effects, although they will not eliminate them entirely, which would be the ideal outcome. Even if these amendments are adopted, people with disabilities will still be subject to the decisions of policymakers, many of whom lack a comprehensive understanding of the impact their choices have on this community.

Governance Structures

The limited timeframe for responding to this Bill, given that the Government has been developing it for some time, is frustrating. This echoes similar problems that arose when amendments to the NDIS legislation were proposed and then passed in 2024.

The Bill’s broad rule-making powers give the Minister too much power, which can be subject to the political issues of the moment. The absence of appropriate safeguards to provide checks and balances to these unfettered powers undermines trust and impedes effective co-design, which the government identifies as a core value in developing policies with and for people with disability.

The Government has not implemented the Royal Commission into Violence, Abuse, Neglect and Exploitation of People with Disability (the DRC) proposal for a dedicated federal department, which represented a significant governance reform. The DRC recommendation was intended to provide disability policy with a distinct identity, increased political influence, and leadership by individuals with lived experience. The federal government’s decision to “note” rather than accept this recommendation reflects its approach to the legislation. Evidently, lived experience and the practical implications of these changes have not been sufficiently considered.

Rein in the Minister’s Funding Cut Power

Submission 1640

The Bill grants the Minister authority to impose unilateral, percentage-based reductions on participant support budgets. This is designed to achieve broader political and economic objectives unrelated to the NDIS, without consultation with the Scheme’s many stakeholders. This power, which is designed to be used at a time of their choosing, will result in the Minister reducing all participants’ funding by a fixed percentage, irrespective of individual circumstances or assessed needs, for reasons outside participants’ control.

The Minister already possesses targeted powers, including the ability to set maximum funding limits across specific budget line items. This power relies on evidence-based decision-making, rather than on unilateral authority to achieve short-term political gains. Granting such significant authority to a single political actor, who can directly ration support already deemed necessary under legislative criteria, and agreed upon by the majority of political parties, poses substantial risks and undermines basic democratic principles. It also renders the “Reasonable and Necessary” legislative test that determines what should be funded in a participant’s plan utterly pointless.

The political overreach in the proposed Bill is susceptible to exploitation, as it may be exercised at any time and for any reason without input from individuals with disabilities or their supporters. Morally, this approach also contradicts the disability sector’s timeless slogan of “Nothing about us, without us.” Politically, it undermines the development of the “New Framework” planning model, extensive consultation with NDIS providers, and the contributions of NDIS participants.

If specific funding reductions are necessary, the power to enforce these should be incorporated into primary legislation. This process would enable parliamentary debate, allow community members to express support or objections, and permit Members of Parliament to vote, holding them accountable for these enormous decisions.

Change of Circumstances Restrictions

There are multiple concerns about new restrictions on when and how participants can seek changes to their plans. It is a crude attempt to reduce ‘Intraplan Inflation’. While this is necessary in some instances, these proposed changes are like lighting a match to set the whole process ablaze.

The Bill needs to be amended to address the following: - Eliminating the ability to appeal decisions that participants consider unsatisfactory leaves individuals without recourse. This may lead to reliance on outdated plans for up to 90 days. - The “unanticipated” test excludes cases in which certain aspects of a circumstance were anticipated and funded, but the situation subsequently deteriorated. For example, this could occur if a tenancy ends unexpectedly, or if an informal supporter’s post-operative recovery is prolonged.

Submission 1640

• Requiring that non-medical changes of circumstance be classified as “ongoing” imposes an excessive evidential burden in situations characterised by uncertainty or evolving change.
• Critically, the proposed Bill fails to recognise that life circumstances can shift rapidly due to unforeseen events.

Fix the materially ‘improve or alleviate’ clause designed to limit access to the NDIS

The Bill proposes that if any treatment can “materially improve or alleviate” someone’s impairment, they may be disqualified from the NDIS until they have tried it. This test to access the Scheme sets the bar far too high. Under this logic, someone could be denied NDIS access simply because a treatment offers modest improvement in one aspect of their condition, even if they remain significantly disabled overall and still clearly need support. This, for example, could include someone with a psychosocial disability whose symptoms improve temporarily because of electroconvulsive or ketamine therapy that treats their impairment for a short, fixed period.

This clause overlooks the Scheme’s original purpose: to apply a meaningful “severity test” to determine whether someone’s disability is serious enough to warrant the NDIS. Instead, the Bill creates uncertainty and fear, leaving people in limbo across mainstream services and so-called foundational supports, many of which have yet to be developed, until every possible treatment has been exhausted and every aspect of their impairment has fully stabilised.

The eligibility test should instead be amended so that a person is asked to try a treatment only if it could plausibly lift all their affected life areas above the threshold for needing the NDIS, rather than just improve things somewhat in one area. In other words, treatment should be a prerequisite only if it could genuinely eliminate the need for the NDIS altogether.

The Bill would deny NDIS access on the basis that they have not tried a particular treatment, even if that treatment is expensive (and not covered through the public health system), rare, or geographically inaccessible. This disproportionately harms people in regional and remote areas, people on low incomes (which proportionally describes most NDIS participants), who face real-world barriers to accessing health care that city-based or wealthier applicants do not.

The intent of this clause is clear: to find a lawful way to reduce the number of existing participants without developing a safe and secure policy alternative.

Return to the Concept of the “Whole Person”.

The Bill introduces a requirement that NDIS support needs must “directly arise from” a person’s qualifying impairment. This fundamental change undermines the purpose of the NDIS and will cause serious harm for two reasons.

Submission 1640

First, it imposes arbitrary distinctions with no practical basis. A person’s disability needs are shaped by who they are as individuals and how they live. This can include their environment, finances, support network, employment, and social preferences. Attempting to separate what is “directly” caused by impairment from an individual’s life circumstances results in unfair, inconsistent decisions.

Second, this test disadvantages participants who are already vulnerable, especially participants with complex, chronic conditions or multiple disabilities. These groups of participants often need the NDIS the most. They are less likely to have detailed medical evidence to prove eligibility.

This creates a two-tiered system in which people with the most evidence succeed, rather than one based on support needs.

The NDIS was designed to support a person based on individual needs: it should consider the whole of a person’s life and reality, because that is where outcomes can be achieved. Support plans that ignore housing, support networks, or financial stress will not work, no matter their design.

In its early development, the NDIS was designed to consider several elements of a participant’s life. These included their health, social context, and circumstances in support planning.

Removing these, as proposed in the Bill, means complex clients receive generic plans that don’t match their situation and won’t deliver results. This cookie-cutter approach completely disregards individual experience.

If the NDIS framework is not based on capacity building and limits attempts to strive for independence, the Scheme will face repeated cycles of cost-cutting in all the wrong places, as this Bill does.

Conclusion

Ensuring participants have authentic power, visibility, and voice in the proposed Bill is non-negotiable. We are the experts in our own lives, and our expertise must drive this process. Independent oversight, transparent data, and public reporting are also essential. These are compulsory elements to policy making in the disability sector. When used effectively, these measures would help the government address the very problems this poorly designed Bill aims to fix. If the proposed Bill passes without significant amendments and real input from people with disabilities, we will be forced to continually repair NDIS legislation well beyond this government’s term, and for decades to come. This would make the NDIS the biggest policy failure in Australian democracy.