Submission to the Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs (Legislation Committee)

Inquiry into the National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

From: Lee Knights, Senior Process Engineer, Autistic adult, parent of two Autistic children, current NDIS participant, resident of South Guildford WA 6055 (federal electorate Hasluck; sate electorate Midland).

Date: June, 2026

Synopsis

I am writing as directly affected individual. I Am An autistic adult And current ndis Participant. i Am A Parent Of Two autistics Childrens. The bill In its Current form Will land On my family In three distinct ways: directly ON me As an existing Adult participant; directly ON My fourteen-year-old daughter AS AN Existing cohort participant Facing reassessment Under an unnamed instrument; and structurally ON MY sixteen year old son who Is autism but not currently a participant By narrowing The eligibility pathway available To him in THE 16-to-17 Cohort For which no replacement supports program has been announced.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079

from support. I ask the Committee to weigh the Bill on that effect, not on the framing around it.

I welcome the Committee’s inquiry.I submitthis evidenceinsupportofthree things: • Omit Schedule l ‘s eligibility-tightening provisions fromth eBill.The existing evidence base—theDisability Royal Commission,theNational Autism Strategy\n \t - 31 ,The IndependentNDIS Review(BonyhadyandPaullO), The ProductivityCommissionZOO4 foundational supports paper,andthe still-active EvidenceAdvisoryCommitteeThird Round Consultation—does notsupporthem . • DeferSchedule Z until after th eJoint Standing Committeeonthen DIDS Integrityofof theN ational Disabilit y Insuranc escheme inqu ry reportsonzJuly z026.T he inquiry’ s recommendations should then be integrated intotheschedule Z design, andtheadm ishedschedulezbroughtbackforsubstantivecommunityconsultationunder“nothing about us withoutus”principles.
• Omitschedule 3 f rom t h ebill,ongrounds ofMinisterialoverreachinth enew pricing decision-maker modelandsignificantparticipant safety risksinthe automation o fa dministrative action under new s.z9B tosz9D. The three Schedules operate on different evidence bases andrequire separate procedural treatment.Th ec linical evidenc ebase, ta ssessment instruments,t a ndth ereplacementsupports programs that Schedule l assumes do n ot exist,a renot publicly named are no tfunded anda renot demonstrably ready—andont eh evidenceinthis submission\nschedule1is incompatible withthestatutoryand treaty foundations ont whicht henDISIrestsonfourdistinct grounds:the ne w sz(1)(d) Objects clause amendment subordinating reasonable-and-necessary supports ta fo r financial sustainability; \ne ns .9 B functional capacity definitionthat excludes environmentalanda nd personal circumstances,inverting the CRPD Article I socialmodeltha nt N DIS ActZ0lzs.s.(a ) commits th escheme togiv eeffectto ; th ewhole sale removalofthesz.lPrincip les relatingtoplan sa tSchedule Z Part6,strippingsthes tatutary framework for supporteddecision-making and community inclusion againstCRPDArticles 2 and z9;z an dt hene ws.5A(z)c odification of income-ana nd- geographic regressivityagainstthen Disability DiscriminationAct ZZo2an d then National AgreementonClosingThe Gap commitments.

I have prepared thissubmissionwiththead assistance o fa ccessibility tools ,as thee Committee invites participants todo where required.The substantive arguments,lived experience,factual claims,andprimary-source verificationare mine.A full disclosure onth euseoft he stools is atcloseth issubmission.

Section structure\nThe submissionistructuredin fourparts.Sec tion s landt wo sit as introductory material—personal contextands tand ing,

w hattheBilldoes,h owitlandsont myfamily,a ndt ahe asksataglance.Parts A,B anda C setoutthest casefortreatingeachot eh Bill’sthree

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079

Schedules separately, mirroring the separability of their evidence bases and procedural treatment. Part D collects cross-cutting evidence, procedures concerns, recommendations to the committee.

• Personal context & standing – family triple-take * This section* What this bill does; why it lands with my family at a glance

A - Schedule I: The case Against eligibility tightening provisions

Schedule’s one’s eligibility tightening applies scheme-wide across all ages Section five addresses fourteen-year-old daughter specifically in cohort nine-to fifteen. Permanence-and-treatment test new s34(5), s25B and S25A apply to all ages including sixteen year old son pathway sixteen through seventeen plus own eighteen-plus path way. The clinical-evidence vacuum permanence-and-treatment test in new s.s24(5) s25(B)and s.S25a The diagnostic-language critique low moderate support needs against DSM-5 Independent NDIS Review national autism strategy peak clinical bodies The ninety-nine to fifteen cohort plan-reassessment renewal provisions new s48A And s50A Structural under-subscription NDIS disabled community funding below cost provisions In new sss34A ss32K (C)And s 45c Statutory inconsistency discrimination objects clause amendment new s9b CRPD Article social model wholesale removal of principles relating plans schedule part Six articles twelve nineteen and new sS25A(2) DDA CRPD National Agreement on Foundational Supports commitment Closing the Gap Direct contradictions Government-commissioned reviews on Schedule One NDIS review, National Autism Strategy Disability Royal Commission Evidence Advisory Committee Third Round Consultation Productivity Commission House Committee Inquiry into Thriving Kids initiative substantiation Minister’s Royal Commission claim Explanatory Memorandum

B - Schedule Two: Wait for JSC NDIS Integrity inquiry

What does well integrity-rhetoric mismatch Schedule two launch-era expert lineage – productivity commission establishment academic critiques quasi-market failure Quality Safeguards Commission’s audit Office Audit

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment Bill Submission

Part C - Schedule 3: Ministerial overreach and participant safety

• Part I: Ministerial overreach in new pricing decision-maker model under s. Schedule 3 Part II: Automation administrative action evaluative determinations under ss., Robodebt Royal Commission findings against

Cross-cutting evidence, procedural concerns,

Economic impact assessment cost benefit analysis lineage across every public-service system family worked example missing Regulation Impact statement BP spending-to-revenue ratio gas-tax counterfactual

Procedural convergence critique Senate Legislation Committee sixteen days before JSC NDIS Integrity inquiry reports own evidence base Disability Representatve Organizations Joint Statement April 2026 multi-party consensus inadequate Butler office auto acknowledgement Mosman Park case broadcaster architecture observation

Recommendation to committee conclusion Disclosure annexes key primary source reference

Section 1 - Personal context and standing: The family triple-take

I am a Senior Process Engineer based in South Guildford, Western Australia, in the federal electorate of Hasluck and the state electorate of Midland. I am Autistic and late-diagnosed.

My professional life as an NDIS participant:

As part of my current participation with National Disability Insurance Scheme participants who work within chartered professions since well before diagnosis, your submission highlights how being diagnosed autistic shapes experiences across lifespan due absence supports available throughout it. The Bill will land on me directly through existing adult cohort at age +8 years old where scheme provides essential support enabling paid employment which has been maintained despite severe burnout period otherwise ending career. My daughter’s education continues online learning supported by NDIS program while son sits boundary eligibility tightening provisions exposed to lack replacement programs needed should his needs escalate. Daughter is most affected overall her peer group faces gap new eligibility tests apply no assessment instrument publicly named for their age band nor announced replacement program exists.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment Bill

Submission: [2079]

treatments do not exist; vacuous reading admits all because there is nothing to exhaust. The gateway being deployed tightens intent exclusionary argument Section3. Second — daughter existing fourteen-year-old participant cohort:

• Triple gap reform package scheme-wide eligibility test applies, named assessment instrument public Thriving Kids excluded age band; labeled disability-sector commentary I-CAN ages sixteen above; thirteen state-delivered methodology worked up nine-to-fifteen neither. she reassessed plan review unnamed instrument same permanence test no announced safety net if she does gate supports currently receives continued education possible would withdrawn develop Argument section5 Third son structurally sixteenth non-participant eighteen- cohort Autistic but NDIS participant support arrangements today none from NDIS materially narrows access pathway escalation needs apply new regime with no announced foundational supports program available alternative These three positions abstractions reality daily family life arguments grounded those three positions broader evidence base Government’s published Budget papers peer-reviewed clinical literature peak-body submissions credentialed third-party economic analysis substantive rely figures dates quotations cited primary sources independently verified originals make submission personal capacity views expressed mine represent employer.

Section 2 - What the Bill does and how it should be measured

This submission is structured in four parts. Part A makes the case against Schedule 1’s eligibility-tightening provisions on the basis of existing evidence base – Disability Royal Commission; National Autism Strategy 2025-31; independent review findings from the Evidence Advisory Committee Third Round Consultation Part B argues to hold over until after Joint Standing Committee report date of July 2nd, schedule recommendations are integrated into design amended schedule brought back for substantive consultation. Part C sets out arguments against Ministerial overreach new pricing decision-maker model funding cap architecture significant participant safety concerns automation administrative action evaluative determinations latter Robodebt Scheme findings. Part D covers cross-cutting evidence procedural issues full list recommended actions committee structure mirrors three procedures I ask you consider.

between them\n> support (Securing NDIS Future Generations) Amendment (National Insurance Scheme Disabiliy Insurancce 2026 Submission

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment

Submission: [NDIS Amendement](Securing NDIS Future Generations) Submission No.: [2079]

The document assumes an unclarity which this submission does not demonstrate. The bill falls short with respect each commitment, on terms alone—and even worse so regarding second/third commitments—on their goals themselves being wrong. A note about terminology before I address them individually: schedule three part two introduces under new s59B through Ss69D a structure of automated administrative action—including automation involving discretion/evaluative judgement/state-of-mind applied to participants whose engagement with bureaucratic processes is structurally affected due to disability.The Royal Commission into Robodebt made specific findings related participant-safety risks associated exactly such architecture & external accountability safeguards were necessary.Bill’s internal-process safeguarding measures are CEO Oversight rather than statutory notification or independent oversight as per Robodebt commission’s recommendations.I refer throughout my submission to schedule Three Part Two architecture as ‘RoboNDIS’ in anticipation framing any post-failure investigation likely use on Robodebt precedent.See Section 13 for full development of safety case.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 2079

enabling the Minister to set funding below cost (new s.34A, s.32K(3C), new s.45C). Neither mechanism distinguishes between rorts that would be removed under an affordability frame versus those that are reasonable-and-necessary.

The fiscal asymmetry within $378 billion four-year NDIS reduction announced alongside revenue concessions that could replace industry-revenue measures—set out further—is supported with three Government-commissioned analyses of net economic benefit over fifteen years: PC 2011; PC 2017 Taylor Fry 2023); none support existing scheme’s negative net economic benefits No updated analysis has been published yet.

On making eligibility requirements clearer:

The premise is unclear whether current access criteria at ss.s.21-ss.s.27 and the reasonableness criterion @s.ss.s.34 require clarification as per Explanatory Memorandum which cites no participant survey or feedback data on these provisions’ clarity. The reform rationales focus instead upon costs, growth & alignment w/NDIS Review structural recommendations rather than clarifying ambiguous provisions. Schedule I imposes stricter tests through ss.new_s_24(5) , S.SS.(1B) & SS.SSS.A - permanence-treatment-exhaustion gateway - lacks foundation in DDAA 92 s.4 definition of disability nor CRPD Article l definition. It also lacks clinical evidence base endorsement from Australian medical colleges peak bodies. For autism other impairment categories it appears clinically inconsistent face RoboNDIS automation evaluative determinations does not clarify but automate decisions more dangerous precedent Robodebt . Bill substitutes tightening for clarification substituting automation transparency Section 3 develops clinical-evidence vacuum Section 3&Section 5 critiques eligibility test Section 13 examines RoboNDIS architecture case.

On delivering quality services supports participants Bill’s substantive provisions operate opposite direction commitment too. Schedule reduces

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment Bill

Submission: [2079]

participation by approximately [number] existing participants on projection, prefers entry without joining. fewer receiving supports not delivery to participants. New s.[numbers], authorise Minister set funding below cost—providers paid cannot deliver quality services indefinitely; relying categories expect remaining available. Schedule Part removes Principles relating plans wholesale stripping statutory participant-centred supported decision-making community inclusion planmaking process architecture gives “supports” commitment its shape. Schedule concentrates pricing discretion in beyond independent-monitoring Productivity Commission’s report contemplated. Schedule automates evaluative judgement administrative action against cohort whose engagement with bureaucratic processes structurally affected disability each moves away from fourth commitment toward it measured minister four commitments opposite direction Measured question a drafted response disability does engage at all asks head submission evidence Government own commissioned work, structural choices supports What the Bill does Schedule eligibility tightening across whole scheme introduces three interconnected provisions narrowing access NDIS January imposes identical permanence-and-treatment test both requirements early intervention pathways providing that “an impairment or impairments are permanent unless (a) person has undertaken appropriate treatment for any other treatment is unlikely to materially improve reverse alleviate impact of impairs and c) impairments likely persist lifetime.” Defines includes subsection 25A(2) explicit provision remains

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079 give effect to – places at the centre of how disability is constituted. The full statutory and treaty inconsistency is developed in Section 7. A scheme-wide gating to alternative supports is added in new ss.25B; Objects clause amended as per Act’s amendment on new s3(1)(d); reasonable-and-necessary supports subordinated towards “financial sustainability”; funding authorized below actual costs via new ssss:4AA, :32K(3C), & C45C authorizes ministerial set-up for groups undercosts. Schedule I Part VI removes wholesale plans principles—statutory framework governing supported decision-making and community inclusion left with fragments intact. Combined operative effect cited in public reporting shows a reduction approximately existing participants by about 160k within decade, preventing entry nearly another 140 who would otherwise join.

Provider-side reforms and integrity measures introduced through schedule two:

schedule introduces substantial provider-side reform package including narrowed definition of NDIS providers in new s.:10C extension regulatory powers act monitoring investigation regime national disability insurance agency civil penalty provisions parallel penalties criminal offences plan management support coordination commissioning protection against participant overcharging broadly aligned ndis taskforce report three key concerns raised before jsc inquiry reports scheduled committee review concludes before findings available partial subset registration recommendations universal architecture from recommendation worker registration complaints process four-tier framework launch-era expert critique thin markets workforce capacity market stewardship placed public record ndis quality safeguards commission body exercising substantive regulatory functions expanded publicly characterized under-resourced

Pricing decisions automation included as part Three

currently introducing two distinct changes. Part one makes the Minister pricing decision-maker for supports under new s:ss.45C adjacent provisions discretion to set maximum amounts payable intensity ceilings ratios operate regardless cost or needs identified clinical care professional assessment minister has no statutory requirement hold consult qualifications making those determinations; Part Two RoboNDIS—introduces statutory authority via ss:59B-ss:59D automating administrative action evaluative determination involving

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment

Submission: [NDIS] Securing Future Generations Bill - Submission No.: 79

Discretion, Evaluative Judgement & State Of Mind

Discretionary powers are concentrated within Ministers rather than independent monitoring structures as outlined under Productivity Commission’s ‘Costs’ report from 2017. Automation provisions operate near participant safety risk areas highlighted during Royal Commission into Robodebt scheme findings made specific about these risks at Section 12 for Ministerial overreach case; Participant Safety Case in section 13 discusses Schedule 3 omission due either ground.

Definition Against Which The Bill Is Operating

A key issue with definitions runs through this bill which Explanatory Memorandum does not address substantively: The Statement of Compatibility engages CRPD Article(4)(3), but fails against new s.(9B) functional capacity definition; does also fail against DDA s.(4); same goes for Australia’s primary domestic disability statute defined via DDA s.(4). Australia is a party to UN Convention on Persons With Disabilities (CRPD). It defines disability broadly including long-term impairments that hinder full and effective participation. NDIS Act commits the scheme towards fulfilling obligations per CRPD. Neither DDA nor CRPD define disability contingent upon treatment or alleviation thereof, or unavailability of remedy. Bill introduces permanence-and-treatment test alongside Functional Capacity Definiton, both lacking foundation across Australian Disability Framework. Schedule One operates contrary to recognized framework defining disability under Australian law.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079

Persons with Disabilities Article 1 definition,

which NDIS Act 2013 s.3(a) commits the scheme to give effect. schedule). Schedule introduces a definition disability no clinical authority supports nor Australian law recognises. The current Act already considers mainstream foundational supports A second observation runs through structure of schedule.The current NDIS Act at s. requires as part reasonable-and-necessary criteria funding supports CEO be satisfied that support “most appropriately funded provided through [NDIS] more appropriate funds services general systems service delivery support services”, taking account family carer informal, main stream community supports available.Reasonable test currently operates accounts whether a could be more appropriat delivered outside scheme.If Government’s policy objective foundation supports outside to carry weight structural lever development those foundations – amendment access gate because access gate already consider them. Premise eligibility-tightening needed direct people toward main stream foundational supports structurally inconsistent existing act operate.Until Thriving Kids program operational October adult and years old nine seventeen foundational programs designed fund $ million Inclusive Communities Fund Budget Paper No line allocated operational there nothing point participants towards Once those are operati demonstrably ready existing framework would direct participants without statutory tightening eligibility test all.Schedule is redundant cost-shift purpose Explanatory Memorandum advances. What adequate should look like — four-step framework I want concrete about functioning disability system provide Bill’s choices best understood against baseline My own experience accessing the NDIS places where failed entrench failures maps directly onto step explicitly they clearest what does not address. Step 1 Pre-diagnostic including diagnosis Identification disability require requires diagnosis most Autistic Australians costs approximately out-of-pocket privately twelve month public waitlist.NDIS diagnostics person cannot afford private assessment waiting months excluded evidence base required apply any support otherwise before even reached.Bill this barrier.Diagnosis also vulnerable cognitive executive resources

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079

required to navigate the diagnostic process – finding a specialist, attending appointments, completing intake forms, sitting through assessments, and managing the emotional eexperienceof receiving adiagnosis are oftenthe same resourcesthat thee emerging disability has already compromised.I came closeto endingmy career duringa periodsevereAutistic burnout,inthesameperiodIwas navigatingthediagnosticandsupport- aaccessprocess;Step belowdevelopstheburnoucontextinfull.DisabledAustraliansneed supportduringthediagnosticsprocessregardlessofhowthatprocesissupportedelivered.TheBill providesnomechanismtoreaddressthiseither.Thenewpermanence-and-treatmenttestatnew s.(5) saddsafurtherrequirement at this step: person mustdemonstratenotonlydisabilitexistsbut all appropriate treatments have beenexhaustedand further treatment unlikely alleviatethe impairment.For autismwhich isnot“ treated” in sense test requires practical effect additional layer of clinical inequity.

Step Post-diagnosticsupporincludingfunctionalcapacityassessmentidentificationexistingmissing supportsFollowingdiagnosystem should provide structured processto identify whatperson can do assistance they need formalinformalsuppors place gaps remain current NDIS role functional capacity assessment (FCA) designed play participant may receive initial plan basic supps funding for FCA then identifies full range needs aplan update actioned incorporate them two-pass process –initial plan,then FC Ainformedupdate not anomaly overreachdesigned mechanism getting generic firstassessments accurate individual-needs picture. My own experience illustrates precisely where fails received initial as Autistic adult my plancalledundingfora functionalcapacity assessment never completed that assessment because did not neededsuppneeds had adequately identified nobody explained me functional capacity was or why completing mattered I severe burnoutAutisticburnouis temporary stress response it period significant reduction lasting months during which cognitive and executive resources required navigate unfamiliar administrative processes are the most depleted barely managing daily life afford privately some supportsnecessaryduringthatperiod many people position cannot understandFCAdidntknowwhatwas missing by completin no-one system statutory obligation explain to me result plan reflected actual support needs further dimension failureadministrative record does capture anxiety new things placespeople is mere discomfortit is barrier neurotypical-designed pathway account helps knowing involves procedurallywhere will take with whom order long actually makes accessibleWithout advance

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment

Submission: 2079

procedural clarity; however, these challenges do not stem from motivational factors but rather they pertain directly towards disability-specific issues. The cognitive effort involved when managing uncertainty surrounding unfamiliar processes—such as interacting within an unknown environment—is often perceived merely as background noise. Conversely, an individual experiencing burnout due to autism might find this task so overwhelming it completely eliminates their options entirely. I did receive no procedural details regarding such assessments; it was designed around a flawed assumption that disabilities being assessed had already been compromised prior to evaluation. This structural mismatch between how FCA pathways are structured versus serving specific cohorts of individuals with disabilities highlights significant design flaws—not general anxiety failures nor personal shortcomings alone.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079

The period between initial application and plan approval is also the period of greatest vulnerability.

• A person has disclosed a disability and asked for help; they are receiving nothing while the system assesses them.- The clinical consequences of Autistic burnout - impaired executive function, communication difficulties,- heightened sensory sensitivity- inability to engage with complex administrative processes -are at theirmost acute duringthe monthsa person istrying tonavigate themoost administrativelycomplex processthedisabilitysupportsystemprovides. People who can afford privatesupportsduring thisperiod receivethem. Peoplewhocannotaredexposedto thatvulnerabilitywithout anysafetynet.TheBill provides no mechanismtowardressisthewaiting-periodgap.

Th eBil’s new s .48A makes FCA-pathway failure then governing framework rather than remediating it.Under Th e Bil ’snewplan-reassessment provisions,a requestfor an unscheduledplanchange requires partici pantsdemonstratethatsuppor t needs have significantly changed.A pland update following afunctio nalcapacity assessmentis notachang in supportneeds-itisa betteridentificationofexistingneedsthatwere neveraccuratelymeasuredin first place. The two-passprocess-initial plan,thenF CA-informedupdate-ISthesystemworkingasdesigned.New S ． A treats completiondesignedinStep2assess mentpathwa rasunschedul edoverreachratherthan as the system working.T heMinister’spublic rhetoric characterising unscheduledp lan updatesasa evidence of excessive demand on these cheme is,on structureAct,misleading:itidentifiescomple tion Stepastheproblem,in circumstanceswhere twop ass proces isthesy stem Parliament designed.Th erhetoricreflectseither misrepresentationhowsystemactuallyworksor lackunderstandingofit,andthe Bill’sS entrenches thatmisframingaspolicy.Idvelop thisargument Section5.

Step3-Access to identified supports: Oncesupport need sare accuratelyidentified, person should be ableto access them.Under current scheme,the s .4 reasonable-and-necessary test alreadyrequires CEO satisfythat a sup port mostappropriatel yfunded through NDIS rather than other general systems,takinginto accountwhatalreadyavailable.Thetestcurrentlydesignedalreadyc onsidersfoundationalandmainstreamalternatives.Bill eligibility-tightening at Steps1 anddoes notimproveth ematching people supportatStep -removes pipeline beforeStepisreached,circumstances where foundationalsupports they meant directedtoward do n’tyetexist formostagebandsandsupportcategories.This structural redundancy argument I develop insubsection above. A furtherstructural problem step 3, often invisible policy framing theBill restson,is supply-side market failure.Even participants have fundingfor identifedsuppor tservices frequentlyunavai lable.Provider thin marketsparticularly specialist autismsupp ortsin regional remote areas-producelong waitlistsparticipants holding plans cannot fully use.T hin-marketproblem worsened byNDIS payment limitsoften set belowmarketvaluewhich keeps service-worker paylowdrives

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079

workforce attrition, and renders providers non-viable. A substantial portion of the “NDIS underspend” the Government cites as evidence of scheme excess is, in fact, evidence of supply-side market failure preventing participants from using their plans ––not evidence heat participants do not need the supports they have been funded for. Schedule 1′’s new s .34A, s.32K(3C) asnd s.45C authorise the Ministerto setfundingfor groupsofsupports belowthetactualcostofothesupportswhich structurally worsens thethin-market problem TheGovernment’sownframingalreadymisreads.Schedule’zsilenceon then launch-era expert critique o thin markets workforce capacityandmarket stewardship leaves underly ingproblem unaddressed.I developunder-subscriptionbelow cost-fundingcase at Section ’6,and launche-ricritique Sections lOandll. Step -Access to review changescircumstances Support needs change Thisis trueforall disabled Australians itistrueindistinctive ways Autistic Australi ans Autism isthena stable-state condition insense thatBill’s s.‘significantongoingchange framework assumesAutistic supportneeds are often episodic context-dependent: Autistic burnoutchanges masking compensatory strategies make person appear more functional thantheyare changess life circumstances andchangestheexternalsupportsthat sitalongside NDISplans can all produce genuine changes what apersonneedsthesignificant ongoing threshold innew s,48A its additional requirementat s.’48A(2)(b)that anyfunctionalcapacity alteration involve substantial reduction daily activities’ ,calibrated deterioration model medicalmodel which needsincrease linear observable sustained trajectory Thatmodell isstructurallyillfittedtoautismpsychosocial disability where needsvariableepisodicanotpredicted prior clinical trajectory IdevelopthisinSection 5 . Step must also accommodate changes supports outside theNDIS The design premise ofthe Bill ––thatafoundationalsupportsoutside scheme will carrymore weight impliesscheme’sobligationsparticipants includeaccounting happens when those external supports changethislistcategories environmental change trigger reassessment living circumstance education work informal suppor network Changes toformal externalsupport programs including Thriving Kids foundationalsuppportprograms withdrawn under funded school-baseddisability supp services not listTheBillsupposes founda tional supportswill be adequate durable it provides no review mechanism if they arenot. Stepmustalsoaccom modate reverse case supportneeds lessen If Government deliversgenuine foundationalsupporthenewSDISThroughout better-funded properly-scoped andadultfoundationalsuppportsprogram restored dis ability funding schools inscheme NDIS demand should fall because participants would have real alternative direct some their needs towardThat policy directionGovernment’s own foundational-supports rhetoric claims moving in. Bill’s s48A architecture calibrated only deterioration containsno mecha nism for that lesseningcaseIf foundationsups portss delivered well enough reduce a

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079

participant’s NDIS-met need, the Bill provides no plan-update pathway that recognises the reduction; if the foundational support is subsequently withdrawn, nopathwayto restore theNDISplan toprior level either. TheBillcannotachievethepolicydirectiontheste Government claims towant while themechanismsthatputsinplace assumeonly escalation. ##The equity dimensionacrossallfoursteps.The failure pointsinthefour-step framework do not distribute evenly acrossthesdisabledpopulation.Peer-reviewed research published inthemMedicalJournalofAustraliainan2025—Disneyetal., analysing705，594 ND IS applications betweenand2016-2022-foundmeasurablylowerN DIS eligibility ratesfor applicantsinalower socioeconomic areas.[§89]This quantitative finding confirms whatthe structure ofthesystempredicts: every stepint heframeworkis harder to complete on lower income and in regionalandre motesetting s.Step diagnosisismore expensive.Steps FCA lesslikelytobe explainedandsupported. Thewaiting periodmore harmful when private supportsareunaffordable Step reviewhardertoinitiate without administrativecapacityandinformalsupportnetworks.THeBillsnewss.( 2), whichprovidesthat treatment ist “appropriate” for purposesoftreatment test regardless whether personcan afford itor accessit geographically, writes the Disney et al.and Disability Royal Commissionfindinginto statute rather than remedying It.Idevelopthediscriminationanda Closing Gap dimensionsoff thisbelow Discrimination,equity,andClosingthegap A third observation ison thee quity impact.Thess( provision that treat mentremains “ appropriate ”regardlessperson’sfinancial or geographiccircumstances codifies,in statute ,anincome-andgeographic regressivity.AdultautisticdiagnosisinAustralia currentlycostapproximately$ out-of-pocketprivatelyagainstatwelve-month-plus publicwaitlistwithnoNDISfundingfordiagnostics Treatmentexhaustionmeanstens of thousandsofdollarsprivate therapyandmedication trials.TheDisability Discrimination Act1992ats6 prohibitsindirectdiscrimination—a requirement“isanot reasonablehaving regardtothe circumstances of case” and hasorto have,the effectdisadvantaging personsa particular impairment category .TheCRPD atArticle5 obligatesStateParties to prohibit all discrimination on basis disability. AboriginalTorres Strait Islander peopleareoverrepresented inlower incomeandre motepopulations therefore disproportionalyface costand geographical barriers s.( 2)codifies;thenationalAgreementFoundationalSupports2026-3 signedbyall eightjurisdictionsinearly, commits theCommonwealthStates clauses4andclosingGap TheBilloperating opposite directionsacross these instruments.

Section 3 – The clinical-evidence vacuum: the permanence-and-treatment test in new s.24(5), s.25(1B) and s.25A

What the test requires

New s.s.24(5)

New section provides:

• s.24(5) The Bill’s new section specifies —and new subsection(1B)` imposes identical requirement on early intervention pathway—that “an impairment or impairments are not permanent, or likely be permanent,” unless all three conditions below must hold true.

Conditions for Permanence

(a) Person undertakes appropriate treatments; b) Other treatments unlikely improve/reverse/relieve impact; c) Impairment persists throughout lifetime.” All these requirements need met simultaneously before declaring an impairment as non-permanent.

Definition under S.25(A)

Section defines “appropriate treatment” based paragraphs (a)(b). Treatment is considered ‘evidence-based’ if it reliably improves, reverses, alleviates impacts of impaired condition(s); regularly performed within Australia.“ Sub-section further clarifies that regardless individual circumstances restrict access to such treatment may still apply appropriately provided financial/geographical location factors included therein noted explicitly include person’s financial situation & geographical position.Sub-section 25A(3)(a) allows exceptions where medical reasons prevent undertaking necessary care. Section also grants Minister power through delegated rules determine additional criteria when deemed having undergone required treatments, which can vary by participant class and type/class of disability involved in the process described above.

Submission 2079

The clinical-evidence problem

The test the Bill is constructing operates as an effective new statutory construct for what counts as a permanent impairment for NDIS access purposes: an impairment is treated as permanent only where the ss.24(5),ss.25(1B) conjunctive limbs are satisfied including treatment-exhaustion limb That construct structurally inconsistent with Australian disability framework’s foundational instruments —the Disability Discrimination Act 1992,the United Nations Convention on Rights Persons Disabilities to which Australia State Party,and Nat Agreement Closing Gap Section this submission develops that statutory-inconsistency case full This section concerns dimension alongside statistical inconsistency. Bill applies all NDIS decisions across impairments categories To survive clinical scrutiny,s.s.(b) definition would need capable identifying body each category apply test reliably expected materially improve reverse or alleviate impact impairment For large share impairment categories served such does coherent paradigm Autism Diagnostic and Statistical Manual Mental Disorders Fifth Edition (DSM-5 defines autism spectrum disorder neurodevelopmental condition characterised persistent differences social communication interaction multiple contexts restricted repetitive patterns behaviour interests activities diagnostic criteria explicitly require symptoms present early developmental period DSM not characterise autism conditions remedies alleviates underlying Early intervention exists supports Autistic children develop adaptive strategies skills it non-autistic described peer-reviewed literature remediating or alleviating underling in sense s requires no clinical

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment

Submission: [NDIS Submission Number]

Paradigm for Autism.

The proposed reading admits Autistic applicants without any actual gating effect because under section s.25A(1) “appropriate treatment” must exhaust all options before an applicant can qualify as eligible within this scheme’s framework. This strict interpretation aligning closely with cost-saving projections indicates that existing participants may leave while prospective ones might be excluded entirely if their applications fail to meet these criteria exclusively based on clinical merit rather than individual case evaluation.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 2079

Consistency Across Largest Cohorts On The NDIS

The pattern consistent across largest cohorts on the NDIS.

• s.25A(1) definition appropriate treatment operating paradigm ”does apply impairments it will most consequentially gate”. The clinical paradigm autism remedy paradigm so test applied me structural exclusion gate individual evidence assessment I can address providing case fourteen year old daughter whose access subject Section five tested same provisions sixteen-year-old son where his needs escalate point applying became necessary would under amendment early intervention pathway imports same test cost incoherence borne cohort test applies.

The Royal Commission Claim The Explanatory Memorandum Does Not Substantiate

Minister told House Thursday May that “takes up recommendations measures improve delivery NDIS have been made government various independent reviews including Independent Review into NDIS, and Royal Commission Violence Abuse Neglect Exploitation People with Disability.”\nBill’s own explanatory memorandum Consultation section cites four specific actions Action ,Action .“,Action ..”.,Action..“, plus one recommendation Recommendation Taskforce report also cited final report Recommendations as part of consultation research basis plan management support coordination commissioning Schedule (Explanatory Mem. sect.) It does not cite any Royal Commission by number or content implementation basis for any Schedule provision new permanence-and-treatment-test \nDisability Royal Commission delivered 222 across twelve volumes September Joint Australian State Territory Response published July Bill introduced Parliament Ministerial Second Reading claim review inquiry bodies evidentiary foundation package Bill’s own explanatory memorandum substantiates only respect four out twenty-two Royal Commission attached to Part six plan management and support coordination commissioning provisions the Committee entitled require Ministerial claim be substantiated against Schedule 1provisions

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079

Government’s public framing relies on the Royal Commission to legitimise, and to consider the implications of finding that it cannot be.

The s.25 early intervention pathway the Bill collapses

The current NDIS Act 2013 contains two distinct access pathways. Section 24 (disability requirements) does requires permanence; section 25 (early intervention) does not.The s.25 path way is route which children with developmental delay—for whom an impairment may yet have clinically established permanent, an dfor whom underlying clinical question whether early support shifts development trajectory—access supports without first having satisfy a permanence test.Section(1)(b) defines early inter vention support one providing likely benefit person reducing future needs for supports.”Parliament enacted original ND ISAct in built into scheme separate pathway precisely so could provided prevent deterioration impairm ent-related needs without requiring demonstrated permanence. The Bill’s new s.(B) imposes identical permanence-and-treatment test onthe early intervention pathway.Functionally this collapse s.pathway into s.24 pathway:an applicant must now also demonstrate undertaken appropriate treatment no other treatment improve materialy impa irment,andthatimpair ment will persist life.Architecture allowed early intervention flow before was removed. This significant beyond immediate effect on early interven tion cohort.Government’s spokesperson statement reported Guardian May framed reform package ensuring that NDIS “replace health, rehabilitation and treatment services critical role preventing lifelong disability.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment

Submission: NDIS Amendement_Bill_2026_Section_15

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 2079

To seek clinical evidence on the test before it reports. The parallel absence of a cost-benefit analysis on the reform package is addressed in Section 14.

Parallel peak-body validation gap applies…

The parallel peak-body validation gap applies…to the assessment instrument that will operationalise new functional-capacity gate alongside permanence-and-treatment test….People With Disability Australia - national cross-disability peak has flagged I-CAN not validated episodic fluctuating disability nor First Peoples cultural appropriateness…..The First Peoples validation gap material context s.25A(2)…against National Agreement Foundational Supports commitment clauses align Closing Gap PWDA flagging peak body weight recognised national cross-disability put public submission record instrument Reform Package rely Functional Capacity Assessment unvalidated two cohorts most consequentially operate Peak Body Validation Gap therefore confined to permanent treatment Test extends architecture around test……Section develops assessment-instrument vacuum and PWDA cultural-appropriateness critique full.

Income-geographic regressivity layer S.25A(2)

Sub-sections express provision Treatment remains appropriate regardless person’s individual circumstances restrict access Note “individual circumstances include financial geographical location” codifies income geographic gating operates Clinical Evidence Gate Therefore question has dimension Adult autism diagnosis alone subsequent treatment-exhaustion exercise depends currently costs approximately $2,000 out-of-pocket privately against twelve-month-plus public waitlist NDIS does fund diagnostics Treatment exhaustion mean tens thousands dollars private therapy medication trials concentrated major metropolitan service catchments The carve-out for “appropriate medical treatment cannot undertake reasons is narrow does extend…person can’t access financially or geographically… The cohort the drafting stringently excludes Australians in lower-income households Aboriginal Torres Strait Islander people over-represented both populations Treating as “appropriate” regardless applicant’s financial means geometric access explicit decision gate scheme Access on income Location Australian disability framework foundational instruments Disability Discrimination Act 1992 United Nations Convention Rights Persons Disabilities National Agreement

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment Submission

on Closing the Gap: do not contemplate disability access being gated based solely upon affordability or geographic availability.

Federalism Dimension:

The treatment-exhaustion limb conflicts state mental-health-legislation rights to refuse treatment.

A further dimension surfaced at Sydney’s Joint Standing Committee hearing May 2026 where Professor Jennifer Smith-Merry testified about conflict between Commonwealth exhaust-treatment requirements under s.24(5)(a),s.25(1B)(a). This contradicts State and Territory refusal-to-treat legislative rights. An applicant cannot satisfy both simultaneously: refusing treatment precludes exhaustion thereof as per Commonwealth law while States allow such refusals legally.

Section 4 - The diagnostic-language critique: “low to moderate support

needs“ against the clinical evidence base

The Government’s placement:

In Budget Paper No.2 (2026–27), within ThrivingKids measure, it describes those transitioning out from NDIS individualized plans into new foundational supports program. The verbatim text reads:‘children aged eight or under with developmental delay/or autism low to moderate support needs alongwith their families carers kin.’ This phrase—“low-to-moderate-support-needs”—is central for defining this group & broader reform package. It carries weight in implying specificity but isn’t used clinically.

The departmental contradiction:

On May, a signed response was issued regarding my direct communication to Hon Mark Butler MP. Pargraph two states:“Terms such as ‘high functioning’, ‘low-functioning’,‘profound’,‘severe’ and mild’ autism are sometimes used to describe challenges faced by autistic people and their family/carers.” It acknowledges that every Autistic person has different strengths and faces unique barriers; these terms can misrepresent difficulties some may experience and capabilities of others.” Following paragraph says:

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment Bill Submission

Thriving Kids Program Contradictions & Operational Work

The same letter further notes that “Thriving kids is not diagnosis-based”—yet the cohort descriptor used immediately prior paragraph (“low-to-moderate support needs”) IS an operational filter within this program.

This descriptor serves as both rhetorical work AND operational work: it defines how low-to-moderate support needs are being designed around and will be assessed via new s9B’s functional-capacity assessment with thresholds delegated under NDIS Rules (s 24(1)(b)and3). The design now begins at Budget Paper No. line8919with$3 millioninBudgetPaperNo. Section7developsthestatutory-inconsistencyconsequenceintofulltheGovernment’sstatedrationaleforthetighteningpackageis permanencebutAutismbydefinitionpermanent(DSM-5lifelongneurodevelopmental conditionrequiringdiagnosticcriteriaexplicitly requiringsymptomsinthedevelopmentalperiod),sotheseveritylimbofnewss.(5)ands.(1B)cannot excludeautisticapplicants.Theoperationalexclusionmechanismtherefore reliesonisthelow-tomoderesupportneedscohortdescriptor, whichhasno statutory grounding in ss or . TheDepartment’sMC26008601paragraphplaces ontherelationrecordthatthisfilterdiverts autisticchildrenfromNDISindividualisedsupportsinto thestate-deliveredThrivingKidsprograminstead ofNDSIplansTheDiagnosticLanguage acknowledgementindataparagraph2 isthedepartment’ownadmission that this operational gate cannot do its work without misrepresenting what it applies to.

DSM-5’s Three Support Needs Levels Not Autism Severity

ThediagnosticalStatisticalManualMentalDisordersFifthEdition (DSM 5 published by American Psychiatric Association is used as a diagnostic instrument for Australian clinicians with autism spectrum disorder. The DSM does not categorise autism into mild moderateor severe forms but rather defines three support-needs levels explicitly tiedtothe supports requiredintheiractualcontextnotintensityofunderlyingcondition:

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 2079

• Level requiring support.*
• Level* requiring substantial support“.*
• **Level **requiring very substantial support”. These three support-needs levels are applied separately to two domains of presentation—social communication, and restricted/repetitivetbehaviours—and reflectthe pattern persistence ofsupports the person requiresfor daily functioning. TheDSM- s frameworkis functionalandsupportanchored.Itisanot“mildto severe”autismspectrumintheway colloquialusageoftenimplies.Thesupportneedlevelaclinicianrecordsunderthedescriptorthesameconstruct.“Requiringsupporthisapattern descriptor inthedSM-5: apersonat Level1 hasnoticeabledifficultiessupportedwith socialcommunication and behavioural impacts thatare realpattern-disrupting.ALeveledesignation is,by thdescriptordescribedasnotstableacross-time-and-context attributeofpersonAutisticsupporthavechanges with life-stage transitionsenvironmental demandscooccurring conditions,and supportsalready inplace.DSMe Frameworkrecognises this; “lowmoderatesupporthasdoes notappearninthedsm-5. TheGovernment’sphrase doesappearindoesuse“low”.It usestheclosestanalogue — Levelequaldescriptor.”Low need” everyday sense BudgetPaperNo2 phrase invitesapplie at cohort level rather than individual level.This matters because public framing ThrivingKids eligibilitytightening provisions Schedule 1 Bill target same through new scheme-wide capacity assessment regime from JanuaryNDISindividualised planskept off them futurehas clinically lower needs retained DSM-5 support implication. WithinLevel alone Autistic children present range of across thesocial communication restrictedandrepetitivebehaviour domains Many requireexisting NDISscheme delivering cannot be reproduced generalised foundational programs.Bill mechanism substituting for s34 test designed perform.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment Bill Submission

The Independent NDIS Review did not use ‘low-to-moderate’ diagnostic descriptor.

The Minister identified the Working Together report from December 2023 (by Bonyhady & Paul), which does not frame its recommendations around “low to moderate” levels but rather uses tier models like general foundational supports versus individual packages funded through NDIA funding.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 2079

Basis for autism cohort categorisation in NDIS access decisions.

I have not found one.The bodies whose endorsement would carry the relevant evidentiary weight include:

• Royal Australasian College of Physicians (RACP).
• Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists (RANZCP).
• Australian Psychological Society (APS).
• Australasian Faculty of Rehabilitation Medicine (AFRM).
• Autism Spectrum Australia (Aspect).
• Australian Autism Alliance (AAA).
• AMAZE (Victorian autism peak).
• Inclusion Australia (national peak for intellectual disability). The Cerebral Palsy Alliance /Cerebral Palsy Australia. The Bill applies the test on which the cohort categorisations depend — both Thriving Kids’ 0-to-8 cohort framing,from January1st ,the scheme-wide functional capacity assessment regime new s.sB to autism,intellectualdisability Down syndrome, cerebral palsy,and other impairment cohorts.Noneofthecorrespondingpeakbodies has publicly endorsed “lowto moderate” as descriptorforwhoisinscopeandwhonot.foranyagecohort. The Committee is entitled.I submit obligated.to request from Department Health Disability Ageing list clinical body reviewed cohort-categorisation framing—forThrivingspecifically.andbroaderfunctionalcapacityassessmentregimeBill commences 2028 together with dates those reviews.If no suchreviews have taken place that itself a finding should record.

Independent third-party convergenceclinicalbasis absence

Same conclusion—that diagnostic-languageframing operationaliseshasno foundation in operative clinical documents—reached independently by credentialed commentary predecessor mildtomoautism used Government public messaging August 25.Hannah Thomas lawyer policy advisor writing Cheek April described“mildtomoderateautisticategorisation misleading political termwhich has noclinical basis”.Traced its entry August when newly-appointed Minister for National Disability Insurance Scheme Mark Butler announced plan curb NDIS spending expressed concern number Autistic children on the scheme.Budget Paper No lowmoderate support needs measure text published May same framing.Dr Clem Bastow cultural critic critical Autism studies researcher (Naarm–Melbourne)writing Crikey under headline NDIS headlines turning autistic people into new dole bludgers made adjacent point effects media apparatus accompanying reform package roll-out functioned recategoriseAutisticNDIS participants as welfare-suspectcohort decoupledfromtheclini literature autism depends.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 2079

apparent specificity. The convergence – peak Australian clinical bodies silent on the framing, and credentialed independent commentary across two registers describing the framing as a political construct without clinical foundation—confirms the absence of the clinical evidence the Committee should require the Department to identify.

The same critique has surfaced from a Government-side parliamentary register. Dr Mike Freelander MP, the Member for Macarthur (Labor), and paediatrician with more than four decades’ practice served Chair House Standing Committee Health Aged Care & Disability Inquiry Thriving Kids initiative December report No child left behind carries Foreword Chair’s acknowledgement mild or moderate disabilities… are very subjective definitions.” Paediatrician Labor MP serving Chair Government-referred Inquiry into program diagnostic-language descriptor designed for Parliamentary record conceding that Framing Bill targeting logic depends is subjective Forwards concession sits alongside Departments signed concession paragraph MC26-008601 —two adjacent Government-side registers (parliamentary committee Chairs forewords; Departmental Assistant Secretarys signed Ministerial response both acknowledge limitation Framing operationalises Pattern now four-register: Peak Australian Clinical Bodies Silent Framing Credentialed Independent Commentary Two Registers Describing Political Construct Without Clinical Foundation Chair Governments own Thriving Kids Inquiry Conceding Descriptor “very subjective” On Record And Departments Signed Ministerial Response Acknowledging Underlying Terminology Can Misrepresent Cohort Absence Clinical Evidence Department Would Need Point Only Fact Consistent All Four Registers The connection new s9B functional capacity Schedule 1new defines Functional Capacity Person Ability Undertake Activity without assistance other people assistive technology modifications in context excludes as far possible impact persons environmental personal circumstances This definition direct tension DSM5 Level-based framework. DSM5 support-needs levels explicitly defined by need Context person at level requires Support actual social and behavioural environment what Level descriptor refers to Bills New S9B Requires Functionality assessed absence supports DSM5 treats constitutive of Persons profile Conflict between two frameworks same conflict Social Model Disability Medical Model Disability International disability-rights instruments resolved favour Social model Autism constituted interaction Autistic neurology Neurotypical Environment whose rules sensory load communication conventions routine administrative

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079 demands are not designed for Autistic functioning. Strip out the environment —the assistive technology,the supports ,The accommodations ，theneurotypical-norm -attuned cohabitants—and a substantial shareof whatis experiencedas autismdisability doesnot presentat all.The same dynamic appliestoarangeofother impairmentcohorts .Th e CRPD Article l definition o f disability that Australia， asa State Party,is obligated togive effecttounderNDIS ActlOlls．(I)(a)i s anchored on exactly this relational understanding: disabilit y i st constitutedby th ei nteraction betweenimpairment an d barriers.T heBill’s new S。 。B isanchoredontheadverse construct—the person’s ability stripped off them very interactions t h e international framework identifiesasa constitutive.Th emismatchi sn ot aclinicallanguage inconsistency atthemargins.Itisastructural inversion oftfheframeworktheschemeisc ommitted to. Theinversioncarriesdirectlegal-exposure consequences.Sect ion IOfthis submission setsoutthestaturary and treaty inconsistenciybetweennewS。 B anda ndCRPDArticle1, alongsideparallel inconsistencieswiththedisabil ity DiscriminationAct 1992an dt henational Agreement On Closing Th e Gap. T hediagnostics-languagevacuum thesectionsets outands theS。定义the diagnostics-lang uage vacuum willbe operationalised throughare not severable issues.They produce ， together,a Bill whose targeting logicrestson a cohort descriptorwithout clinical foundation , appliedthroughafunctio nal-capacity testwhosestatutoryframe inverts tfieinternational modelthecommunwealth has committedto giveeffecttot . The assessment-instrument vacu umt het framing depends ont A second consequencefollowsfromabsenceof aclini cally grounded“lowtomoderate” category.A standardized functionalcapacityassessment instrument i s intended tobemanagedbya third-party assessor toproduce areliable， reproducible categorisationacrossmany people.Forth ei n strumenttocategoriseapplicants reliably,the categories themselvesmust be clinically reliable—that is they must map t o constructs that thediagnosticliteraturedefines consistentlyandthat trained assessors canapplyconsistently.Ift hecategories them selves ar enot anchoredintheadoperativeclinical framework,t h einstrum entdesigned to applythem cannot bereliableonitsface. TheBillimposesthenewfunctional capacityassess mentregime from 1JanuarylO28(new S 。9B；thestartmentisconfirmedi nBudgetPaperNo. llineI029).Nose ssessmentinstrumenthasbeenpubliclynamedforthe I-to-15cohort.TheICAN instrumen tflagged indisability-sector commentary ist describedas applyingta ages sixteen andabove; ThrivingKids hasthe own state-delivered methodology stillbeingworkedup.T hel Government’s Technical Advisory Group,establishedin Budget Paper No．2 lineS。 ，with $3 .Smillion inllO6一7 ,isetbodynowbeginningtodesign the instruments.Th eGroup hasnotyetreported Th el instrumentit willdesign i s atthet imeofwriting not publicly named，no tpbl ically descri bed， no tpub lic ally evidence-tested,andnotin publ ic ly endorsedby any clinical body.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment Submission

What the diagnostic-language vacuum means for the Committee

The diagnostic-language vacuum is significant because it mirrors a similar issue discussed earlier regarding Clinical Evidence Section 3’s significance.

Background:

The Bill relies heavily upon categorizations from operational clinical documentation which are absent within its own text but referenced extensively elsewhere—such references include terms found both [in] Budget paper record & Ministerial Second Reading Record, yet without any mention identifying endorsing bodies nor anchoring clinical documents behind these categories.

The Frameworks Involved:

These frameworks—the Australian disability framework encompassing elements like Disability Discrimination Act s4., CRPD Article I; NDIS Act of ‘13’ s3.; Diagnostic Instrument Layer represented through DSM-V; Cross-Policy Portfolio Strategies outlined under National Autistic Strategy 2025–31—are collectively silent on providing foundational framing necessary to support this logic.

Thus far, all relevant policies and strategies have been developed in policy registers by government agencies with an aim towards determining legislative scope rather than directly addressing how they should be applied or interpreted operationally, as seen here: NDIS Act, CRPD (Article), etc. This has led us into ambiguity about what constitutes eligibility criteria based purely off assumptions made outside official records.

Section 5 - The 9-to-15 Cohort and Plan Reassessment Renewal Provisions

new sections: Ss.

Part 1 – The 9-to-15 Cohort and Apparatus Gap:

The reform package affects three strands impacting NDIS access for different age groups, as follows:

• Eligibility Policy: New tests (permanence-and-treatment requirements) in Sss., a revised function-capacity definition; an assessment instrument; replacement supports program outside of NDIS. For ages 0–7, Thriving Kids commences October ’26 with $billion over five years per Budget Paper No.to replace current support arrangements. In contrast, the I-CAN tool is expected as an assessment instrument for those aged –over- closing part of this gap in the middle-aged cohort (9—to- `). This section addresses two distinct ways that these changes impact existing participants on the National Disability Insurance Scheme between nine to fifteen years old—those most acutely exposed due to new test commencement dates versus actual existence of supporting apparatuses. It also discusses participant-initiated reassessment provisions under ss.s which apply scheme-wide across all ages but particularly disadvantage impairment categories characterized by fluctuating needs.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 2079

• No assessment instrument has been publicly named for the cohort.
  • I-CAN does not apply to children <16 on sector commentary; Thriving Kids scoped up age eight;
    • Technical Advisory Group provision $3.3M budget paper no. two did NOT report a 9-to-15 instrument yet.
• No replacement supports program announced:
  • Thriving Kids excludes ages nine through fifteen,
  • unnamed adult/ages sixteen through seventeen foundational programs referenced at April press club have not been designed/funded as per submission date.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 2079

populations. They are also disproportionately represented among the cohorts the Bill’s eligibility-tightening will affect. The National Agreementon Foundational Supports 2026-31, signed by all eight jurisdictions in early 2026, commits the Commonwealth and the States\nat clauses (24\text{ }a nd {}{} {}25)}to aligning Foundational Supports design a n d implementation with
The four Priority Reforms o f t he N ational Ag reement**o nc los ing th e Gap. T h e F oundation al\Supports A greemen t is ihe inter-governmen tal instrument ihie B ill’s reform package ia rolled into. Applying an unvalidated-for-Fir st-Peoples assessment instrumen to First Peoples participants — -at the access gate ot the scheme that sits underneath teh Foundation al Suppo rts Agree men t—i s structurally inconsistent w ith teh Agreement’ s own commitments toi Closing the Gap. PWDA ’sa flagging is peak-body weight.The recognised national cross-disability p eak has put onthe public submission recordthatth eiinstrumentt ehB il l’sreformpackagewil rely On for functional-capacity as sessmentisunvalid ate df or two cohorts On which it will operate at scale. The Committee Is entitled io requirete Departmentio identify the validation evidence underpinning the I-CAN ins trument’s application to episodicor f luctuating disability, and thevalidation evidenc eunderpinnin g its cultural appropriatenessforFirstPeop lesparticipants——beforethenewframeworkplanning regime commenceson1April20 7and before then ewfunctionalcapacityassessment reg imencommence sonlJanuary(28). The rushed-rollout pattern (is being repeated) T he transition-gap risk fo rh9-to-15 cohort i sn o ta hypothetical concern arising from this Bill alone.It isthe second iteration of a rush ed-r ollo utpattern th at senior figures across
t hedisabilit ysectorhave publicly identifiedasa significant contributorto teh integrity, capacitv anda ndequityproblems t he Government now citesas te justificationforte very cuts te hBill imposes.T helvidence thosefigures give speakstodistinctdimensionsof teproblem,andthissubmissioniscarefulnottomerge them:theAgency’ s own anti-fraud co-chair attributes The integrity gapt ot ehdesigno fth originalpayment system,built for speed oft disbursement;thesenior Labor architectotfheschemeattributesbroaderdifficulties tota rolloutwhose early warnings were not heed ; an dtehacademic voice closest to the deinstitutionalisation history attributesthec apacitygaptot e absenceoft aeadyreplacement service sys tem.Speedopayments andspeedorroll out are different things;botharetinevidenc ,an dn either isparticipant eligibility. On 0 May,Mr John Dardo,D epu tyChiefExecutiveOfficerforIntegrity,T ransformationand TechnologyServicesatthenationalDisabilityInsurance Agency——gave evidence too Joint Standing Committee on thenDIS’s Integrity o n the National Disability Insurance Scheme inquiry.Asked by the Chair io identify contributing factors toiheintegrityp roblems th eiinquirywasinvestigating,MrDardoplacedon tehparliamentaryrecordthat(“the program was established quite quickly. I think there weresome assumptions about
h ow t heprogram,the market a nd te claiming systems would work.”He described t horiginal payment syst em in detail: “thestep of payments gettingoutw as teprimary

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079

motivator of the system design”, with manual extraction of integrity-flagged claims limited to “maybe 20 to 30 claims per day”, and “any claims between 5 pm and 6 pm were being paid without any human eyeballs on them.“ The Government’s own anti-fraud co-chair has placed on the parliamentary record that a primary cause of the integrity problems is the design of the original payment system — built for speed of disbursement, not for fraud prevention — and that the post-2022 remediation has been about putting payment-system checks and balances into place. The diagnosis the Government’s own evidence base supports is a payment-system-design diagnosis, not a participant-eligibility diagnosis. Schedule 1 of this Bill does not address payment-system design. Schedule 2 does, in part (Section 9). The Bill’s targeting logic—that the integrity problems are a function of who is on the scheme—is contradicted by the Government’s own anti-fraud co-chair on the parliamentary record.

The Honourable John Della Bosca, former New South Wales Labor health and disability minister and a pivotal advocate for the establishment of the NDIS, has publicly warned the Albanese Government against rushing the present changes ABC News On May 18th]. on the original rollout, Mr Della Bosca observed “there were points along the way when I thought there things going wrong very early piece don’t think obvious warnings heeded.”On reform:“in policy terms human relations terms you won’t be able solve immediately it needs planned out carefully with people disabilities mind” Professor Keith McVilly University Melbourne career psychologist one institutions closed before NDIS began made same point ABC News May 17th]: Unless these new services well designed could end up crisis situation again Professor assessment next to nothing old state systems reactivated much their new would start scratch need rebuild system now reality taking quite number years achieve The community’s national peak bodies make readiness Ms Megan Spindler-Smith Acting Chief Executive Officer People Disability Australia told Australian Broadcasting Corporation on that this is huge reform map such short period time get done These cannot set overnight as a political football and know what built doesn’t mean back doing didn’t work segregating many us Sophie Cusworth CEO Women Disabilities Australia in Joint Statement of located concern apparatus itself women girls gender-diverse disability already failed eligibility settings tools properly recognise lives our needs or ways disability presents for us. We know less likely found eligible men Rushing through reforms without proper scrutiny risks locking

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment Bill

Submission: [Redacted]

Gender Bias Even Deeper Into System

These are cohort’s own representative organizations, saying - before regime commences under this bill – systems it relies upon aren’t built yet or assessment tools won’t work. The new functional capacity assessment starts January ’28 — set ahead when instrument is designed. Thriving Kids program begins Oct ‘26—before bilateral agreements with Victoria & Queensland signed off. New framework planning rollout kicks Jan ’27 across whole scheme while design and s.’25A(4) carve-out rules still to be made. Government’s framing contradicted by anti-fraud official, senior Labor architect of system, academic voices closest history, disability community peak bodies who identify primary driver as insufficient execution speed transitions, inadequate design/consultation/replacement readiness. The reform package repeats rushed-rollout pattern on available evidence even more compressed Parliamentary scrutiny windows than original NDIS legislation received for 9-to-15 age group most directly exposed consequences Reform not merely targeting wrong source integrity problem Government diagnosed; also repeating real-time implementation mistake that government’s own evidence base identifies as cause issue.

Psychosocial Disability Precedent

Australian disability system has recent experience supports withdrawn without replacement operational psychosocial-disability cohort experienced precisely transition out Personal Helpers Mentors Scheme (PHaMs), which ceased June’19 Of those previously receiving PHaM support approximately per cent accepted into the NDIS in 2018 percent applied deemed ineligible remainder fell gap neither retained existing nor accepted new replacement Productivity Commission’s report review accountability mental health spending Community Mental Health Australia Remember PHaMs paper April ’24 both record documented service-withdrawal followed lasting consequence availability lived-experience consequence David Harris paranoid schizophrenia was an NDIS participant His plan expired Apr ‘19 found dead Western Sydney home July Crikey investigation NSW Deputy State Coroner Erin Kennedy ruled Oct ’22

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment Bill Submission

The Coroner’s ruling addresses institutional responses after Mr Harris’s NDIS plans expired; it does not address whether these original transition-gap patterns will expose future participants like those under consideration.

This submission highlights that if such gaps are allowed again for people aged 9–15, there could be significant consequences including deaths due to loss of supports keeping them safe or well—evidenced from both systemic proportions (30%) & lived-experiences documented during PHaMs’ rollout period.*

Part II: The new provisions apply broadly: s48A allows participant-initiated re-assessments while Ss67B introduces automatic plan renewals which impact all existing participants regardless age/needs fluctuation (like autism across ages). The Committee should consider why transitioning younger cohorts won’t replicate older ones’ service-withdrawal risks.

What new ss.48A and 67 do

What new Ss.

New Section 48a

New section Section 48 A*, inserted into the NDIS Act under schedule one part two of this bill replaces the arrangement described above.*

Conditions for Reassessment Under Section €₹*

Under subsection (€) there has been significant changes to those ongoing support needs arising from an impairment related disability or early intervention requirements; AND, (b) Significant changes result either: i Alteration on functional capacity relating activity covered paragraph(1)(c), subparagraph*(1); or ii Alterations personal environmental circumstances; c To extent alteration mentioned b(i); d To extend alterations as per (b(ii). Subsection (2)(3) conditions are met respectively.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment

Submission:2079

pending waiting longer for the substantive reassessment to be triggered. A participant’swhose supportneeds have changedin waysthe new s48Agates do acceptmust still waitup to three monthsforthecEOto decidewhether thereassessments warranted,beforethesubstantiverassessment caneven begin.

Asubtler structural concernoperates inside thens 48Adrafting itself.Newss .(b)(ii) andnew ss.(3) pertman alterationintheparticipant’personal or environmentalcircumstances tobetriggerparticipant-initiatedreassessment Newss ,however, necessary capacitybe assessedinthe absenceof impact onparticipan’tenvironmentaland personal circumstances.The reassemment-triggerthresholdandevaluation methodologytherefore operateon different conceptions ofsame environmentaland personcontextchanges that contextcan reopen workflowbut workfproceeds premisethat contex stripped outThe asymmetryis not resolved face Bill, it carries same social-model-versus-medicalmodel conflictSection develops respectresss newssB. The combined effect is participantsinitiated reassessment gated by highersubstantial threshold significant ongoing unanticipated substantiallylonger decision window.A participantsupport needschanged graduallyor whose changing needs anticipated as part impairment known trajectorydoes n satisfy gates.Participants circumstanceshave changes Act characterises anticipate for example foreseeable transition from primary to secondary schoolplannedtransitionfromsecondaryschooltopost-school education employment doesnot satisfys. gate even if those transitions materially affect their supportneeds The drafting disadvantagesimpairmentscategoriescharacterisedby fluctuating need Autism such category: DSM-5 describes condition presentation varies across contexts developmental stages Senate Select CommitteeAutism’s 2022 final report Servicessupport and life outcomes autistic Australians documented significance keylife transiti Autistic people whole-of-life naturetheir suppor (Chapter Key Life Transitions Mental health conditions anothersuchcategory degenerative impairments intellectual disability cohorts cooccurringconditions several physicalimpairm present respond environmental contextual factors over time provision draws thethreshold participant agency plan content point excludes precisely cohortsupporthas static For my daughter operational consequence concrete If her support needs change waysAct’sdrafting treats anticipatransitionprimaryto secondary schooleven where actual supp implications thattransition were notforeseeable specifics she cannot request a reassessment thoughherplan no longer matches her needs.Theprovision movesagency CEO exactlypoint at whichparticipant is best position identifychange.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079

Section: The FCA-to-plan update pathway and the structural mismatch in new section .48 A

Description:

This submission describes how two-pass process is intended within an initial plan providing basic supports funding towards assessing individual’s capacity followed up through Functional Capacity Assessment where full range support identified then updated accordingly. The disruption caused due to New s.48A which requires substantiating ‘significant change’ arising either alteration on functionality or environmental circumstances leading into reassessment while not reflecting actual changes but merely better identification of stable yet inaccurately measured needs initially, demonstrating it structurally wrong for post-FCA updates.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079

section’s purposes is this: the participants most affected by the post-FCA update gate are the same participants least likely to have completed the FCA in the first place, because the to completing the barrier and requesting subsequent plan two instances mismatch. The suppression self-reinforcing Disney et al.’s finding — measurably lower NDIS eligibility rates applicants socioeconomic areas across applications between NDIS legitimacy not randomly distributed.

The formal external support change gap environmental-circumstances covers changes living arrangements education work informal networks does cover government programs participant relied Thriving Kids school-based disability services $ million loading schools Budget simultaneously cut state-based supports The design premise foundation outside weight those withdrawn underfunded or unavailable geographic area no review pathway opens where technical exists but delivers reasonable-and-necessary requires block-funded inadequate was criticism pre-NDIS system motivated scheme individualised-plan architecture first recreates pattern treating existence of a as sufficient s48A regardless whether it deliver what participant requires A whose constructed on assumption that based support program community service carry part load who then loses external support finds form meets their needs has mechanism trigger reassessment basis. Assumption foundational assumes adequate durable own review provides means testing

Volume Recommendation specifically identified health navigators assist people with disability accessing navigating including functional capacity assessment development process directly addresses completion gap absence explains involves matters terms accessible moment maximum executive depletion No navigator program Bill Paper 2 Minister’s Second Reading Speech May invokes Royal Commission justification for FCA completion gap at recommendation entrenched by the s48A architecture rather than addressed cost this bypasses entirely and framing implicitly relies upon building foundations ecosystem

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment

Submission 2079 outside the scheme so that participants naturally reduce their NDIS footprint as adequate external supports become available. A participant who currently relies on the NDIS for supports that a functioning school-based disability service, an accessible community program or health navigator could provide will if those services come into existence then draw upon them rather than rely solely within this system.The existing s34 reasonable-and-necessary test enables this:it requires CEO’s satisfaction that support most appropriately funded through nidis rather other systems.Building foundational-supports ecosystem first makes current s34 test cost-reduction mechanism applied at individual level without eligibility-gate amendment Restrict access before funding named operational removes participants from scheme without providing alternatives cost reduction logic requires Sequencing restriction ahead of ecosystem is no cost reduction It transfer to health education families networks bear weight scheme longer carries This structural critique Schedule cannot answer itself case omission new s50a does plan renewal Bill’s new s50a inserted schedule Part introduces automatic renew “by force section” end date old framework plan renewed plan same except (1)the end date(new plan) is anniversary(end date(old plan);(b)new plan not include any one-off-funding included under old plan;(c)any alteration determined in accordance with instrument made subsection 50A(3) Ministerial legislative-instrument power Minister may by instrument determine further alterations beyond (date-shift and(b)(one-off-funding drop).Explanatory Memorandum Note indicates examples contemplated dropping temporary variations such as variation responding unexpected medical event affecting participant carer dropping time-limited funding extent already used scope therefore delegated minister discretion exercised after bill commences Sub-section confirms the new plan does require statement supports prepared participant approved CEO making involves reviewable decision The mechanism, own terms, automatic renewal input fresh statement support administrative rights

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079

off funding line—that is, such as home modifications, capacity-building activities or assistive technology purchased at a fixed-cost—drops upon automatic renewal.

This drafting again disadvantages cohorts characterized by fluctuating needs: several concrete examples illustrate its operational consequence: a child wheelchair-user whose plan included one-off allowance for assistive tech has their allowance dropped automatically even though growth between years requires new wheelchairs which neither qualify under ‘significant change’ in condition nor unanticipated changes per section(s). Plans auto-renew without replacement-funding lines similarly affecting allowances related to capacity building or environmental mods. Consider participants temporarily varied plans adding paid support due hospitalization of informal carers who are stripped out defaulting back to old plan minus funds/allowances unless re-established through s48A reassessment route narrowed by this bill’s own example noted above. This concern arises from removal being automatic and indifferent whether underlying need still exists; renewed plans assume no material change requiring participant recognition while any significant changes can be addressed via participant-initiated reassessments also narrowing down with these sections. The provisions operate together ensuring gradual changing needs like autism & intellectual disabilities have silent renewals lacking input mechanisms thus gated-out of the updating workflow. The architecture results into drift further away until clearing thresholds making gaps irrecoverable within timescales lived-in.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment Submission

The Bill’s provisions land on her in three overlapping ways: New sections s.24(5),s.25(1B)**,ands*. 25A apply to her next plan reassessment from January 1st*, she will then undergo an assessment against criteria clinically inconsistent with autism using instruments yet uncreated; this contrasts ‘low moderate support needs’ classification DSM-5 & Nat Autism Strategy do not use. Section S* .*48 A limits conditions under which as parent acting for her can request re-assessments if gradual changes occur in support needs per Act’s anticipation - including transition between educational arrangements post-secondary one. Section s . *.50A means each end date auto-renewal without fresh statement supports, dropping off single funding and no input either as a parent or participant. She turns fourteen now. By Jan., when new functional capacity regime commences at age sixteen I-CAN instrument flagged sector commentary scope. When renewed twice under s.s.50A once or more, original education plans drift away alignment without mechanism recovery. S.48 gates may be met but eroded by drafting process making restoration hard. The Committee should consider: 9-to-15 cohort question is sequencing issue. Bill starts eligibility-tightening on January 1 st (functional capacity assessment regime Budget Paper No line). Replacement program announced. Assessment instrument unnamed. Clinical evidence basis unknown public record.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079

The instrument does not use, through a process that narrows agencies’ control over individual plans while dropping elements within those plans during every renewal period.

Section 6 - Structural under-subscription of the NDIS across the disabled community, and funding-below-cost provisions

s34A related sections The Bill’s targeting logic presents the NDIS as a scheme whose participant count rising beyond sustainable bounds. Minister cited National Press Club on April current participation “760k” rising well over 900k basis reform package eligibility-tightening provisions framing present rise evidence expansion wrong evidence participant count I set this section under-count population need driven structural access barriers compound those access rather than relieve them same also authorises primary legislation Minister set funding groups supports below actual cost those support caps regardless whether cap meets costs group combination narrower accessbelowcost funding structurally inconsistent Government own published statutory objects Scheme Why Participant Count Undercount not Over-expansion Current reflects population cleared four sequential diagnosis awareness eligibilty application successful planning meeting each operates material rejection or attrition nothing underlying clinical need Diagnostic Access adult autism private in Australia currently $2500 pocket against public sector waitlists twelve months more NDIS does fund diagnostics cost falls individual family Female genderdiverse Autistic Australians face average later diagnostic age frequently late thirties forties because literature autistic presentations women genderdiverse people recently begun brought routine clinical practice Aboriginal Torres Strait Islander people additional structure barrier culturally appropriate diagnosis remote very remote areas fewer clinicians qualified make result substantial share of Australian population undiagnosed any given time additional diagnosed only middle adulthood decades impairment first affected functioning Application Barriers Applying to the NDIS administratively gruelling. The asks applicant cohort whose includes difficulty with administrative tasks executive function sustained attention written communication assemble extensive documentation describe needs particular format engage multiple interfaces process itself an access for scheme designed serve eligible drop out never start

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079

that successfully completes the application is a subset-of-the-eligible-cohort-not-a-representative-sample.

Planning-meeting representation.The NDIs planning meeting-is-in-its-current-operational-form-frequently-one-hour-interview-in-which-the-applicant-or-participant-must-describe-they-needs-to-an-Agency-planner.-Autism-is,-structurally,a-presentation-in-

in which masking—the-conscious-or-unconscious-performance-of-allistic-social-behaviour-at-significantinternal-cost—ispartofhowthecohortmoves-through-unfamiliarinstitutionalencounters.Aonehourmeetingwithastrangerinaninstitutionsettingisahighmasking-context.Supportneedsaresystematicallyunder-describedinthatcontext,nottbecausetheparticipantiscoercingneedbutbecausemaskingispartoftheimpairment’sinteraction-with-theplanningenvironment.Thesamedynamicappliestowith-differentmechanisms,toa-range-ofotherimpairmentcohorts-ThetPlanningMeeting-under-measureswhatitisintendedtomeasure. Population-scale-TheAustralianBureauOfStatisticsSurveyDisabilityAgeingandCarersidentifiesapproximately5.5millionAustralianslivingdisabilitypopulation.Approximately14percentofthesubmittedpopulationTheNDISSchemeActuarymostrecentpublishedparticipantcountisanapproximate760000

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 2079

Under-subscription Reading Reinforced By International Comparator Australia’s spending on disability and incapacity-related public services as share GDP sits OECD average Nordic comparators particularly well above Australia under subscription point does not depend comparison alone - itself drawn across thirty-eight member countries welfare system models higher than Australia international comparative evidence does support framing Australian scheme expanded beyond comparator country norms NDLS over-expanded survives either broadOECD or specific reading.

Medicare Comparitor Government Itself Has Invoked The Treasurer’s Budget speech Tuesday May invoked Medicare comparator being brought into line reform package ensure growth “in programs like Medicare.”

The comparator analysis Medicare need driven uncapped wider reform through Paper No bilateral funding mechanic imposes explicit per cent ceiling Commonwealth contributions states July fully utilised because access barriers structurally low universal bulk billable diagnosis near zero financial barrier entry light administrative process NDSI structurally under subscribed because high access barriers structurally high privately funded adult autism costing approximately $ against twelve month plus public waits gruelling application masking measurement planning meetings current participant count therefore an of population need driven by high access barriers – expansion. Growth government cites evidence a scheme exceeding sustainable bounds this is, in fact beginning to reach eligible it has since inception measure the working toward its statutory purpose failing against it Capping NDIS at 8 makes less like Medicare more Reform widens structural gap between schemes rather narrowing one Bill moving away from

Funding Below Cost Provisions: new s34A; new s32K(3C); and s33(2EA) (s33(2EB)), And New S45C While eligibility tightening provisions Schedule narrow who admitted Scheme separate cluster narrows what people on actually receive Bill creates two parallel below cost mechanisms - for old framework plans schedule together with caps EB price ceilings . Each operates different route same effect : can sit below support intended provide.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment

Submission: [NDIS Amendement] - Securing NDIS Future Generations Bill Submission No.: 2079

New s.34A – Ministerial determination reducing funding for groups of supports.

Section 34A states:

For ensuring financial sustainability within NDINS scheme, The minister can determine via legislative instrument that certain percentages (⩡ <▸▼%) of funds allocated towards specific types of assistance will decrease while this decision is active… This change does not alter existing plans; instead, it reduces funding unilaterally. Sub-sections include a clarification stating such decisions still apply even if they result either from insufficient coverage on individual participant’s plan or overall insufficiency across all reasonable and necessary supports under their entire plan. It also requires ministers’ actions must consider participants’ safety but provides no substantive safeguard beyond this requirement. Ministers may reduce any type of support’s budget to ensure ‘financial sustainability’, which takes effect regardless whether total planned spending falls below actual costs covered in each case. No definition exists regarding what constitutes ‘financial sustainability’, leaving the term subjectively determined by Ministers without statutory criteria, thresholds, tests against these determinations being reviewed. New section S.45C prevents providers charging agency-managed or plan-managed participants more than pre-determined amounts leading them generally unable legally charge differences resulting often in withdrawal from lower-cost segments where participants lose access entirely unless self-administered (which many disabled people cannot manage).

New s.32K(3C) – Statutory permission for new framework planning at cost-below-level.

The inserted Section 32K(3C), part Schedule IV Part II of Bill, describes:

A specified amount as mentioned within paragraph 3B can be higher equal less than real expenses incurred providing/acquiring a specific group/class assistance.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 2079

The drafting authorizes three states: funding above cost, funding at cost, and funding below cost. In context, the operative state is the third: a scheme designed on assumption that funding meets costs has no need primary legislation, supports has no need; construction reads as generic permissive draft but it anchored $378 billion savings target Schedule reforms operationalize The pathways are operationally inert fiscal structured around savings pathway one was inserted permit This Ministerial determination route built-in statutory permission Under new framework planning regime commencing April rules-making power amounts level needs s explicit knowledge written into primary legislation produced may sit below cost provisions Explanatory Memorandum confirms design intent Ministerial authority under applies to old plans s Applies to new frameworks Together two cover full transition can be reduced below cost determined new specified below rule-outset New s and s — caps apply regardless Section authorization minister set support class maximum amount intensity ratio sub-section requires Agency’s working out such exceeded Note load-bearing text These provisions apply whether a component amount of supports in group relates Therefore cap funding intensities worker-to-participant ratios any class operate regardless resulting meeting costs becomes notional ceiling decoupled from provision New s empowers section determine legislative instrument maximum for acquisition or providing NDIS supports Where determines agency must pay person respect acquiring or exceeding maximum An provider “must charge more than” Sub-authorizes different matters among others (ii) costs supporting classes

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079

supports are greater due to the remoteness of the location in which they are provided; or ⢵(iii) whether the supports or classes of supports are provided remotely or in person.“” The price cap can be set differently for remote and non-remote provision, at the Minister’s discretion. Read together, the four powers authorise the Minister to reduce funding below cost for old framework plans (⢧⸌A),authoriserule-makingtospecifyfundingamountsbelowcostfor newframeworkplans(⢫K(3C)), autorizecapsthatapplyregardlessofcost(s.(2EA)/(2EB)) ,and authorizepriceceilingsthatisproviderscannotexceed(S.C).TheBillremoves,inthesamelllegislative move,the structural assumption thanthatNDISfundswillmeetthe-costofthesupportstheplan funds—acrossboththeadoldrameworkplann regime(whichexistingparticipantsareon )andanewframworkplanneremiginewhichall participantstransitionintoafter1April.45C). The pay-gap consequence already documented Thpay-gapsequenceoNDSI fundssittingbelowcostisanalreadydocumentedinthesector.TheAbilityRoundtable’s 2025 workforce remuneration analysis found a ⦶per cent pay gap fOR NDIS-funded psychologists againstnon-NIDSsectorpsychologist remuneratior Thegapexistsincurrentarrangements,beforeany ofthenewMinisterial below-copowersins.⢧.A, s.(EAB)/⺻)orS.S is exercised.THe Billprovides statutory authority to extend and entrench the existing gap by Ministerial determination, with participant carrying cost difference through reduced support quality,reducedsupport intensity or withdrawal providers from regulated market segment for suppor in question. TProductivityCommission’s reports flagged thin markets , workforc ecapacityandmarket stewardship as launch-era risks scheme would need manage deliver on its statutary objects .The academic literature between 2013-2024 has confirmed quasi-market failure specific segments geographies.e6 Institute economist Pelin Akyol,in advance her Economic Society Australia (New South Wales )seminarWednesdayMaytitledMore Quasi than Market:Price CapsMarket Design INNDIS“has framed questions these terms While much public debate focused tighter eligibilityreduces plan funding third lever received less attention design itself whether functions competitive marketwhether price caps doing most heavy lifting.“Credentialed economics framing converges same architecture this section identifies.Schedulebelow-costfundingarchitecture imposespriceceilings that operate thosemarkets without addressing indeed exacerbating underlyingthin-markets problem.Integration point Schedulecostarchitecturactively worsens conditionsSchedule needs remedy developed Section combination:narrower access below-cost funding Sectioncoveredclinical-evidencevacuum permanence-and-treatment test. ⢵ covered diagnostic-language vacuum the eligiblity-targeting dependson.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 2079

Section 5 covered the assessment-instrument vacuum and the reassessment-and-renewal architecture that disproportionately disadvantages cohorts with fluctuating need. This section adds the under-subscription reframe and the below-cost funding architecture.Read together, the four sections describe a Bill:

• Narrows access against impairment cohorts the existing scheme is already understating; Does so using test has no peer clinical body endorsement structurally incoherent those impairments categories; Categorises affected Thriving Kids’ descriptor and every age cohort new functional capacity regime applies diagnostic language operative clinical statutory documents do use;Operates on instrument designed Restricts agency participants update plans needs change Removes administrative-review rights plan renewal point s.50A(4)(b);Subordinates substantive reasonable-necessary obligation financial sustainability Objects clause level (s3(1)d));andAuthorises Minister fund supports remain amounts their cost(s.s.(5), s., n.n./, n.)These are not independent design choices.They operate coordinated reorientation of participant whose retained permanence-treatment test who assessed apparatus produced whose renewed without input reviewable decision challenge one-off time-limited dropped renewals remaining reduced by determination under s.supports costs remains alternative named relevant age still paper.In substance,the plan secures it exists provide funds less than support’s cost,support delivered markets further thinned through pricing assessment operating population structural under-reaching lifetime scheme date avenues challenged outcomes progressively narrowed Schedule 1,Schedule objects amendment together. That argument omission Schedule It single provision can amended coherence provisions operate Section reflects only remedy adequate architectural state package introduced.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 2079

Statutory inconsistency and discrimination

Sections 3 through 6 set out the substantive evidence base for the omission of Schedule 1—the clinical-evidence vacuum, the diagnostic-language critique, the assessment-instrument and reassessment-and-renewal architecture, and the structural undersubscription paired with the funding-below-cost provisions. This section turns to statutory footing: seven load-bearing amendments are made to NDIA’s core law: Pillar 1—Objects Clause at new s.(d); Pillar 2—New definition on functional capacity; Pillar 3—Permanence-treatment gate; Pillars 4–7, respectively addressing Commonwealth-State conflict, wholesale removals in schedule principles relating plans, administrative reviewability removed during plan renewal, regressive codification introduced into a specific clause—all inconsistent structurally against Australia’s disability framework foundational instruments including CRPD obligations. The current Act commits scheme to ‘give effect’ under [CRPD]. The pillars work against that obligation specifically Articles [5], [12] & [19]; they operate together as interdependent issues not independent technical problems. Each pillar is described below:\

Pillar 1 — Objects Clauses amendment (item): New s.(a)

The NDIS Act Object clauses set out what Scheme aims for participants. Current s.(b) reads “provide reasonable supports.” Bill amends this provision item 60 to read:(c)(i) provide NDIS Supports for Participants in the National Disability Insurance Scheme that are reasonable and necessary so far consistent with financial sustainability of said Scheme; Two changes: first removing early intervention support from foundation statement second adding subordination clause regarding financial sustainability, as per Section 25(1)b which states early interventions likely reduce future needs for supports.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment

Submission 2079

foundational statement of the scheme’s purpose at the same time as it imposes, under new s.25(1B), the same permanence-and-treatment test that gates the disability-requirements pathway. The s.25 pathway is, in legal form, retained; in substantive form, it is collapsed into the s.24 pathway, gated by the same clinically-incoherent test I described in Section 3, and removed from the Objects clause that names what the scheme is committed to providing.

The second change is more structurally significant than this one because: The current Objects clause sets out coordinate principles — each grounded in s.(1)(a) without being conditional upon another principle within its own statutory home.New s.17B compounds alteration introduced by introducing “Principles relating to scheme sustainability” CEO MUST have regard for these when performing functions under Act including sub-section (b). Participants should be responsible day-to-day living costs regardless if person has disabilities.The combination—Objects clause subordination at s., operational direction at s.—restructures around fiscal targets in a way not done currently.

s.amendment also creates an internal contradiction with s.(a). which remains unchanged:Section commits Scheme to Australia’s obligations under CRPD.Australia’s Convention Obligations are contingent on State Party domestic financial circumstances.Bill leaves s.in force while introduces adjacent paragraph of same clause regarding Fiscal Sustainability Subordinate Principle Two Principles now operating against each other inside Object Clause Bill drafting does address Contradiction. A separate concern attaches itself to “financial sustainability”. The phrase imported as substantive criterion governing support obligation used again new s..(3), where Minister determines below-cost funding reductions for purpose of Financial Sustainability and at new s..(17), the need ensure Financial Sustainability when setting maximum amounts.)Bill defines what means measured or evidence base established that Scheme is financially sustainable.Sustainability load-bearing term across Schedule 1,2 undefined.Minister’s discretion rhetorical authorisation.Undefined trigger carries no defined process. When made determination affected supports cohorts age groups participants basis choices cannot know whether or when determined might.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079

reduce the funding their plan depends on, and a provider cannot know whether the market segment they operate in will remain viable. The instability the undefined power introduces itself harm—it removes stability disabled people need to plan lives predictably providers thin markets so compounds Section problems develop.

Pillar II: Functional Capacity Definition New s against CRPD Article Social Model

The Bill inserts new statutory functional capacity at verbatim: “(1)A person’s ability undertake activity without assistance other people assistive technology or modifications; b)in excludes possible impact environmental personal circumstances.” is hypothetical test measured supports currently use environment personal conditions threshold not defined. New rules made Minister Technical Advisory Group Budget Paper No line $3 million is body now beginning work gate operates undesigned date submission methodology structurally incompatible with CRPD Article disability Australia obligated give effect under Act socially relational impairment barriers social model framework recognises same impairment different context produces experience does separate from identifies constitutive Commonwealth put public inter-governmental record three months before introduced.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079

New s.9B operates in the opposite methodological direction.

Functional capacity is measured by stripping out the supports and the environmental context—exactly the factors the CRPD identifies as constitutive of disability.The Bill is, in effect, asking what the person’s ability would be in a counterfactual world in which supports and environmental adaptations did not exist. The CRPD does not recognise that counterfactualas the relevant frame for understanding disability.NDIS Act 2013 s.(a)(i)a commits theme to giving effect to the CRPD.New s.9B amends the scheme in awaythe CRPDdoes not support,andinawaythecommonwealth’sownFoundational SupportsAgreement doessupport either. The s.9B methodology has afurther substantive problem beyond th framework conflict: itbuilds acatch-22 into access test.Because functionalcapacityismeasured with thenperson’’currentsupports strippedout,a participant whose needs are well-metbyeffective fundedsupportswill measure ashaving higherfunctional capacitathan theyactually have unsupported—andthathighermeasuredcapacityispreciselywhatcan costthemthesupports on their next plan review.Thesupporthatareworkingarethereason thestestconcludsthat thesuppor ts ar enot needed.Aperverse incentive istbuiltinto statutory definition people who currently receive effective sup portsscorehig heronfunctionalc apacit yandmay losethosesu pportsonthenextplanreview,b ecausethesesupp orthemselveshave raisedthemeasure dc a pacity.Thefluctuating-needcohorts I described Section5—AutisticAustralians,peoplewithintellectualdisability andcooccurring conditions,personswithmentalhealthconditions, personswithdegenerativeimpairments—are disproportionately exposed to this dynamicbecause thesefunded supportstheycurrentlyreceivearet what is keepingtheir measured function al capacity atthehigh erlevel.This critiquehas been advanced ont he public record byth eV illamanta Disability RightsLegal Service inits community legal forumonthe Billdelivered 20May 262026bysenior LawyerEliseAlmond,LawyerKellyWilkinsLaw ClerkTrinityFord.Thelegal-servicesslide deckidentifiesnew s.9Basthereoperative provision thatstripsout th esupports-and-environment contextCRPD Article1definition of disability identifies as constitutiveof disabilitythe scheme designedtosuppo rt.ThesubstantivecritiqueIset outinthis sectionison thelegal-servicepublicrecord. New ss. does not restore an original definition—itintroduces anew one Theoriginal NDIS Act contains no support-strippedenvironment-excluded hypothetical-capacity test;that methodology istreatedbythisBill.Changing how dis ability definedandhow functionalcapacity assessedismorefundamentaldeparture fromthescheme’soriginaldesignthanany change inp articipantnumbers,becauseit changes thing thenumbersarecounting.Sectionaddresses participant-number framing andSection8setsou tthen fourprimary-source venueswhich “original intent” rhetoricappears; The point here is narrowerands tructural—a

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment Bill

Submission: [2079]

Bill that genuinely returned the scheme to its founding definition of disability would not need to write a new definition of functional capacity into the Act. Pillar 3 — The permanence-and-treatment gate at new s.24(5) and new s.25(1B): the rhetoric is permanence, the operational mechanism is severity- b-y-cohort-descriptor

The Bill introduces a new permanence-and-treatment gate at item 64 (new s.24(5)) for the disability-requirements pathway and at item 70 (new s.25(1B)) for the early-intervention pathw ay.The operative text imposes three conjunctive requirements: “(a)the person has undertaken all appropriate treatmentfor the impairment or impairments(if any); anda(bany othertreatmentism unlikelyto materially improve, reverseor alleviate thee impactof,theimpairmentorimpairments;and(c) the impairemtonormpaimentsarelikelytopersistfortheperson’slifetime.” I addressedtheclinicalincoherenceoftreatmentehaustionlimbinSectionautism,intellectualdisabilit yDownsyndrome,cerebral palsy,motorneuronedisease,andbroadcohortswhomeredyorelleviationistnottheadaptiveclinical paradigmcannotmeaningfullyexhaust treatments therelevant clinical evidence basedoes notname.Thelimbamsumesatreatmentmodelthatdoesno tapply tothese conditions:there ist no treatmen that“reversesa utismordown syndrome,anda progressive condition such as motor neurone disease theroperativeclini paradigm is symptom management,notremedy.Formy own family thisisanotabstract—theren o course oftreement mychildrenori could“ehaust”tosatisfys.s.(5)(a),because conditions testis applied arenot kindtestimagines.This sub-section addressessecondstatutory inconsistency gatecarries gap between Government permanence rhetoric criterion in existing access tests Act,Bill operational exclusion mechanism for Autistic applicants. Thepermanencerhetoricstable framingGovernment has restated across multiple primary-source venuesMinister address National Press Club 22 April Treasurer Budget Paper No. measure text May ,and the Department Health Disability and Ageing’s signed ministerial response MC on (Section sets out full venue map “original intent drift). Across all three venues Governments stated rationaleforaccess-tightening package protection supports people with permanent significant disability.” The Chair Foreword House Standing CommitteeonHealth,Aged CareDisability December report reproduces sameframing phraseallpeoplewithsevere disability Permanence one halfofrhetor icSeverity otherhalf.Two run together governments public formulation do not appear criteriaAct.The naming these instruments worth pausing because reform names effects point opposite directions.Areport titledNo child left behind accompanies a reformat leaves cohort announced replacement

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079

program and narrows the early-intervention pathway thousands of children rely on. A Bill titled the National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the National Disability Insurance Scheme for Future Generations) Bill 2026 delivers a $37.8 billion reduction over four years and removes an estimated 160,000 people from the scheme.The titles convey protection and continuity; the operative provisions deliver contraction. The Committee is entitled to weigh the operative text against the framing the names invite,and give the text greater weight. The statutory architecture the Bill amending does not use “significant” or “severity” as criterion.NIDS Act s.24,the disability-requirements pathwary refers impairments that “are,or are likely be,permanent**”to functional capacity substantially reduced in one more communication social interaction learning mobility self-care **or self-management Section S5,the early intervention pathway,in its current form does require permanence at all under six developmental delay limb—its access test turns whether early interventon benefit person by reducing future needs supports Neither pathways uses severity as criteria any age Substantially reduced functiona capacity attaches impact named areas impairment itself—a mild can meet s.test if substantial reduced those areas severe impairment fall outside test if substantial reduced in those areas Severity language non-statutory rhetorical layer Government applied different formulations venues above.Bill carries rhetoric forward without grounding it new statuary criterion Legislation determines lifelong support should rest on established appropriately qualified clinical authorities developed with affected communities genuinely consulted—not a rhetorical frame imported into statute without evidentiary foundation New s.(5)new s(1B introduce permanence-and-treatment-exhaustion gate they do not introduce severity criterion Operative text speaks permanent treatment exhaustion material improvement —not severity This is where autism-is-permanent point bites Autism defined DSM 5 neurodevelopmental condition characterised persistent differences across lifespan diagnostic criteria explicitly requiring symptoms present from the early development period The condition definition lifelang Autistic applicant categorically passes permanence of s.24 access test An autistic child seeking early-intervention also categorical passes Bill imports via new s.(1B).For autism formal diagnosis confirmation against DSM-5 criteria that impairmnet lifelong so permanence already satisfied point diagnois and treatme exhaust overlay adds second gate top clinical determination scheme accepts Campaign restore NDIS original intent”of “permanent significant disability cannot exclude autistics applicants permanence limb gate constructing Autism

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079

Government’s rhetoric and the Bill’s permanence criterion do not, by their own terms, exclude Autistic applicants from access.

The Bill’s operational mechanism for narrowing Autistic access lies elsewhere. The Department’s MC26-008601 paragraph 3 names the Thriving Kids cohort it is rolling out from October 2026 as “children aged eight and under with developmental delay and/or autism with low to moderate support needs, as well as their families, carers and kin.” The cohort descriptor “low to moderate support needs” is the operational filter.The new functional-capacity assessment at s.9B—the methodology I addressed in the preceding sub-section ,with the threshold delegated to NDIS Rulesunder ss.(2)(and(3))nd the Technical Advisory Group provisionedin Budget Paper No .line now beginning design work—is instrument that will operationalisethe descriptor.the cohort-redirectionmechanismis composition of two architectural elements: acohortdescriptorthat tags someAutistic childrenas having“lowto moderatesupportneeds”,afunctionalcapacitytestthresholdbelow which theywillnot accesst individualised supports through thendisands will be redirected into state-deliveredThrivingsKids program insteadofNDIS plans.Samecompositionoperate scheme-wide Januaryagainst existing participants on plan review,new appliedthroughnew ndsRules.

Operational mechanism severity-based.Cohortdescriptorexpressedlanguage“support needs”.Assessmentinstrument measure functionality against threshold Bill does not name.Either descriptorthresholdoperatesseverity gate by anothernameSeverity has no statutory grounding ins.or —criterion Act permanence plus substantially reduced function capacity named areas.not severity impairment,Billdoes addseveriteto either access test as explicit criterion.

Gap between Government’s stated rationale andBill’ operatomechani is evidence case for these provisionshas been honestly made.Rationalepermanence;operational mecha nism severity-by-cohordescriptor. Rationale cannot exclude Autistic applicants, because categorically pass the permanence limb.Mechanism exclusionworkrationalecannot— criteriaAct face containapplied via s.functional-capacity testand “low to moderate support needs” cohort descriptor.Reform genuinely about permanent would need that machinery its presence telloperative purposeis notthe stated one . I am asking Committee resolve this writing clean severity criterinto gate.Entrenchexclusionnot cure it.Point opposite:permance-and-treatmentgate at new ss.(5)nd (1B),definition operationalisescohort-descriptor architecture targets inconsistent CRPD Disability Discrimination 1992 abandon scheme’sstatutorypurpose under s.-omitted grounds whatever basis rhetoric ultimately said rest on.Scheme should continue do what act

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079

has always required: provide reasonable and necessary supports, including early intervention, to people whose impairment is permanent and whose functional capacity is substantially reduced, without a treatment-exhaustion overlay; the clinical evidence base does not support. Section 4 addresses how “low-to-moderate-support-needs” cohort descriptor maps onto diagnostic-language critique—the Department’s own letter at MC26-008601 paragraph acknowledges mild-severe autism terminology can misrepresent”the support needs of Autistic people.” Section immediately preceding operationalises equivalent “low-to moderate-suppport-needs” as Thriving Kids filter. Section sets out full four-venue map Government’s permanence-and-original-intent rhetoric way against existing statutory text. Pillar 4 —The Commonwealth-vs-State law conflict new s.(5)(a)and new s(1B)aagainst state mentalhealthlegislation rights refuse-treatment The permanence-andtreatment gate carries further axis-statutory inconsistency surfaced parliamentary record May Professor Jennifer SmithMerry Centre disability Research Policy University Sydney testified Joint Standing Committee on NDIS inquiry second public hearing in Sydney Professors research funded Australian Research Council Laureate Fellowship based qualitative interviews participants family members stakeholders across Australia examining experiences scheme for psychosocial disability Her evidence Hansard record:

“I am concerned about one particular change related need exhaust all treatments or other avenues first What we’ve seen already operation NDIS significant work access eligibility within current rules processes involved that are denied under psychosocial if haven’t tried medical therapies to address their disability That even include electroshock therapy types treatment Now conflicts with our state-based legislation Under statebasedmental health you’re allowed not take up a treatment In response Senator SteeleJohn direct question meant conflict between proposed change and patients have right State Territory mental-health statutes Professor answered: “You’re allow refusal treatment Right people have would conflict criteria where had be able show tried alternative treatments” The States Territories each different provide right refuses defined circumstances. This is foundational regulatory framework parliaments built around mental-health

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079 treatment over decades. It operates at the level of the individual’s lawful capacity to decline a clinical intervention, and it does not turn on the medical considerations the narrow s.25A(3)(a) carve-out from the treatment-exhaustion limb contemplates. The federalism axis of the inconsistency is structurally distinct from the CRPD, DDA and Closing the Gap inconsistencies the other pillars of this section address. The Bill amends Commonwealth legislation in a way that conditions access to a Commonwealth-administered support scheme on the applicant having undertaken treatment State and Territory legislation provides the applicant with a statutory right to refuse. An applicant with psychosocial disability who exercises the State-law right to refuse treatment categorically cannot satisfy the Commonwealth-law requirement at new s.24(5)(a) and new s.25(1B)(a) that all appropriate treatment be exhausted. The Bill’s drafting does not address whether the Commonwealth provision operates to penalise the lawful exercise of a State-conferred rights, or whether the Commonwealth provision is inoperative where the State right is exercised.The s.25A(3)(a) carve-out for treatment the person cannot undertake for medical reasons does not reach the conflict —- the State right to refuse is a rights-of-the-person matter ,not a medical-reason exception.Professor Smith-Merry’s evidence was that this is not hypothetical conflict.Her participant qualitative research has documented psychosocial-disability applicants being “denied access… if they haven’t tried all medical treatments to address theirdisability” under existing NDIS access processes—under arrangements operational rules, primary-legislation criteria. The Bill writes arrangement into test itself,new s.(5)a(new s.)and applies it across both pathways.Conflict produced by current arrangement what bill codifying.Joint Standing Committee on NDIs Professor Smith-Merrys evidence public record Conflict between two pieces statutory architectureCommonwealths Act amendment requiring exhaustion.State Territory mental-health legislation providing right refusal treatmenthas been addressed.Bill Senate Community Affairs Legislation Committee asked consider its Explanatory Memorandum Minister Second Reading Speech or any Government material campaign able identify.Pillar The Principles relating plans: wholesale removal at Schedule Part against CRPD ArticlesThe current sets outPrinciples relating plan preparation varied reassessed replaced funding management should as reasonably practicable individualised directed by participant consideration respect role family carers other persons significant in participants life recognise and respect

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment

Submission: [NDIS] Securing NDIS Future Generations Bill - Submission No.: 079

relationship between participants and their families and carers; strengthen and build capacity of families and carers to support participants who are children, adults if agreed upon; support communities responding individually based on needs. The principle underpinning these actions: is for individuals’ rights regarding personal control over lives. This aims towards inclusion within society while achieving each person’s aspirations. Maximise choice & independence among participants. Facilitate tailored responses meeting individual goals and needs. Provide context for disability service delivery where multiple providers exist.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079

Inclusion and Participation in Community

The S31 Principles under Articles e), h), k): consideration informal support services generally available; advancement inclusion participation communities); coordination disability service delivery context. These principles operational expression Article obligation level. Their removal Act is removal scheme given effect to Article same direction travel operating wider funding Schedule below-cost provisions disproportionately affect community-participation supports—cut Social, Civic & Community Participation Office Impact Analysis report surfaced Guardian Australia May addresses full directly against community-inclusion obligations imposed on these two instances inconsistency: s.31 Principles removed planning-architecture level SCCP cut funding-architecture level are instances same Article inconsistent The Agreement reinforces social-model definition frame; bill removes operational expression that frame from instrument while retaining inter-governmental commitment at agreement Commonwealth’s own documents working each other period—and CRPD commitments NDIS s requires give-effect-to. The pattern which principles retained fragmentary form itself informative: family/carer relationship principles c ca fragments community-responsiveness principle f fragmented forms choice-and-control principles a b g i j removed community-inclusion principles e h k significant selectivity CRPD articles protect participant’s legal capacity choices community inclusion article frames family roles protection the bill removes articles while retains framework where relationships recognized but participants’ rights not substituted participant-directed control-based plan-design with Framework Family Carer Relationships Recognized Participant Choice Control and Inclusive Rights Not Protected

Pillar 6 — Removal Administrative Review Plan Renewal New S50A(4)(b) Against CRPD Article DDA Review-Rights Architecture

Schedule Part of Bill introduces new providing automatic renewal force law end reassessment period. New reads verbatim:

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079 The automatic renewal-by-force-of-law produces a new plan, and the new plan is not, on the operative text of the provision, the product of a reviewable decision. Administrative ermits-review against a reviewable decision under s.99 of the Act, and the Administrative eview Tribunal pathway that follows from it, do not apply. A participant whose annual auto-renewed plan funds less than the previous plan funded ––for example,becausetheminister’ss.34Adeterminationhasreducedthefundingcomponentforspecifiedgroupofsupportsbetweentheadoldplandthenewplanorbecauseagencyhassapplied thenewframeworkplanningregime’ss.32K(3C)bellow-cost funding amounts tonewplan— has,onoperative-textofs.s5A(b),noreviewabledecisiontochallengeattherenewalpoint. ThisisincompatiblewithCRPDArticle12obligation.Articlerequiresthatallmeasuresrelating toexerciselegalcapacityrespect therights,willpreferences personare“subjecttoregularreviewbya competent,independentimpartialauthority.” Theautomaticplan-renewalarchitectureismeasure relating exerciseparticipant’s legal capacity respect supports plans fundstheAdministrative ReviewTribunalcompetent independent impartial authority through which currentAct gives effect Article 12 New Soperates obligation off table atannual plann renewal point —the point continuing access scheme supportsdeterminedundereitherthes reduced-fundings regime orSbelowcost regimethatSection6 of this submission addresses in full.Villamanta Disability Rights Legal Service’s independentevaluation analysis community forumidentifies new sas operative text removal review rights pathway plan renewable.Thelegalservice framing is on public record The provision also structurally inconsistent with broaderDisability Discrimination Act and Australian HumanRightsCommissionAct1986 review-rights architecture the Commonwealth anti-discrimination framework operatesthroughRemoving administrative-reviewabilityplannerelocation participantcontinuing accessto schemesupports being determined places reviewrights architecureCommonwealthanti discriminationframework tensionaccessarchitecturedisabilitiesupporsschemeantidiscrimination framework supposed operate alongside Sectionofthissubmissionaddresses parallel stripping Bill effects Schedule Part Ministerial pricing-decision-maker model legislativeinstrument carveout from administrativemerits removes reviewpathwaypricing determinationpoint.Two provisionsoperate together:news.50A(b)removesreviewrightspoint underSchedule4Cremovesthematprice determinationpointunderSchedule3Combinedeffect structural removal merits-reviews pathwayout two pointsparticipant most likely need it.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment: Securing the NDIS for Future Generations

Submission 2079

Pillar 7 — The regressivity codification: new s.25A(2) against DDA, CRPD Articel 5 & Closing the Gap

I addressed income-geographic regresivty layer of S.25a(2) clinical-access frame Section3 This section addresses same provison discrimination-statutory-inconsistency frame Sub-section provides purposes of S.s4(5)(a)s.(1B)a treatment-exhaustion limb it irrelevent whether person can access appropriate treatment regardless individual circumstances restrict person accessing treatment Note persons individulal circumstanc include financia circumsances geographical location Subsection A narrow statutory exception appropriatemedicaltreatmmentperson cannot undertake medical reasons financial inability geographic inaccessible explicitly outside exceptio. This incompatible with three foundational instruments Australiandisability framework Disabilidiscrimination Act prohibits indirect discriminatio requirement not reasonable having regard to circumstance case higher proportion people without relevant attribute comply or able complie effect disadvantaging people relevan attribut Treatments test contemplates fall on indivual adult autism diagnosis Australia currently costs approximately $ out-of-pocket twelve-month-plus public waitlist full treatme exhaustion mean tens thousands dollars private therapy medication trials S provision imposes requiremen all appropriatetreatment in financi and geographircumstances says do matter disproportionately disadvantages low-income remote applicants reasonableness under s6 DDA satisfied by requirment whose unreasonablness relevance is explicit statuar point DDA at defines disability reference exhausted Bill permanence-and-treatment introduces treatmentexhaustionrequirement into NDIS acces alone has no foundation Commonwealths own anti-discriminatin definition disabilit The CRPD Articel 5 obligates State Parties prohibit discrimination basis of disable take all appropiate steps ensure reasonable accommodation provided Reasonable accommodati Convention defined Article as necessary appropriate modification adjustments imposing disproportionate undue burden needed particular casenjoyment exercise equal bas person disabilities human rights fundamental freedoms Statutory provisio codifies financiaandgeographic circumstanc irrelevant access refusal provide that reasonable accomodation design the acess gate itself. CRPDArticle right health separate from disability-supportsaccessBill’spermanence-andtreatmnettest

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment

Submission: [NDIS for Future Generations] Bill 2026 - Submission No.:

The seven pillars operate together. The seven pillars are not seven separable technical defects.Taken together they reorientthe scheme’s purpose its methodologyits access gateit federalism alignment it plan-level participant rightsthe review pathwayandthenequity profile of th eaccess gatEach offends one ore moreof them foundational instruments: Pillar I Objects clausenew s3I(d): subordinates substantive supportprinciple fiscal sustainabilityremoves early intervention from thenfoundational statement o fthescheme’s purpuseagainst CRPDcommitment sameclausePillar II functional capacitynew s9B strips out social-model factorsCRPD Article definition identifies constitutive disabilityDisability Discrimination Actdefinition likewise contingent supportsstripped counterfactual Pillar III permanence-and-treatment gates new ss45 /ss1B stated rationalepermanencenot exclude Autistic applicantsbecause Autism permanent defintionoperational exclusion mechanismseverity-by-cohort-descriptorapplied through test has no statutory grounding in ss4 or SS5.Pillar IV Commonwealth-vs-State conflict, new ss4(5)(a) /s.25(I B)( a)): directconflict with State and Territory mental-health-legislation rights to refuse treatmentProfessor Jennifer Smith-Merry parliamentary-record testimony Joint

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 2079

Standing Committee on 15 May 2026 establishes – a federalism inconsistency the Bill’s drafting and Explanatory Memorandum do not address. • Pillar 5 (“Principles removal” s.31 Part ‘s.31 Principles removal,

SCHEDULE 1 PART 6): strips out choice-and-control community-inclusion architecture which scheme has given effect CRPD Articles 12 & Article 19 participant-plan level. • Pillar 6 review removal new s.50A(4)(b)): operates CRPD Article regular-review obligation off table - sits in tension with Disabil Discrimination Act Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 review-rights architecture point most likely need it renewal Ministerial determination, or planning regime’s below-cost authority may have reduced funded supports. • Pillar regressive codification new s.25A(2)) puts statutory record access cost geography barriers grounds consider treatment unavailable against Disabl DiscriminAct prohibition indirect discrimination CRPD Artic Closing Gap commitments Foundational Supports Agreement is conditioned on. The current NDIS Act commits Scheme giving Australia’s CRPD obligations The amends seven coordinated moves work those Obligations – articles specifically – and the Disability Discrimination Act ’s prohibition Indirect discrimination Commonwealth National Agreements Aligning Closing Gap Federalism State Territory mental-health statutes seventh pillar identifies provisions Schedule cannot amended into compatibility edits operative text structural reorientation what face Bill Committee being asked assess load-bearing reason omission of Section recommendations ask Committee to record.

Section 8 - Direct contradictions with Government-commissioned reviews on Schedule 1

Sections 3 through 7 set out the substantive evidence base – clinical-evidence vacuum, diagnostic-language critique, assessment-instrument and reassessment-and-renewal architecture, structural under-subscription and below-cost funding provisions, statutory-and-treaty inconsistency. This section turns to review-framework footing of government’s case for Schedule 1 publicly rests in Bill’s explanatory memorandum and Minister Second Reading Speech May 14th identifies five commissioned review streams as evidentiary basis reform package based this section bill is either selectively implementing recommendations from those reviews taking elements that support eligibility tightening while contradicting or omitting elements would not operating against substantial direction altogether. The Bill what governmental primary documentation says it isn’t.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079

Explanatory Memorandum identifies four Disability Royal Commission Recommendations (

Recommendation numbers:

• (9.4)
• (10.2)
• (10.3)
• **(10.4) **), all which inform Schedule 2 Part 6’s plan management and support coordination commissioning provisions. The document does not cite any recommendation number or content to implement specific Schedule 1 provisions such as new permanence-and-treatment test, test on functional capacity definition etc., nor funding below cost authorities or wholesale removal s.31 Principles from Schedul ePart six of schedule one part six.The Minister claimed Hansard record that “takes up recommendations…of royal commision” is substantiated in explanatory memorandum respect of four attached recommendat ions, but bulk substantive operative architecture of bill - access tightening provision -is not anchored single recommendation Government own primary documentation.I ask Committee require Department Health disability ageing identify public record further Royal Commi ssion recommendations operationalised beyond cited section five point four schedules each implemented.If no mapping exists second reading speech implies endorsement should be corrected parliamentary record.

The contradiction sharpens when narrow citation against government formal position on the twenty two hundred plus recom mendations.Joint Australian State Territory Government Response published July thirty first records Commonwealth acceptance positions delivered September twenty third.Forty seven percent accepted principle continues consider sixty three per cent accept notes continuing consideration for implementation framework forty nine specific Royal Commission Recommendations.Bill cites four implementations source for one part of schedule two remaining twelve do not include access tightening architec ture.Position therefore simple:Royal Comission invoked at rhetorical level package whole but anchored implementation level four recommendations to a component Schedule 2. The direction Final Report opposite structural choices made by Schedule One.Royal Commission heard evidence over four and half years reported September twenty-third;Government’s narrow citations cannot read isolation from report as whole.Gap between acceptance action stark independent analysis Queensland Advocacy Inclusion May found only Three Percent have been implemented fifty-three percent have no progress.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079

that record — near-total non-implementation of recommendations the Commonwealth has formally accepted – Schedule 1 advances the scheme in the opposite direction to two or three them each which warrants Committee’s attention.

Community inclusion,

aversing largest saving package. The Royal Commission found segregation people with disabilities housing education employment community life structural condition violence abuse neglect exploitation take hold reducing segregation enabling participation central reform task Departmental modelling tabled Senate May shows that single largest saving present $billion over years achieved cutting funding stream allows participants engage support workers get out communities Government’s own makes reduction community-participation funding financial centrepiece Reform former Commissioner warned package will leave more isolated segregated ignoring lessons Royal Commission Largest measure takes up Royal Commission’s produces outcome segregation isolation Royal established end.

Supported decision-making, against removal s31 Principles Recommendations Final Report called new supported framework placing person’s at centre decisions affect them Schedule Part removes s31 principles relating plans operational architecture through gave effect participant choice control and supported decision making plan level Section develops statutory consequence The dismantles machinery same package government says implements Royal Commission.

Inclusive Education,against schools-disability cut Volume seven made fifteen directed inclusive education recommendation Reduction schooling Budget introduces this Bill cuts million from disability loadings supports students mainstream classrooms fiscal runs against direction Royal Commission’s inclusive-education recommendations.##### A dedicated portfolio,Against consolidation.The recommended a Minister for Disability specific department equality inclusion current has instead consolidated function into combined Health Aged Care Disability NDIS Machinery-of-government the Royal Commonwealth’s own governance answered opposite direction.Underlying all four is methodological inversion.Royal Commission grounded social model of disability lived experience.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 2079

people with disability; the Bill’s new s.9B functional capacity definition, addressed in Section 7, is grounded in the opposite frame. A further provision-level contradiction sits Volume 6 Enabling Autonomy Access one provisions Second Reading Speech invokes Royal Commission justify Volu Recommendation specifically recommended health navigators assist people access navigate NDIS including functiona capacity assessment plan-development process particular attention financial geographic barriers lower-income applicants face navigating complex administrative system No health-navigator program responding Recommendat $ million Inclusive Communities Fund Budget Paper line group-based social participation not access navigation More directly: The Bill’s new s. provides that treatment appropriate purposes permanence-and-treatment test regardless whether person individual circumstances restrict from accessing treatment —including per Note Provision finding Financial Barriers systemic inequity lower-income NDIS applications Peer-reviewed research published Medical Journal Australia Disney et al analysing NDIS applications between provided quantitative confirmation of Volume ndis eligibility rates applicants socioeconomic areas The Bill’s does address financial-barrier inequity identified It writes inequity into statute income and geographical accessibility codified irrelevant to whether treatment “appropriate” for eligibilit Government has invoked Disability Royal Commissio justification specific Royal Commision finding about who current NDIS failing reach # original intent rhetoric second venue on Department signed record A separate rhetorical claim centre government case bill On April Minister told National Press Club would return NDIS its original intent phrase since become signature framing governmen public communications reform package Departme Health, Disabilit Ageing now placed same framings own signed correspondence record Ministerial response MC26-008601 signed by L Jackman Assistant Secretary Thriving Kids Taskforce dated 25 May reads paragraph

“Government is working with professionals engaging community respect reforms restoring the NDIS it’s original intent supporting people permanent significant disability securing scheme future generations”

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 2079

The framing has therefore spread from Ministerial speech (22 April 2026) and Budget paper measure text (12 May 2026) to formal Departmental correspondence (25 May 2026), and the same rhetorical layer also appears in the Chair’s Foreword to the December 2025 House Committee report No child left behind — set out in the Thriving Kids Inquiry sub-section that follows ––in the phrase “all people with severe disability.”“’ ’The framing is now operating across four primary-source venues of the Commonwealth’s NDIS-reform communications: three executive-side (Minister, Treasury, Department) and one parliamentary-committee. The framing is rhetoric, not statutory grounding.’NDIS Act at s.(3)(a) s(3)(d) commits scheme to “provide reasonable necessary supports including early intervention supports participants”NationalDisabilityInsuranceScheme.” Early intervention named Objects clause as coordinate Object scheme Section distinct access pathway established early intervention supports does require permanence admits since launch The framing was “only ever intended ‘people permanent significant disability’is what act says face contradicted by own objects This emphasis original intent“framing repeated media coverage absorbed public understanding reform meaningful part limited resistance Bill traces premise -that scheme drifted narrow founding purpose governing statute contains. Department restatement MC26-008601 measured against statute department administers incorrect A second statutory anchor compounds point.NDSAct 2013 s.(1)a commits scheme effect Australia obligations under CRPD]”.CRPDArticle defines interaction between impairment barriers social model without conditioning on permanence OriginalintentDepartment has signed rests definition itself first Object bound gives different definition Third sits inside design Schedule Part amends new s.(B) applies test early intervention pathway.Bill itself treats never existed; it amendments substantive distinction from s.(Part separately removes Principles relating plans operational architecture which given participant choice control community inclusion level These provisions confirm that the bill is restoring prior state of scheme restructuring through which purposes Act have been operationalisedOriginalintentionframingserves rhetorical function operative text not support. Fourth lies outside NDIS Act Disability Discrimination Act (DDA) includes past present future imputed disabilities impairments without

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 2079

regard to their permanence or severity; it contains no permanence threshold. The “original intent” framing —andthepermanence-ands-treatment gatethBillconstructsto operationalisit—narrowsaccessbyacriterionthatneitherthenNDISActnortheadDAcontains atthesametimeastheGovernmentassertsthereformrestoresa statutory purpose.Bothpropositionscannothold.

taken together,thefouranchorssettleasinglequestion.The“originalintent”claimiscor rectedby(iitheObjectsclauseats.s.(1)(d),whichnamesearlyinterventionasa coordinateobjectofthesescheme;(iiithedisctinct early-interventions accesspathwayat s., whichtheBillsownPart8must amend inorder tonarrowconfirming pathwayersexists tobennar rowed;i(iiithefirst Objectatas(1)a,whicbinds thesechmetotheCRPD’s barriers-baseddefinition ofdisability ; and(iv)thedDA definition , whichearnesnoc permenancecriter ion.A claimcontradictedon four independentstatutoryfootings isnot a contestable reading ofThe Act’spurpose.Itisa rhetoricalframe theoperative text oft he Bill works against,nowerested on then Department’s own signedrecord . TheCommitteee entitled to require that anyreliance ont h e “ original intent ” framing as astransitive rationale for this package be testedagainst (i )thestatu tory Objects o f The act atas.3( 1 ), iiithestanding s25access pathwayandth B ill’ so wn Partamendstot it,(iii)thes.3(a) CRPGrounding thAct commitsthese chetom,and iv)theadis ability Discriminationact1992definitio n of disability , whichcontains noc permanence threshold.Theframing ’ sa ppearanceonth edepartment’ssignature record atMC26-008601makes testavailable aga inst ap rimary-sourcevenuethen department itselfhasproduced.

The provenanceofthispackage’sfram ing—taxpayer-fundedmessagetestin g

tA further mattergoestotheproven anceofofthe fram ingwhichthepack age’spubliccase rests.In, beforeIndependent NDIS Review reported,the NationalDisability InsuranceAgencycommissionedtheredbridgeGroup—apoliticalstrategy and research firm—toconductfocus-groupmessage-testingonhowtocommunicatere ductions thescheme.Theworkwas fundedfrom then publicpurse.Itsoutput is on therecordinrecord throughThe Saturday Paper’sreporting hasbeenraised publiclybySenatorJordon Steele-John,t heGreensdisabilityspokesperson . TheOctoberredbridgereportise xpli cits about itsstrategicpurpose.Itre cords that whenfraud,rortsandunreasonablepricingwerepresentedtoparticipants as“posingan existentialthreattoth eNDIS”,there searchers were “abletocreate anenvironmentinin whic hrespondentsware amenabletoreformsdesigned tocounterthesethings.”It recordsthatthestestingwasa ble tocitegree ofqualifiedtolerancet”forreformsthat wouldrestrict…eligibility forthese cheme. ”Anditsetoutsofeoperative sequencing instructiondirectly:“demon stratingtha wearefirstaddress ingprovidersanda ndricingisc riticalbeforediscussing reforms th atimpactparticipantaccessibilit yorfunding.The reportalso recordsthetheconverse:w ithouthetheruad-and-rortsf raming,participants resisted reform.Thatisconsistentwiththebroaderpublicsentiment Redbridge’ s20 3

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment Bill

Submission 2079

research identified — that the NDIS was so popular with the Australian public that it was regarded with the same protectiveness as Medicare. Significance is direct: Government commissioned research found instinctive defense from scheme fraud-and-rorts framing makes restriction tolerable; not incidental to reform but mechanism making cuttable otherwise protected schemes possible; The structure follows sequencing: schedule-2 provider-side & integrity measures foregrounded in Gov’t communications, eligibility-tightening permanence treatment gate funding below-cost authorities sit schedule-1 discussed far less publicly framed access restrictions taxpayer-funded advice lead with fraud pricing build tolerance for access restriction bill leads with fraud pricing packages alongside access restriction Two limits should be stated plainly so committee can weigh point precisely Redbridge testing conducted in 2023 surfaced through inquiry into predecessor Getting the NDIS Back On Track legislation of 2024 goes provenance communication evidence base present bill inherits, not finding about drafting this bill and ndis review’s co-chair has stated message-testing did influence Review recommendations submission does assert test produced bill asks Committee weighs documented fact public money spent identify framing most likely make access restriction tolerable people affected recommended a fraud-pricing-first sequence bill’s structure together government’s public communications follow that sequencing where package sold on frame developed manufacture tolerance rather than evidenced set out across section framing substitute Committee entitled require

The Government’s own Thriving Kids Inquiry — sixteen recommendations Bill does implement Deputy Chair Ryan load-bearing dissent

On September 2nd Minister referred House Standing Committee Health Aged Care Disability an Inquiry into Thriving Kids initiative. Committee chaired by Dr Mike Freelander MP (Labor Macarthur) paediatrician more four decades’ practice deputy-chaired Monique Ryan MP Independent Kooyong received written submissions held eight hearings Canberra October November Surry Hills NSW December report No child left behind made sixteenth recommendation Department Health Disability Ageing names this Inquiry its signed correspondence record as one consultation venue design for Thriving Kids

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 2079

Ministerial response MC26-008601 of 25 May 2026 identifies the Inquiry – referenced as “the Parliamentary Inquiry on Thriving Kids and Foundational Supports”– among the venues that“helped informed the national model for Thriving Kids.“The Inquiry isGovernment-cited evidence; it sits inside the Government’s own claim about theconsultation foundations of the program the Bill creates the legislative pathway into.

The relevant point is what the Inquiry’s recommendations actually said,and whether theBill before this Committee implements them.On the operative text of the Billand theoperational follow-through documented in MC26-008601,the Billis structurally non-implementingof five ofthemost materialCommitteerecommendations.

**Recommendation **1. *Th e CommitteerecommendedthatthethrivingKidsAdvisoryGroup,establishedtoinformthedesignoftheprogram,“includerecognisedorganisationsandepeakbodieswithanestablisheddhistoryinprovidingservicesandsupportforchildren with…disabilities…aswellasilividualswithlivedexperienceofdayabilityorcareof personsewith disability,Fir stN ations , anda ndcultura llya n dlinguisticallydiversebackgrounds.” TheCommitt erecognised,on theparliamentaryrecordind ecember 25,tha tthe Advisory Groupneeded to includeathe cohortthestprogramtargets.TheDepartment’ sdescriptiono fthead vis oryG roup ’sc omposition,setoutinf ul laterinthissectionunderthenatio nalAutismStrategyheading,nameseightcategoriesoff rofessionalexpertise.It doesnotnamen y peakauti smbody .Itdoes not nam en any Autistic-ledself-advo cacyorganisation.Itdoesno tarn ameanyA utist ic -adultcommunitywhose lived expertise ison theNational Autism Strategy’s own framing,a namedtier ofevidence.T he Department’s operational follow-through,five monthsaftertherCommitt ee’ s recommendation,dose no tsatisfy Recommendation1 oft h e Government ’ so wn Inquiry.“Nothing about us withoutus” – The long-standing principle of *Autistic- led policy participation– sits documented ontheparliam ent ary record assthe standardthesGovernment’sown Committee specified,andonthesignedDepartmen talrecordinasstandardthesGovern ment’soperationalfollow-

throughhasnomet.

*Recommendation3. TheCommitteerecommendedthattheGovernmentengagewiththebroaderdisabilitysector— includingcohortsonwhomThrivingKidswilloperate—inthedesignandimplementationoft he program. Th edis abilityRepresentative OrganisationsJointStatemento f 4 May206documentstha ttheadvisorybodiesector publiclyconsidersconsultationpatterntodateinadequate, withthen Senate inquiry timeframe describedasa“extraordinary short.”Recommenda tionsof th egovernment’s ow nInquiryisnotimplementedbythe consultation patternthestDepartment hasappliedto t heBillitself .

**R ec om m enda ti ons 4.*Th eCom mit tee recommended theestablishment ofan Inspector-GeneralonNDSI—an independentstatutory oversight rolewit public-reporting obligations and a charter to monitor operation of scheme.The Bill before this Commit teedoes not legislate anInspectorGeneral.T h eso ver sityarchitectureof NDISremains architecturet hatCommitt ee , inDecember1525,recom mend be supplemented bydedicated independen tsupervisionofficer.Recommendations is on

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079

the Government’s own December 2025 record. Legislative response five months later does not implement it.

Recommendation 9.The Committee recommended that a child’s participation in Thriving Kids should not preclude access to individualised supports if support needs increase during or after participating with Thriving Kids. This recommendation contradicts Schedule Parts 8 & 9 which operationalise cohort redirection through new s.s(5), s.(1B). The permanence-and-treatment gate is introduced under these sections while s.B authorises Ministerial declaration regarding entire support systems including Thriving Kids itself being declared ‘alternative’ and excluding impairment categories from accessing NDIS services. The bill does not give effect to non-precluding-pathway commitment but rather constructs an exclusionary pathway: Thriving Kids serves as destination, eligibility filter via permanent treatment gate, closing mechanism per s..4. Therefore, on operative text, this recommendation structurally conflicts within legislation.

Recommendation 10.The committee recommends comprehensive review of implementation by government at end-of-implementation period i.e., two years post commencement. Recognising need testing before settling architecture design. Commencement date for ThrivingKids (October) differs significantly compared to Bill’s functional capacity assessment regime start-up point(January).

The five recommendations the Bill fails to address are:

Recommendation 1 required Departmental consultation among program targets when designing Advisory Group;

does not align with department’s own correspondence showing lack thereof. Recommendation 3 called upon broader disability sector engagement in Thriving Kids development, corresponding records show no such action taken. Recommendation 4 established independent oversight officer; bill lacks legislative provision accordingly.

Recommendation 9 made participation in Thriving Kids non-exclusionary towards access to individualised supports under NDIS if needs increase or support is insufficient during/after involvement.

Bill instead makes it part preclusive structure through Schedule Parts and new sections introduced therein. Recommendation 10 would have built a mandatory twenty-four-month review into implementation process which bill commences without one. In conclusion: The relationship between inquiry findings and the National Disability Insurance Scheme Review, National Autism Strategy EAC Third Round Consultations, Productivity Commission Working Paper on selective implementation, partial omission, active contradiction remains unchanged within legislation.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079

referred Inquiry and a Labor MP, is making political statements rather than independent clinical-evidence findings, but the concessions are on the parliamentary record nonetheless. First, the Chair acknowledges that Mr Butler’s Thriving Kids announcement “did create anxiety amongst a number of groups including parents and providers.” The Government’s own Inquiry Chair confirms on the parliamentary record that the program’s announcement produced community anxiety—the basis on which Sections 5 and 15 of this submission discuss the impact of the reform package on participants and their families. Second, the Chair concedes that “mild or moderate disabilities…are very subjective definitions.” Section 4 of this submission addresses this concession in detail. A paediatrician Labor MP serving as Chair of the Inquiry into the program diagnostic-language descriptor was designed to agree with substantive critique framing low-to-moderate support needs logic depends upon targeting. Section 7 develops statutory-inconsistency consequence: Autism defined permanent under DSM-5 so permanence limb new s.(5)(s.) cannot exclude Autistic applicants operational exclusion mechanism through new s.9B—described by inquiry chair now described as

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079

First, the Deputy Chair places the NDIS economic multiplier on the parliamentary record—that “every dollar spent on the NDIS generated $2.25 of economic benefit.” The $2.25 return-on-investment figure originates in Per Capita’s 2021 False Economy analysis rather than in the Productivity Commission’s 2011 report; Section 14 sets out its provenance. The load-bearing point for present purposes is the one the Deputy Chair makes: the economic-benefit side of the scheme—the multiplier on which its original case rests—has not been re-tested in the modelling that underpins the present Bill. Section 14 sets out the three Government-commissioned cost-benefit analyses to date—the Productivity Commission’s 2011 and 2017 reports and Taylor Fry’s 2023 quantification for the NDIS Review—and the absence of a fourth analysis testing whether the present reform package itself delivers net economic benefit. The three-CBAs-no-fourth point this submission develops in Section 14 now has a Government-record corroborating citation from the Deputy Chair of the Government’s own Thriving Kids Inquiry. Second, the Deputy Chair adopts the defunding-of-alternatives framing as the structural causal account of NDIS cohort growth—the inverse of the Chair’s “overdiagnosis” framing on the same data. Dr Ryan’s Additional Comments place on the parliamentary record that the growth in Autistic NDIS participation is the consequence of the defunding of community-based alternatives over the preceding decade, not the consequence of clinical over-identification. This is the under-served-cohort thesis that Sections 4 and 6 of this submission develop in more detail. The substantive causal account of the data the Government cites as the rationale for the Bill is in active dispute between the Chair and the Deputy Chair of the Government’s own Inquiry, on the parliamentary record.Third, the Deputy Chair’s Additional Comments call for the Thriving Kids rollout to proceed “only when… ready”—a deferred-rollout position that parallels the deferral framing this submission applies to Schedule 2 in Part B.The Deputy Chair of the Government’s own Inquiry is on the parliamentary record calling for a procedurally-deferred commencement of the Thriving Kids program against the Bill’s October 1st commencing date.Fourth, the Deputy Chair broadens the Chair’s

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 2079

s.25A(2) regressivity codification compounds the workforce gap the Deputy Chair has identified.

Material requiring counter-context

The Inquiry’s record also contains material this submission does not cite uncritically. The Chair’s Foreword frames cohort growth as “overdiagnosis” and “upgrading of diagnosis”—uncited assertions of contested clinical framings directly contradicted by peer-reviewed evidence base relied on Disney et al., 2025; under-served-cohort thesis developed Section 6). The Foreword ‘all people severe disability’ scope phrasing applies original intent / scope-narrowing rhetoric addressed Autism definition permanent DSM-5 severity statutory criterion s.24 or s.25 rhetorical rather than grounding. The Deputy Chair’s “11 per cent Australian five-to seven-year-old boys girls are NDIS participants This unsustainable” construction reproduces Minister Growth-as-crisis framing campaign’s under-subscription thesis in Section disputes conclusion follows numbers. The Deputy Chair dual system defined packages those significant needs proposal sits Butler-aligned policy direction endorsement it. The Deputy Chair social licence frame submission declines accept legitimacy anchored Act CRPD obligations, not social licence. These framings appear same parliamentary record cited subsection they do displace substantive concessions load-bearing dissent December 2025 record contained sit alongside that material points disagreement campaign contradicting evidence base —Section canonical statutory statement section six under subscription thesis four diagnostic-language critique applies

The three-layer consultation gap

The consultation gap this submission case for omission Schedule one relies documented across Government’s own primary-source record none which is uncontested Layer the Chair’s Foreword names network drew Inquiry my many paediatric health and education colleagues given advice Foreword clinical educational professional advisors does Autistic-community voices layer two Recommendation Committee report set earlier sub-section specifies cohort Thriving Kids Advisory Group should include peak bodies established history disability services individuals lived experience First Nations representatives culturally linguistically diverse

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079

representatives. The Committee, in its own report, carried out an analysis that identified design gaps within their recommendations; it recommended corrective measures be implemented as part thereof.

Layer three: five months after initial operational follow-through of Departmental directives outlined under ‘Thriving Kids’ advisory group composition’, as detailed further below beneath heading titled “National Autism Strategy”, eight categories were listed: namely expertise areas; however none included peak autism bodies or Autistic-led self advocacy organisations nor any separately named ‘lived experience’ category. The enumeration provided does not align fully according to Recommendation One specified by said committee.

Together these layers document a “nothing about us without us” gap on Government records, which was framed differently from campaign rhetoric but rather documented across government’s consultation network and in this Committee’s own correctionary measure R1. It also highlights non-implementation regarding departmental advice given during Advisory Group formation. This legislative product is derived directly through consultations recognized December last year as needing rectification due to governmental oversight failure.

The NDIS Review — Bonyhady & Paul (December 2023)

Working Together To Deliver the NDIS report published by the aforementioned review serves primarily for evidentiative basis behind reform package. However its relationship with Bill’s implementation remains more contentious than official messaging suggests, specifically concerning recommendation number Three - foundational supports alongside individualised NDIS support systems being complementary tiers; an additional capacity rather than substitution of existing services. However Schedule I Parts Eight And Nine create pathways out-of-the-NDIS into foundational supports for participants whose access has been revoked under new permanence tests or captured via s.25B(4) Ministerial declaration alternative system. Thus structural inversion occurs where instead of complementing it now becomes exclusion criteria within eligibility-tightening provisions. The opposite framing compared against original recommendations.

Action Number One: Consistent Assessment Threshold Deferred. Bill implements a consistent functional assessment definition at Section Ninety-B, however threshold does not exist in said bill itself; Subsections Two and three delegate this responsibility to be determined per NDIS Rules made by minister. Technical Advisory Group provisioned budget paper No two line eight thousand nine hundred nineteen provides $3 million to commence work on that matter. While claiming compliance with recommendation while leaving operative thresholds undefined.

Action 6.3 - assessment tools as precondition to transition

Action identified availability validated assessment tools a pre-condition commencement any new access regime Bill commences functional capacity regime January (Budget Paper No line application provisions across items confirm test applies existing participants plan review from date regardless whether have been validated by date Bill commence regime absence Review identify necessary.

Evidence Advisory Committee evidence base

Review identifies committee body responsible reviewing NDIS access decisions made People with Disability submission EAC Third Round Consultation March documents active ongoing at introduced Bill preempt process Review institutional mechanism operationalises evidence base EAC endorsed permanence-and-treatment test definition design instruments Technical now developing. The National Autistic Strategy 2025-

Co-design lived experience core pillar

Strategy commits commonwealth working autistic Australians development policy affects them Bill developed without co-design autistic community broader disability peak bodies speak both Disablity Representative Organisations Joint Statement dated May described Senate inquiry timeframe extraordinarily short approximately month does not allow time written submissions public hearings meaningful engagement disability community peak-body consensus consultation inadequacy inverse principle National Autism Strategy commits Commonwealth Department further confirmed co-design gap signed record Ministerial response MC of describes composition

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079 Thriving Kids Advisory Group — the operational body the Department names as having “helped informed the national model for Thriving Kids”— verbatim as follows:

‘The Thriving Kids Advisory Group included experts from a range of fields including paediatrics, child development, research, disability, child and family services, health care, early education and schools, and First Nations perspective.’ The eight categories of expertise named are the categories the Department considers material to the design of the 0-to-8 national model. The list does not name any peak autism body, it does not name any Autistic-led self-advocacy organisation; it does not name the Autistic-adult community whose lived expertise is, on the National Autism Strategy’s own framing; it commits itself in Section A to naming tiers based upon such expert input but has failed here to do so with respect to this group which represents an important tier on its own terms. It also fails to mention that the Commonwealth has committed under the National Autism Strategy to recognising the importance of autistic adults’ perspectives. The Department’s description of the operational Advisory Group composition is thus one designed without reference or representation by those who have first-hand experience using NDIS supports themselves (the principle being “nothing about us/without us”) as well as their families and carers — the long-standing principle of Autistic-led policy participation in Australia—is the principle that has been ignored.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 2079

inverse of the Strategy’s evidence framework — published research at the top, lived experience demoted to a residual category.

Evidence Advisory Committee Third Round Consultation

The Evidence Advisory Committee is the body established under NDIS Review Action 23.2 with responsibility for reviewing the evidence base on which NDIS access decisions are made. The PWDA submission of March 26th [year] submitted to EAC’s third round consultation was public record. This document records ongoing consultations—PWDA recommends maintaining/expand Early Intensive Behavioural Intervention against eligibility-tightening provisions in this bill combined Thriving Kids reframe). Submissions closed Sunday Mar[day], 1st year; no completion date announced yet. The new regime starts before EAC finishes its review action. Government cites NDIS Review evidentiary basis; EAC itself tests that evidence while the bill pre-empts it. An active and ongoing evidence-review specifically set up by government contradicts these terms structurally—the contradiction being another reason Schedule one isn’t included here.

Productivity Commission Three PC reports sit within NDIs documentary lineage: 2011 Disability Care & Support report establishing scheme, Cost Report from ‘17 examining cost implications moving cohorts off individualized plans into foundational supports.’ Both found net economic benefit per all-scheme analysis. Taylor Fry quantified costs exceeding benefits ($16 billion vs $75 million) excluding major categories (justice, child protection outcomes etc.). He also noted cohort-level positive returns despite methodological limitations. These analyses don’t support negative net economic impact claim on growth sustainability.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 2079

Government’s commissioned-analysis findings of net economic benefit at the all-of-scheme level (PC 2011 and PC 2017), and of net cohort-level benefits within the lowest-measured-support-needs Autistic cohort and the children-and-families cohort—the Thriving Kids measure now redirects—(Taylor Fry 2023 under its constrained methodology). A scheme delivering net economic benefit on the Government’s own commissioned analyses is not, on the criterion these apply, unsustainable. The cost-side framing the Government has placed in public records does not align with their evidence base supporting this claim; Section 14 elaborates further into detail regarding economics dimension as per Section 8 purposes which highlights that without a fourth government-commissioned CBA testing whether reform package delivers net economic benefit once costs are shifted across adjacent public-service systems, itself counted. The PC 2024 working paper identified specific consequences: approximately $1 billion annually additional state/territory funding due to shifting cohorts off individualized plans onto foundational supports. New s.25B(4)’s authorizes Minister declaring entire support systems

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 2079

design”, with manual extraction of integrity-flagged claims limited to “maybe 20 to 30 claims per day”, and “any claims between 5 pm and 6 pm were being paid without any human eyeballs on them.”The Government’s own anti-fraud co-chair has placed on the parliamentary record that the cause of the integrity problems is the design of the originalpayment system — built for speed of disbursement,notfor fraud prevention.TheBill responds tot hat diagnosisby tighteningparticipanteligibility.Thetwoare notasame problem. The rushed-rollout patternis then visible atthe structural levelofth eB illitself:theadministrativest ructures are n ot designed(theTechnical Advisory Group ist now beginningtheworkagainst a1 January 2028 commencement); thereplacement programs ar enot named forthecohort or fora dults(only th eto-8 Thriving Kids programisanamed,and its bilateral implementation agreementsar enot yet in placef o Victoriaand Queensland— approximately46per centoft he Australianpopulation——p er OccupationalTherapy Australia’s12 May 2026 confirmationunchanged byt h e14May Policy anda dvocacy update) ; t he consultation periodi s ,on peak-body consensus, “extraordinarily short”; an dt he assessment-instrument vacuum i se mbeddedin tl egislative text (Section3.5 ofthis submission). Thepattern antifraudco-chair identified ascausedintegrityproblemsisthepattern Billnowrepeating.This iss tructural,nostrategic—theimplementationpat ternthatproduced the integrity problems B ill saidto address isbeing replicatedinth eBill’s own commencem ent architecture.

##Thestructural evidence-base mismatch t he Joint Standing Committee onthen D IS Integritythe National Disability Insurance Scheme inquiry was referred toth eCommitteebyMinisterons March, Th Chair confirmed atopeningofthe public hearing: “Theminerhas actuallyrefereed this tousasked us take up.”T hinquiryisGovernment’ so n primary investigationvehicle.Its evidenc base — capturedacrossitspublic hearings tod atebeginningwiththe Canberra andcontinuingSydneyMelbournefocuses providerand payment-system integrit y.Thewitnesssexamined daywereNDIAInteg rityTransformation TechnologyServicesDeputyCEO; NDIAServicedelivery Deputy CEO; Services AustraliaPayments Integra tion DeputYCEO General Manager FraudControl Investigationsat Servic esAustraliaAustralian Criminal Intelligence CommissionNationalManagerOperational AnalysisExecutive Director Mission CoordinationAnalysis ACICCommonwealth Ombudsman two senior officers o fO mbuds man’s office seniorofficers NDIS Quality Safeguard sCommission senior offi cers Department HealthDisability Ageing Australian Competition Consumer Commissio ns’CEOGenera lManag erforConsumerComplianceStrategies.Witnessslate providersidepayment-side regulatorycomplaintshandingconsumerprotection doesnot include witnesses examinedparticipanteligibility.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment

Submission: [NDIS] Securing NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 2079 The testimony on this day is correspondingly provider-and-payment-focused. Mr Dardo’s evidence about original payment system architecture, cornerstone of government’s narrative regarding parliamentary record: payment delay, bulk hold/release capabilities; mandatory digital identity; mandatory ABN/text-description/invoice evidence above thresholds) is central to Government’s focus on integrity issues. The Associate Commissioner from NDLS Quality Safeguards Commission framed regulatory function as protecting participants against misconduct: “Where we see noncompliance our main concern impact participant disruption.” Often it can be incredibly disruptive or dangerous when there fraud/non-compliance within market designed keep participants safe.” Commonwealth Ombudsman Mr Iain Anderson testified that complaints overwhelmingly concern access scheme changes plans not fraud sharp practice: “Complainants raise number issue with us Very few actually involve allegations fraud sharp practice most part they’re experiences participants who concerned change their plan accessing schemes things like that” The pattern across entire evidence base consistent. Government’s own investigation inquiry has assembled body pointing at provider conduct pay-system design and enforcement locus the problem—pointing at NDIS participants parties harmed by that conduct. Ombudsmans complaint data confirms participants’ concerns are overwhelmingly about accessplan delivery—not fraudulent. Quality Safeguard Commissions frame protective Schedule 2 present Bill responds this in Section9 develops this).Schedule1 present Bill tightens eligibility operates same cohort inquiry evidences identifies harmed by provider-side problems inquiry investigating.Bill punishes victims of very failures government cites package justification.Government public parliamentary record does assemble an evidence supporting proposition tightening responses integrity problem commission parliamentary inquiry investigate.Mr Dardo’s May, 2026 evidence quantifies what already done NDIA Services Australia Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission Federal Police Commonwealth Director Public Prosecutions State Territory police force address integrity problem cited as its justification.NDIA now approximately staff working space Fraud Fusion Taskforce payment analytics through business-as-usual funding plus support staff)Taskforce conducts work agencies every State territory police force.Warrant activity was compared total combined Over problematic providers been

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment Bill

Submission: [Number]

Analysis:

The pattern across the six review streams.

• Disability Royal Commission: Four recommendations at section 5.4; none regarding Schedule 1 implementation;
• NDIS Review Action (Action): Partially deferred with operative thresholds;
• EAC Third Round Consultation under NDIS Review Actions: Pre-empts completion before consultation concludes,
• Assessment Tools (Review Action No.:) Commences without meeting preconditions for assessment tools,
• Productivity Commission Cost Shift Warning & NDIS Recommendation Framing: Codifies opposite direction to cost shifting alongside framework rather than instead-of approach as per recommendation three’s wording from the Productivity Commission in its 2024 report on costs,
• Thrive Kids Inquiry Recommendations: Structurally does not implement recommended actions of Thriving Kids Inquiry’s Nos.,

The Committee is entitled that Government substantiate case against actual content cited, not rhetorical citations alone.

Section 9 — What Schedule 2 does well, and the integrity-rhetoric mismatch

Part A of this submission set out the case for the omission of Schedule 1 on the existing evidence base. Part B addresses Schedule 2 on its own merits. Substantive position I put to Committee was deferred until after Joint Standing Committee reports in July ’26; recommendations integrated into design then brought back under “nothing about us without us” principles; schedule’s substantive direction right— provider-side reforms aligning with Government’s investigation but procedural timing wrong, as JSC has not reported yet and rushing ahead risks repeating original rollout mistake identified as significant contributor.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079

records are not retained. Part 5 reduces the time within which NDIS amounts may be claimed under ss.45A(5)(a) from two years to ninety days. Part 6 restructures the plan-manager market: plan managers cannot simultaneously be registered to provide other supports under newly introduced section(s). This addresses documented conflict-of-interest concerns.

The combined effect creates an integrity package on both provider-side and payment-side, responding substantively to issues investigated through Joint Standing Committee’s inquiry into the NDIS Integrity referred in March of this year [specific date]. It’s important to clarify what these provisions address—interim hearing evidence, final advice provided during registration taskforce consultations—and do not relate directly back to any completed report or recommendations yet delivered as part of that committee investigation. The distinction is central here—the direction taken based upon gathered information so far appears sound but there remains incomplete data regarding Schedule Two settlement criteria.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079

Agency officer to answer questions on at least 14 days’ notice. The appear-and-answer- questions power is a substantive escalation from current arrangements and warrants ongoing oversight of how it is used in practice, but it is standard for Commonwealth regulators that the Regulatory Powers Act model contemplates. The substantive evidentiary support for Part3 upliftisthesameasthesupportforPart’sbroader regulatory toolkit extension. Fourth —theplan-manager market restructureatPartThe conflict-of-interest restrictionatatnewss.(2B) adressesadocumented problem.TheMinister’sownSecond Reading Speech citedthefigureas evidenceofthemarketsegment’documenteddysfunction.T heGovernment’intention toc ommisiona plan-managemen tpanelunderdefined standards,governanceandintegrity requirementsissubstantively rightonthe providerside .Thesefour elements respondtotheadvanc edevidencebaseGover nmenthas assembled.They sitcomfortablywiththeworkFraud Fusion Taskforceh addone since withthen DISAmendment(Integ ritySafeguarding )Act( RoyalAssent8April ndi s supportslegislationMrScottMcNaughto nt,D eputyCEO ServiceDeliveryath NDI AidentifiedattheMay hearing ashaving“providedalot moreclarityaroundwhat peoplecan’ spendtheirNDISplans on. That created further safeguards thatarereallyimportant.” The integrity work has beenprogress ing throughamulti-layered legislative architecture.Schedul 2 ofthisBillextendsthat architec tu.recongnisingthedirection isnot thesameasan endorsings its enactmentaheadofthe Integrityinquiry’sfinal report.L egislatingselectedelementsfrom areviewthatis notyet completecarriesits own risk —therisksetting instatuteadesignthe inquiry’s ow findingsmay yet revise.Thatist why thissection commendsthedi rection and,inthes amebre , recommendsdeferral. Two ScheduleprovisionswarrantCommitteescrutinyparticipant- burdengrounds—Parts4and5 Twoschedulepartsimpose newcomplianceburdensoperateprimarily againstparticipantsagainstthesmallerendof providermarket,nottagainstconductGovernment’sownintegrity evidencebaseidentifiesasthe locusoft heirgk .Theydo nedisplaceSchedulesubstantivedirect ionbutthey warrant Committee’sscr utinityands mysubmissionrefinementbeforepackagebrought backafterIntegrit yNationalDisabilityInsuranceScheme inquiriesreports. partrecordretentioncombinedwiththenewdebtcreationmechanismats182(4). New s. requires participants who make claims for NDIS amounts to keepandre taining recordsclaim,andrelatesto forthree years.Item 86 of schedule substitutes anew underwhichanamountequaltoNDIS amountbecomes adebtAgencywhereperson requiredtoretainrecordsunder doesnot comply with that requirement.The providerside seven-year retention

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079

obligation is proportionate to the regulatory uplift Part 2 introduces and to the disabled entities. administrative capacity of the regulated entities.The participant-side three year retention obligation combined s182(4) debt-creation mechanism structurally different. The Hansard on Ombudsman’s evidence Quality Safeguards Commission’s evidence establishes that participants are source integrity risk Schedule designed address—providers individuals operating supply chain .The record-retention with debt creation does respond documented participant side problem base; it transfers burden regime onto cohort same evidence identifies victims failures cause.There basic difficulty imposing Obligation at all.Self-managing plan managed already submit their claim receipts invoices Agency through claiming systems time claiming ,Agency reviews approves before payment made The records Participant under s require substantial part Agency holds generated process vetting evidence money changes hands It difficult identify gap retained automatic backed when cannot be paid first place without very Evidence agency keeps Committee should consider whether sautomatic debt-creation mechanism proportional response failure at all—and whether required given Agency existing custody claim evidence—or minimum graduated administrative better fit participant cohort evidentiary baseline, applies where attributable disability related incapacity—which structure scheme itself common in population. P5 reducing window from two years days Item amends Act by omitting “years” substituting “90”. Bill makes no other change architecture Explanatory Memorandum not set out basis for choice 90 as new window nor addresses how will interact cases support provided good faith but formal late discovered example provider disengaged business interruptions participant hospitalised crisis intermediary arrangements failed surface payable claims timely Two year exists absorb those operational realities. A workable well resourced corporate providers mature billing infrastructure materially harder sole trader allied health practitioners small regional remote areas and any self managing supports particularly whose disability affects executive function organisation capacity action tasks inside tight window .Committee should consider proportionate setting discretionary extension preserved so legitimate delayed reason rendered

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079

unrecoverable by the passage of time alone. A genuine claim does not become less genuine because a disengaged provider, a hospitalisation, or a disability-related administrative barrier pushed it past ninety days; rendering it unrecoverable is a different problem from fraud, and not one the Government’s integrity evidence base identifies as needing address. These two provisions sit alongside the substantive elements of Schedule 2 the previous sub-section commends. They do not displace the broader Schedule 2 deferral the rest of this section sets out. They are flagged for the Committee as candidates for refinement during the post-JSC redesign, alongside the larger gaps Section 10 of this submission develops. The integrity-rhetoric mismatch The Government’s public framing of the present Bill has used integrity as the load-bearing justification for the package as a whole. The Minister’s Second Reading Speech on 14 May 2026 closed by naming four objectives: “fighting fraud and stopping rorts; slowing rapid cost increases; making eligibility requirements clearer; and delivering quality services and supports to participants.””The first of those four objectives — fighting fraud and stopping rots—-is-the-public anchor-of-the-package.TheGovernment’scommunicationsstrategyhas emphasised-integrity.TheBill’s title-is SecuringtheNationalDisabilityInsurance SchemeforFutureGenerations—aframinginwhichintegrityisthethrough-line. The-mismatch is in the relationship between the public framing-and-thethe operativeprovisions.The-integrity evidence base-sits-in-Schedule -territory.The-substantive integrity work-the-Government cites—is-InSchedule-Provider-definition narrowing,intheregulatorypowersactextensiontoAgency, ininformation-gathering powers uplift,andintheplan-manager market restructure.Thefraud fusion Taskforce cross-agency information-sharingthegovemment invokes-as operational backboneofthe integritypackage sits within then-broader integrity architecture—theNdis supports legislation,thenDISAmendment(IntegrityandSafeguarding)Act_2026,_anatheTaskforces own establishedcrossagency arrangements-rather thanina discrete PartOfthe present Bill.Each Ofthese elements responds-to-evidence already on parliamentary record though as set out above not yet to inquiry’s final recommendations.Schedule 1–theeligibility-tightening,the new functional capacity assessment regime , The permanence-

another problem.Sections3 through7 of this submissionsetoutthe absenceofofclinical evidenc ebase,a diagnostic framework anassessmentinstrument design a replacement-supports program anda CRPD-and-DDA-and-Closing-TheGap consistency for Schedule ’soperative provisions.’Theintegrityevidenccase doesnot bridge th gap .schedule is sold publicly with schedule 2’s evidence based attached it.

The May hearing makes the mismatch concrete.Mr Dardo government’s anti-fraud co-chair testified that the integrity problems trace to original payment system design-built speed disbursement not fraud prevention

-and that the post-2022 remediation has been a payment-system and provider-side undertaking: -thousands of problematic providers removed, warrant activity multiplied several times over -and NDIA’s integrity workforce scaled to roughly ⅓ staff working across two dozen Commonwealth agencies every State Territory police force. Section sets out figures in full.The relevant point here locus work:the effort delivering it sits Schedule territory -Provider side Payment- side-not participant eligibility provisions Schedule .What does do different.Schedule narrows access scheme.Minister announced reform at National Press Club on April , figure given was net reduction about from participants around June Departmental modelling tabled Senate May reported Guardian Australia puts human substantially higher people who were before new rules commence January projected exited mid-June rising to mid-by , against change projection ; once those denied entry counted almost fewer will be than otherwise have been Minister’s “”is landing point;Government own shows existing participants removed close overall.None fall outside because behaviour.They fall outside because gate narrowed.integrity-rhetoric mismatch therefore structural Government public connects whole package but operative is not bridge Schedule architecture, andSchedule narrows basis altogether.The funding-below-cost structure itself sharpest single demonstration rhetoric does not bridge Schedule operative provision.New s. inserted by Part reads verbatim:“To avoid doubt the determination has effect even if result either both following:(a)funding provided under a plan for reasonable necessary support less total cost of (b)funding provided under all reasonable supports funded taken as follows: total costs of supports.“The text Bill itself campaign characterisation.provision authorises Minister legislative instrument reduce group financial sustainability”construction confirms reduction falls below intended provide.has no connection fraud rorts provider integrity payment-system safeguards documented work cites rationale package.cost-constraint

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079

provision authorising below-cost funding against participants.

Its insertion in Schedule 1 – while Schedule 2 carries the genuine provider-side integrity work—-is the operative-text proof of the mismatch the Government’s public framing creates, it is the structure taxpayer-funded message-testing set out Section 8 expressly advised: lead with taxpayer-and-pricing integrity measures and package access-and-funding restriction alongside them; Section sets full; here illustrates cannot be sold Committee using rationale.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment

Submission: [Bill number] - Securing NDIS for Future Generations

misconduct in supply chain.

The bill’s schedule # invert relationship treating participant as locus integrity problem. A contemporary documented allegation illustrates central premise concrete terms: on Wednesday May 26th a Perth man appeared Magistrates Court charged with counts fraud totaling more than $54K allegedly committed intellectually disabled man he was employed homesharer live support Police allege support helped participant bank account NDIS payments deposited kept card used funds across alleged eleven year period personal purchases including holidays alcohol tools massages charges allegations denied indicated will plead guilty Australian Broadcasting Corporation report quotes Western Australia statement broader pattern such cases sit within Individuals who rely carers or arrangements should treated dignity respect honesty times Anyone suspects financial abuse fraud exploitation vulnerable person urged to matter police The participant victim this matter alleged perpetrator paid support Schedule inverted that relation compounds it treats party harmed locus of integrity makes access harder obtain easier lose Integrity work provider-definition narrowing monitoring investigation powers information-gathering powers uplift plan-manager market restructure substantive response structural pattern case sits within Schedule punishes victim Pattern inversion has human consequence beyond legal-architectural one Government leakage rhetoric unsustainable growth framing and integrity narrative attached Schedule does not address provider integrity generated public-discourse climate which disabled Australians use scheme characterised by direct implication print broadcast coverage gaming system receiving supports they do deserve Characterisation cohort-blame frame National Autism Strategy commits Commonwealth actively reducing Section addresses contradiction in full It is side-effect package’s framing but the framing My family lives under that climate every time resurfaces harm abstract

Key gaps schedule 2 section develops

Schedule also partial against recommendation set government evidence base supports. Full risk-proportionate registration framework (NDIS Review Recommendation) deferred future Rules limited high-risk-supports providers leaving unregistered providers data outside mandatory-registration scope four-tier model worker-registration recommended Registration Taskforce, taskforces participants complaints reforms are Bill launch-era Productivity Commission

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment Bill

Submission 2079

lineage on thin markets, workforce development and market stewardship is not engaged. Section 10 develops these gaps together with findings from the Australian National Audit Office’s Quality & Safeguards Commission as inputs to post-JSC redesign of Schedule 2—not amendments but separate consideration due to different evidence bases requiring distinct procedural treatment: The separability of two Schedules: Different Evidence Bases Require Distinct Treatment The case strengthens in treating schedules separately because they operate under differing evidentiary foundations necessitating varied procedures; schedule #1 access-and-funding tightening operates based upon an already-assembled public engagement framework including four-year community consultation leading up until its report; national autism strategy has substantial community input; independent review consulted; productivity commission foundational paper recorded; ongoing third round evidence advisory committee consultations continue—all supporting schedule #3 rather than #1 which JSC inquiry terms do not cover subject matter for schedule #1 thus should be omitted entirely per existing evidence base without further investigation sections three through eight build this argument using current data, further reinforcing omission given funding below cost authorities (new s45C) exacerbate problems addressed by schedule#2. The schedules are interdependent such that omitting one makes structural issues worse while allowing another to undermine integrity work dependent provider markets thereby undermining both simultaneously scheduling deferral allows integration into design and subsequent substantive community consultation ensuring continuity. Schedule Two’s reforms rely on emerging JSC NDIS Integrity Inquiry findings, May Hansard testimony from Mr Dardo and Ombudsman Quality & Safeguards Commission as well as additional hearings scheduled for 16th June 2026 Sydney and Melbourne respectively concluding Thursday July 7th 2026 Schedule two must wait till then recommendations integrated into the revised schedule brought back for full community feedback during period of transition—existing infrastructure maintained pending implementation.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079

Commonwealth-agency Architecture All Remain Operational.

Schedule 2 Is Next Layer Of Integrity Work Not Its Foundation. The Two Arguments Are Independent On Independent Grounds.Schedule Doesn’t Wait For The Jsc Because Isn’T Investigating Subject Matter.Schedule Waits For The Jsc Because Evidence Base Is Schedule’s Evidence Base.The Committee Has Authority Under Standing Orders To Recommend Each Schedule On Own Terms.On Evidentiary Footing And With Procedural Treatment.This Core Ask Of Part B My Submission.Developed In Recommendations At Section.

Section 10 — Schedule 2 against the launch-era expert lineage

Section 9 set out what Schedule 2 does well, the integrity-rhetoric mismatch in the Government’s public framing of the package, and the case for deferring Schedule 2 until after the Joint Standing Committee on the NDIS Integrity of the National Disability Insurance Scheme inquiry reports on Thursday 2 July 2026. This section sets out the broader implementation-risk lineage the National Disability Insurance Scheme has carried since its founding, and what Schedule 2 engages and does not engage from that lineage.The Explanatory Memorandum anchors Schedule 2 to two recent documents ––the Independent NDIS Review (Bonyhady Paul) Recommendation 17andthetheProviderWorkerRegistrationTaskforceFinalAdviceofNDISThelaunch-eralevidencebaseisbroaderandalong-standingthaneither.Theaparticularlydescribeasetstructuralrisksscheduleinitscurrentformleaveslargelyopen.TheargumentsdevelopedinthissectionarenotputasamendmentstobemadetoscheduledcurrentlybeforeCommittee.TheyareputsubsistentinputsthatshouldbeincorporatedintoredesignofscheduledafterJointStandingCommitteENDSIntegrityinquiryreports. ThefoundinginquiryproductionCommission2011ThesProductivityCommissionsDisabilityCareSupportreportdeliveredAugustacrosstwovolumeswasfoundationaldocumentforNational Beyonditseconomiccase(developedinthissubmission’sSection4),thesreportedflaggedfiveimplementation-risksareaschemeswouldneedmanagetodeliveronconsumer-choice-model-theCommision-was-recommending.First,onmarketdesign,the reportedcautionedconsumerschoiceapproachrequiredactivemarketstewardshipfunction.Commissionevidencedstrongrationalesconsumingershipbutconditionedsuggestionexistence-ofsupporting-market-infrastructurewarnedmarkethad-functionwellabsence-interventionparticularly-ingeographic-and-complex-cohort-segments.Second, on workforce development the 2011 report identified growth as critical implementation risk. The Commission’s later quantified projection: approximately one in five new jobs across whole over years following its assessment would need to be disability care if scheme was staffed at projected participant numbers.Third,thinmarketsthe explicitly acknowledged that geographic and complex-needs cohorts face market failure absent government intervention.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 2079

blueprint contemplated that, without specific intervention, Indigenous people with complex needs may have to relocate from their communities to regional centres or major cities to receive appropriate care and support” ––a structural admission,in the founding document ,that the mark model was expected deliver remote First Nations communities without targeted interventiion. Fourth,on quality assurance provider registration,the report recommended service providers should pre-qualify claim higher price limits.with pre qualification typically requir[ing]registration”.This conceptual precursor to Provider Worker Registration Task force recommendations cited Explanatory Memorandum Fifth.on service standards enforcement .report noted enforcement would require dedicated regulatory infrastructur a concern produced establishment Quality Safeguards Commission Schedule of present Bill addresses fourth fifth areas partially narrowing definition at new s.10C extension monitoring investigation powers under Regulatory Powers Standard Provisions Act respond concerns founded flagged does not address first three areas workforce development provisions in there are no specific provision remot very reme market interventions The architecture implicitly requires is not established bill worse works opposite direction funding below cost authorities at new s34A,s32K(3C)s45C Section thin markets warned would fail without intervention codifies participant (Section each these gaps post-JSC redesign should engage made harder easier by same Bill The Productivity Commission 2017 Productivity October NDIS Costs commissioned study report assessed implementation three four years into scheme’s rollout findings on market workforce remain unresolved substance period since Commission headline market concerns verbatim On intake quality planning processes supporting market could keep pace with roll out suggestion too many people were being admitted speed participant impact planning process quality plans supporting infrastructure and market development”On workforce: “in jobs over next few years need disability care but growth remains way slow.”thin markets persist for

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079

participants “with complex, specialised or high intensity needs, or very challenging behaviours” and “in the absence of effective government intervention, such market failure is likely to result in greater shortages, less competition and poorer participant outcomes.” On the policy framework as a whole: “Present policy settings are unlikely to see enough providers and workers as the scheme rolls out.”

The Commission’s recommended responses included independent price monitoring and regulation, better-tailored responses to thin markets, formal and informal carers being allowed to provide more paid care, and a targeted approach to skilled migration. The Commission’s 2017 recommendation on pricing was specific: an independent price-monitoring and regulation function, set at arm’s length from the Minister of the day.Schedule 3 Part 1 of the Bill does close to the opposite — it makes the Minister the pricing decision-maker.The Explanatory Memorandum cites this as implementing Action 11.3 of the 2023 NDIS Review. The difficulty is the gap between form and substance:a Ministerial pricing power can be described as

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 2079

Schedule 2 needs. Omitting Schedule 1 and Schedule 3 is therefore not only the right response on each Schedule’s own evidence base (Sections 3, 8 and 9, and Part C)—it is a precondition for Schedule 2 ever achieving its intent. Section 11 develops the interdependence in full.

Academic Quasi-Market Failure Literature — 2013-2024

A decade of academic research has documented structural failure of the pure-competition model in the NDIS quasi-market.The work has been conducted across the University of New South Wales,the University of Melbourne,the University of Western Australia,Curtin University,and the Centre for Social Impact.Daniel Reenders,Gemma Carey,Alice Kavanagh,Helen Dickinson,Gordon Duff,David Gilchrist,Satish Chand,Damon Alexander,Eleanor Malbon,Natalie Cortis,Celia Greenand others have produced substantial body peer-reviewed research policy commentary The headline findings are consistent this body This literature direct:“The first decade ndis was characterised by assumption that pure competition alone could deliver choice quality services…In practice,this happened many participants supports.”On alternative same literature direct“The ndis best described as ‘quasi market’ requires higher level intervention relative private sector markets.Governmentsas steward retain responsibility ensuring ndis delivers intended outcomes all even when using driven service delivery approaches” participant outcomes,literature directresearch with people disability their carers found experience service had “not improved despite reforms driven a quasi-market model; instead delivering increased consumer choice and efficiency,service users experienced inadequate supply cutbacks an emphasis on cost subsidisation. remote First Nations access gapliterature carries quantification Government should not allowed remain unaddressed decade“In remote very remote Australia over one three participants who in NDIS year accessing daily activity supports four other needed supports These not refused Supports these admitted scheme entitled to supports whom supplies because of 2011 Productivity Commission report contemplated the 2017 Commission report quantified Schedule present Bill does engage Market Capacity Framework research produced Reenders colleagues University Western via Social Science Research Network proposed structured approach identifying thin markets government has adopted.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079

Launch-Era Academic Critique Not Historical Artefact

On Wednesday May 27th — same week Committee received submissions of this bill: Economic Society Australia held seminar economist Pelin Akyol titled “More Quasi than Market Price Caps Design”. Akyo’s framing central question verbatim:“While public debate focused tighter eligibility reduced plan funding third lever has far less attention design market itself whether functions competitive market or price caps doing most heavy lifting” credentialed economics community restating structural criticism academic literature published since 2013 which Government own productivity commission first raised in its foundational year review. The pattern consistent across fifteen years independent expert and academic work; over those fifteen years it identifies substantial unaddressed market failure Schedule addresses provider conduct regulation through civil penalties expanded monitoring powers deeds arrangement restructures specific conflict interest critique parliamentary record at hearing Joint Standing Committee NDIS Integrity inquiry restructures support coordination segment to address a specific market-segment critique on evidence base each substantive intervention post-JSC redesign should retain does not address fundamental thesis that pure-competition model is structure problem quasi-market delivery requires stewardship rather than regulatory alone segments where market delivery demonstrably failed raises legitimate questions about right vehicle remote First Nations service-access gap will be closed by tightening rules providers present markets expands National Disability Insurance Agency’s regulatory function moves broader market-stewardship architecture called for concrete form proposed Alternative Commissioning Remote First Nations Communities paper

Quality Safeguards Commission Establishment ANAO Performance Audit The NDIS Quality Safeguards Commission established Commonwealth legislation December commenced operations New South Wales South Australia July expanding progressively all jurisdictions. It was response launch-era fragmented state-and territory oversight previously governing disability services inadequate national scheme principal current institutional answer enforcement concerns founding Productivity Commission report identified.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 2079

Schedule 2 of the present Bill extends the Commission’s powers - through the extension of the Regulatory Powers (Standard Provisions) Act 2014 monitoring and investigation provisions; through Rules-based mandatory registration administration for high-risk supports; annd throught associated structural reforms. The National Disability Insurancce Scheme Amendmnet Integrity and Safeguarding Act 2026, which received Royal Assent on April 8th 2026 adds enhanced information-gathering poweres anti-promotion orders whistleblower protections aand ninety-day cooling-off period participants exiting providers.The Budget contains substantial Quality and Safeguards Commision funding measure in line with expanded role.

The Australian National Audit Office performance audit of Qudity and Safeguards Comission regulatory functions is most recent independent assessment commisions effectiveness Schedule expands Commissions enforcement scope substantially Whether can effectively absorb expansion depends current operational state ANAOs audis published public document point that findings should formally before Committee weighed deliberation before Schedules Commission-expansion provisions passed Recommendation Unless audit squarely record considered Schedule expension proceeds untested assumption audits own conclusion, that Commission only partly effective existing regulary function directly material whether it absorbs an expanded role.

The substantive inputs to post-JSC redesign schedule-2

Launch-era expert lineage produces five substantives inputs after JSC NDIS integrity inquiry reports design should incorporate. Inputs framed below as input not amendments currently before the committee procedural reason set out Section this submission Substantive reason integrate launch era expert alongside JSC’s finding evidence base result combined work stronger than text. First post-JSC redesign Schedule workforce development provision addressing one-in-five-new-jobs required projection from Commission’s 117 reports Current has no workforce development without supply growth Schedule national disability insurance agency enforcement against providers will reduce provider pool further rather improve participant outcomes particularly geographic complex-needs market segments where capacity limiting factor Second post-JSC redesign Schedule thin-markets alternative-commissioning for remote very remote complex-cohort First Nations communities pure-market delivery demonstrably failed 203 NDIS

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079

Review Alternative commissioning for remote and First Nations communities paper and the Market Capacity Framework academic research provide the evidence base. The one-in- two-thirds remote-participant service-access failure documented in the academic literature cannot be closed by provider-side regulation alone.This is one of the clearest places where Schedules collide.New s.25A(2) of Schedule 1 actively codifies onto participants’ cost due to decades-documented thin-markets failures, since known about since founding report from year 2011—but this instance isn’t just sharp.The submission’s position: is that both schedules should omit because they operate directly against improvements post-JSC schedule must make.Schedule regresses while others remain—this interdependence why cannot achieve intent full development Section .Third,the redesign after JSC should require either Agency or Quality Safeguards Commission as appropriate market-stewardship body produce plan parallel regulatory function.Productivity Commission reports contemplation architecture broader than current expands; it does not establish stewardship.Fourth,Committee requires ANAO performance audit findings on Regulatory effectiveness tabled considered before any vote expansion provisions principle Commission can absorb expanded role assumption makes.ANAO has independently assessed question Parliament should not proceed without assessment record regardless Fifth Committee scrutinise whether model resolves launch-era quasi-market critique decade identified structural problem.Schedule assumes existing delivery through stronger regulation.Reeders Carey Dickinson Cortis Gilchrist Malbon and wider research argue since 2013 Akyol e61 seminar restates in May 2026 then will deliver participant outcomes Government claims.

The Committee is entitled under its standing orders demonstrate contrary by reference evidence rather than assumption.

Synthesis – what Schedule 2 still leaves open from the launch-era expert

lineage

Schedule 2 addresses a defined sub-set of the integrity and provider-conduct problems the Government has diagnosed in its immediate-recent advice—the 2023 Independent NDIS Review Recommendation 17, the 2024 NDIS Provider and Worker Registration Taskforce Final Advice, and currently assembling. it does not address broader implementation-risk areas flagged Productivity Commission inquiry (the founding) in 2011, post-launch evaluation reaffirmed in 2017, decade academic research between 2013-2024 documented detail—thin markets development stewardship intake quality quasi-market failure thesis largely absent current Schedule 2. The Section framing this submission confirmed: partial two directions: partial against Explanatory Memorandum cites central architectural reform implemented narrowly risk-proportionate framework deferred future Rules limited high-risk supports providers four-tier registration recommended Taskforce primary legislation worker registration scheme participant complaints reforms Taskforce recommended Bill also partial evidence base thin-markets workforce market-stewardship concerns identified Commission report reaffirmed post-launch evaluation are not included Bill. Framing that Schedule right corrective requires acknowledging both layers partality corrected procedural position Committee set out Sections put to sections document interdependence active work against intent Schedule should be omitted from existing evidence base Disability Royal Commission National Autism Strategy 25–31 independent further Inquiry Schedule until after Joint Standing Committee NDIS Integrity reports Thursday July 2026 recommendations then integrated redesign alongside launch-era expert lineage amended Schedule subject before any legislative step taken provider-side integrity-side reforms expert review confirm actually meets market-stewardship, and substantive community consultation under “nothing about us without” principles Drafting the is end process testing it against and scrutiny.

Section 11 — How Schedule 1 and Schedule 3 work against Schedule 2:

Interdependence that Bill ignores

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079 daily activity supports, and more than one in four are not accessing other needed supports. The Pelin Akyol e61 Institute seminar held on Wednesday 27 May 2026 restated the same critique in the credentialed-economics register:

“whether the NDIS functions as a competitive market, or whether price caps are doing most of the heavy lifting.” This is a fifteen-year evidence base, on the public record, from the Government’s own statutory body,fromtheGovernment’sofcommissionedindependentreview,andfrom independent academic research.Themarketfailureisdocumented.Thecohortsaffecte dareidentified.Thegeographicandcomplex-needsconcentrationisquantified.Andstillth egovernmenthasnotacted—notacrossfifteenyearsofaccumulatingevidence,andnotin thisBillwhichfails toaddress thefailureinscheduleandschedules3makesthedocumentedproblemactivelyworse.

What new s.25A(2) does Schedule 1ofthest presentBillsinsertsnewS.25a(2), whichprovidesverbatim:

treatment may be appropriate treatmentforaperson’s impairment or impairmentsregardlessofwetherperson’ sindividualcircumstancesrestrict personfromaccessingtheretment The Note tot he sub-section reads:A person ’sin dividual circumstances includesthe persons financial circum stances and geographical location.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079

founding 2011 Productivity Commission report identified and that the 2017, 2023 and 2024 evidence base has reaffirmed over fifteen years. This is not a marginal or incidental effect of the provision. It is the statutory point of s.25A(2). The Government has chosen, in the operative text of the Bill, to write into law that the question of whether the treatment can be accessed is not the test. The test is whether the treatment exists somewhere as a conceptual category, irrespective of whether the participant can access it. The cost of the participant’s inability to access —the financial barrier,the geographic distance ,The absenceof providersin remoteand First Nations communities—is assignedtotheparticipant.The eligibility gate operatesas if themarketis functioning,in cohorts where th eGovernment’s ownevidencebasehas documentedfor fifte enyearsthatthemarketisonfunctioning . The Schedule 2 silence on thin markets isthe same decision Schedule 2 o f t he presentBill could have engagedt hethin-markets failure.T heredict 2023 NDIS Review’s Alternative commission ing for remotelandFirstNationscommunities paper provideda specific framework.Th erediction 2024NDIS Provider an d Worker Registration Taskforce Final Advice contemplatedabroader market-stewardship architecture Th ereport identifie d policy responses.The Schedul edesign choicesgovern ment made— narrowingther “ND IS provider” definition at news1O C extending therRegulatory Powers (Standard Provisions) Act monitoring and investigation regime restructuring plan-managerandsupport-coordinationmarket segments addressprovider-sideconduct inthesegmentswhereprovidersexist.Theydonotaddresstheme rketsegmentswhereprovid ersarenotpresent.Scheduleexpanseregulation;itdoes not establish stewardship. Read together, Schedule s. regressivity codification of the Bill is the two facesofthe sam egovernmentdecision.Schedulelegislates thattheparticipant’ sinabilitytoaccesstreatment,incohortsandlocationswheremarket has failedfifteen yearsisno relevant to eligibility.Schedule does nocommit governmenttosolving themarketfailure The combined effect onoperative text of the Bill isthe assignment cost decades-documented mark et failur eparticipant rather than t o Government asmark -ste ward,andcodificat ionthatassignmentinstatute . The market-steward inversion The current NDISAct commits scheme enable people with disabilitytobe included community which they live AustralianGovernment State Party Convention Rights PersonswithDisabilities obligations under Article 19 ensurepeopledisabilit ycanlivecommunitychoices equal others range home residential other communitysuppor tservices including personal assistance necessary support living inclusion from isolation segregationcommunities available launch-era expert lineage developed at Section sets out market-stewardship

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment

Submission 2079 architecture the founding 2011 Productivity Commission report contemplated and the academic literature has called for since. Market stewardship is Government responsibility where markets fail remote First Nations complex-needs cohorts as documented fifteen years ago, situation falls upon government as market-steward participant’s problem. The bill reverses these responsibilities new s.25A(2) writes into statute participant inability access treatment due to market failures becomes participants issue schedule silence thin markets written design broader architecture not established now two choices together statement market will solve consequence borne affected cohort government documents most impacted integration point what after JSC post-redesigns schedule incorporate addressed section ten redesign schedule following joint standing committee ndis integrity national disability insurance scheme inputs incorporation thin-markets alternative-commissioning provisions centre of that redesign post-JSC schedule establish market-stewardship architecture engages remote first nations complexity needs cohorts identified drawing on review paper research redesign commit government market-steward addressing thin-market failure legislating around or present bill through schedule one three actively making worse Schedule sharpest single operative provision codifying regressivity alone whole submission position omit entire (section sixteen): instance across below-cost funding authorities permanence-and-treatment gate works against market repair Section seven addresses statutory inconsistency with Disability Discrimination Act CRPD Article National Agreement Foundational Supports commitment Closing Gap adds structural-integration dimension Omitting Schedule 1 discrimination-law correction step stops Bill from coding onto the cost a market failure post-JSC Schedule appropriate place address This close Part B summary procedural position puts Committee should be omitted full already-assembled and consulted evidence base A; substantive direction supported but deferred until Joint Standing Committee NDIS Integrity inquiry reports

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment

Submission 2079

On July 2 , redesigning was done using inquiries’ results along with the initial era’s experts. Lineages were returned after being scrutinized through Sections (\text{Section}~[9] and [10]) ; schedule $^{{}{ { }^{{}} }}$ three -the control-provisions under schedule two have been pulled away from schedule two’s intentions- is discussed within part c, in which submissions ask its omission as well.The schedules can’t be separated: to proceed with repairing markets according to schedule one requires scheduling three to stop.

Section 12 – Schedule 3 Part 1: Ministerial overreach in the pricing decision-maker model and funding-cap architecture

What Schedule 3 Part 1 introduces

Schedule 3 Part 1 makes the Minister the pricing decision-maker for NDIS supports. New s.45C authorizes the Minister to make legislative instruments specifying maximum amounts payable for NDIS supports or groups thereof, strength ceilings on specified supports; despite these specifications operating regardless actual costs involved providing such support; New ss.sssA(5) introduced through Bill’s funding-adequacy provisions authorize setting below-cost market requirements provided them—s.34A via ministerial instrument old frameworks plans;s.32K(3C) rules new frameworks plans Together produce single policy outcome: The Minister statutory authority set prices below cost without requirement establishing price financially viable provider nor modeling impact of decisions no merits review pathway available participants providers affected The funding-below-cost authorization not campaign characterization it face bill.New s.34A(5), inserted schedule part reads verbatim:

“To avoid doubt, determination has effect even if result either both following:(a)funding participant plan reasonable necessary less total cost support(b)funding under whole plan taken as a whole is less than total costs supported.” The ‘to avoid doubt’ construction confirms that Minster’s determinations operate regardless resulting funding meets those supports Combined with s.45C maxima authorities subject this section architecture coherent: Schedule 1 authorises below-cost funding within plans Scheduleauthorises maximum amounts payables for the supports those plans fund Section sets out full Schedule one funding-below-cost structure in this addresses pricing-decision-maker concentration compounded. That significant concentration power inconsistent Pricing Commission contemplated when designed NDIS introduces accountability deficits ask Committee examine carefully

The pricing framework ndis operated under Since commencement,

national disability insurance agency developed Price Guide previously Support Catalogue and before

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 2079

through an annual process of cost analysis, market consultation, and sector engagement. That process has not been perfect, and the sector has documented its limitations extensively: below-cost pricing in thin markets, inadequate indexation, and workforce supply pressures supply pressures that the price guide has been slow to reflect.Noneofthatisindispute here. What mattersfortheargumentinthissectionisthathcurrentpricingleframeworkhas threestructuralaccountabilityfeaturesthatschedulepartremoves.TheNDIAasastatutoryagency,isoperationally accountableforthepricingdecisions—itisperquiredtopublishitsmethodologyconsultwiththesector,andanswerforsanalysis throughtheadministrativeprocessessenateestimates,senatecommittee inquiries,andANAOaudit.ThepromisingdecisionstheNDIAMakesareadministrativedeclionsmade understatutoriauthorityandinprincipalsubjecttoreview.Andthestaturaryfunctions oft he NDIA at s.(2)(f)f of then currentNDSActincludemarket stewardship—afunction that is operationally anchoredinthepricingsprocess,becauseprice scheme pays fors a support shapes whether themarket fortha supports remains viable. Schedule3Part1 removes th pricingle functionfromthenDIA andreplacesitiminister’soffice,tobeexercisedbylegislativeinstrument.Eachoftothestructural features changes materially when this transfer occurs

What the Productivity Commission’s design contemplated TheschemeProductivityCommissiondesigned in 2011 was built on competitive market model which, over time provider competition expected to discipline prices.Foundingreportwas explicitthat price guidance wastransitionalarchitecture— necessaryintheearlyyearsbeforematuredbutintendedtogivewayasschemescaled.Commission’soffollow-up report NDIS Costs found that competitivemodelling had not materialized as anticipated: thin-market conditions were extensive across regional remote and outer-metropolitan areas; market concentration certainsupportcategorieshadincreasedratherthan dispersedandthescheme required active market stewardship including independent pricing oversight manage structural failure purecompetitionmodelhaddnotcorrected Neithertheneither nor thedesignanticipatedwhatSchedulepartnowproposes:

pricing authority would be held by Ministeroftheday exercisable legislative instrument with parliamentary disallowance sole accountability mechanism.ProductivityCommissions architecture imperfect implementation maintained operational separation between political direction administrative pricing.Schedule part collapsesseparation.Thereis deeper incomherenceinthesign. A genuinelycompetitivemarket—the modelfovernmentinvokeswhendescribesNDISparticipant-led choice-drivenwould allowprice torise where supply is short drawing providers workers underserved segments.A below-cost cap setbyMinisterialinstrumentdoes opposite suppress verypricingsignal a

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment Bill

Submission 2079

The “have regard to” discretion is not bounded by objective standards. New s.45C(17) specifies matters for consideration when making a pricing decision: any relevant advice provided by the NDIS; ensuring financial sustainability of the scheme (NDIS); objects and principles underpinning legislation; note what’s missing: The agency must have regards costs associated safe efficient high-quality acquisition or provision supports value money alongside diversity competition & financial sustainabilty, such as considering cost while minister does not need to do so.The ministers’ obligations are tied NDIA advice schemes sustainable funding act objectives -not actual price providing support being priced.“Have regard to” isn’t ‘must be satisfied’, nor ‘determine unless’. It’s consultative, not substantive constraint.Minister must consider listed considerations but doesn’t require them govern court tribunal review merits pricing determination based on Minister weighted incorrectly.Financial-sustainability obligation sits with Schedule new clause amendment which subordinates reasonable-and-necessary supports financially sustainedMinisters now include financial sustainability in their Act primary purpose both pathways towards same fiscal destination power sets maximum prices every support approximately participants currently depend Australia CRPD Article living independently included community Article adequate standard living engaged three-item “have regard” obligation that excludes cost-provision inadequate accountability standard Power determining whether supported funded level allows it exist should bounded satisfaction cost providing merely list from absent. Compare this Agency publishes methodology grounds price costing modelling market analysis sector before finalising decision accepts challenge through established processes where participants providers believe wrong shift process Ministerial legislative instrument three-item “have regard to” obligation excluding cost of provision represents degradation rather than enhancement.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079

A further feature of s.45C reinforces the accountability concern. The Note following s.45C(1) exempts pricing determinations from the sunsetting provisions in Part 4 of Chapter 3 of the Legislation Act 2003. Legislative instruments normally sunset after ten years, requiring Parliament to actively renew them.The pricing determination is exempt.A decision made under S .45 Ccan remainin force indefinitely withoutParliament beingrequiredto revisit it.T heaccountability mechanismthat sunetting provides— forcinga parliamentary reconsiderationof whether aninstrument remains appropriate—is removedby design. Disallowance ist not routine accountability A legislative instrumentmadeunderS ,45CTakes effect whenit registered(or onthedatespecifiedinthelnterument) uless eitherHouse o f Parliam ent passes adisallowancemotion within fifteen sitting days oft h eInstrumentbeing tabled.Thedefault,therefore,is thatthe Instrumentstands.Parliamentmustactively intervene toreversethem;theministeristnot requiredtodemonstratetheInstrumentsappropriatebeforeittakeseffect.For a government th at holds or can secure amajority ineither Housewhenadisallowanccmotionismoved,the disallowance mecha nism i s no t meaningful accountabilit y constraint Thepricing determinationtakeseffect; burden reversal fallsonano ppositionor crossbench capablepassingdis allowancemotion—which mayno te x i st.Comparing this the existing accountability architecture:then DIA’s Pricing decisions are madethrough process sector engage with before finalisation, n ot after.Thelegislative instrumen model reverses sequence decision takes effect first challenge depends political will in both Houses of Parliamentafter fact.This is marginal procedural point.It means ordinary casegovernment numbers Minister set below cost price take effect and stands body— court merits tribunal practice able requireprice reflectcost support.Determination governs Price every Support scheme Dis allowance only Accountability substance close externalaccountability all. Reviewability stripping — most significant accountability failure Administrative Decisions NDIA reviewable by Admin Review Tribunal Legislative instruments not subject judicial Federal Court constitutional grounds jurisdictional error Judicial review does assess substantive merit decision tests whether Decision maker had legal power act followed requiredprocess.Provider pricing has been setbelow service participant whose intensity capped level reflects assessed functional need No administrative merits review pathway against legislative instrument pricing Determination Can bring judicial review threshold materially higher than for merits review Cost material greater remedy quashing Instrument blunter tool substituting different price.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079

This finding was independently validated by Villamanta Disability Rights Legal Service through its community legal forum held on May 20th, 2026: The Minister’s pricing alterations made within their architecture are considered non-reviewable decisions from an administrative standpoint as currently applied towards NDIA pricing actions. Villamanta reached this conclusion after analyzing Schedule 3 Part of the Bill itself which confirms what transferring these functions into ministerial legislative instruments achieves in practical accountability terms - it removes any merits review pathway protecting both participant rights against wrong pricing decisions.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment Bill

Submission 2079

The Ministerial price cap therefore operates most stringently on participants with structural barriers such as lower-income or remote circumstances; those whose disability affects their ability to manage funding directly lose access if providers charge above this limit while NDIA-managed ones retain support at capped prices. This feature means no gap-payment mechanism exists when actual costs exceed caps—NDIAs cannot legally pay differences between these two figures unless any provider delivers services below them otherwise not delivered entirely due to lack thereof. The practical consequence here lies within s45C’s pricing power which can remove supports from schemes underpriced thereby removing all options available regardless of whether self-management applies—a minister setting limits below what providers deliver effectively removes that option altogether, making decisions non-reviewable and contrary CRPD Article & DD Act obligations scheme must uphold.

The thin-markets compounding problem

Section establishes fifteen-year evidence base: NDIS supply issues rural/outer metropolitan areas market concentration among large providers certain categories ways in which new s25A(2) deeming treatment “appropriate” irrespective participant affordability/reach makes thin-market gaps worse I do repeat analysis here. What Schedule Part adds is the dimension Pricing caps set below cost reduce supply rather than reducing expenses. Providers operating geographically isolated participants sustain operations indefinitely effect below-cost price caps suppressing incentives for existing/new providers entering it Pelin Akyol’s 2025 research on quasi-market failure identifies cap as primary lever through which scheme fails most heavily lifting this (More Quasi Market e61 Institute / Economic Society Australia NSW seminar May). a Ministerial discretion exercisable without objective-standards constraint independent review merits-review pathway affected parties compounds thin markets failure addressing instead applied structurally deficient Productivity Commission identified year confirms remains today Concentrating

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079

pricing power in the Minister without an independent oversight architecture is not the cmarket stewardship intervention the evidence base supports. This is not abstract for my family. My fourteen-year-old daughter, an NDIS participant, neds speech therapy and occupational therapy; evenin metropolitan Perth we waited alon time t find providers wth availability;andwe now travel thirty minutes each way to reach them.Her plan funds one session month against clinical recommendation weekly,andw manage fortnightly stretching what have.The suppor are already under-funded hardtoreach at current price levels—andthatis beforeMinisterial powerto set thosepricelevels lower still,inthesameBill narrows her access on reassessment.A below-cost cap doesnotreachmyfamilyas a questionof market design.It reaches us asatherapysession recommended needed ndot funded. The structural invesion—from independnet mkt stewartshipto Minsterial direction TheNDIS Actat s.(f) givesthe NDIA market facilitationstewardship functions.The scheme’s pricingarchitecture principal tool through whichm kettewhich exercies—Thepriceguide shapeswhatthemarket will bear whoproviders can offer whether participants thin-market areascanaccesssuppors all.Concentrating pricing function minister removes it from operationally accountable statutory agency placesit in political office.This matters independence of thepricing process: Minister’s prcisions decisions made context fiscal constraints (37.8 billion savings target over four years established by Bill Budget measure),political priorities,Budget cycles—not onlycontextmarket actually costs operate.Independent pricing oversight not bureaucratic nicety; is structual protection againts pricing power being used saving instrument rather than market management tool.Schedule 3 Part1doesnt merely remove thatprotection;

in context $37 .Billion Savings Target legislated sameBudget, hands Government direct lever decide politcal and fisc matter how much support Scheme fund setting price supports delivered.The concernis notonlythat indepenence lost itspower configured let fisical targets,rather cost suppor determine what participant actuall receive. The Productivity Commission2017 report identified independent mkt stewardship essential to NDIS long-term sustainability.Congenting market-stewardship pricingfunctions Minster basis have regard discretion with disallowance-only parliamentary accountability no merits review pathway—inverts design Commision identifed necessary.I am aware evidenceGovernment produced addresses why inversion appropriate orhow accountabilty deficit creates meant remedied.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 2079

What should happen instead

My position on Schedule 3 is that it should be omitted from the Bill. The underlying question Schedule 3 Part 1 gestures at is real – how maximum amounts, extensity ceilings, and worker-to-participant ratios should be set,by whom,and against what evidencebase – buttheBillanswersitincoherently.Therearetwo coherent modelsforaschemeofthiskind: a genuinely market-led model withindependent priceoversightthatletssupplyandepriceadjust ,orapublicly-commissioned,nott-for-profitdeliverymodel inwhichthegovernmentprovisionsupports directly.Schedule 3 Part Iisneither.Itkeepsthe markets’risks—participantsdependonprivateproviderschoosingtodeliver —whileremoving themarket’spricemechanismandtheadependenceoftbodythesets prices.Thatistheworst ofboth :politicalcontrolofpricewithneithermarketdiscipline nor apubl ic-provisionguarantee.Butanswer tothatquestionisanMinisterial legislativeinstrumentwitha“have regardto”discretion,dissallowance-onlyaccountability andnomeritsreviewpathway for participants or providers.The answerisa independent pricing oversight architecture—onealsoengagesthesthin-marketsproblemdirect ly,besincepricesettingmarket stewardshipcannot sensiblybeseparated-developed throughsubstantiveconsultationwit h the disabilitysectorunder “nothing about us withoutus ” principles,wit publishedmethodologyoperational transparencyobligations, andal accessible reviewforall affectedparties. Thatarchitectureshouldbedesignedanda nd consulted on,andtestedagainst bothexpert anda communityscrutiny, beforeany legislativesteponthpricingfunction isbroughtbackt otheParliament. The omissionI am askingforisonot aposition that th epricing function shouldbefrozenas it currently operates .The currentPricing Arrangements an dPrice Limits framework has documentedlimitations ,andsectorsahasraisedconcernsaboutbelow-cost pr icing underthexistingNDIA-ledframeworkforyears.What Iamaskingistha remedytot hose limitationsnotbe thencentration ofpric ingauthorityina Ministeri allegislative instrument withtheadv ailabilityarchitectur ei have describedinthissection.T he evidencebase—the Productivity Commission’s2011and2017designwork,the academicthin-m arketsliterature andVillaman ta’ sindependentlegalanalysisofthe accountability architecturethenBillcreates—supportsthe conclusionthat Schedule3 PartImakesthestricingaccountabilityproblemworse,nottbetter.Omissiono fSchedulefromB ill,followedb y thecodesignoi n dependent pricing oversight throughgenuinecommunity consultation,isathe procedurallya ndsubstantivelyappropriate response.

Section 13 – Schedule 3 Part 2: Automation of Administrative Action

Evaluative Determinations, And Participant Safety Risk Against Robodebt Royal Commission Findings

This provision refers to itself within campaigns and submissions under RoboNDIS. The section allows automated decisions regarding individual disabled people’s NDIS benefits—including determining ‘reasonable-and-necessary’ at subsection (a) through an oversight structure whose central safeguards are stated but may be breached without invalidating decision validity as per legislation reviewed previously. Australia has done something similar before with its own welfare system examined during the Royal Commission into the Robodebt Scheme. It found profound systemic harm caused from automation applied on vulnerable groups linked directly or indirectly towards deaths among affected individuals—this parallel runs throughout every safeguard in schedule part two below measured against necessary criteria identified by said commission—and why it should not appear here due to these concerns.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment Bill

Submission from commencement

New section 59C specifies which sections will automatically apply when Schedule Part commences: Sections , and . Section defines what supports participants receive based upon their individual needs. The CEO has authority for computer programs in Section without further action being needed, or accountability if they make decisions using this method.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079

The safeguard architecture and its structural gaps

New section . sets out oversight and safeguards. I examine each element against what Royal Commission into Robodebt identified necessary:

• CEO Oversight - Section E(3): Failure does not affect validity if reasonable-steps obligation isn’t met; parallels Robodebt experience where errors weren’t detected; safeguard as process but provides no protection when automated incorrectly, asymmetry between compliance with obligations vs actual effect on decisions made automatically.
• Notification - Sections E(4),E(5): The notice must inform participants that an automatic decision was taken via computer program at point-of-receiving-decision notification. is meaningful transparency measure, failure doesn’t impact automative-action’s validity or participant’s right to seek review without being told automation occurred. Without remedy upon breach of this requirement. Transparency regarding input data: Notification provision tells users it used a computer, not details about how specific inputs led outcomes doesn’t tell them logic applied or why outcome reached. Villamanta independently validated gap in May ’26 analysis showing lack thereof. Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) instrument is published for general rules the system applies rather than specifics behind individual cases. lacks detail needed by user to identify wrongness of their case & take steps challenging it materially impaired The arrangement itself is also not legislative instrument per section B(12). It cannot be tabled before Parliament and thus has no parliamentary advance.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079

visibility of it. The CEO is required to publish a statement on the Agency’s website that an arrangement has been made and which provisions it covers (⅛.s⺎(6))—but publication after the fact is not the same as parliamentary approval before.The decision to automate the most consequential eligibility assessments in the scheme is one the CEO can make unilaterally without parliamentary notice or disallowance, an with no external approval requirement. The standard operating procedure is notifiable ,not disallowable – s .sⷝE(6).Where automation involves evaluative determinations,th eCEO must mak estandard operat ing procedur e instrument specifying th ecircumstancesinwhichtheevaluat ive determinationwill always be mad eina specified way(s .SDD(2)).Thatinstrumentisannotifi able instrumen t:itispublishedandParliamentcanreadi ti.tisanotifiable instument:notdisallowab leinstument: P arliam entcannotvotetodis allow i t. Th erulesgoverninghowautomated evalutiv edeterminati ons— automated judgements—aremad ei nasc heme serving 760 disabledAustraliansaresubjecttopublication butnotinparliamentary accountability.Retrospectiveaccountabilityonly — S.S9EE(7). Th eCEOmustinclude,intheadge ny’s annual report,the kinds of substituted actions taken (where the CE Ointervened because an autom ated decision wasno r corrector preferable) andt hekinds o faut omatic action the CEOwas satisfied were incorrect.Annual reporting ist retrospe ctive, a ggregated,and occurs aftertha te ffected participants have already receivedthewrongdecision.The Robodebt Royal Commission found that retrospective accountabilit y⅛—the “we can fix errorsafterthefact”defence—isnotanadequate substituteforcontemporaneous safeguards. TheerrorsinRob ode bwt wereno tc aughtbyretrospectiver epo rt ing mechanisms;theywerecaughtbecauseindividualaffected people contested individual decisions,oftenatsignificant personal cost.T her NDIS participant cohort ,as I descri bef belowincludesa substantial proportionofpeople for whomthatindividu al-contestation pathway is structurally compromised by their disability.Thereisafurther dimensiontheR obodebxperien ce makes unavoidable. R obode bt’s errors persistedf or years not only becaus ere tros pective rep orting failed to catch them,b utbecaus ewarningsweredismiss edandthosewhoraised th ealarmwera resisted rather than heard; theroyalCommission documented aculture in which the scheme’s continuation w as defended against theevidence.Schedul 3 Part placestheadutomation of thesedecisions andt he rules t hat governthem under adegre eofexecutive an dMinisterial control — arrangements are no legislative instruments, standard operating proceduresare nota ffiablebutno td i sallowable,andexpansion o ftahe autom ated provisions on Ministeri alsel fsatisfaction⅛— that affords even less external visibilitythan ae arrangements Robodebt operatedunder.Ascheme thisconsequentialfor disabled Australianscannot safely restonth assumptiontha tt h epoliticalan dan administrative actors running it will reliably surfacetheir ownsystemic errors.TheRob ode b recordisthat they didnot.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment Bill

Submission 2079 - Securing NDIS Future Generations Act 2026

Plan Suspension & Revocation Architecture

Sitting alongside automation provisions but operating through different mechanisms, new Section 40A authorizes suspension if participants are not contactable. The CEO can suspend plans after reasonable attempts for information or reports have been made without success; suspension decisions under this section allow challenges via a process requiring knowledge about decision-making, an understanding it’s available as well as communication capacity—barriers especially affecting those with disabilities impacting engagement patterns. New Section 50A automatically renews old framework plans on their end date; making these renewals does not involve any reviewable decisions—a significant departure from other sections’ processes where adjustments might require individual assessments.

The Robodebt Royal Commission parallel

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 2079

The Robodebt Royal Commission parallel

The National Disability Insurance Scheme amendment bill was introduced with significant implications regarding systemic harm prevention within welfare systems.

According to historical records, Australia had previously deployed similar automated schemes leading to widespread negative impacts on disadvantaged populations; however, these instances were less thoroughly documented than those involving Robodebt’s scheme under review during its royal commission in late-2023/early-2024 period [1]. The Royal Commission highlighted how this automation led directly towards profound societal damage across affected demographics including individuals from diverse socio-economic backgrounds such as people living with disabilities or other vulnerabilities. It also underscored connections between flawed decision-making and fatalities among users impacted thereby emphasizing broader stakes beyond mere administrative costs—human life itself being at risk due incorrect algorithmic decisions. Thus, lessons learned are pertinent here:

Failure of Safeguard Architecture

Automated income averaging calculations applied uniformly irrespective individual circumstances often resulted mathematically plausible yet systematically erroneous over time. These failures weren’t primarily legal authority issues but rather structural flaws inherent safeguard architecture: lack transparency about data driving debt calculation, absence external reviews mechanisms, internal oversight failing catching systematic errors because it assumed correctness of algorithms used etc., all while most vulnerable cohorts like disability recipients struggled navigating contestation pathways.

Schedule 3 Part 2 Comparison

Schedule 3 part two creates a framework where CEO’s oversight obligations don’t affect validity if not met by the CEO whereas notification obligation doesn’t impact when Agency fails to comply; participants cannot see input data influencing automated decisions despite standard operating procedures published though disallowable; annual reporting is retrospective aggregated sowing seeds for potential systemic error detection delays years later instead of immediate resolution; suspension under section (40A) & revocation pathway placed burden on least likely able participant reinitiating contact within ninety days otherwise face revocation, as well as plan renewals altering funding through operation law without reviewable decision operate entirely outside automation frameworks’ transparency and oversight obligations. The Government’s position reflected in this bill appears that explicit statutory authorization along with CEO oversight outlined at Section(59E), distinguishes schedule three part from Robodebt procedural distinction which does not address substantive question Royal Commission identified regarding whether an automated system applied across vulnerable groups possess necessary accountability structures ensuring timely identification of such mistakes rather than delayed discovery decades hence. Evidence provided by actual provisions set forth in Schedule Three Part Two clearly indicates failure.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079

The Committee should weigh that conclusion against the gravity the Robodebt Royal Commission established. That inquiry connected an inadequately-safeguarded automated welfare-decision system to the deaths of affected people. Applying a comparable architecture to the NDIS participant cohort – disproportionately Autistic, intellectually disabled, and psychosocially disabled Australians - carries the same foreseeable categoryof risk. The foreseeable worstcase gettingautomated decision-making wrongfor thiscohortisnotanadministrative inconvenienceto be corrected ina later annual report; it isthe lossdisabled lives.Ontheevidence therobodebtroyalcommission placed onthepublicrecord ,thatriskshouldbedeterminativewhether Schedule3 Partproceedsinitscurrentform .

The pattern is already operational: KarenShine’s parliamentary-record testimony

Thestructural riskschedulewouldscale notahypothetical projection.Itisthelived experienceNDIS participantsunderexisting administrative arrangements—arrangementsoperate without explicit statutory automation frameworkBill introducesbut with samemotivationaldriven decisions,delayagency response,and operative-text removal review rightsframework wouldsystematise.MsKaren Shine,a current NDISPARTICIPANT,gave first-person testemonyJoint StandingCommitteeonNDS atsecond public hearingSydney15 May 2026.Hertestimonypublic Hansard recordtracks onto threeSchedulePartfeaturessection hassetout.Ialso bearstwo threads running throughthis submission:further evidence of scheduleoperating againstparticipant-protective intentGovernment locatesinSCHEDULE, andsharpens procedural-sequence concernSections8anddevelop—that Bill being advanced aheadof JointStanding Committee’s integrity findingsbefore the evidencethe Committeehearing(Msshineincluded) caninform legislation.

Categorical applicationwithout individualised assessment—the s. riskMs Shines opening statement tothe committee:

“I’m an NDIS participant who was subjected prolonged procedurally unfair schemeintegrity audit resulted in $ debt just days pay.Eighteen months later thatdebt withdrawn no restoration myrights… Iwas auditedagainst rules didn’t even exist time made claim.Was told should have claimed using categories on self-managed portal don’sexist.TheNDIA assumed fraud raised debts whenever two or more suppliers invoiced for same period.That’s notevidencefraud .That’evidencedemy choice control.”

This is pattern Robodebtroyalcommission identified as systemically harmful when applied algorithmically—categorical rulessubmitted retrospectivelyindividual circumstancesrules didnot contemplate attime original administrative action.MsShine case demonstrates under current arrangementseven without

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079

explicit statutory authorisation for automation of s.33 evaluative determinations, the agency is already applying rules that did not exist at the relevant time and raising debts on category-based assumptions rather than individualised assessments of the participant’s actual circumstances. The Bill’s authorisation of automated s.33 reasonable-and- necessary determinations from commencement would extend the pattern that has already produced this result to the most consequential individual eligibility assessment in the scheme. Ms Shine’s experience also speaks to the integrity-leakage figure the Government relies on ( Section 8). Her debts were raised on the assumption that overlapping invoices were fraud, when —on her account— they reflected legitimate choice and control.Where categorybased assumptionsofthatkindarecountedinintoa“leakagetotal,thefigureoverstatesfraudbyfoldinginconductthatisnotfrauditall.Automatingthes.33determinationwouldscalepreciselythat over-attribution. Operativetextremovalreviewrights—thes50A(4)(b)/ss.45Cpattern.Msshine’evidenceonthadministrativerviewpathway: it tooktheNDIAyearswhileIwasonlyevergiven14daystorespondorcomply includingpayinglargedebs.Documentswereinaccessiblespiterequestsforalternatives.Thedebtleterstatedithe decisionswerenot reviewable, meaning no AATreiewno internal reivewnos oversightandnowaytoclearmyname.SchedulePart2’sframeworkwoulsystematisethispatern atthestaturylevel.Section7 of thissubmissionhassetouthownew s . 50A ( b ) places annual plan renewals outside thereviewabledecision pathwayands how new ss. 45 Cplaces Ministerial pricingdecisionsoutsideit aswell MsShines experience demonstrates the livedexperience consequencesofo same pattern operating now under current arrangements: then participant left with n oAA T revi ew,nointernalreviewnos oversight , nos way to clear her name The implicit defence thatth e existing review architecture will catch automated errors is falsified byMs Shine’s case where agency’debt letterexpressly saidthed ecisio ns were notreview able removing pathwa yte xisting legislativearchitecture was meantto provide. The Bill would put this removal on statutary record across ther enwal andpricingpathwaysth eparticipantismostlikelytoneed review for Retrospective correction without restoration—thes 59E(7) mechanism.Msshine’accountoftheaudit’resolution: in 23 my lawyer received an email saying,‘Theagencywillnotpursuethe debt,’butIreceivedno apology,no explanation, nocorrectionoftherecord no educationandnoreinstatementselfmanagement.The debtvansished butconsequencescontinueto have significant emotional toll andrestrictmy choice candcontrol.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079

means in practice for the affected participant: the debt was withdrawn after eighteen

months, but the structural consequences ––for choice and control, for engagement with the scheme, for emotional wellbeing—were not addressed. The participant did not receive: an apology; a correction or explanation about what agency now considers correct; or reinstatement of self-management arrangement removed during audit.The Robodebt Royal Commission’s finding regarding retrospective reporting as inadequate substitute for contemporaneous safeguards directly evidences Ms Shine under existing arrangements.Schedule Part3 annual-reporting mechanism described inadequately by public record.

The Joint Standing Committee has Ms Shine evidence on its public record.Her case falsifies implicit ‘this won’t happen at scale’ defence Schedule relies upon.Under current arrangements without explicit statutory automation framework introduced by bill pattern already operating.Schedule would codify removal review rights new s50A(4)(b),new Ss45C,and replace retroactive reportingscheduled 59E(7).

The Autistic-cohort-specific risk

NDIS participant cohort is non-random cross-section Australian population. According to Scheme Actuary figures cited publicly approximately per cent NDIS entrants are autistic children.Scheme’s base heavily weighted toward autistics Australians intellectual disability whose engagement bureaucratic administrative processes structurally shaped ways automated systems must account. Autistic process communication differently.Phone calls significant source sensory social distress many people.Autism burnout recognised phenomenon involving temporary severe reduction functional capacity can last days weeks months and affects ability engage with administrative processes precisely point those most consequential.snon-contactability suspension applied participants cannot be contacted; a proportion of these will be autism, their contact inability reflects rather than absence need.In cases failure scheme itself offering accessible individualised methods suited disabilities therefore penalises the participant for access failures Agency’s fix.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 2079

The NDIS automation framework as designed does not account for these structural features of the cohort it applies to. The SOP framework requires that circumstances covered by automated evaluative determinations be “sufficiently objective in nature” to be ascertained by computer program (s.59D(3)). The assessment of what is “reasonable and necessary” under s.33 is, for Autistic participants in particular, highly contextual and individual ––it is the antithesis of the“ sufficiently objective ”circumstancestheSOPframeworkrequires.The riskisthattheadautomationofss.evaluativedeterminationswill produce systematicunder-assessmentofsupportneedsforparticipantswhose presentationismostvariableandcontextualwhileappearingtocomplywiththesop framework’sobjectivityrequirementata categoricallevel. I am one oftheparticipantsthissub-sectionconcerns.IamAutistic,latediagnosed,andacurrentNDISparticipant.Mydisclosure atSection17namesitheexecutivefunctioncommunicationandanformation-processingcharacteristicsforthewhichihaveused accessibility toolsinpreparing thissubmission.Those characteristicsarethestructuralfeatures SchedulePart safeguardarchitecturedoesnotcontemplate.If a.s.reasonable-and-necessaryassessmentsaboutmysuppor tsautomatedproducesan und-assessmentmyactual needs,the pathwaybywhichwouldidentifyerrorchallenge itisthepathway mydisabilitystructurallycompromises.Thenotification provisiontellsmecomputermadethe decisionbut notwhatdataits used aboutm caseorwhaterasoning producedoutcome; thereview path requirestomeinitiate engagement,parsethedecisionandrepond administratively underconditions in which m capacitytodothose things isthespecific variable assessmentturnson. TheBill’ ssafeguard architecturereliesonthe participantbeing able todo ––athelative moment, respectofthemost consequential individual eligibility assessmentinscheme theverything disabilitymakeshardest What should happen instead Myposition onSchedule3issetoutattheadopening PartC:itshouldbe omittedfrom Bill.Theusecomputersadministrationisnotin itselfwrong butintentthis schedulereveals is.Schedule 2partbuilttolet computers makefinal decisions whatdisabledpeople receivewith human oversightreduced toa retrospective check; faceprovisionsdirection traveltowarddecision system that needsfewer peopletorunit:notone supportsparticipantsbetter.That wrong objective.Automationshould assisthuman decision-maker logging surfacing informationflagging anomaliesnotreplacehumanjudgement atpoint person’s supportsdecidedandahuman elementmustremainavailable help participants understand a decision,knowtheir rights and challenge it where needed.Theschemeprocessslargevolumesadministrativ actions,andtherearegenuineefficiency consistency arguments forcomputer-assisted decision-makingwhereappropriate.But “ computerassisted”inwhich computerpresentsinformation humandelictionmaker whoexercisesjudgment structurallydifferent from“automated ” in whichthecomputertakesactionandrethumansupervisionretrospective. Scheduleauthorises latterincludingfor evaluativedeterminations including

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 2079

for the s.33 reasonable-and-necessary assessment, with a safeguard architecture that does not provide contemporaneous participant-facing accountability, does not provide input-data transparency, and explicitly preserves the validity of decisions taken in breach of the CEO’s oversight and notification obligations.

The Robodebt Royal Commission’s central finding —that internal-process safeguards are insufficient where the system applies algorithmic rules to a vulnerable cohort whose individual circumstances are the primary variable—has direct application here. Schedule Part should be omitted from the Bill,

Section 14 - Economic evidence, cost-shift, and the missing impact analysis

Sections 3 through 11 set out the access, cohort, statutory and integration arguments. This section addresses what the economic evidence the Australian Government has put on the public record actually shows, what the Bill omits from its own impact assessment, and where the cost-shift the Bill triggers will land.The Committee is being asked to recommend a package of reforms wit h$a$\mathbf{3} \mathrm{T}.8 billion gross National Disability Insurance Scheme reduction over four years against he S c hem e Actuary’s pre-reform projections , an d a twelve-year cumulative reduct ion o f $A B T .9 b illion t o A D E R 6-7 per Budget Pap er N.o. I Statement J.The econom ic case th at G ov ernment ha s assembled for that pack age i st ot al l arge r than the revenue-side measures inthe sameBudget is documentedinthegovernment’ownBud get papers. The cost-benefit analysi sl ineage —an d The fourth anal ysis Tha bill does not containTheNationalDisabilityInsuranceSchemehas beenthesubjectofthreeGovernment-commissionedcostbenefita nalysis across itslifet ime.Th ep ro ductivityCommission’s2011D is abilityCareandsuppor tinquiryproducedtfh efoundingeconomiccasefor these m ch eme.It foundtbe benefits would exceed te costsatthewhole-of-economy level—estimatingthatthesech me,once mature,would add aroundper cent to GDP—and identified approximately $T.billionperyearinaoffsettingavoidedspendingacross public-service systems this scheme was designedto reduce dependence on.The Commission’sthe 2017NDISCostscommission study report reaffirmedtha net-positive findingata all -o fschemelevelonapost-launchevaluationbasis.Onboth of those Government commissioned analyses,the schemereturnedm oreineconomic benefitthanitcost. T he TaylorFryA3IndependentEvaluation o f t h e NDIS—the most recent G overnment- commission ed analysis-measurednetco stsof$6 billionexceeding measuredbene fits oft.$5 bil lion in A D E R .23. TheTaylor Fry measurement requires precise handling.T heremethodologywas deliberately constrained The evaluationreportexplicitly excluded major benefic ategoriesfromitsmea suredbenef itscolumn:justice-systemoutcomes, c hild-protection outcomes , post-school education outcom es,broadercommunitybenefits,fiscalmultipliereffects,value tot eh disabilitysupportsector,andeconomicutilitytoparticipants.Taylor F ry characterised the $5bil l ion measure db enefitsfigureas“mostlikelyanunderestimate”onafaceofthereport.Atthe cohort-band level,evenwithinthec ons trained methodology,Tay lor Fr y foundne tb et s exceeded ne tc ostsf orAutisticparticipantsin lowestmeasure dc ostbandsandforchildren-and-families.ThecohottheThriving Kids me asure targets— children aged eight and under with “low to moderate support needs“i n th e Budget Paper No 0.2m easur text framing—ist he coh ott TaylorFry’sanalysisidentifiesasthesh o rt est m ea sed net benefitsThe Government’s

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 2079

The targeting logic for Thriving Kids fails based upon analysis commissioned most recently from Government sources themselves. (The “low-to-moderate support needs” clinical-language framing used within Budget paper is addressed at Section4—neither term appears either DSM–5 or Independent NDIS Review nor does any Australian medical college or peak body endorse this framing.) The headline net-cost finding therefore represents a partial measurement against an explicit list excluded categories not final assessment scheme’s economic value.The Productivity Commission findings on broader benefit categories remain public record have been displaced subsequent analyses.There no published cost-benefit analysis present reform package weighing $38 billion reduction across other public-service systems.Bill proceeds without fourth such analysis. Independent(nongovernment-commissioned)economic literature points same way as two Productivity Commission findings.Per Capita’s False Economy estimated return approximately$1 in every $1ofNDIS expenditure,that every $billion of underfunding costs around jobs and $billionsin economic activity.e6 Institute work market design(Pelin Akyol More Quasi than Market locates inefficiency price-capmarket-design failure existence supports.I unable locate credentialled independent economic analysis disputes whole-scheme net-positive finding the Productivity Commission reached;only contrary figureGovernmentcommission Taylor Fry 2023 which constrained partial excludes major benefit categories.Committee should require Department produce forpublic record before Bill proceed full lifecycle costbenefit analysis reforms that accounts shift across other service systems(Section).

WhattheBill says about its owneconomic impact

The Bill Explanatory Memorandum lines acknowledges absence by characterisation.Two documents attached separately described Impact Analysis equivalent—not Regulation Impact Statement phrase “ImpactAnalysis Equivalent” Government description.A Regulation Impact Statement document Australian Guide to Policy requires substantial regulatory proposals with significant economic social or environmental impact.choice describe attached documents“equivalent rather RISdocuments acknowledge standard discipline not applied Bill.Office report Guardian Australia surfaced May recording Department Health Disability Ageing chose per cent reduction Social Civic Community Participation funding over more cohort-neutral alternatives.Department’s warning significant cuts participant supports could result regression daily living skills elevated risk injury neglectandsocialisolation would undermine objectives NDIS including aim provide reasonable necessary supports participants—

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 2079

confirms that the Department considered the cohort-asymmetric impact and proceeded with the cut anyway. The Department’s own report is the closest document to a substantive impact analysis. It is not what the Explanatory Memorandum attaches as the Bill’s economic justification.

• Committee should require full Regulation Impact Statement prepared according Australian Government Guide Policy Analysis standard rather than accept ‘equivalent’ label government concedes falls short.- There irony committee entitled note: bill leans heavily Economic actuarial framing justify narrowing core clinical functional eligibility question yet sets aside part economists qualified provide whole-of-scheme net-benefit finding & Cost shift package will trigger.

Cost-shift across public-service systems scheme was designed reduce dependence on

The Productivity Commission included approximately $11billion per year offsetting avoided spending other Government-funded Systems Avoided-spending categories - emergency department waits Public mental health system load schools-disability support requirements Centrelink JobSeeker case loads justice-system contact family carers exiting paid employment aged-care Medicare contact are schemes designed directly When access narrowed demand returns those systems. Bill counts National Disablity Insurace expenditure reduction without counting corresponding increases narrowing elsewhere in service. The ledger also has positive side ignored by Bills accounting NDIS expenditure leaves economy largely pays wages disability workforce 325,00 workers who pay tax draw less income support spend incomes communities Well-supported participants themselves more likely be work longer hours better physical and mental reducing demand Income Support Health System Per Capita modelling captures circular effect its $2.25-per-$ return estimate of jobs billion A $378bn reduction over four years roughly $9.5bn a year that implies job losses across the Disability Support Workforce run tens thousands each carrying own cost revenue foregone income tax increased income-support payments Reduction Scheme Expenditure therefore not clean saving headline figure it withdraws wages from large workforce returning demand to systems scheme relieves forgoes Tax participation gains supports produce None this counted Bills impact material The Productivity Commissions Working Paper Foundational Supports Governments statutory bodies most recent assessment warned $1billion per year Cost-shift States structural risk Foundational envelope broader access-tightening direction Schedule present Bill combination

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment Bill Submission

with the Foundational Supports Agreement signed by all eight jurisdictions in early 2026, codifies direction warned about prospectively. Cost-shift due structural consequence identified; The cost shift concrete through two budgetary measures: narrows access for schools-system support while reducing scheme’s operational costs.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079

negative gearing reform package in the same Budget delivers approximately $3.6\ billion of the revenue-side measures over four years against a Government-acknowledged total of approximately $13.5\ billion per year currently foregone through the existing capital gains tax discount and negative gearing arrangements. The ratio between the NDIS spending- side reduction over four years ($37.8 billion) and the CGT negative gearings revenue- side measures over four years ( $3.6 bilion) is approximatively ten to one.The comparison with the revenuue the government continues fo forgone is sharper still: at approximatey $13 .5
billion per year, headexisting capitol gainstax discoutnt nd negativte gearing concesions forgo ont he orderof $54 biliom across teh samne fouyr yeas—more than tehe entire $37,8 bilinon foor-year NDIS reductioen The Govenmentis cutting disability support by less thant it forgoes everyfouryears thrugh two tax concessionsit has left substantially intact. I supporrtthecapitalgains taix anndnegatviegearing reforms as good direction.Teh Division 296 superannuationtax reform oft 025 was tbe same direcction.Gooddirectionist notthesameast enouh in scope.Thestructural critiquet I puttoe Committee ist on tescale- asymmetry betweenthespending-side measure andtrevenue-sidemeasurenotont ehsubstance of eitherreform. The PetroleumResource Rent Tax forecast adds a further asymmetri data point. Teh Australia Institute analysis otthe costs papers records that “PRRT revenue will fall from$1 ,9 bilion nextyear to$1 .3 billionby the endotfdecade.The gas industry keeps telling us towait insiting PRRT revenuetwill go up.Butte budgetpapers showittalling by a thirdb y-2029 -30.”A per centgas export tax teh reform Senator David Pocock’s Senate SelectCommitteeon teTaxationofGas Resourceshas been investigating since late 2025,an whichhe Australian Greens also pursue would have raised, on TheAustraliaInstitutesanalysis more than $17bilinonper yearThe four-year NDIS reduction at $38 biliom is approximately two yearsand three months offoregone gastax reuvenueat the scaleSenatorPcock’ sComitteeisinvestigating.Teh structural choice tbe 26 Budget makesistake spending side savingsfromthedisability supports cohort attree times therate it takes revenueside savingsfrom anysource.Thet contrast in difficulty ist itself telling: agasttaxreform of this kind could be legislated and take effect quickly with a positive fiscal an consumer outcome;then DIDS reducitioen i st he harder path carries alarge hidden costshift thatmakes itsheadline saving almost certainly overstated,and falls hardest on disabled Australians—and disproportianately ont Aborigina nd Torres Strait Islanderdisabled peopleint eh thin market communities Sections tennd naddress. The “better anda cheaper” logical incomaptibility Tegovernment’s framing ot the reform packagei sthatthesavingsont eNational Disability Insurance Scheme sidewillbepartially redirected into Foundational Supports outside te scheme-Thriving Kidsan dte broaderFoundationalSupports envelope.Thefiscal arithmetic does not support tehframing. ThrivngKids $4 bilion total over fiveyears ($\t$2bilinon Commonwealth plus $13 billion states-matched). Foundational Supportsthe NationalDisabiltyInsuranceScheme:$3 biliomCommonwealthoverfive years, matched-contingent o nthe States.Teh Inclusive Communities Fund:$ 0 million ov er

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 2079

three years, held in Contingency Reserve pending further design and consultation. The total nominal envelope of $10 billion over five years (Commonwealth plus states-matched, sate matching not locked) is against a $37.8 billion four-year reduction in the scheme. The Inclusive Communities Fund specifically ––the group-based replacement-services measure— provides $200 million over three years, about $67 million a year,against the$37.8billionreductionoverfouryearsabout$9.billionayear.Comparedlike-for-like thatisaratioofroughlyonetoonehundredandfortyunderacentgroup-basereplacementfundingforeverydollarremovedfromindividualplans.Noper-person funding comparison has been publishedforanyofthereplacemostreams. This isthereminister’sstatedobjectivescollide.Onetwofofourobjective namedforthepackageisdelliveringbetter-qualityservicesandooutcomesforparticipants.A$37.8 billonfouryearreductioisetagainsatareplacementenvelopeofoatmost$10billion ovfiveyeairstatematchingnotlocked),anda groupservicesfundrunningatan underadcentforeachdollarremoved from individual plans cannot deliver both better outcomesandsavingsats thisscale.TheCommitteeshouldnoaccept“better andcheaper”asa singlepropositionwherethegovernment’sonarithmetickmakes themtwo mutually exclusive The correct cost-reduction sequence — ecosystem first, access restriction second The government’s fiscal case for Schedule 1 rests onthe propositionthat narrowing scheme access produces net savings.Theeconomicargumentismore complicated than hesavings-columncalculus,becausethemechanism thegovernment’ own policy logic relies upon ––andanmechanismtheministers National Press Club address implicitly assumed— istheadvailability of alternative supports that participants can transition to That mechanism requires the foundational supportsecosystemtoexistbeforetheaccess restric tionisapplied.Thel Bill reverses thesequencing . ThexistingNDISAct2013sectionalready provides therecorrectcost reduction me chanism.SectionrequiresCEO,indetermining reasonable-and-necessary sup ports,tobeesatisfiedtha tsupportist most appropriately funded through thenDIS ratherthanthroughotheravailable systems,havingregardtowhatisan available through family carer informal mainstreamandcommunitysupports.Whenthenfoundational supp ort secosystemsbuilt accessible diagnosis health navigators school-based disabilitysupport communitybased alliedhealth mentalhealh services existing s. test naturally directs participantstowardthosealternativesastheybecome avai lable.Participantswhocurrentlyrelyon NDIS funding fors upports thatsfunctioningschoolsystemaccessiblecommunityserviceor he althnavigatorcouldprovide will natur ally drawont hose servic es.The ND ISP plan reviewed accordingly.Cost reduc tions from ecosystem development without a legislative access gate toproduce it The Disney et all 205 data maps this argument onto thee xistingparticipantpopulation Lower socioeconomic areas have measurably lowerN DIS eligibility rates not because

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 2079

disability prevalence is lower in those areas, but because the barriers to accessing diagnosis, completing the FCA, and navigating the administrative process are higher. If the Government’s $10 billion foundational supports envelope were deployed to build the diagnostic and navigation infrastructure in those areas first – accessible diagnosis at Step Step, Health navigators and FCA support at Step (\text{2})— eligible people currently excluded by structural barriers would enter the scheme.In short term,scheme participationwould increase.Overtime ,those participants—with adequate communityandfoundationalsupports available —woud draw more fromthe ecosystem lessfromthen DIS,and existing s .34 mechanism wou produce thenatural cost-reductionthegovernment seeking.The Disney et al.data does not describescheme over-expansion.It describes themstructural under-subscriptionoftheschemewithunder-resourced communities.Therect correct policy responseto that data isthecosystem development reduced accessbarriers—the opposite ofBill’saccess-tighteningdirection. The fiscal asymmetry documented earlierin this section means theeconomydevelopment investment theright sequence requires isreadilyavailable from therevenue side: The$10billion foundati envelopover five years–Theenvelope government relies on provide alternative suppossesthesystem exists—is around six months revenue a 25 per cent gas export tax raiseon Australia Institute projections. Thefiscal choice not fundecosystemrevenueside,while restricting accesbeforeexists has clear distributive consequences they land disabled Australians their families while counterfactual benefits remain withgasexportsector

Thecost-impactaffected familiesth dimension Billdoesnot measure

Thes “Impact analysis equivalent” documents do includea cost impact assessment affected when National Disability Insurance Scheme plans narrowed withdrawn.I write parent two Autistic children late-diagnosedAutistic adult myself.My daughter fourteenyears old an NDIS participant recently transitioned mainstream schooling online learning.NDS funded supports makes her continued education possible.When NDSP are reduced or removed participants circumstances costs disappear;they shift.Parent leaves paid employment care thesupports were funding.The household income falls.Participant’s access toeducation community participation allied health specialist services contracts.Downstream Government-funded systems pick consequence public mentalhealth system contact emergency department waits schools-system load justice -system involvement for adolescents whose support beenwithdrawn Downstream costs real and measured by Impactanalysisequivalent document records only scheme-side expenditure reduction. The missingdimension ofBill’s economic justification.Productivity Commission’ s foundingeconomic case included offsetting avoided spending

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment

Submission: Securing NDIS Future Generations Bill 2026 - 2079

The government’s approach towards reducing access within a decade and neglects accounting for increased costs associated with such reductions. The absence from the bill includes an essential cost benefit assessment weighing both sides of their ledger system which was integral according to its previous economic evaluation.

Section 15 - Procedural concerns and peak-body convergence

Sections 3 through 14 set out the substantive case on the merits: the clinical-evidence vacuum, the diagnostic-language critique, the cohort assessment-instrument gap, the structural under-subscription, the statutory and treaty inconsistency, the contradictions with Government-commissioned reviews, the economic-evidence limitations, and the cost-shift the Bill will produce across adjacent public-service systems. This section addresses four procedural concerns that are independent of those substantive arguments but that the Committee should weigh when assessing the basis on which the reform package has been brought to Parliament and the adequacy of the process through which the Committee’s own scrutiny is being conducted.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 2079

This procedural-sequencing concern is distinct from the consultation adequacy concern addressed below; it pertains to both aspects independently:

• First concerns how parliamentary review structure operates.
• Second addresses time given disabled Australians engage with legislation under consideration here,

The proportionate-scrutiny argument compounds these issues further as Michael Brennan’s independent analysis highlights significant fiscal implications tied directly and indirectly through budget measures like NDIS savings ($37 billion over four years), which are eight times larger than trust taxation, tenfold greater compared combined capital gains tax reforms or negative gearing changes. His historical assessment underscores unprecedented scale dominating this Budget cycle, emphasizing reliance on successful implementation of one measure rather than others in strategy execution.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079

pathway from Thriving Kids back into NDIS); and Recommendation 10 (24-month review of Thriving Kids implementation). Five months is sufficient time to integrate substantive recommendations from the Government’s own Inquiry into the design of a Bill on the program the Inquiry investigated. The five-month gap was not a constraint on integration.The Department’s signed Ministerial response MC26-008601of5May2026namesInquiryasoneconsultationvenuesthat“helpedinformedthenationalmodelforThrvingKids.” The Inquirys placeintheconsultationrecordistheDepartmentsownclaim.TenonimplementationOfTheInquiriesfive most materialrecommendations,five monthsafterthereportandagainstavenueDepartmentidentifiespartitsconsultation foundation,isproceduraldemocracyconcern.TheGovernmentcannotcitenotimplementingtherecommendations thatconsultationproduced.Committeeisentitledrequiredepartmentidentifybasisgovernmenthas selectivelyengagedwithInquiries record— citinglet as consultation venue whilenot implementing recommendationsmade.## The Government’s Own Published Consultation StandardA further procedural-democracyproof point applies consultwindow for this submission itself.Australian Government Guide Policy Impact Analysis—the whole-of-Government framework maintained by OfficeImpactAnalysis within DepartmenPrimeMinisterCabinet sets Governments published standard: “consulation should occur minimum 30 days where possible.“Bill introduced Parliament Thursday May Senate Community Affairs Legislation Committees original closing date submissions Bill Friday may —a day window measured from the day after introduction.

The peak-bodysecured extension still falls ofdays short Commonwealths own published standard to critique, not a external it.Section14 separately addresses parallel choice government made characterise Bills economic impact analysis equivalent under sameGuide rather than Regulation Impact Statement; two sub-sections together establish Commonwealts own framework both consultation period andimpactanalysis discipline has been applied selectively tothis Bill. The scale measure makes truncated window harder justify easier.On assessment former Productivity Commission Chair set out above largest single program saving in historyCommonwealth Budgetmeasure magnitude reach warrants consultationperiod beyonddayminimumone

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment Bill Submission

Submission: [number]

that falls short of it. The Committee is entitled to ask why the Government has compressed scrutiny of its largest-ever budget measure below its own published standard.

The peak-body consensus on consultation inadequacy

On May 14th [year] (the same day this bill was introduced), Twelve Disability Representative Organisations issued an joint statement titled “Call for Genuine Senate Scrutiny As Concerns Grow Over Rushed NDIS Reforms.”

• People with Disability Australia(PWDA)
• Australian Federation Of Disability Organizations(AFDO)
• Australian Autism Alliance(CYDA)
• Children And Young People With Disabilities Australia(DANA)
• Inclusion Australia(Mental Health Australia)
• First Peoples Disability Network Australia(NEDA)
• Physical Disability Australia(PDA)
• Women With Disabilities Australia(WWWD)
• Down Syndrome Australia(The signatories were: The joint statement characterised proposed Senate inquiry timeframe as “extraordinarily short… approximately one month” that does not allow time written submissions, public hearings and meaningful engagement disability community.“ These organisations jointly called genuine Senate scrutiny robust timeframe. Signatory Commonwealth’s own Disability Representations Organisation funded through operational-integrity envelope in Budget Paper No2(line $8963,$15 million for Disability Representatives) specifically provide disability-community voices policy process. the Government funds to provide disability-community voices have publicly described Bill inadequate. The multi-party consensus extends beyond peak bodies Senator Jordon Steele John(Greens WA Greens’ disability spokesperson substitute member of Senate Community Affairs Legislation Committee for NDIS-specific bills), publicly described reform package extraordinarily alarming cruel Ms Melissa McIntosh MP (Coalition Lindsay shadow NDIS minister stated on record government once again neglected consult Australians directly affected legislation people with a disability are feeling ambushed by Government Two parties Parliament -the Greens Coalition-publicly describing consultation process inadequately That cross-partisan consensus procedural failing single party critique The inclusion among twelve DRO signatories is primary data point Aboriginal Torres Strait Islander representation gap Consultation Record Aboriginal And Torres Strait Islanders overrepresented low-income remote populations populations new s 25A(2) most disadvantages treating treatment access appropriate regardless financial or geographic circumstances DRO Joint Statement does address Aboriginal Torres Strait Islander community

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079

consultation; the Committee is entitled to ask the Department whether the consultation process for the Bill included specific targeted engagement with First Nations disability communities, and whether the Department has assessed the impact of the s.25A(2) income-and-geographic regressivity provisions against the National Agreement on Closing the Gap Priority Reform 3 (building First Nations-led services and governance). The “nothing about us without us” principle – embedded in the National Autism Strategy\r\n2025–31, intheDisabilityRoyalCommission’sFinalReport,andinthesocial-modeldisabilityframeworkNDISAct2013s.(a)commitstheseschemetogiveeffectto—providesthestandingbasisfortheconsultationadequacycritique.LegislationaffecteddisabledAustralian’srights,accessandsupportsshouldbedevelopedwithsubstantiaco-designengagementwithdisabledAustraliaandidtheirrepresentativeorganisations,notaone-monthconsultationwindowthattherepresentativenorganisationsthemselveshavejointlydescribedasinadequate.

The responsible Minister’s engagement postureTheframingtheCommitteeappliestotheGovernment’sengagementwithdisabled Australianson thereformpackageisrelevanttotoassessmentoftheconsultation-

audacityargument.TheOfficeoftheHonMarkButlerMP—theMinisterforHealthanda AgeingandMinistertor DisabilityandthenationalDisabilityInsuranceSchemeinitiallyoperatedanautoacknowledgementtemplatefornDIScorrespondencefromtheme communityredirectingparticipantsandontheirfamilystothenationalDisabilityInsur anceAgency and then NDIS Quality Safeguard Commission neither of which has any role in the design reform package.On 25 May 2026 Department Health Disabil ity Ageing issued signed substantive response to my April correspondence (reference MC-08601signedbyAssistantSecretaryThrivingKidsTaskforce).Theresponseitselfinformativeabouttheengage mentposture.Itwasroutednottotheminister,andnotinNDISreformaarea,buttotopicspecific subDepartmental task force. It acknowledged that “mild” severe autism terminology can misrepresent difficulties capabilities Autistic people, following paragraph operationalised equivalent low moderate support needs descriptor as Thriving Kids cohort definition And engaged cohort framing while not engaging Bill Schedule or operative provisions at all.Pattern is silence; it sub ministerial routing acknowledges cohort leaving legislation substance unanswered. I am constituent electorate Hasluck Western Australia submitted correspon denceto Minister’s office on through aphgovau contact form.Theresponsefive weeks later was Thri ving kids Taskforce letter described above – substanti eform but routed away from ND IS refor area silent bill provision.Iengagedwithoffice local Member Hon Tania Lawrence MP(LaborHas luck)onAprilChiefofStaffconfirmedthatqueriesfrommy briefing dispatched Minis ter’s office with a response expected approximately sixmonth timeline note this personal grievance data

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 2079

point on what the engagement pathway between affected community members and the responsible Minister looks like in practice, during the period when the Bill was being finalised and introduced.

A documented systemic-failure incident

I include this element of Section 15 with care, and I am guided by the framing adopted by the Australian Human Rights Commission and disability peak bodies when they addressed it publicly. On February 1st, 2026, police were called to residential address at Mott Close Mosman Park Perth ––in federal electorate Curtin approximately eleven kilometres from my home South Guildford person who provided care services family made call The family parents Maiwenna Goasdowe(49 Jarrod Clune(50 two teenage sons Leon Otis was found deceased Two boys Autistic their mother had public described them higher end autism spectrum they NDIS participants Family under coronial process suspected murder suicide do not make predictive claims relationship NDIS support decisions incident matter Coroner What is following Multiple friends support workers stated publicly that felt failed National Disability Insurance Scheme boys’ funding cut couple caring full-time limited support breaking point statements sourced multiple media outlets Disability Advocacy Resource Unit’s summary The Australian Human Rights Commissioner response incident Rosemary Kayess Disability Discrimination Commissioner We seeing reforms reduce supports harder access leaving families anxious frightened” Commissioner statement frames event isolated but pattern reform-related withdrawal Multiple disability commissioners peak bodies called inquest broader review for children high support needs Committee entitled consider documented statement Disability Discrimination Commissioner Australian Human Rights Commission assessing human-consequences dimension Bill provisions new s34 (G) J )provisions increase weight informal supports including carers reasonable-and-necessary assessment Concern Kayess already anxious and frightened current scheme directly relevant any legislative provision increases the weight placed those families’ caring capacity supports assessment reference because Australian Human Rights Commission has placed it evidence structural-harm pattern because Bill’s provisions move settings direction identified creating harm consequence plainly, because Commissioner framing

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079

The Committee invites no less: where safety-supports reduce or make them hard-to-reach, the predictable outcomes affecting certain families aren’t quantified. The Committee must assess legislation advancing harmful structures— including lives lost—that have been well-documented.

Section 16 - Recommendations to the Committee

The substantive case for each of these recommendations is in the numbered sections cross-referenced. The recommendations are grouped by Schedule, consistent with the submission’s four-part structure, and then by the cross-cutting Part D asks. They are numbered sequentially for ease of reference.

Part A – Recommendations on Schedule 1

Recommendation 1: The Committee recommends that Schedule 1 should not appear within this bill entirely, due primarily because:

• There exists no clinical evidence base supporting new provisions under ss(5)(a),sss.(b).
• No assessment instruments have been designed yet; work begins next year per Budget Paper No. Line 8919.
• Replacement support programs haven’t announced for age groups: from ages nine through fifteen years old up until adulthood.
• Eligibility criteria outlined here conflict across multiple legal frameworks including National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) Act 2013,Disability Discrimination Act 1992,Australia’s obligations towards UN Convention Rights Persons Disabilities,National Agreement Foundational Supports 2026-31 commitment Closing Gap. Omitting schedule one ensures alignment between integrity improvements intended via schedule two which includes funding below cost authorities s.s.25A(2)’s regressivity thinning provider markets scheduled to be repaired in sections ten eleven respectively.Omission is thus both right based upon its own evidentiary basis as well a necessary condition enabling schedule achieving its purpose.See Sections [3],[4], etc.,[7] and [11].

Recommendation 2: If Recommendation One isn’t adopted, The Committee recommends that commencement of Schedule Functional Capacity Assessment Regime currently set at January first twenty-eight annually according budget paper line eight thousand ninety-nine should become conditional on: a.) Technical Advisory Group publishing advice regarding assessment instruments; b.) Independent validation against impairment cohorts they will apply these assessments toward; c.) Bilateral implementation agreements signed published Commonwealth all states territories replacement support programs participants who don’t clear new access gate directed toward;and those replacements are operationally available geographic areas affected participants.(Sections five,eight).

*Recommendation Three: The committee recommend removal from the bill entirely of new ss. (a) – treatment deemed appropriate for permanence-and-treatment test regardless individual’s financial circumstances or location geography.The provision codifies income-geographic regressive inequity identified by Disability Royal Commission Volume six recommendation sixty-three-four peer-reviewed evidence Disney et al Medical Journal Australia, year two-thousand-fifty-five. it incompatible with Disabilty Discrimination Act nineteen-ninety-two section Six.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment

Submission 2079

prohibition on indirect discrimination, the CRPD Article 5 obligation to prohibit disability discrimination, and the National Agreement on Closing the Gap commitments on which the National Agreement on Foundational Supports 2026-31 is conditioned. Sections (3), (7), &(8).

Recommendation: The Committee recommends reversing wholesale removal s.31 Principles relating plans Schedule Part be restored fully NDIS Act These are statutory framework supported decision-making participants agency community inclusion plan process Their removal inconsistent with Articles independently confirmed Villamanta Disability Rights Legal Service’s analysis May as structural change architecture technical amendment Section .)

**Recommendation:***The Committee recommend new s.’B definition functional capacity excludes environmental personal circumstances assessment omitted Bill substantively amended before any functional capacity regime commences Definition incompatible social model of disability which NDS Act commits scheme give effect This in substance attempt redefine disability for scheme-access purposes against barriers-based definition established CRPD establishes reflects test function exclusion person’s environment circumstance medical model displace Framework adopted displaced Sections ,.)

**Recommendation:Committee recommend that amendment Objects clause at new s.(d) subordinates provision reasonable-and-necessary supports objective financial sustainability omit from Bill Amendment subordinates participant rights object fiscal management way parallel Commonwealth rights based statutory schemes consistent grounding CRDP obligations Financial Sustainability defined bill unsustainable growth addressed Government commissioned analyses found net economic benefit whole-of-scheme level Section .,).

**Recommendation*Committee recommend omission new s.*A participant-initiated reassessment provisions included Bill or substantially amend preserve participant agency over content Specifically requirement request demonstrate significant change support needs should not apply to updates following completed functional capacity threshold substantial reduction participant ability perform daily activities impairment categories including autism psychosocial intellectual episodic variable context-

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079 dependent need; and the extended 90-day decision window (from the current 21 days) should be reconsidered in light of the waiting-period vulnerability the submission documents at Section 2. (Section 5.)

Recommendation 8.The Committee recommend that the automatic plan renewalprovisionsatnewss.50Abe omitted fromtheBillor substantially amended.Automaticplanrenewalwithoutparticipantinput,

onewitha fresh statementofsupports,and withoutgeneratingareviewabledecision is structurally incompatiblewiththescheme’s participant-centred designandwithesthe s31 Principlesthewholesale removalatschedule \(Part\\ 6istransitionallyremoving.(Section %5.).

Part B — Recommendations on Schedule 2

Recommendation 9.TTheCommitteerecommendthatSchedule2bedeferred— not opposed—not until after the Joint Standing CommitteeeonthenNDIS IntegrityofofNational DisabilitysuranceSchemeinquiryreportsontThursday,July2026.Schedulesubject matteristhesubjectmatterthestJSC inquiryisinvestigating.ThesJC’sfindings andrecommeations shouldberealatedintotheScheduldesignbefore Schedulesreturns to Parliament.Deferring Schedule doesnotdissolveexisting integrity infrastructure: thenDIS Amendment(Integrity and Safeguarding) Act remains in force; approximately strong NDIAintegy workforceoperational;

t heFraud Fusion Taskforce’architecturecontinuestofunction. (Sections , .)

Recommendation The Committee recommend that when Schedule be re-broughttoParliamentfollowing JSC report itbe expanded toreincorporate elements of the RegistrationTaskforceFinalAdvice,the NDS ReviewRecommendation universal registration architecture,and launch-era expert lineage thin markets,

onworkforce capacityand market stewardshipidentified Productivity Commission’s reports -none which is current before the Committee. (Section )

Recommendation THeComiteerecommendschedulesubjectsubstantive community consultation under “nothing about us without” principles with aconsultation periodDisabilityRepresentativeOrganisationsJointStatement 14 May characterises as adequate,beforeit returned Parliam for consideration.(Sections,,.)

Part C — Recommendations on Schedule

Recommendation TTheCommitteerecommendthatSchedulePartMinisterial pricing decision-maker modelinnewssCadjacentprovisions— ommitted from Bill.Theconcentrationofpricing discretion Minister, exercisable through legislative instrumentswith disallowanceas sole accountability mechanismis not consistent independent-monitoring architecturetheProductivity Commissions207NDIS Costsreportcontemplated.Independentpriceoversightthe

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment Bill

Submission 2079

NDIS should be restored before any further legislative step on the pricing architecture. Committee note: Because NDIA-managed participants cannot lawfully pay a gap above cap, a price set below provider rate removes that support entirely — power is effectively an exclusion power for those participants due to indiscriminate under-pricing.(Section 12.)

Recommendation 13:

The Committee recommend Schedule Part omitted from bill as it authorises automation involving discretion, evaluative judgement & state-of-mind without external accountability safeguards; participant cohort substantially comprising Autistic Australians intellectually disabled Australians ⚨ psychosocial disability whose engagement in automated decision processes structurally affected by their disabilities.RoboNDIS reflects structural parallel found systemic harm Robodebt Royal Commision(Section).

Recommendation 14:The Committee recommend re-developing policy intent if Government wishes to reintroduce it with participant notification automatic review trigger independent oversight safeguard identified necessary through substantive community consultation “nothing about us” principles.(Section)

Cross-cutting recommendations

Recommendation 15:The Department of Health prepare full Regulation Impact Statement reform package instead two equivalent documents Explanatory Memorandum attaches include new holistic cost-benefit analysis modelling effect participation outcomes impairment cohorts access regime applies across adjacent public-service systems (health mental health education justice child protection Centrelink aged care) on families labour-market effects reduction job losses income-tax revenue increased income-support outlays compatibility National Autism Strategy Joint Australian State and Territory Response Disability Royal Commission National Agreement Closing the Gap Australia’s obligations United Nations Convention Rights Persons Disabilities Discrimination Act 1992. Section.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079

Recommendation 16.

The Committee recommends that the Minister’s claim made during his Second Reading Speech dated May 14th, 2026—that this bill “takes up recommendations…of the Royal Commission into Violence, Abuse, Neglect and Exploitation of People with Disability”—be substantiated against Section B Part C Plan Management and Support Coordination Commissioning Provisions in Schedule D, which cites four Disability Royal Commission Recommendations: Nos., 8/4; No.; No./No.; & No./No.) at section 5.4 informing these provisions but does NOT cite any recommendation regarding eligibility-tightening measures within Schedule A. Therefore: The Department must identify all further Royal Commission Recommendations operationalized under this Act alongwith their respective Schedules on public record; If no such mapping exists then correct the reference from the Second Reading Speech implying endorsement towards access tightening architecture in Schedule A to reflect parliamentary records accurately, Further require explanation as per public record why accepted Commonwealth endorsed Royal Commissions’ recommendations are not implemented or engaged by said Act, How Government intends satisfying those accepted recommendations, And how it has assessed its own targets set forth for National Autism Strategy (N.A.S) 2025-31 and Closing The Gap Agreement (Section).

Recommendation 17.

Committee recommends seeking terms-of-reference, membership composition evidence inputs projected timeline for Group’s advice on functional capacity assessment instruments from Technical Advisory Group—and assess whether group’s timelines aligns with January first year commencement date for new regime (Sections ,

Recommendation 18.

The Committee recommend assessing consultation period against standard identified by Joint Statement of May thirteenth Disability Representative Organizations dated May fourteenthth—whether one-month Senate inquiry window is proportionate fiscal magnitude package characterized CEO e61 Institute former Chair Productivity Commission largest single-program Budget save Australian fiscal history; And Aboriginal Torres Strait Islander disability community received specific targeted engagement development bill. Section .

Recommendation 19.The Committee recommend that Department provide implementation modeling underlying annual scheme growth target: assumptions behind this target operational mechanisms achieving savings participant plan level analysis why comparable budgetary measure Getting NDIS Back Track billion over years was not achieved projection quantified as $13./billion upward revision to NDIS costs five-year prior current Bill’s saving measures.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment Bill

Submission 2079

Budget’s fiscal strategy rests on a save; the Committee has an entitlement to understand implementation details.

Recommendation 20: Establishing Inspector General within NDIA oversight with public reporting obligations should implement Recommendation # from House Standing Committee report “No child left behind” dated December ’25 regarding Thriving Kids initiative recommendations five months ago for independent supervision architecture not yet legislated under this bill (Sections:8 &15).

Recommendation 21: If Thriving Kids commences October’26 as scheduled, comprehensive review at two years post-commencement must be conducted before commencement terms established per Inquiry recommendation ten implementing same framework without provided mechanism (Sections :4&3)

Recommendation 22: Department of Health, Disability Ageing substantiate mild-to-moderate diagnostic framing in reform targeting against DSM-5 and other relevant documents or withdraw it as basis for foundational supports program (Section:4&

Recommendation 23: Place findings of NDIS Quality Safeguards Commission audit on parliamentary record which found only partial effectiveness in existing regulatory functions. Assess whether current operational state can support expanded enforcement role outlined by Schedule Two based upon demonstrated capacity evidence.

Overarching Recommendation

Recommendation 24.

The Committee recommends that, as an overarching principle, the government must comply with one option: implementing all relevant evidence-based recommendations from key bodies such as:

• The Disability Royal Commission;
• The Independent NDIS Review; or providing detailed explanations in writing if they choose not to adopt any specific recommendation due diligence process. Policymakers who cite these sources’ findings but fail to follow their advice should justify this decision clearly before Parliament under scrutiny regarding their alignment towards national goals outlined within strategies like ‘National Autistic Strategy’ as well as broader commitments made through agreements such as “Closing the Gap.”

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2079

Conclusion - Disclosure

Conclusion

The bill before the Committee consists of three structurally distinct measures in a single document—an eligibility tightening package, an integrity improvement measure, and pricing-and-automation packages—each resting upon different evidentiary bases requiring separate scrutiny from the committee. My submission has treated them separately because their government case differs; clearer recommendations will result if following this separable structure as outlined within it itself does not mean independence but rather that schedule one actively works against improvements intended to come through schedules two’s sections ten eleven respectively while schedule Two carries its public argument despite being dominated financially by cost reduction under schedule One which was advised by taxpayer-funded message testing to lead fraud and integrity first building tolerance around access restrictions fiscal work done.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 2079

which should be integrated into the design of a fuller Schedule 2 that is then brought back to Parliament with substantive community consultation. Deferral preserves the integrity infrastructure that already exists while getting the design right. The 2025 Australian National Audit Office findings on the Quality and Safeguards Commission’s regulatory effectiveness should be before the Committee, and integrated on the same footing as the JSC’s findings, before any expanded enforcement role is conferred.

Schedule 3 should be omitted from the Bill. The Ministerial pricing-decision-maker model is less independent than the architecture the Productivity Commission contemplated. The automation of evaluative determinations, in the participant cohort this Bill applies to, only text content retained: ’without the external-accountability safeguards the Robodebt Royal Commission identifiedas necessary,’is a participant safety risk that the Bill’s internal-process safeguardsdonot adequately address.’The procedural record compounds the substantivcase.The Government commissionedits own integritiy inquiry; introduced legislation based ont hatinquiry’s ongoing evidencebasebeforethe inquiry reported; stucturedth eSenate’s reviewto conclude sixteen daysbe fore th einquity’ sfindings are due ;and gave t hecommunity — throught hedisabilit yRepresentativOrganisations,twelveof them,theorganisaionsgovernm ent funds specificallytoprovid edsibility-community voicesinthepolicyprocess—approximatelyone monthtor espondtol egislationthat teh61 Institute ,whoseCEOisanformerProductivityCommissionChair,c haracterisesasthe largestsingle-programBudget saveina ustalian fiscal historywithno historical precedent . I have writtenthis submissionasa directly affected person—an Autistic adult,a current NDISparticipant,theadentwoAutisticchildrenareadresstheHasluckelectoratei n WesternAustralia.T her gumentsint hespagesrest onthenGovernment’sownpublished Budgetpapers,onprimarylegisl ation and thenExplanatory Memorandum, oncredentialed expertanalysis ont peer-reviewedclinicalliterature,nonth Disability Royal Commission’s Final Report,andtontheparliamentaryrecord ofthes JCHearings.Where Ihaveasserted facts,Ihavcitedthemwhere Ihave madearguments,i haveshownt theevidence they reston.Ihavenotbeenmoderate wherebtheBillisim moderate.ihavenots othed case wherethecase isnotsoft. The scheme this Billproposes to reform isa statutoryscheme grounded in Australia’s CRPD obligations,enacted by Parliamentanddesignedto provide reasonablean d necessary supports top eople with disabilityacross th elifespan.My daughter’ s education depends ont it.M y working lifedepends onit.Ont he Government’s own modelling 24100 existing participants are projectedtolose accessby endof t hedecade , ancl close ton350 fewerAustralians will besupported once those denied entry ar ecoun ted.They d their families,a reinpositions comparable toours.The Committee’sscrutiny oft his Billistheir scrutiny .I am gratefulfor opportunitycontributeitto.

Disclosure — Use Of Accessibility Tools

This Submission Has Been Prepared With The Assistance Of Artificial Intelligence Tools Used As Cognitive Accessibility Infrastructure To Support My Participation In The Democratic Process.

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Section 18 - Annexes

Annex A – Key primary sources and references

The following are the primary sources cited in this submission. Full source records, including URL verification dates and cross-document citation tracking, are held by the author.

Primary legislation and Bills

• National Disability Insurance Scheme Act Cth, ss: 3 to 7B (proposed), etc., etc.;
• NDIS Amendment Bill, as introduced on May 16; Schedules I-III; The Explanatory Memorandum is available at: hubspot.com/ [Disability Discrimination Act] Cth, sss:[4],5,etc. Regulatory Powers (Standard Provisions) Act of Australia, 2014.

International instruments

United Nations Convention for Persons with Disabilities Articles 1–5, et al.

Budget papers

Commonwealth of Australia’s budget paper No.: 2 – Securing NDIS Future Generations measure lines 8919 through line 8963; Thriving Kids measure in line number nine two four four; Education Portfolio disability loadings schools measure inclusive communities fund measure lines eight thousand and ninety three seven. Available: https://budget.gov.au/content/bp2/index.htm The Commonwealth’s budget strategy outlook paper No one – Statement Three Box Three Two Three One spending revenue ratio $one hundred eighty-four point nine billion medium term NDIS reduction.

Government-commissioned reviews

Bonyhady B Paul L Working Together to Deliver the National Disability Insurance Scheme Independent Review of the NDIS December 2023 Commonwealth of Australia Available: https://www.ndisreview.gov.au/ndis-review-report.html

• Royal Commission into Violence Abuse Neglect Exploitation People With Disability Final Report September 2023 Volume Six Enabling Autonomy Access Recommendation Number six thirty four; The Commonwealth Of Australia National Autism Strategy 2025-2031 2025 available at: hubspot.com/ Productivity Commission Disability Care Support Report Number Fifty Four Year Twenty Eleven.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 2079

• Productivity Commission, NDIS Costs, Study Report, 2017.
• Productivity Commission, Foundational Supports — Working Paper, 2024.
• Taylor Fry Consulting Actuaries, Independent Evaluation of the NDIS — Final Report, commissioned for the Independent Review of the NDIS, 2023.
• NDIS Provider and Worker Registration Taskforce, Final Advice, 2024.
• People with Disability Australia (PWDA), Submission to the NDIS Evidence Advisory Committee Third Round Consultation, 26 March 2026.

Parliamentary record

• Minister for Disability and the NDIS (Hon Mark Butler MP), Second Reading Speech—National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026, Hansard, 14 May 2026.
• Minister for the NDIS (Hon Mark Butler MP), National Press Club Address, 22 April 2026.
• Joint Standing Committee on the NDIS, Integrity of the National Disability Insurance Scheme inquiry, Public Hearing Transcript, 1 May 2026, Canberra — testimony of Mr John Dardo (NDIA), Ms Natalie Wade (NDIS Quality and Safeguards Commission), Mr Iain Anderson (Commonwealth Ombudsman) and others.
• Senate Community Affairs Legislation Committee, Inquiry into the National Disablity Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 — referral 14 May 2026; reporting date 16 June 2026.https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Community_Affairs/NDISFutureGenBill
• Joint Standing Committee on the NDIS, Integrity of the National Disability Insurancce Scheme inquiry referral: redacted; reporting date: resources available at: https://www.aph.gov.au/

Agreements and national frameworks

• National Agreement on Foundational Supports 2026-31—signed by Commonwealth all eight States Territories January–February 2026. Availablehttps://federalfinancialrelations.gov.au/agreements/national-agreement-foundational-supports.
• National Agreement Closing Gap Priority Reforms 3 & 4.

Peer-reviewed research credentialed expert analysis

• Disney G et al., Socioeconomic disadvantage access to Australia’s National Disabiltiy Insurance Scheme A retrospective cohort study applications 705,594 NDIS 2016 – to 2022 Medical Journal Australia (MJA) 2025.
• Brennan M e61 Institute Hiding in plain sight big item that underpins Budget LinkedIn Pulse May 2026 https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/hidingplain-sight-big-item-underpins-budget-e61-institute-ltd-znjyc

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment Bill 2026

Submission 2079

• Australia Institute: Budget analysis – PRRT and gas revenue; media release dated: [May] 2026. Economist Matt Grudnoff is a Senior Economist at this institute;
• Per Capita False Economy: The economic benefits to the NDIS from government cost-cutting are detailed here: return approximately US$2 for every dollar spent; alternatively, a loss per each billion dollars underfunding would be around \US(billion) lost annually;
• Akyol P e61 Institute: More Quasi than Market: Price Caps & Design in the NDIS was presented on 25th of March year 2024 during an Economic Society seminar held within NSW;
• Grattan Institute, Better safer more sustainable: How To Reform NDIS housing support, published as part of their annual report (year unknown).

Legal service disability community analysis

• Villamanta Disability Rights Legal Service Community Forum Slides — Analysis of NDIS amendment bill 2026. Delivered by Elise Almond Kelly Wilkins Trinity Ford on May day two thousand twenty six;
• Australian Human Rights Commission Commissioner Rosemary Kayess Disability Discrimination Commissioner media release responding to Mosman Park incident February [two] zero [twenty-six]. The full text is available at this link:Mosman park incident response;
• Queensland Advocacy for Inclusion #TheDRCStillMatters implementation analysis, 20[26] – Across all recommendations made by Royal commission only three percent have been implemented and fifty-three per cent had no reported progress.

Peak-body statements

• The following organisations signed a joint statement calling genuine Senate scrutiny over rushed reforms: PWDA AFDO AUA CYDA DANA IAA MHA FP DNA NEA PDA WWDA DS Australia.

Departmental correspondence tabled modelling

• Department Health Ministerial Response MC26–08601 dated: [May] year 27th of the same year was signed off by an Assistant Secretary Thriving Kids Taskforce;
• Health & Ageing: NDIS reform model presented in senate on May day two thousand twenty six. Projected that 45% of participants will be exited from program by mid-year thirty one with $US billion cut to community participation funding as single largest saving measure (Guardian Australia report dated may eighth).