NDIA Accountability Project

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Addressing systemic issues impacting NDIS participant experience (Participant experience)

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Submission to the Senate Community Affairs Legislation Committee

Inquiry into the National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Introduction

I am writing this submission as an NDIS participant with lived experience of the Scheme and as a Masters in Public Health student. This submission addresses provisions of the National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 (the Bill), particularly those relating to eligibility, planning, sustainability, and the broader framing of disability support reform. While reform of the NDIS is necessary, the current reform proposal relies on too many assumptions that have not yet been adequately tested, validated, operationalised or independently evaluated. The Bill prioritises expenditure restraint and administrative control without sufficiently regarding population-level health data, implementing a co-design method to change, or model economic impact onto other systems, organisations, businesses or bodies of government. The current reform proposals plan is incomplete without further consideration and evidence given NDIA’s history of implementation difficulties(5). Rapid large-scale reforms create substantial risks if they are implemented before their consequences can be properly understood; therefore caution greater transparency stronger safeguards than what’s currently proposed should accompany these changes.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 2307

Background:

The NDIS gained bipartisan support because it was fundamentally grounded in these principles[8]. However, a constellation of factors such as rapid rollout before mature systems were ready,[9] inconsistent planning [and review], lack of evidence-based decisions.[4][10],[11] have contributed more significantly than original principles underpinning expenditure pressures. The original principles underlying this scheme haven’t proven responsible; rather, a combination including governance weaknesses, structural market problems, operational struggles, escalating costs participant frustration declining public confidence[6].[1] These issues warrant further investigation which include:

  • Rapid roll-out prior system maturity[6][8];
  • Inconsistent planning & review processes[1][9][11]; lack-of-evidence based-decision-making[8][11][13]; incomplete transparency accountability[1][9][11]; weak NDIA’s structure[1]; unhealthy working culture withinNDIA[8]; inadequate state disability infrastructure[1][2][7]; provider distortion and price gauging[8][9][14]; biased relentless media pressure[4]; poor procedural oversight due process[10][11]; quality improvement evaluation lacking[8][13]; administrative consistency poorly maintained[1][8][11][13]. The Bill does not yet sufficiently address many these causes. These reforms are needed but incomplete without data consultation co-design input instead proposed solutions assume implementation failures can be managed later through discretion after legislation passed rapid rollout inadequately administered systems risk contributing to cost escalation participant frustration It is more costly wrong than taking longer right.

Recommendation 2: Slow Implementation Strengthen it - do well

The reform proposals extensive highly technical exceed pages legislative explanatory material[5] Despite scale significant impact disabled Australians, the consultation timeframe extremely limited two weeks Australian Government’s Best Practice Consultation guidance recommends iterative consultative processes for social impacts.[15] The current process insufficient risks unintended consequences years reverse.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 2307

The history of the NDIS already demonstrates how quickly operational problems become deeply embedded once systems are rolled out nationally(1)(6)(8)(13). There is little evidence presented that these reforms have been sufficiently piloted, modelled or stress-tested before implementation.

For this reason, I strongly recommend staged implementation, independent evaluation and mandatory post-implementation review periods. Large-scale reform affecting hundreds of thousands of disabled Australians should proceed carefully, transparently with accurate data and meaningful co-design It should not be treated as a secondary exercise of administrative matters While these reforms are long overdue That is not an adequate justification to be reactive within policy reform Recommendation 3 Accurately describe and report on ‘integrity leakage’ The Bill is being introduced within a political media environment heavily focused fraud rorts sustainability concerns while integrity measures important repeated emphasis misuse risks creating misleading perception widespread abuse primary cause cost growth when it isn’t Current public discourse frequently conflates deliberate fraud administrativ error provider misconduct broader integrity leakage single narrative rorting creates stigma toward disabled people obscures structural drivers expenditure including market distortion NDIA pricing decisions governance failures inadequate state disability system I see new headline everyday in media making mockery ndis disabled people understand frustration This opportunity federal government put foot down agree way things played out way ndis designed implemented demonstrated far willing push envelope take piss out do believe calls for reform Government set terms But am convinced these reforms achieve The government should require annual public reporting clearly separates deliberate criminal fraud from provider non-compliance participant error admin mistakes broad integ leak estimates Without distinction debate risk becoming distorted policies responses become reactive rather evidence-based ## Functional capacity assessments need further testing validation sensitivity reliability

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment Submission

The proposed reforms rely heavily on concepts of functional impairment and functional capacity. However, functional capacity and observed performance or capabilities are not equivalent concepts. Many disabled people maintain employment, education or independent living through extraordinary personal effort and by masking the underlying severity and instability of their conditions. Many can be functionally capable with the right support. A participant may appear highly capable during periods of relative wellness while still experiencing profound impairment, episodic deterioration or periods of acute incapacity(11). as much as these reforms wish for operational efficiency and process disabled people through standardised measures population-health data indicates many disabled people comorbid social determinants health directly impact outcomes you cannot remove environment person circumstance from this reform if took into consideration rates prevalence other available it will become clear proposals cohesive feasible stand disease interconnected measured independently cutting supports category equally equitably some more important disability others Standardisation is incompatible way aspirated therefore must drawing board In research tools validated before accepted same should apply here recommend future assessment frameworks explicitly account fluctuating conditions psychosocial sustainability functioning over time cumulative exhaustion episodic deteriorate there safeguards preventing reliance standardized automated especially complex health good example myself considered highly intelligent presentable most would immediately identify me disabled after fifteen years therapy (not paid NDIS) medication management learning carefully structure my environment figured out how to function relatively well under everyday But fundamentally unstable ecosystem disrupted significantly stressed removal happened collapse experienced six months unable leave bed meaningful capacity anyone when like truly try best avoid Can perform short period sustain without proper support around work consistently supported properly contribute economically socially tax pays budget more but don’t have working reduced When first became an NDIs within year running non-profit company up staff members delivering crucial community based once access revoked organization closed those staff let go that receiving

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

Submission 2307

life-saving resources now abandoned - because my focus had to be exclusively reserved to my day-to-day survival. I became the community I was supposedly supporting.

I am concerned about the concept of functional impairment because in my case, I was subjected to this very threshold when my participation was revoked, and it was unnecessarily lengthy, hostile and difficult to navigate. After more than six months before the AAT, extensive historic clinical evidence, and substantial legal expenditure by the NDIA, I was ultimately recognised as functionally impaired. The amount spent attempting to remove my access was likely comparable to the value of my budget. It was a waste of public funds plain and square. Nobody won –the NDIA lost money; specialist hours that should have been focused on treating were focused on report writing: I lost productivity and advancement in my studies and career, and we have nothing to show from these efforts! As someone who’s forced through hoops just to demonstrate functional impairment can confidently say current tools are inadequate! This is type structural failure alluding throughout submission Systems become overly focused gatekeeping cost containment begin generating expensive harmful counterproductive administrative behaviour They also widen equity gaps rather shrinking them(11).

Recommendation 5 Do not shuffle disability into infrastructure does yet exist

A major concern with Bill assumption participants excluded redirected NDIS adequately supported mainstream state-based systems historically State disability fragmented insufficient prior NDIS Despite many alternative underdeveloped inconsistent across jurisdictions States territories had decades improve disability infrastructure remain significant gaps farfetched expect states now properly fit purpose since inception NDIS Bill contains no enforceable mechanism requiring foundational supports or mainstream operational before removal redirection denied access especially true children moving Thriving Kids program creates risk disabled people will fall between system Restricting without simultaneously establishing robust community based supports risks shifting costs primary health networks secondary tertiary including hospitals emergency departments mental homelessness services informal carers crisis These more costly operate upstream funding like the NDIS. Understand reforms intend transfer those psychosocial disabilities more state-based systems there legislative mandate compelling

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 2307

states or territories to offer this service before participants are reprocessed - nor any guarantee that these services will be sufficiently piloted.

The Explanatory Memorandum does not adequately model these downstream impacts despite the availability of population-level health and economic data that could assist in doing so(5). I recommend this additional data be consulted and included with any reforms that depend on redirecting demand to alternative infrastructure and that there be guarantees that supports will not be removed without being replaced with existing systems (not hypothetical).

Recommendation 6: Address market distortion, pricing failures and strengthen provider/participant safeguards

Current reform discussions focus heavily on participant eligibility and expenditure growth while giving insufficient attention to structural market distortion within the disability support sector itself or occupational health and safety. NDIS pricing frameworks and funding settings have significantly shaped provider behaviour, workforce allocation and nmarket inflation. Participants did not independently create many of the inflatedpricing conditions currently criticisedwithin public debate.Theseconditions emerged within marketsettingsdesignedapprovedregulatedbythe NDIAitself.Thereareprovidersexperiencinggenerationallevelwealthbecauseofthen DISI don’t believethatwas ever intentionbut none addressedinExplanatoryMemorandum(5)To me it reads though has been successful lobbying by some largerdisabilityproviderbusiness whohave a vested financial interest consolidatinglocking downthedisabilitymarketThat way they monopoloy only balance/contested other large pre-existing businesses Ifthis casewhile sure argument here better formquality than unregistered providers implore government not reassurance face value legislate quality if plans close market Without addressingstructuralpricings and market incentives reforms risk disproportionately targetingparticipant access leaving broader expenditure driversinsufficiently examined Thegovernment should undertake independent review NDIS pricing structures(provider market concentration contribution ndia pricing decisionsto expendituregrowth Safety another issuenotaddressed in thesereforms Those taking piss come at from both sidesIf look individual cases there numerous storiessupport workers plan managers companies ripping off disabled throughNDS But reverse this can true too There reportsdisabled people sexually harassing disrespecting supportworkers This demonstrates inherent disregard foranother’s dignity common humanaffliction found any context Disability sector needs safeguards just likeanyother industry protectboth provider participantsfromthesebroader issues seeping

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 2307

But these reforms don’t do that, despite claiming that extra regulatory powers are in the name of quality control. All of this has been enabled by legislation that has been inadequate and may very well continue to be if it isn’t addressed head on(13). There is an opportunity, through these reforms, to address these quality safeguards by mandating provider and participant training.* Given* The NDIA’s legislative obligation,* I was surprised and deeply concerned that the extrapowersproposedfortheNDIArepowersonotgrantedtothemupontheaditionofthenNDIS.

Recommendation 7: Strengthen safeguards around Ministerial powers and automation The expansion of Ministerial rule-making and instrument powers within the Bill raises significant concerns regarding transparency*, accountability , procedural fairness. In particular**, proposed section** section* would permit substantial alteration of support categories and funding arrangements through legislativinstrumentwithlimitedparliamentaryscrutinyandleimitedparticipantrecourse*(5)* .TheBillshouldrequirepublicationofevidence relied upon when supportcategoriesare changed,** alongside disability impact statements and independent review mechanisms where changes materially affect participants.

*I am also concernedbythearisinguseautomationalgorithmic decisionmakingwithin thenDISAdministrativeefficiencyisimportantbutAustraliahasalreadyseenconsequences poorly governed automated systems throught Robodebt.ThelessonfromRobodebts notthatautomationshouldneveroccur butthautomationwithouttransparency ,accountability and human oversight can produce catastrophic outcomes.I don’t see any deliberate attempt withinthesereformstointegratetheselessons.

Recommendation8Introduce stronger suicide-riskand continuity-of-care protections* ThesBilldoesnotadequatelyaddressparticipantsatheightenedriskofsuicide, self-harmor severe psychosocial deterioration during reassessment, transition orsupportdisruption.* For high-riskparticipantrapidfundingchangesorpoorlycoordinated transitionscancreateserious safeguarding risks.Continuitycare should nottreatedasoptionaladministrive best practice.It should be legislated .* Provider-to-provider handover obligations*, hospital discharge coordination ,continuity safeguardsduring disputesorreassessmentshoulldallbe mandatory*, particularly for higher risk**

participants*

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment Bill 2026

Submission 2307

Without these protections, many of the broader integrity and safeguarding reforms risk becoming performative rather than protective.

Recommendation 9: Measure the NDIS economic value-not just its expenditure

Debate surrounding the NDIS often focuses narrowly on expenditure without adequately considering broader social and economic returns. I see this reflected in the Explanatory Memorandum. The research demonstrates that the NDIS contributes substantial value to the Australian economy through workforce participation, employment generation and reduced reliance on crisis systems(1)(14). Existing evidence suggests every dollar invested in the NDIS generates broader economic return through increased participation and reduced long-term service demand(14). This does not mean the Scheme should be exempt from reform. However, sustainability should not be assessed solely through short-term cost containment. Poorly designed reductions may produce downstream costs elsewhere in the health and welfare system while simultaneously diminishing participation, stability and quality of life for disabled Australians. There’s no modelling offered in the Explanatory Memorandum despite data being available; The economic impact these proposals will have on other systems of support and public health should be measured before legislation is passed.

Recommendation 10: Commit funds to improving governance structure and workplace culture within the NDIA

This one comes from personal experience—Nobody else can share my story so it might as well otherwise what insight would Parliament gain about how the NDIA treats participants? I cannot comment why cultural problems arose but sharing a case illuminates issues warranting further investigation into general cultural climate review. I want preface by saying outside two-year instance where they revoked access to me, interactions with them were positive & helpful—not criticizing everyday staff—but this highlights governance at executive levels needs improvement.

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment Bill

Submission 2307

When my access was revoked within just over four weeks’ notice after submitting more than two hundred pages documenting why I met NDIS criteria as requested, there seemed something wrong. But nobody wanted explanations about what or how this occurred until I submitted Freedom Of Information requests which revealed some concerning aspects behind-the-scenes in decision-making processes:

  1. The CEO (Rebecca Falkingham) explicitly singled out someone like myself from being removed without credible intelligence backing her decision nor legal justification; emails show she asked deputies to remove me quickly despite concerns regarding due process & procedural fairness;
  2. None challenged her orders even though they were public servants bound under statutory obligations - a culture problem where either fear of challenging authority or active participation in power abuse could have been misfeasance;
  3. Two delegates combed through invoices looking for false claims but found ‘coffee and chat’, mocking social needs impaired because non-verbal; such people shouldn’t decide disabled supports;
  4. One delegate who had to revoke my access didn’t read evidence provided instead told it came ‘from above’ so ignored their superior’s concern that some warranted attention – an entrenched top-down issue affecting all levels down the hierarchy at NDIA.

Summary of Recommendations

  • Conduct a comprehensive and transparent review of all factors contributing to NDIS expenditure growth, including governance failures, market distortion, pricing structures, implementation challenges and administrative inefficiencies, before further narrowing participant access.
  • Slow implementation of the proposed reforms and adopt a genuine co-design approach with disabled people, providers, researchers and other stakeholders. Require staged implementation, independent evaluation and post-implementation review before national rollout.
  • Require annual public reporting that clearly distinguishes deliberate fraud, provider misconduct, participant error, administrative error and broader integrity leakage so that policy responses remain evidence-based and proportionate.
  • Require functional capacity assessment tools to undergo further testing, validation and review before implementation. Assessment frameworks should explicitly account for fluctuating impairment, psychosocial disability, episodic deterioration, sustainability of functioning over time and cumulative exhaustion. Safeguards should prevent sole reliance on standardised or automated assessment tools.
  • Delay participant transition, offboarding or eligibility tightening until foundational supports and alternative systems are independently verified as operational, adequately funded and capable of meeting demand. Participants should not lose support before replacement systems exist.
  • Require publication of independent cross-system economic modelling assessing the impact of proposed reforms on healthcare, mental health, homelessness, crisis services, carers and other downstream systems before major eligibility restrictions occur.
  • Undertake an independent review of NDIS pricing structures, provider market concentration and the contribution of NDIA pricing decisions to expenditure growth and market inflation.
  • Review the NDIA’s governance structure, decision-making processes and organisational culture, including whether current systems support transparency, accountability, procedural fairness and evidence-based decision-making.
  • Require mandatory disability impact statements, publication of supporting evidence and independent review safeguards for Ministerial rule-making powers, including those proposed under section 34A.
  • Insert statutory safeguards preventing fully automated adverse eligibility decisions, automated budget reductions or other significant participant decisions without meaningful human review.
  • Establish legislated continuity-of-care obligations, including provider-to-provider handover requirements, hospital discharge coordination and support continuity during reassessment, disputes and transition periods.
  • Introduce mandatory clinical risk reviews and additional safeguards before substantial support reductions for participants at risk of suicide, self-harm or severe psychosocial deterioration.

Conclusion

I want to reiterate how unacceptable it is that the timeframe given for this consultation is what it is. I am deeply grateful for the NDIS and know it has changed my life for the better (then for worse, buthat’sa separate matter).

References

National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 2307

References

Acknowledgement_of_AI

ChatGPT was used to help structure this submission and clarify my writing.