SUPPLEMENTARY SUBMISSION
Disabled People Against Cuts Australia
supplementary submission
Senate Community Affairs Legislation Committee inquiry into the NDIS
Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026
10 July 2026
Contents
- Executive summary and DPAC’s position ……………………………………………………………………………. 3
- About the current government framing of the Bill ………………………………………………………………… 4
- Automated decision-making and RoboNDIS ………………………………………………………………………… 5
- The claim that nobody will die is not supported by the evidence …………………………………………… 6
- Sequencing makes the Bill unsafe ………………………………………………………………………………………. 7
- Clause-by-clause findings ………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 8
- Submissions to the Inquiry …………………………………………………………………………………………………. 9
- The copayment argument …………………………………………………………………………………………………. 10
- Original legal and practical pitfalls that require Committee attention …………………………………… 11
- Response to the interim report and dissenting reports ……………………………………………………… 12
- Recommendations …………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 13
- Conclusion …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 14
- References …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 16 Appendix A. Clause-by-clause analysis of tracked changes …………………………………………………… 17
Appendix B. How an impact analysis for this Bill should have been written …………………………….. 19
Appendix C. Co-payment Mechanism ……………………………………………………………………………………. 26
Appendix D. How to Write An Impact Analysis Correctly …………………………….. separate attachment
- Executive summary and DPAC’s position
Disabled People Against Cuts Australia opposes the National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment
(Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 and recommends that it be withdrawn (APH Bill page). The Bill is not a narrow anti-fraud Bill. It changes eligibility, supports, planning, reassessment, claims, pricing, provider regulation, information powers and automated decision-making (Health changes page; NDIS Act 2013; the Bill).
DPAC’s position is that the Bill should not pass in its present form, should not pass with only explanatory amendments, and should not pass on the promise that later rules, a roadmap or an Explanatory Memorandum (EM) will protect people (Joint DRO statement). The legal protections must be in the Act before Parliament votes, because the EM is not binding law and a roadmap is not an enforceable safeguard (Joint DRO statement).
The evidence supports a clear conclusion: if supports are reduced, capped, delayed or removed before safe, funded and enforceable alternatives exist, some disabled people face a foreseeable risk of neglect, hospitalisation, institutionalisation, serious injury and death (SWAN submission; DPAC forum report; NDIS Annual Financial Sustainability Report 2024-25, actuarial peer review). This is a neutral evidence-based risk statement. It does not require proof that every death would be caused by this Bill. It requires Parliament to recognise that support withdrawal in a high-support population has real life-and-death consequences (NDIS Annual Financial Sustainability Report 2024-25, actuarial peer review).
DPAC asks the Committee to recommend withdrawal of the Bill. If the Parliament wants to progress integrity measures, those measures should be split into a separate narrow Bill with full safeguards, proper disability consultation, no automated decision-making, no support caps below assessed need and no eligibility removals before replacement supports are built, funded, operational, accessible, appealable and independently evaluated (Robodebt Royal Commission report; Joint DRO statement).
- About the Current Government Framing of the
Bill
The Department has consistently described the Bill as a mechanism for clarifying eligibility and supports, addressing fraud and updating governance and administration (Health Bill page). That framing is incomplete because the operative provisions also authorise support determinations, caps, new eligibility gates, reassessment changes, claims restrictions, information powers, pricing instruments, provider controls and automated decision-making (the Bill; Health changes page).
The Office of Impact Analysis record says the impact analysis was assessed as adequate, but the OIA page also records post-assessment corrections to Department material (OIA assessment). A second-lowest adequate rating is not a finding that disabled people are safe, that rights are protected, or that all material provisions were assessed (OIA assessment). DPAC has written a document (sent to government and the OIA called ‘How to Write An Impact Analysis’, which is attached as an appendix and identifies unassessed and under-assessed provisions across debts, automation, review rights, mortality, privacy and delegated powers. Of great concern is the fact that significant changes were made to the Impact Analysis after the assessment was carried out (to percentages and fraud values). In addition, there were serious exclusions to the document which includes the above. If these exclusions, mistakes and risks have not been considered by government, the ‘reforms’ outlined in the Bill have been set up to fail before the rollout commences.
The Health page’s own timetable shows the sequencing problem. It says support budget resets start from 1 October 2026, the claims period changes from 1 December 2026, new framework planning starts from 1 April 2027 and eligibility reassessments begin from 1 January 2028 (Health changes page). It also says consultation in the second half of 2026 will occur on key design matters including new planning, functional capacity eligibility, SIL home and living commissioning, support connection, pricing and market reforms (Health changes page). This means Parliament is being asked to pass legal powers before core replacement systems and safeguards are complete (Health changes page).
The NDIS Summary of Statistics for May 2026 reports 779,210 participants and 50.87 billion dollars in paid supports over the previous 12 months (NDIS Summary of Statistics). Those figures do not prove support cuts are safe. They are aggregate scheme statistics and do not show which people lose essential supports, which markets collapse, which participants cannot navigate reassessment, or which deaths, hospitalisations or institutional placements may result (NDIS Summary of Statistics; NDIS Annual Financial Sustainability Report 2024-25, actuarial peer review).
- Automated decision-making and RoboNDIS DPAC’s position is that no automated decision-making should be authorised for access, eligibility, planning, claims, payments, debts, suspensions, reassessments, provider compliance or any other function that can affect a disabled person’s support, safety or legal rights (Marie Johnson, RoboNDIS). The Bill’s automation provisions sit in a system where errors can mean a person loses workers, transport, therapy, communication support, housing-related support or the ability to leave home (SWAN submission).
The Robodebt Royal Commission recommended that any Commonwealth ADM framework include a clear path to review, plain-language publication that ADM is used, publication of business rules and algorithms for independent expert scrutiny, and a monitoring or audit body with power to examine technical aspects and impacts including fairness, bias and client usability (Robodebt Royal Commission report). The Bill should not authorise expanded ADM before those recommendations are fully implemented for the NDIS context (Robodebt Royal Commission report).
The GDPR provides a stronger comparative safeguard. Article 22 gives a person a right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing where that decision produces legal effects or similarly significant effects, subject to limited exceptions and safeguards including human intervention, the right to express a view and the right to contest the decision (GDPR Article 22). Recital 71 adds safeguards including specific information, human intervention, explanation, challenge rights and measures to prevent discriminatory effects, including on disability-related health and personal data contexts (GDPR Article 22).
Australia should not build RoboNDIS below the GDPR standard and below the lessons of Robodebt. A statement of procedure published shortly before tabling is not enough. A later review right is not enough. A human who can correct an automated decision after support is stopped is not enough. For disabled people, a wrong decision can cause harm before any review is heard (Marie Johnson, RoboNDIS; Robodebt Royal Commission report).
- The claim that nobody will die is not supported by the evidence
No evidence base supports a categorical claim that no disabled person will die because of this plan. The scheme’s own actuarial reporting confirms that death rates for participants in Supported Independent Living ran above the model’s assumptions for years and had to be revised upward, with deaths for participants with higher support needs described as considerably higher than expected, a feature observed for several years (NDIS Annual Financial Sustainability Report 2024-25, actuarial peer review). This means the scheme’s sustainability projections rested on mortality assumptions that real experience had already exceeded, and the actuary increased the mortality assumptions for higher-support-needs participants as a result (NDIS Annual Financial Sustainability Report 2024-25, actuarial peer review). This does not prove every death was preventable. It proves that mortality among high-support participants is a material, model-relevant fact, and that those dying are disproportionately the highest-support cohort this Bill targets for cuts (NDIS Annual Financial Sustainability Report 2024-25, actuarial peer review).
DPAC’s forum evidence records disabled people’s concern that the Bill creates risks of reinstitutionalisation, injury and death for people who rely on intensive supports (DPAC forum report). SWAN’s submission records concern that reassessment restrictions, funding cuts and communication failures can create risks of neglect, abuse, hospitalisation and death (SWAN submission). Villamanta’s legal evidence on related NDIS integrity amendments warns that withdrawal or abrupt support loss can have dire consequences for vulnerable people, especially people with intellectual disability and those already exposed to high mortality risks (Villamanta submission).
The evidence supports a serious foreseeable risk of preventable harm and death if supports are reduced, capped, delayed or removed before safe alternatives exist. The Committee cannot treat that risk as zero (NDIS Annual Financial Sustainability Report 2024-25, actuarial peer review; Joint DRO statement).
- Sequencing makes the Bill unsafe The Bill’s sequencing is one of the central safety problems. The Government’s public timetable starts reductions and administrative restrictions in 2026, begins new planning in 2027, begins eligibility reassessments in 2028 and runs transition through 2030 (Health changes page). Foundational supports, Thriving Kids, functional capacity tools, home and living commissioning, support connection and market reforms are still being designed or consulted on (Health changes page).
The joint disability representative organisation statement says changes should not proceed before foundational supports are co-designed, tested, funded and operational (Joint DRO statement). The same statement makes the key legal point: an Explanatory Memorandum is not legislation and a roadmap is not an enforceable safeguard (Joint DRO statement).
The Bill therefore creates a cut-first, build-later pathway. That pathway is dangerous because people lose real supports immediately, while the promised alternatives remain uncertain, unfunded in practice, non reviewable, or unavailable in thin markets (Health changes page; DPAC forum report).
- Clause-by-clause findings The separate clause-by-clause appendix reads the Bill against the current Act and addresses each substantive change group (NDIS Act 2013; the Bill). It groups the tracked insertions and deletions into legal mechanisms and explains what each enables in practice. The table covers financial sustainability, functional capacity, all appropriate treatment, alternative supports, supports tied to eligible impairment, evidence tests, parental responsibility, support determinations, caps, reassessment, automatic renewal, non-contact suspension, claims limits, records and debts, information powers, provider regulation, pricing, plan management, support coordination, ADM, transitional powers and OIA failures (DPAC clause-by-clause appendix, attached).
The main conclusion is that the Bill shifts power away from individualised, reviewable support decisions and towards Ministerial instruments, rules, assessment tools, pricing determinations, standardised caps, automated decisions and Agency discretion (the Bill; Justice and Equity Centre explainer). That shift is the real legal effect of the Bill.
- Submissions to the Inquiry DPAC’s analysis of the organisational submissions found that an overwhelming majority opposed or heavily qualified the Bill, with unqualified support confined to its own authors, the Department of Health, Disability and Ageing together with the NDIA (DPAC analysis, attached as an appendix). On DPAC’s analysis, no independent disability representative organisation, allied health body, union or expert supported the Bill as drafted (DPAC analysis, attached as an appendix).
The Senate inquiry received a very large public response in a short time, with ABC reporting more than 4,000 written submissions by 10 June 2026 (ABC report on inquiry submissions). That public response is consistent with the disability sector evidence that the Bill lacks community consent (SWAN submission; PWDA submission).
- The copayment argument Although co-payments are explicitly mentioned in the text of the Explanatory Memorandum as not being permitted, the Bill itself creates a functional gap-payment or forced under-service structure. This occurs where a person is assessed as needing a support but a cap, support determination, price rule or finite budget leaves less funding than the actual cost of the support (Appendix C: Copayment Mechanism).
The Health page says participants are not expected to pay a gap fee (Health changes page). That statement does not answer the practical problem. If the law funds less than the support costs, the person must go without support, reduce the amount or quality of support, rely on unpaid labour, use another unsafe system, or pay privately if they can (Appendix C: Copayment Mechanism). For self-managed participants in thin or specialised markets, the problem is sharper because paying above a pricing benchmark can mean buying fewer supports from the same capped budget (Appendix C: Copayment Mechanism).
Caps have been already introduced on equipment, according to equipment providers. Others report widespread refusals of provision of equipment and cuts to necessary support, even though the Bill has not yet passed. Some people with disability with higher support needs are reporting cuts of up to $200,000 per person/family. The June Quarterly report reinforces this anecdotal evidence.
- Original legal and practical pitfalls that require Committee attention
First, support determinations can create a gap between what a person needs and what the plan will actually fund. This can happen even without a formal co-payment rule because a cap below actual cost produces forced under-service (Health changes page; Appendix C: Copayment Mechanism).
Second, automatic renewal can make a changed legal position look like continuity. A person may have the same apparent plan while new caps, support determinations or reassessment barriers change what the plan is worth in practice (the Bill).
Third, the 90-day claims rule and record-keeping debt machinery can create Robodebt-like pressure if the system treats missing paperwork as a debt pathway without proving fraud or real overpayment (Villamanta submission; Robodebt Royal Commission report).
Fourth, an alternative support rule can exclude a person because a different system is theoretically responsible, even when that system is not available, safe, accessible or enforceable for that person (Justice and Equity Centre explainer; Joint DRO statement).
Fifth, evidence hierarchy provisions can discriminate against cohorts whose supports have not been well researched, including rare disability, psychosocial disability, complex disability, culturally specific supports and First Nations contexts (SWAN submission).
Sixth, a standardised functional capacity gate can produce false precision. A tool can look objective while missing fluctuating, relational, environmental and trauma-related support needs (Justice and Equity Centre explainer; DPAC forum report).
Seventh, provider regulation and pricing can reduce real choice if they shrink thin markets or exclude the small, local or trusted providers disabled people actually use (Health changes page).
Eighth, the Bill moves too much power into later instruments. Parliament cannot assess safety when the rules, tools, SOPIs and operational policies that will decide real outcomes are not public in final form (Health changes page; Robodebt Royal Commission report).
- Response to the interim report and dissenting reports
Public disability organisation summaries report that the Committee’s interim majority recommended the Bill proceed with clarification, a roadmap and related changes (Inclusion Australia Easy Read summary; WWDA extension report). DPAC’s response is that clarification cannot cure unsafe operative powers. If a safeguard is important, it must be in the Act, not in a later explanation (Joint DRO statement).
The Greens publicly stated that they would oppose the Bill and had secured more time for the inquiry, as well as proposed failsafe amendments on Ministerial powers, transparency around automated decision-making and protection from harmful restrictive practices (Greens media release). Public summaries of the Greens dissent say it called for withdrawal of the Bill, no removals before foundational supports are fully implemented and evaluated, stronger safeguards on automation, removal of broad Ministerial powers and protection against unwanted or inaccessible treatment pathways (AbilityNews summary; Powerd Media summary). We agree with this stance, with codicils around automation and other key issues outlined within this submission.
Public summaries of Senator David Pocock’s dissent identify sequencing, Robodebt-style automation safeguards and gendered impacts as central concerns (AbilityNews summary; Powerd Media summary). DPAC agrees with those concerns and adds that the correct remedy is withdrawal, not passage with clarification.
-
Recommendations
-
The Committee should recommend that the Bill be withdrawn (Joint DRO statement).
-
Any genuine fraud or integrity measures should be separated into a narrow Bill with full safeguards, disability consultation, accessible administration and no support-cutting powers (Villamanta submission).
-
The Bill should contain no automated decision-making authorisation for NDIS access, planning, payments, claims, debts, suspensions, reassessments or provider action (Marie Johnson, RoboNDIS; Robodebt Royal Commission report).
-
If Parliament ever considers ADM, it must first implement Robodebt Royal Commission recommendations 17.1 and 17.2, meet or exceed GDPR Article 22 safeguards, publish business rules and algorithms for independent expert and public scrutiny, and provide a right to human decision before harm occurs (Robodebt Royal Commission report; GDPR Article 22).
-
No person should be reassessed, exited, capped or cut until foundational supports, Thriving Kids and mainstream alternatives are built, funded, operational, accessible, culturally safe, appealable and independently evaluated (Health changes page; Joint DRO statement).
-
The Bill should remove support determinations, caps below assessed need, and any mechanism that lets a person be found to need a support but not receive enough funding to buy it (Justice and Equity Centre explainer; Appendix C: Copayment Mechanism).
-
The Bill should remove the all appropriate treatment gate or replace it with a rights-based provision that respects bodily autonomy, actual access, side effects, contraindications, trauma and personal circumstances (Justice and Equity Centre explainer).
-
The Bill should remove alternative support exclusions unless the alternative support is actually available, safe, accessible, funded, enforceable, culturally safe and reviewable for the individual person (Joint DRO statement).
-
The Bill should keep whole-person planning and should not limit supports to the impairment that qualified a person for access (Justice and Equity Centre explainer).
-
The Bill should remove or radically limit non-contact suspension, information demand and record-debt powers unless there are enforceable accessible communication, advocacy, safety and waiver safeguards (SWAN submission; Villamanta submission).
-
The 90-day claims limit should not proceed unless there is a broad, reviewable and accessible discretion to pay late claims where disability, crisis, provider failure, family violence, hospitalisation, homelessness, nominee failure or Agency error contributed to delay (Villamanta submission).
-
Support coordination and plan management should not be removed from individual choice before any replacement model is co-designed, funded, tested and independently evaluated (Health changes page; AbilityNews summary).
-
A corrected impact analysis should be published and independently reviewed before any vote, including mortality, serious harm, distributional, market, automation, privacy, debt, unpaid care and review-rights impacts (OIA assessment; NDIS Annual Financial Sustainability Report 2024-25, actuarial peer review).
-
Parliament should require public release of all draft rules, assessment tools, pricing instruments, support determinations, SOPIs, modelling, assumptions and cohort impact tables before further debate (Health changes page; Robodebt Royal Commission report).
-
An independent monitoring body should report publicly on exits, deaths, hospitalisations, homelessness, violence risk, support reductions, appeals, automation errors, provider market loss and unmet need throughout any reform process (NDIS Annual Financial Sustainability Report 2024-25, actuarial peer review; Robodebt Royal Commission report).
- Conclusion The Bill should not pass. The evidence base does not support passage as drafted, and it does not support passage with only clarifications, a roadmap or later rule-making. The operative legal effect is a transfer of power away from disabled people and individualised review, and towards Ministerial instruments, Agency discretion, standardised gates, caps, pricing controls and automated systems (the Bill; NDIS Act 2013; Justice and Equity Centre explainer).
DPAC’s final position is simple and evidence-based: no cuts before safe supports exist, no exits before alternatives exist, no caps below assessed need, no forced-treatment gate, no RoboNDIS, no hidden debt machinery, no roadmap as a substitute for law, and no Bill until disabled people have had real co-design power over the whole system (Joint DRO statement; DPAC forum report).
A suitable alternative pathway forward would be to review the recommendations of the Review with people with disability and our families, reassemble the Disability Royal Commission Task Force and roll out both sets of reviewed recommendations with transparency, accountability and true co-design. The community understands that savings must be found for government to deliver a surplus; however, the lives of disabled people will not be an acceptable trade-off in the eyes of the public in place of savings found around AUKUS submarines, Defence investments, gas or taxes for billionaires.
The NDIS was meant to be like Medicare – a plan that this country got right. Where everyone paid a little bit to make sure that if they became disabled, or had an accident or a disabled child, they would be protected from the cost of disability. Labor’s landmark reform, the promise that disability would no longer mean poverty, isolation, segregation or the institution; that a person’s worth would not be rationed to fit a budget line. That promise is now being silently rewritten in the language of sustainability, where “sustainable” means fewer of us, supported less, reviewed harder, and trusted least of all. A scheme built to let disabled people get what we need to be who we are, to have the same rights, responsibilities and opportunities as other Australians has been redrafted to return us to the pre-1980s conditions we fought to leave behind.
Labor can still choose which reform it wants to be remembered for: the one that lifted 700,000 Australians into a life, or the one that decided our lives were the saving. Withdraw the Bill, keep the promise, and find the money where it was always going to have to come from.
- Prepared by Samantha Connor AM for Disabled People Against Cuts
-
References All external sources cited in this submission are listed below with full URLs. DPAC’s own analysis documents (the submissions analysis, the OIA analysis and the clause-by-clause reading) are provided as attached appendices to this submission.
-
Parliament of Australia, National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026, Bill page (Bill ID r7487): https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=r7487
-
Federal Register of Legislation, National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (latest in-force version): https://www.legislation.gov.au/C2013A00020/latest
-
Department of Health, Disability and Ageing, NDIS Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026: https://www.health.gov.au/our-work/ndis-legislation-changes/amendments/ndis amendment-securing-the-ndis-for-future-generations-bill-2026
-
Department of Health, Disability and Ageing, About the changes to the NDIS: https://www.health.gov.au/our-work/ndis-legislation-changes/amendments/ndis-amendment-securing-the ndis-for-future-generations-bill-2026/about-the-changes-to-the-ndis
-
NDIS, Annual Financial Sustainability Report 2024-25 (including the independent actuary peer review): https://www.ndis.gov.au/media/8187/download?attachment
-
NDIS Data and Insights, Summary of Statistics, reporting month May 2026: https://dataresearch.ndis.gov.au/media/4540/download?attachment
-
Office of Impact Analysis, National Disability Insurance Scheme Reforms: https://oia.pmc.gov.au/published- impact-analyses-and-reports/national-disability-insurance-scheme-reforms
-
Royal Commission into the Robodebt Scheme, Report of the Royal Commission into the Robodebt Scheme: https://robodebt.royalcommission.gov.au/system/files/2023-09/rrc-accessible-full-report.PDF
-
EUR-Lex, Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (General Data Protection Regulation), Article 22: https://eur- lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj/eng
-
Women With Disabilities Australia and joint disability representative organisations, Joint Statement: No
Cuts Before Alternative Supports Available (6 July 2026): https://wwda.org.au/2026/07/06/joint-statement-no-
cuts-before-alternative-supports-available/
-
Justice and Equity Centre, Explainer on the 2026 NDIS Bill: https://jec.org.au/publication/explainer- national-disability-insurance-scheme-amendment-securing-the-ndis-for-future-generations-bill-2026/
-
Justice and Equity Centre, Submission on the National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026: https://jec.org.au/publication/submission-on-the nationaldisability-insurance-schemeamendment-securing-the-ndis-forfuture-generations-bill-2026/
-
Marie Johnson, RoboNDIS: https://marie-johnson.com/robondis
-
People with Disability Australia, Submission on the NDIS Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026: https://pwd.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Submission-to-the-NDIS-Amendment
Securing-the-NDIS-for-Future-Generations-Bill-May-2026.pdf
-
Australian Greens, Greens secure longer inquiry into the NDIS: https://greens.org.au/news/media- release/greens-secure-longer-inquiry-ndis-government-support-failsafe-amendments-if
-
ABC News, Warning NDIS cuts could create unsafe environments (10 June 2026): https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-06-10/ndis-cuts-could-create-unsafe-environments-inquiry warned/106780028
-
ABC News, Disability advocates welcome inquiry extension (23 June 2026): https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-06-23/ndis-bill-senate-inquiry-extended/106818164
-
Inclusion Australia, What we think about the NDIS Bill interim report (Easy Read): https://www.inclusionaustralia.org.au/what-we-think-about-the-ndis-bill-interim-report-easy-read/
-
AbilityNews, Senate fractures over NDIS report: https://www.abilitynews.org/p/senate-fractures-over-ndis- report
-
Powerd Media, NDIS inquiry report released, Greens secure amendments: https://powerd.media/news/ndis-inquiry-report-released-greens-secure-amendments
Appendix A. Clause-by-clause analysis of every tracked change
This appendix groups the 1,403 tracked insertions and deletions in the marked-up NDIS Act into substantive legal change groups. It does not treat government headings or explanatory claims as neutral. For each provision it identifies the legal mechanism, the operational pathway, the affected cohorts, the rights impact and the caveats and gaps.
Issue / tracked Provision What it says What it actually enables Affected cohorts Rights impact Caveats and gaps What this means Sourceschange group
1. Objects and Objects clause, The tracked Bill Financial sustainability All participants, with It makes budget control Financial The Bill makes cost NDIS Act 2013;
financial including s 3 changes the objects so becomes a direct legal strongest effect on part of merits decisions sustainability is not control a legal gate, Justice and
sustainability and financial supports are provided constraint on rights that people with high and increases risk that defined by an not merely an Equity Centre
sustainability only so far as were previously expressed support needs, individual need is individual safety administrative explainer
wording consistent with financial through individual children, people with displaced by scheme- test. background issue.
sustainability. reasonable and necessary psychosocial level cost control.support duties. disability, First Nations people and regional participants.
2. Definition of New s 9B and The Bill creates a A standardised functional Autistic people, People can be excluded The tools and The Bill asks Justice and
functional connected rules statutory definition of capacity threshold can people with if tools fail to capture thresholds were not Parliament to Equity Centre
capacity functional capacity and become a gate for entry, intellectual disability, real-world disability and finalised when the approve a gate explainer; Health
allows rules and tools to continuation and psychosocial support context. Bill was introduced. before the key test changes page
be used to assess it. reassessment. disability, fluctuating exists.disability, cumulative disability and rare conditions.
3. Access Access The Bill moves major Parliament is asked to pass Prospective Transparency and Later rules may No eligibility cut Health changes
decisions provisions and eligibility detail into later a framework before disabled participants and review are weakened change after should pass before page; DPAC
dependent on NDIS Rules NDIS Rules and people can see the rules current participants because the real gate passage and may the rules, tools and analysis
later rules assessment tools. that will decide who gets in due for sits in later instruments not be visible during evidence are public. (attached as an
or stays in. reassessment from and operational this inquiry. appendix)2028. practice. 4. Permanence s 24, s 25 and The Bill requires Access can be refused People with It risks turning health The Bill text does This is a forced- Justice and
and all new s 25A assessment of whether where the Agency says degenerative treatment into a not solve cost, treatment risk even if Equity Centre
appropriate all appropriate treatment remains conditions, condition of disability distance, side the Bill does not explainer; DPAC
treatment treatment has been appropriate, even if psychosocial support and can effects, literally compel forum report
undertaken. treatment is inaccessible, disability, chronic contraindications or treatment.risky or unacceptable to the illness, pain, trauma interfere with bodily personal
person. history and complex autonomy. circumstances.medical needs.
5. Alternative New s 25B and The Bill permits People may be denied NDIS First Nations people Rights are weakened if Foundational and A person should not Justice and
support excluded exclusion where the access or supports because aged 50 and over, actual availability, mainstream lose NDIS support Equity Centre
requirements impairment Agency says another a theoretical health, aged older disabled quality and safety of supports are not yet because a different explainer; Joint
concepts system is more care, education or people, children, alternatives are not built, funded, tested system is imagined DRO statement
appropriate. mainstream service is said people in thin enforceable. or evaluated. on paper.to exist. markets and people in unsafe family settings.
6. Support tied to s 34(1)(aa) and Supports must be tied The Agency can separate a People with multiple Whole-person planning Disability impacts The Bill risks funding DPAC analysis
eligible related support more directly to the person into eligible and disabilities, is undermined and are often interactive a diagnosis label, (attached as an
impairment tests impairment that ineligible impairments and cumulative disability, participants may need and cannot be not the disabled appendix);
qualified the person for refuse supports for the rest. psychosocial to relitigate which cleanly separated. person. PWDA
the NDIS. disability, acquired impairment causes submissionbrain injury, chronic each need. illness and ageing effects.
7. Evidence s 34(1E) to s The Bill narrows Supports can be refused Rare disability, It may privilege Research evidence A support should not Justice and
hierarchy and 34(1F) reasonable and where peer-reviewed complex disability, published evidence is uneven across be refused merely Equity Centre
value for money necessary supports evidence is thin even when psychosocial over disabled people, disability groups and because the submission;
through evidence and lived experience and treating disability, children, families and treating support types. evidence base SWAN
value-for-money tests. evidence show the support regional participants professionals. ignores the cohort. submissionis needed. and culturally specific supports.
8. Parental s 34(1G) to s The Bill hardens tests The Agency can assume Children, young It shifts public support The Bill does not The Bill risks making SWAN
responsibility and 34(1J) about what parents, unpaid care should absorb people, single burdens to families and create a safe-care unpaid family labour submission;
informal supports family or informal needs that are currently parents, exhausted can increase neglect, capacity test for a substitute for NDIS DPAC forum
supports should funded. carers, families in crisis and each household. supports. report
provide. poverty and family institutionalisation risk.violence survivors.
9. Other service s 34(1) The Bill strengthens NDIS support can be denied People in hospital, People can fall between Australian service No disabled person Justice and
system more changes refusal where another because health, education, school, custody, systems when no other systems have should be cut off Equity Centre
appropriate service system is said housing or justice is said to homelessness, aged service actually delivers known gaps and are because another explainer; Joint
to be more appropriate. be responsible. the support. not enforceably department should DRO statementcare, regional areas available to all have helped but did
and thin markets. participants. not.
10. Support New s 34A The Minister can The provision enables People relying on Individualised funding is The Health page This is a statutory Health changes
determinations reduce funding for scheme-wide or cohort-level social, civic and displaced by legislative says social, civic cut power, not just a page; Justice
classes of supports by cuts to existing old community instruments that may and community planning and Equity
percentage or other framework plans. participation, not be merits participation budgets clarification. Centre explainer
rules. therapy, reviewable as individual are to be reset by 50
psychosocial and decisions. percent and capacitycapacity-building building daily supports. activities by 10 percent from 1 October 2026.
11. Plan caps on ss 33(2EA) and The Bill permits caps on Assessed need can be Participants needing A person can be found The gap between A cap below Appendix C:
amount, 33(2EB) supports in old higher than the funded cap. high-intensity to need a support but assessed need and assessed need Copayment
frequency, framework plans. support, therapy, still not receive enough capped funding is creates forced Mechanism;
duration and communication, funding to buy it. not solved by saying under-service or Health changes
ratios behaviour support providers cannot private payment page
and community charge above a pressure.participation. price limit.
12. ss 48 and 48A The Bill restricts People who run out of People with Delay can convert Underutilisation can A plan that cannot SWAN
Reassessment participant-initiated funding or face sudden life fluctuating disability, unmet need into harm, reflect market failure change when life submission;
restrictions reassessment and changes may be unable to deteriorating unpaid care, debt, and crisis, not lower changes is not a Justice and
creates delay windows. get a timely plan change. conditions, family hospitalisation or need. safety plan. Equity Centre
breakdown, hospital institutionalisation. explainerdischarge, housing crisis and violence risk.
13. Automatic s 50A and The Bill allows old plans A renewed plan may carry Current participants, Participants may lose The transition period Automatic renewal is DPAC analysis
renewal and old transitional plan to be automatically forward inadequate funding especially those with practical review is long and overlaps not a safeguard if (attached as an
plans provisions renewed. or apply new restrictions old framework plans opportunities if no clear with cuts, the plan is already appendix);
without a fresh individualised during transition to new reviewable reassessments and unsafe. Health changes
merits process. 2030. decision is made. new planning pagedesign.
14. Non-contact s 40A and The Bill permits plan Failure to navigate NDIA People with Administrative non- The Bill does not A person should not SWAN
suspension or related suspension or access communication can become intellectual disability, contact can become create enforceable lose disability submission;
revocation provisions consequences where a a pathway to loss of support. psychosocial accessible support because theperson cannot be disability, loss of support, not just communication, Agency failed to Villamanta
contacted or homelessness, follow-up. advocacy and safety reach them safely. submission
information is not hospitalisation, checks before
provided. domestic violence, suspension.inaccessible communication needs and no advocate.
15. Claims time s 45A The Bill reduces the Participants and providers Self-managers, plan A paperwork delay can Strict timeframes hit A 90-day rule Health changes
limit claim period from two lose payment rights for late managers, small become unpaid people with punishes disability page; Villamanta
years to 90 days. claims except where providers, regional support, provider executive function, administration failure submission
discretion applies. providers, people in withdrawal or debt trauma, language, as if it were fraud.
crisis, hospital and pressure. digital and advocacyfamily violence barriers. situations.
16. Record s 45B and debt The Bill strengthens Participants can be required Self-managed The burden of proof Villamanta warns Debt should never Villamanta
keeping and machinery record-keeping duties to prove claims after the participants, shifts towards disabled strict documentary be created from submission;
debts and debt event or face repayment families, nominees people in a system rules can harm inaccessible Robodebt Royal
consequences. pressure. and people using where records may not people who lack administration Commission
informal or small exist or be recoverable. capacity or without proof of report
providers. resources to obtain overpayment andrecords. fair review.
17. Information- s 53 changes The Bill expands The Agency can demand People with Privacy, procedural Australian privacy Information powers GDPR Article
gathering powers and related information demands more information and cognitive disability, fairness and practical and ADM must be limited, 22; Marie
powers on participants, connect non-compliance to psychosocial access are weakened if safeguards remain necessary, Johnson,
nominees and others. plan or access disability, trauma, demands are broad or weaker than GDPR- accessible and RoboNDIS
consequences. poverty, unstable inaccessible. style protections for independently
housing and limited significant reviewable.advocacy. automated decisions.
18. Provider New s 10C The Bill creates a broad More people and services Small providers, sole Poorly sequenced Mandatory Provider regulation Health changes
definition statutory provider can be brought into traders, peer regulation can shrink registration rolls out should not remove page; DPAC
definition. compliance, pricing, supports, culturally thin markets and later, with design still the only support a analysis
payment and record specific services, reduce real choice. in progress. person can actually (attached as an
systems. regional workers use. appendix)and informal markets.
19. Inspectors, NDIA inspector The Bill adds integrity Fraud control powers are Participants, Anti-fraud framing can The OIA analysis did Fraud powers OIA
investigators and and investigator and compliance bundled with eligibility cuts, nominees, self- conceal broad coercive not assess many should be split from assessment;
compliance definitions and machinery. support caps and participant managers, providers powers affecting non- material provisions support-cutting DPAC OIA
powers enforcement debt powers. and plan managers. fraud cases. in the same depth. powers and analysis
provisions assessed (attached as anseparately. appendix)
20. Plan ss 73EA and The Bill supports a Participant choice of plan People relying on Choice and control are The design and A panel is not choice Health changes
management 73EB panel model for plan manager may be reduced trusted plan narrowed if services are safeguards are not if the person loses page; DPAC
panel management. through commissioned managers, people channelled through complete at the provider they analysis
arrangements. with complex government-selected passage. trust. (attached as an
markets and people panels. appendix)needing advocacy through plan management.
21. Support Support The Bill supports Support coordination can be People with complex Support coordination is The new model is Do not remove plan- Health changes
coordination and coordination movement towards moved away from individual needs, psychosocial often a safety function, scheduled after cuts funded support page;
navigation and connection commissioned support plans into agency- disability, housing not an optional extra. and reassessments coordination before AbilityNews
commissioning changes connection services. commissioned services. risk, violence risk begin. the replacement is summary of
and institutional built and tested. Pocock dissenttransition needs.
22. Pricing s 45C The Minister can make Pricing can be used to All participants, with Price control without The Bill says price Price caps do not Appendix C:
determinations pricing determinations control markets and higher risk in thin market evidence can caps are not the protect a person if Copayment
and provider price participant purchasing in markets and for remove providers or same as co- the funded amount Mechanism;
limits. ways that affect supply and specialised reduce service quality. payments, but caps is too low to buy the Health fact sheet
quality. supports. below need can still support.create private payment pressure.
23. Self- s 45C(2) Price caps do not apply Self-managed people may Self-managed This creates a practical The legal accuracy The safe wording is: Appendix C:
management in the same way to self- pay more than a government participants, people gap-payment pressure is that the Bill does functional gap Copayment
carve-out managed purchasing. price and therefore buy in thin markets and even if not labelled a not create a formal payment or forced Mechanism;
fewer supports from a finite people needing co-payment. provider co-payment under-service Health changes
budget. niche supports. duty, but can create structure. pageunderfunding and
private payment pressure.
24. Automated ss 59B to 59E The Bill authorises Automation can enter All participants, with Review rights after Robodebt shows No automated NDIS Marie Johnson,
decision-making computerised decisions claims, payments, plan greatest risk for harm do not prevent that automated decision is RoboNDIS;
authorisation for designated approvals and later functions people who cannot unsafe decisions at welfare acceptable where it Robodebt Royal
provisions and allows if designated. detect or challenge scale. administration can affect access, Commission
expansion by errors quickly. without strong legal, supports, payments, report; GDPR
instruments. audit and human debts, suspension, Article 22safeguards can review or safety. cause grave harm.
25. Standard ss 59B to 59E The Government says A statement is not the same People affected by Transparency after Seven days before A published Health changes
operating and SOPI statements of as independent audit, automated claim system design does not tabling is not enough procedure is not a page; Robodebt
procedure framework automated decision- source-rule publication, rejection, payment ensure fairness, safety for disabled people safeguard if the Royal
instruments for making procedure will merits review of logic or a delay, plan approval or legality. and experts to test automated decision Commission
automation be published before right to human decision or debt processes. system effects. still harms people report
tabling. before effect. first.
26. Correcting ADM correction The Bill contemplates The burden may fall on People with Post-decision review is GDPR Article 22 The NDIS should GDPR Article
automated and review correction and review disabled people to notice an cognitive disability, weaker than a human gives a right not to meet or exceed 22; Marie
decisions provisions pathways. error, gather evidence and psychosocial decision made lawfully be subject to solely GDPR safeguards, Johnson,
appeal in time. disability, low in the first place. automated not fall below them. RoboNDISliteracy, no advocate significant decisions, or unstable housing. with human intervention and contest rights in limited exceptions.
27. Nominee and Nominee, The Bill strengthens Administrative or third-party Participants under People may be The interaction with Compliance powers Villamanta
compensation compensation compliance and penalty issues can affect participant nomineeship, people punished for failures by safeguarding, must not punish the submission;
penalties and penalty settings around plans, debts or access. with intellectual others or systems supported decision- disabled person for DPAC forum
amendments nominees and disability, acquired outside their control. making and violence another person or report
compensation. brain injury and risk is under- institution failing
psychosocial assessed. them.disability.
28. New Schedule 4 and The Bill moves towards Planning becomes more All current Individualised review The replacement Do not legislate the Health changes
framework transition new framework plans standardised and budget- participants rights can be weakened architecture is still transition before the page; Justice
planning provisions from 2027 to 2030. centred before foundational transitioning over if budgets are set by incomplete. new planning and Equity
several years. tools, caps or Centre explainersupports and assessment instruments rather than system is public and
tools are proven. full merits assessment. tested.
29. Transitional Schedules and The Bill relies on broad Ministers can change All participants and Parliamentary scrutiny DROs warn a A roadmap cannot Joint DRO
and Henry VIII transitional rule- transitional rule-making practical legal effects prospective is reduced when major roadmap or EM is cure unsafe legal statement;
style powers making powers powers. through instruments during participants. effects are left to later not legislation and is powers. DPAC analysis
transition. rules. not an enforceable (attached as ansafeguard. appendix)
30. Staged dates The Health page says Cuts and administrative People relying on The order of Foundational The core Health changes
Commencement from 1 October support budget resets restrictions begin before the the targeted implementation creates supports and sequencing problem page; Joint DRO
and sequencing 2026 to 2030 begin 1 October 2026, alternative support system is supports in 2026 foreseeable harm Thriving Kids design is cut first, build statement
claims limits begin 1 complete. and people moved because support is are still being later.
December 2026, new through reduced before worked through with
planning begins 1 April reassessment later. replacement support states and
2027 and eligibility exists. territories.reassessments begin 1 January 2028.
31. Inquiry Senate inquiry The Bill was introduced The process did not allow All disabled people Procedural fairness in The inquiry was later The inquiry should APH Bill page;
process and timing and on 14 May 2026 and adequate scrutiny of a large and organisations law-making is extended to 14 not recommend WWDA update;
consultation interim report the committee process Bill and extensive trying to understand weakened where August 2026, but the passage until the Inclusion
initially gave an explanatory material. and respond to the affected people cannot interim majority still actual legal Australia Easy
extremely short Bill. reasonably analyse the recommended safeguards are in Read summary
submission period. law. passage in principle the Bill.according to public disability organisation summaries.
32. Office of Impact analysis The OIA rated the Major legal powers All people affected Policy risk is high when The Department A corrected impact OIA
Impact Analysis and OIA impact analysis proceeded without a reliable by the Bill, modelling is corrected said the errors had analysis must be assessment;
and evidence adequacy rating adequate, the second public assessment of especially cohorts after assessment and no bearing, but the published before DPAC OIA
failures lowest rating, and distributional, mortality, hidden inside not transparently corrected working Parliament votes. analysis
corrections to automation, debt and rights averages. reassessed. was not published in (attached as an
percentage and fraud- impacts. a way that lets the appendix)indicator errors were public verify that made after the decision. conclusion.
-
Mortality and AFSR peer The reviewing actuary Mortality among high- SIL participants, Any claim that no one The peer review The evidence NDIS Annual
safety evidence review and SIL reported deaths for support participants is a participants with will die from unsafe does not prove supports a serious Financial
death data participants with higher known and modelled issue, high support needs support withdrawal which deaths were risk of preventable Sustainability
support needs were not a rhetorical claim. and people at risk of lacks an evidence base. preventable, so the harm and death if Report 2024-25,
considerably higher institutional settings. our view is that this supports are actuarial peer
than expected and that is foreseeable risk, reduced before safe review; NDIS
SIL mortality rates had not proved replacements exist. quarterly
increased. causation for each supplements;
death. We are DPAC deaths aware of a number analysis of suicides and (attached as an attempted suicides, appendix) as well as other deaths, including filicides
34. Submission DPAC analysis DPAC's analysis of the The Bill lacks independent Disability A majority The public The independent DPAC
evidence of the organisational sector support as drafted. representative recommendation to committee website evidence base does submissions
organisational submissions found an organisations, allied pass the Bill is not may not publish not support passage analysis
submissions overwhelming majority health bodies, supported by the every submission at as drafted. (attached as an
and public opposed or heavily unions, experts, independent the same time, so appendix); ABC
submissions qualified the Bill, with participants and submission base as DPAC should keep report on inquiry
unqualified support families. analysed. the workbook as its submissionsconfined to its own underlying audit file. authors, the
Department of Health,
Disability and Ageing
together with the NDIA.
Appendix B. How an impact analysis for this Bill should have been written
Purpose
This appendix analyses the government’s Impact Analysis submission to the Office of Impact Analysis and sets out the minimum standard for a corrected impact analysis. The Bill is listed by the Parliament as the National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 and was introduced on 14 May 2026 (APH Bill page). The Department says the Bill clarifies eligibility and supports, addresses fraud and updates governance and administration (Health Bill page). DPAC’s position is that the impact analysis must test the operative legal effect, not the Department’s description of the Bill.
Profile of the impact analysis evidence base
Evidence base Grain Claim type Quality issue What follows in practice
Office of Impact Analysis public entry One OIA assessment for a policy Official rating and procedural status The rating was adequate, the second Parliament should not rely on the rating
package lowest rating, and the Department later as proof that the Bill's impacts were fullycorrected errors after the rating decision assessed. (OIA assessment).
Department impact analysis attachment One policy impact narrative covering Estimates, assumptions and omitted DPAC's line-by-line review found many A corrected analysis must assess every
supplied to DPAC many Bill items impacts material provisions not costed or rights- operative power, not selected themes.tested (DPAC OIA analysis (attached as an appendix)).
Bill and Explanatory Memorandum Clauses, items, schedules and Binding law plus non-binding The EM is not legislation and cannot Safeguards must be in the Bill itself.
explanations explanation make unsafe powers safe (Joint DROstatement).
NDIS Summary of Statistics, May 2026 Monthly statistics and 12-month Participant numbers, payments and The data use payments and annualised Averages cannot show who loses critical
payment measures average payments averages, not individual unmet need or supports under caps or eligibilitysafety outcomes (NDIS Summary of changes. Statistics).
Actuarial peer review and death data Actuarial review plus mortality/exits Financial sustainability and mortality The peer review records higher-than- Mortality and safety must be valued and
evidence assumptions expected deaths for higher support stress-tested.needs and increased SIL mortality assumptions (NDIS Annual Financial Sustainability Report 2024-25, actuarial peer review).
Submissions and lived evidence Organisational and community evidence Legal, clinical, lived-experience and The evidence base is large, urgent and The impact analysis must include
rights impacts not fully reflected in the majority interim distributional and rights impacts, notframing (ABC report on inquiry only fiscal savings. submissions; WWDA update).
Minimum standard for a corrected impact analysis
A corrected impact analysis must answer these questions before Parliament votes:
-
What exact provisions cut, cap, delay or remove support, and who is exposed to each provision (NDIS Act 2013)?
-
What are the expected exits, support reductions, underutilisation changes, appeal rates, debt creation, unpaid care shifts, provider exits, hospitalisations, homelessness, violence risks and mortality outcomes (SWAN submission; DPAC forum report)?
-
What assumptions are made about foundational supports, Thriving Kids, mainstream health, education, housing, aged care and justice services, and are those services funded, operational, accessible and enforceable before any NDIS reduction occurs (Health changes page; Joint DRO statement)?
-
What are the impacts by disability type, First Nations status, age, gender, remoteness, homelessness, family violence, SIL or SDA status, plan management status, support intensity and communication access need (SWAN submission)?
-
What is the value of harm, including loss of life, serious injury, hospitalisation, institutionalisation, family breakdown, unpaid care, lost work, review burden and provider market loss (NDIS Annual Financial Sustainability Report 2024-25, actuarial peer review)?
-
What automated decisions will be made, what data will feed them, what error rates are expected, how bias will be tested, who audits the logic and what happens before a wrong decision harms a person (Robodebt Royal Commission report; GDPR Article 22)?
-
Which asserted safeguards are binding law, which are merely EM statements, which depend on later instruments and which depend on operational discretion (Justice and Equity Centre explainer)?
Why the existing impact process is not enough
The OIA entry states that an impact analysis was prepared and assessed as adequate, but it also records that the Department corrected errors after the assessment process (OIA assessment). A rating of adequate is not a finding that the proposal is safe, rights-compatible or properly sequenced. It is a procedural rating of the impact analysis process (OIA assessment).
The Department’s public implementation page shows that support budget resets start from 1 October 2026, the claims period changes from 1 December 2026, new framework planning starts from 1 April 2027 and eligibility reassessments start from 1 January 2028 (Health changes page). That timetable proves the sequencing problem: reductions and administrative barriers begin before replacement systems have been built, funded, tested and independently evaluated (Joint DRO statement).
The NDIS Summary of Statistics reports 779,210 participants at the end of May 2026 and 50.87 billion dollars in paid supports over the 12 months to May 2026 (NDIS Summary of Statistics). Those scheme-wide figures do not tell Parliament which participants will lose social participation support, therapy, support coordination, home support, behaviour support or access when caps, reassessments and support determinations apply (Health changes page).
The peer review evidence means mortality cannot be dismissed. The reviewing actuary recorded that deaths for participants with higher support needs were considerably higher than expected and that SIL mortality rates had increased (NDIS Annual Financial Sustainability Report 2024-25, actuarial peer review). The safe conclusion is not that every death was caused by the NDIS or that every death was preventable. The safe conclusion is that mortality is real, material and model-relevant, so Parliament cannot accept any categorical claim that support withdrawal has no life-and-death risk (NDIS Annual Financial Sustainability Report 2024-25, actuarial peer review).
Required corrected impact analysis structure
Section What it must include Why it matters
Clause inventory Every Bill item, grouped by legal mechanism and commencement Prevents selective analysis of only favourable parts of the Bill.date
Cohort exposure table Number and characteristics of people exposed to each gate, cap, Shows who carries the risk, not only total scheme savings.automation power or debt power
Distributional impact model Effects by disability, age, gender, First Nations status, remoteness, Prevents averages hiding severe harm to high-risk groups.support intensity, plan management and living setting
Sequencing map Date each cut starts, date each replacement starts, funding status Tests whether people are cut before alternatives exist.and enforceability
Mortality and serious harm model Deaths, serious injury, hospitalisation, homelessness, family violence, Life-and-death impacts cannot be treated as zero.institutionalisation and suicide risk
Automation impact assessment Decision types, datasets, logic, errors, bias testing, human review, Robodebt-style failure risk must be assessed before automation isaudit and redress authorised.
Market impact model Provider exits, thin markets, self-management effects, price cap A funded plan is useless if no safe provider remains.effects and regional supply
Rights and review assessment Which decisions remain reviewable, which are hidden in instruments Review rights are a core safeguard.and which are not individual merits decisions
Alternatives analysis Split fraud bill, delayed eligibility bill, no-cuts-before-supports option OIA should compare real alternatives, not only the Government'sand co-designed replacement options chosen package.
Appendix recommendation
The Committee should recommend that the Bill not proceed unless a corrected impact analysis is published, independently reviewed, consulted on with disabled people and disability representative organisations, and re-assessed by the OIA after all corrections and all draft rules, tools and SOPIs are public (OIA assessment; Joint DRO statement; Robodebt Royal Commission report).
Appendix C
What the Bill Says About Co-Payments
Note: DPAC gave evidence at the Melbourne hearing. We were asked to clarify our testimony that in our view, the current of the wording of the Bill enabled co-payments to be implemented. This appendix is an explanation of that testimony and viewpoint.
The Explanatory Memorandum (EM) to the National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 (the Bill) uses the word “co-payment” in one relevant place - to say they are prohibited.
Proposed subsection 45C(7) states:
“An NDIS provider must not charge more than the maximum amount prescribed in the pricing determination. The intent of this provision is to ensure the prohibition on private billing, or ‘co-payments’, which has existed since the Scheme commenced, is captured as part of these proposed amendments.”
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2026a)
The Bill formally re-encodes the existing ban on providers privately billing above the price cap. That is the government’s stated public position.
The actual co-payment mechanism, however, is not named as such. It arises from the combination of three interlocking provisions, each of which is set out below.
The Three Provisions That Create the Co-Payment Structure
- Section 34A - Minister’s Power to Reduce Plan Funding Below the Cost of Supports [Schedule 1, Part 4, Item 34 of the Bill]
This is the core structural mechanism. The Minister may by legislative instrument cut funding for a group of supports by a set percentage (Department of Health and Aged Care, 2026a). The critical provision is proposed subsection 34A(5):
“(5) To avoid doubt, the determination has effect even if the result is either or both of the following: (a) the funding provided under a participant’s plan for a reasonable and necessary support is less than the total cost of the support; (b) the funding provided under a participant’s plan for all reasonable and necessary supports funded under the plan taken as a whole is less than the total costs of the supports.”
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2026a)
This is a deliberate, explicit statutory acknowledgement that NDIS funding can be set below the actual price of a support - even one already assessed as reasonable and necessary for that participant. The Bill is silent on what fills that gap. The participant either goes without the support, sources it from elsewhere, or pays the difference personally. The EM does not use the word “co-payment” here and does not address the gap consequence (Commonwealth of Australia, 2026a).
The Ministerial trigger for this power is described in Government materials as “ensuring the financial sustainability of the Scheme” - a broad objective. The only procedural constraint, as described in the EM, is proposed subsection 34A(3): the Minister must “have regard to the safety of participants” (Commonwealth of Australia, 2026a).
People with Disability Australia (PWDA, 2026) stated in its submission to the Senate that this provision allows the Minister to reduce funding “without any consideration of individual needs” and with no clear avenue for individual merits review of the Ministerial determination itself and recommended its removal from the Bill entirely (PWDA, 2026, Recommendation 13).
As a practical example of how section 34A would operate if the Bill passes in its current form: from 1 October 2026, a participant’s plan may still show a dollar amount on paper for social and community participation, but a Ministerial instrument will reduce the amount the participant can actually spend within that category (Kindship, 2026). The plan amount and the spendable amount are different figures.
- Sections 33(2EA) and 33(2EB) - Caps on Maximum Plan Funding Amounts [Schedule 1, Part 6, Item 68 of the Bill]
These new subsections allow the Minister to specify, by determination, a maximum funding amount, maximum intensity (hours or frequency), and maximum worker-to participant ratio for any support or class of supports, applying to participants generally or a defined cohort (Conway Group, 2026).
The EM is explicit that these caps apply regardless of actual support cost. Note 1 to proposed subsection 33(2EB) states:
“Subsections (2E), (2EA) and (2EB) apply regardless of whether a funding component amount meets the actual cost of supports in the group of supports to which it relates.”
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2026a, p. 51, as cited in Conway Group, 2026)
The practical consequence is set out in the EM’s own worked example: a planner may assess 30 hours of therapy per discipline as reasonable and necessary for a participant. A group cap then limits the plan to 25 hours. The cap applies even though it does not meet the actual cost of the support (Conway Group, 2026). The NDIS has assessed the need. The NDIS has accepted the support as reasonable and necessary. It has still capped funding below what the support actually costs.
The same silence on consequences applies. Once the maximum is set, that is the ceiling on what can go into a plan - actual cost above that ceiling is unaddressed in the Bill.
A secondary concern is that if cap values are contained in referenced documents rather than in the primary legislative instrument itself, the Agency may update those numbers without any further parliamentary vote (PAIOR, 2026). Cap levels could therefore be reduced progressively through administrative action.
- Section 45C - Minister’s Pricing Determination, with Self-Managed Carve-Out [Schedule 3, Part 1, Item 4 of the Bill]
Proposed section 45C(1) gives the Minister power to set maximum prices for supports by legislative instrument, replacing the NDIA’s administrative Price Guide with a Ministerial determination (Department of Health and Aged Care, 2026a; Conway Group, 2026).
Proposed section 45C(2) contains the critical carve-out:
“(2) A determination under subsection (1) does not apply in relation to the acquisition or provision of a support or class of supports under a participant’s plan unless the funding for the support or class of supports is managed by: (a) a registered plan management provider; or (b) the Agency.”
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2026a)
The price cap does not apply to self-managed participants. The EM explains the consequence:
“This recognises that self-managed participants, as informed consumers, are empowered to make trade-offs within their NDIS budget and can elect to pay prices for supports above the maximum limit with the knowledge that this would reduce the volume of supports they could otherwise purchase.”
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2026a)
Self-managed participants can pay above the capped price - but only from within their NDIS budget, depleting it faster. Kindship Plan Management (2026), drawing on the Bill’s text, confirms that the price cap applies to plan-managed and Agency-managed supports but “not self-managed.”
Proposed section 45C(9)(b)(ii) then enables differentiated pricing between registered and unregistered providers:
“(b) different kinds of providers, including, without limitation, in relation to: (i) qualifications or experience; or (ii) whether the providers are registered NDIS providers.”
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2026a)
The government has separately announced consultation from July 2026 on implementing lower price caps for unregistered providers delivering social, community and capacity-building supports (PAIOR, 2026; Conway Group, 2026). If those lower caps are set, and a self-managed participant uses an unregistered provider who charges more than the lower cap, the participant’s NDIS budget is depleted faster to cover the difference. This is a functional co-payment drawn from within the participant’s own allocation.
What This Gives Rise To
Taken together, these three provisions create a de facto participant contribution structure without using the words “co-payment” or “out of pocket.” The legal structure is:
Mechanism Provision Effect
Plan funding cut below cost of support s.34A(5) Participant's plan may explicitly not cover the full cost of a support. The gap is unaddressed in theBill.
Maximum caps on plan amounts s.33(2EA), Note 1 to Maximum applies even where it does not meet actual cost of supportsregardless of cost s.33(2EB)
Price caps do not apply to self-managed s.45C(2) Self-managed participants absorb above-cap costs from within their NDIS budgetparticipants
Differentiated lower prices for s.45C(9)(b)(ii) Enables a lower cap for unregistered providers, accelerating NDIS budget depletion for self-unregistered providers managed participants using those providers
The EM notes in its Regulatory Impact Statement that the Aged Care “Support at Home” program requires participants to contribute co-payments. That comparison is included in the EM’s background materials but explicitly stated to apply to aged care, not the NDIS. Its inclusion is notable (Commonwealth of Australia, 2026a).
The Core Legal Concern
The combination of sections 34A(5) and 33(2EA)/(2EB) creates a structure identified by Advocacy for Inclusion (2026) as carrying a structural Robodebt-parallel risk, with PWDA (2026) raising analogous concerns about Ministerial instruments set outside Parliament and the absence of meaningful individual merits review: a determination can systematically reduce funding below the cost of supports across an entire cohort of participants, with no statutory obligation to address the resulting gap, no mandatory merits review, and no prescribed consequence for the participant when funded supports become unaffordable.
The Bill does not prohibit participants from paying the gap personally. It simply never says they must - and never says they do not have to.
The Explanatory Memorandum expressly states that NDIS funding “can be less than the actual cost of providing or acquiring the support” that a participant requires. At the Bill’s introduction press conference on 14 May 2026, the Minister was asked directly three times about gap payments. He responded “No” when asked whether participants would pay gap fees. When pressed to reconcile that denial with s.34A(5)’s explicit acknowledgement that funding can be set below cost, the Minister stated: “I don’t have anything to add to what I just said.” When asked a third time — “Who pays the gap?” — he did not answer the question, instead describing the differentiated pricing powers the Bill confers on the Minister (Department of Health and Aged Care, 2026b).
References
Advocacy for Inclusion. (2026). NDIS Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026: Submission to the Senate Community Affairs Legislation Committee. https://www.advocacyforinclusion.org/ndis-amendment-securing-the-ndis-for-future-generations-bill-2026/
Commonwealth of Australia. (2026a). National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026: Explanatory Memorandum. Parliament of Australia. https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=r7487
Conway Group. (2026, May 14). The NDIS Bill has landed. Here’s what’s actually in it for Allied Health providers. https://www.conwaygroup.com.au/insights/the-ndis-bill-has landed-heres-whats-actually-in-it-for-allied-health-providers
Department of Health and Aged Care. (2026a). NDIS Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026: Fact sheet [PDF]. Australian Government. https://www.health.gov.au/sites/default/files/2026-05/ndis-amendment-securing-the-ndis-for-future-generations-bill-2026---fact-sheet.pdf
Department of Health and Aged Care. (2026b). Press conference with Minister Butler, Parliament House - 14 May 2026. Australian Government. https://www.health.gov.au/ministers/the-hon-mark-butler-mp/media/press-conference-with-minister-butler-parliament-house-14-may-2026
Kindship Plan Management. (2026, May 19). NDIS Reform Bill 2026: What it means for families with disabled kids. https://www.kindship.com.au/blog/ndis-reform-bill-2026 what-it-means-for-families-with-disabled-kids
PAIOR. (2026, May 22). Nine potential impacts on participants if the 2026 NDIS Bill is passed [LinkedIn post]. https://www.linkedin.com/posts/paior_this-video-goes through9of-the-potential-activity-7463842620767653888-mvbA
People with Disability Australia (PWDA). (2026, May). Submission to the NDIS Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 [PDF]. https://pwd.org.au/wp content/uploads/2026/05/Submission-to-the-NDIS-Amendment-Securing-the-NDIS-for-Future-Generations-Bill-May-2026.pdf