Supplementary Submission

Disabled People Against Cuts Australia supplementary submission

Senate Community Affairs Legislation Committee Inquiry Into The Ndis Amendment Securing The Ndis For Future Generations Bill 2026

10 July 2026

Contents

• 1. Executive summary and DPAC’s position

• 2. About the current government framing of the Bill

• 3. Automated decision-making and RoboNDIS

• 4. The claim that nobody will die is not supported by the evidence

• 5. Sequencing makes the Bill unsafe

• 6. Clause-by-Clause findings

• 7. Submissions to the Inquiry

• 8. The copayment argument

• 9. Original legal and practical pitfalls that require Committee attention

• 10. Response to the interim report and dissenting reports

• 11. Recommendations

• 12. Conclusion

• 13. References

• Appendix A. Clause-by-clause analysis of tracked changes

• Appendix B. How an impact analysis for this Bill should have been written

• Appendix C. Co-payment Mechanism

Appendix D. How to Write An Impact Analysis Correctly …………………………….. separate attachment

Executive summary and DPAC’s position

Disabled People Against Cuts Australia opposes the National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 and recommends that it be withdrawn (APH Bill page). The Bill is not a narrow anti-fraud Bill. It changes eligibility, supports, planning, reassessment, claims, pricing, provider regulation, information powers and automated decision-making (Health changes page; NDIS Act 2013; the Bill).

DPAC’s position is that the Bill should not pass in its present form, should not pass with only explanatory amendments, and should not pass on the promise that later rules, a roadmap or an Explanatory Memorandum (EM) will protect people (Joint DRO statement). The legal protections must be in the Act before Parliament votes, because the EM is not binding law and a roadmap is not an enforceable safeguard (Joint DRO statement).

The evidence supports a clear conclusion: if supports are reduced, capped, delayed or removed before safe, funded and enforceable alternatives exist, some disabled people face a foreseeable risk of neglect, hospitalisation, institutionalisation, serious injury and death (SWAN submission; DPAC forum report; NDIS Annual Financial Sustainability Report 2024-25, actuarial peer review). This is a neutral evidence-based risk statement. It does not require proof that every death would be caused by this Bill. It requires Parliament to recognise that support withdrawal in a high-support population has real life-and-death consequences (NDIS Annual Financial Sustainability Report 2024-25, actuarial peer review).

DPAC asks the Committee to recommend withdrawal of the Bill. If the Parliament wants to progress integrity measures, those measures should be split into a separate narrow Bill with full safeguards, proper disability consultation, no automated decision-making, no support caps below assessed need and no eligibility removals before replacement supports are built, funded, operational, accessible, appealable and independently evaluated (Robodebt Royal Commission report; Joint DRO statement).

About the Current Government Framing of the Bill

The Department has consistently described the Bill as a mechanism for clarifying eligibility and supports, addressing fraud and updating governance and administration (Health Bill page). That framing is incomplete because the operative provisions also authorise support determinations, caps, new eligibility gates, reassessment changes, claims restrictions, information powers, pricing instruments, provider controls and automated decision-making (the Bill; Health changes page).

The Office of Impact Analysis record says the impact analysis was assessed as adequate, but the OIA page also records post-assessment corrections to Department material (OIA assessment). A second-lowest adequate rating is not a finding that disabled people are safe, that rights are protected, or that all material provisions were assessed (OIA assessment). DPAC has written a document (sent to government and the OIA called ‘How to Write An Impact Analysis’, which is attached as an appendix and identifies unassessed and under-assessed provisions across debts, automation, review rights, mortality, privacy and delegated powers. Of great concern is the fact that significant changes were made to the Impact Analysis after the assessment was carried out (to percentages and fraud values). In addition, there were serious exclusions to the document which includes the above. If these exclusions, mistakes and risks have not been considered by government, The ‘reforms’ outlined in the Bill have been set up to fail before the rollout commences.

The Health page’s own timetable shows the sequencing problem. It says support budget resets start from 1 October 2026, the claims period changes from 1 December 2026, new framework planning starts from 1 April 2027 and eligibility reassessments begin from 1 January 2028 (Health changes page). It also says consultation in the second half of 2026 will occur on key design matters including new planning, functional capacity eligibility, SIL home and living commissioning, support connection, pricing and market reforms (Health changes page). This means Parliament is being asked to pass legal powers before core replacement systems and safeguards are complete (Health changes page).

The NDIS Summary of Statistics for May 2026 reports 779,210 participants and 50.87 billion dollars in paid supports over the previous 12 months (NDIS Summary of Statistics). Those figures do not prove support cuts are safe. They are aggregate scheme statistics and do not show which people lose essential supports, which markets collapse, which participants cannot navigate reassessment, or which deaths, hospitalisations or institutional placements may result (NDIS Summary of Statistics; NDIS Annual Financial Sustainability Report 2024-25, actuarial peer review)

3. Automated decision-making and RoboNDIS

DPAC’s position is that no automated decision-making should be authorised for access, eligibility, planning, claims, payments, debts, suspensions, reassessments, provider compliance or any other function that can affect a disabled person’s support, safety or legal rights (Marie Johnson, RoboNDIS). The Bill’s automation provisions sit in a system where errors can mean a person loses workers, transport, therapy, communication support, housing-related support or the ability to leave home (SWAN submission).

The Robodebt Royal Commission recommended that any Commonwealth ADM framework include a clear path to review, plain-language publication that ADM is used, publication of business rules and algorithms for independent expert scrutiny, and a monitoring or audit body with power to examine technical aspects and impacts including fairness, bias and client usability (Robodebt Royal Commission report). The Bill should not authorise expanded ADM before those recommendations are fully implemented for the NDIS context (Robodebt Royal Commission report).

The GDPR provides a stronger comparative safeguard. Article 22 gives a person a right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing where that decision produces legal effects or similarly significant effects, subject to limited exceptions and safeguards including human intervention, the right to express a view and the right to contest the decision (GDPR Article 22). Recital 71 adds safeguards including specific information, human intervention, explanation, challenge rights and measures to prevent discriminatory effects, including on disability-related health and personal data contexts (GDPR Article 22).

Australia should not build RoboNDIS below the GDPR standard and below the lessons of Robodebt. A statement of procedure published shortly before tabling is not enough. A later review right is not enough. A human who can correct an automated decision after support is stopped is not enough. For disabled people, a wrong decision can cause harm before any review is heard (Marie Johnson, RoboNDIS; Robodebt Royal Commission report).

4. The claim that nobody will die is not supported by the evidence

No evidence base supports a categorical claim that no disabled person will die because of this plan. The scheme’s own actuarial reporting confirms that death rates for participants in Supported Independent Living ran above the model’s assumptions for years and had to be revised upward, with deaths for participants with higher support needs described as considerably higher than expected, a feature observed for several years (NDIS Annual Financial Sustainability Report 2024-25, actuarial peer review). This means the scheme’s sustainability projections rested on mortality assumptions that real experience had already exceeded, and the actuary increased the mortality assumptions for higher-support-needs participants as a result (NDIS Annual Financial Sustainability Report 2024-25, actuarial peer review). This does not prove every death was preventable. It proves that mortality among high-support participants is a material, model-relevant fact, and that those dying are disproportionately the highest-support cohort this Bill targets for cuts (NDIS Annual Financial Sustainability Report 2024-25, actuarial peer review).

DPAC’s forum evidence records disabled people’s concern that the Bill creates risks of reinstitutionalisation, injury and death for people who rely on intensive supports (DPAC forum report). SWAN’s submission records concern that reassessment restrictions, funding cuts and communication failures can create risks of neglect, abuse, hospitalisation and death (SWAN submission). Villamanta’s legal evidence on related NDIS integrity amendments warns that withdrawal or abrupt support loss can have dire consequences for vulnerable people, especially people with intellectual disability and those already exposed to high mortality risks (Villamanta submission).

The evidence supports a serious foreseeable risk of preventable harm and death if supports are reduced, capped, delayed or removed before safe alternatives exist. The Committee cannot treat that risk as zero (NDIS Annual Financial Sustainability Report 2024-25, actuarial peer review; Joint DRO statement).

5. Sequencing makes the Bill unsafe

The Bill’s sequencing is one of the central safety problems. The Government’s public timetable starts reductions and administrative restrictions in 2026, begins new planning in 2027, begins eligibility reassessments in 2028 and runs transition through 2030 (Health changes page). Foundational supports, Thriving Kids, functional capacity tools, home and living commissioning, support connection and market reforms are still being designed or consulted on (Health changes page).

The joint disability representative organisation statement says changes should not proceed before foundational supports are co-designed, tested, funded and operational (Joint DRO statement). The same statement makes the key legal point: an Explanatory Memorandum is not legislation and a roadmap is not an enforceable safeguard (Joint DRO statement).

The Bill therefore creates a cut-first, build-later pathway. That pathway is dangerous because people lose real supports immediately, while the promised alternatives remain uncertain, unfunded in practice, non-reviewable, or unavailable in thin markets (Health changes page; DPAC forum report).

Clause-by-Clause Findings

Appendix Overview

The separate clause-by-clause appendix reads the Bill against the current Act and addresses each substantive change group (NDIS Act 2013; the Bill). It groups the tracked insertions and deletions into legal mechanisms and explains what each enables in practice.

Table Coverage

• Financial sustainability
• Functional capacity
• All appropriate treatment
• Alternative supports
• Supports tied to eligible impairment
• Evidence tests
• Parental responsibility
• Support determinations
• Caps
• Reassessment
• Automatic renewal
• Non-contact suspension
• Claims limits
• Records and debts
• Information powers
• Provider regulation
• Pricing
• Plan management
• Support coordination
• ADM
• Transitional powers
• OIA failures (DPAC clause-by-clause appendix, attached)

Main Conclusion

The main conclusion is that the Bill shifts power away from individualised, reviewable support decisions and towards Ministerial instruments, rules, assessment tools, pricing determinations, standardised caps, automated decisions and Agency discretion (the Bill; Justice and Equity Centre explainer).

That shift is the real legal effect of the Bill.

7. Submissions to the Inquiry

DPAC’s analysis of the organisational submissions found that an overwhelming majority opposed or heavily qualified the Bill, with unqualified support confined to its own authors, the Department of Health, Disability and Ageing together with the NDIA (DPAC analysis, attached as an appendix). On DPAC’s analysis, no independent disability representative organisation, allied health body, union or expert supported the Bill as drafted (DPAC analysis, attached as an appendix).

The Senate inquiry received a very large public response in a short time, with ABC reporting more than 4,000 written submissions by 10 June 2026 (ABC report on inquiry submissions). That public response is consistent with the disability sector evidence that the Bill lacks community consent (SWAN submission; PWDA submission).

8. The copayment argument

Although co-payments are explicitly mentioned in the text of the Explanatory Memorandum as not being permitted, the Bill itself creates a functional gap-payment or forced under-service structure. This occurs where a person is assessed as needing a support but a cap, support determination, price rule or finite budget leaves less funding than the actual cost of the support (Appendix C: Copayment Mechanism).

The Health page says participants are not expected to pay a gap fee (Health changes page). That statement does not answer the practical problem. If the law funds less than the support costs, the person must go without support, reduce the amount or quality of support, rely on unpaid labour, use another unsafe system, or pay privately if they can (Appendix C: Copayment Mechanism). For self-managed participants in thin or specialised markets, the problem is sharper because paying above a pricing benchmark can mean buying fewer supports from the same capped budget (Appendix C: Copayment Mechanism).

Caps have been already introduced on equipment, according to equipment providers. Others report widespread refusals of provision of equipment and cuts to necessary support, even though the Bill has not yet passed. Some people with disability with higher support needs are reporting cuts of up to $200,000 per person/family. The June Quarterly report reinforces this anecdotal evidence.

9. Original legal and practical pitfalls that require

Committee attention

First, support determinations can create a gap between what a person needs and what the plan will actually fund. This can happen even without a formal co-payment rule because a cap below actual cost produces forced under-service (Health changes page; Appendix C: Copayment Mechanism).

Second, automatic renewal can make a changed legal position look like continuity. A person may have the same apparent plan while new caps, support determinations or reassessment barriers change what the plan is worth in practice (the Bill).

Third, the 90-day claims rule and record-keeping debt machinery can create Robodebt-like pressure if the system treats missing paperwork as a debt pathway without proving fraud or real overpayment (Villamanta submission; Robodebt Royal Commission report).

Fourth, an alternative support rule can exclude a person because a different system is theoretically responsible, even when that system is not available, safe, accessible or enforceable for that person (Justice and Equity Centre explainer; Joint DRO statement).

Fifth, evidence hierarchy provisions can discriminate against cohorts whose supports have not been well researched, including rare disability, psychosocial disability, complex disability, culturally specific supports and First Nations contexts (SWAN submission).

Sixth, a standardised functional capacity gate can produce false precision. A tool can look objective while missing fluctuating, relational, environmental and trauma-related support needs (Justice and Equity Centre explainer; DPAC forum report).

Seventh, provider regulation and pricing can reduce real choice if they shrink thin markets or exclude the small, local or trusted providers disabled people actually use (Health changes page).

Eighth, the Bill moves too much power into later instruments. Parliament cannot assess safety when the rules, tools, SOPIs and operational policies that will decide real outcomes are not public in final form (Health changes page; Robodebt Royal Commission report).

10. Response to the interim report and

dissenting reports

Public disability organisation summaries report that the Committee’s interim majority recommended the Bill proceed with clarification, a roadmap and related changes (Inclusion Australia Easy Read summary; WWDA extension report). DPAC’s response is that clarification cannot cure unsafe operative powers. If a safeguard is important, it must be in the Act, not in a later explanation (Joint DRO statement).

The Greens publicly stated that they would oppose the Bill and had secured more time for the inquiry, as well as proposed failsafe amendments on Ministerial powers, transparency around automated decision-making and protection from harmful restrictive practices (Greens media release). Public summaries of the Greens dissent say it called for withdrawal of the Bill, no removals before foundational supports are fully implemented and evaluated, stronger safeguards on automation, removal of broad Ministerial powers and protection against unwanted or inaccessible treatment pathways (AbilityNews summary; Powerd Media summary). We agree with this stance, with codicils around automation and other key issues outlined within this submission.

Public summaries of Senator David Pocock’s dissent identify sequencing, Robodebt-style automation safeguards and gendered impacts as central concerns (AbilityNews summary; Powerd Media summary). DPAC agrees with those concerns and adds that the correct remedy is withdrawal, not passage with clarification.

11. Recommendations

• The Committee should recommend that the Bill be withdrawn (Joint DRO statement).
• Any genuine fraud or integrity measures should be separated into a narrow Bill with full safeguards, disability consultation, accessible administration and no support-cutting powers (Villamanta submission).
• The Bill should contain no automated decision-making authorisation for NDIS access, planning, payments, claims, debts, suspensions, reassessments or provider action (Marie Johnson, RoboNDIS; Robodebt Royal Commission report).
• If Parliament ever considers ADM, it must first implement Robodebt Royal Commission recommendations 17.1 and 17.2, meet or exceed GDPR Article 22 safeguards, publish business rules and algorithms for independent expert and public scrutiny, and provide a right to human decision before harm occurs (Robodebt Royal Commission report; GDPR Article 22).
• No person should be reassessed, exited, capped or cut until foundational supports, Thriving Kids and mainstream alternatives are built, funded, operational, accessible, culturally safe, appealable and independently evaluated (Health changes page; Joint DRO statement).
• The Bill should remove support determinations, caps below assessed need, and any mechanism that lets a person be found to need a support but not receive enough funding to buy it (Justice and Equity Centre explainer; Appendix C: Copayment Mechanism).
• The Bill should remove the all appropriate treatment gate or replace it with a rights-based provision that respects bodily autonomy, actual access, side effects, contraindications, trauma and personal circumstances (Justice and Equity Centre explainer).
• The Bill should remove alternative support exclusions unless the alternative support is actually available, safe, accessible, funded, enforceable, culturally safe and reviewable for the individual person (Joint DRO statement).
• The Bill should keep whole-person planning and should not limit supports to the impairment that qualified a person for access (Justice and Equity Centre expleller).
• The Bill should remove or radically limit non-contact suspension, information demand and record-debt powers unless there are enforceable accessible communication, advocacy, safety and waiver safeguards (SWAN submission; Villamanta submission).
• The 90-day claims limit should not proceed unless there is a broad, reviewable and accessible discretion to pay late claims where disability, crisis, provider failure, family violence, hospitalisation, homelessness, nominee failure or Agency error contributed to delay (Villamanta submission).

• Support coordination and plan management should not be removed from individual choice before any replacement model is co-designed, funded, tested and independently evaluated (Health changes page; AbilityNews summary).
• A corrected impact analysis should be published and independently reviewed before any vote, including mortality, serious harm, distributional, market, automation, privacy, debt, unpaid care and review-rights impacts (OIA assessment; NDIS Annual Financial Sustainability Report 2024-25, actuarial peer review).
• Parliament should require public release of all draft rules, assessment tools, pricing instruments, support determinations, SOPIs, modelling, assumptions and cohort impact tables before further debate (Health changes page; Robodebt Royal Commission report).
• An independent monitoring body should report publicly on exits, deaths, hospitalisations, homeslessness, violence risk, support reductions, appeals, automation errors, provider market loss and unmet need throughout any reform process (NDIS Annual Financial Sustainability Report 2024-25, actuarial peer review; Robodebt Royal Commission report).

12. Conclusion

The Bill should not pass. The evidence base does not support passage as drafted, and it does not support passage with only clarifications, a roadmap or later rule-making. The operative legal effect is a transfer of power away from disabled people and individualised review, and towards Ministerial instruments, Agency discretion, standardised gates, caps, pricing controls and automated systems (the Bill; NDIS Act 2013; Justice and Equity Centre explainer).

DPAC’s final position is simple and evidence-based: no cuts before safe supports exist, no exits before alternatives exist, no caps below assessed need, no forced-treatment gate, no RoboNDIS, no hidden debt machinery, no roadmap as a substitute for law, and no Bill until disabled people have had real co-design power over the whole system (Joint DRO statement; DPAC forum report).

A suitable alternative pathway forward would be to review the recommendations of the Review with people with disability and our families, reassemble the Disability Royal Commission Task Force and roll out both sets of reviewed recommendations with transparency, accountability and true co-design. The community understands that savings must be found for government to deliver a surplus; however, the lives of disabled people will not be an acceptable trade-off in the eyes of the public in place of savings found around AUKUS submarines, Defence investments, gas or taxes for billionaires.

The NDIS was meant to be like Medicare – a plan that this country got right. Where everyone paid a little bit to make sure that if they became disabled, or had an accident or a disabled child, they would be protected from the cost of disability. Labor’s landmark reform, the promise that disability would no longer mean poverty, isolation, segregation or the institution; that a person’s worth would not be rationed to fit a budget line. That promise is now being silently rewritten in the language of sustainability, where “sustainable” means fewer of us, supported less, reviewed harder, and trusted least of all. A scheme built to let disabled people get what we need to be who we are, to have the same rights, responsibilities and opportunities as other Australians has been redrafted to return us to the pre-1980s conditions we fought to leave behind.

Labor can still choose which reform it wants to be remembered for: the one that lifted 700,000 Australians into a life, or the one that decided our lives were the saving. Withdraw the Bill, keep the promise, and find the money where it was always going to have to come from.

                                       -   Prepared by Samantha Connor AM for Disabled People Against Cuts

References

All external sources cited in this submission are listed below with full URLs. DPAC’s own analysis documents (the submissions analysis, the OIA analysis and the clause-by-clause reading) are provided as attached appendices to this submission.

1. Parliament of Australia, National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026, Bill page (Bill ID r7487): hhttps://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=r7487

2. Federal Register of Legislation, National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (latest in-force version): hhttps://www.legislation.gov.au/C2013A00020/latest

3. Department of Health, Disability and Ageing, NDIS Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026: hhtps://www.health.gov.au/our-work/ndis-legislation-changes/amendments/ndis- amendment-securing-the-ndis-for-future-generations-bill-2026

4. Department of Health, Disability and Ageing, About the changes to the NDIS: hhttps://www.health.gov.au/our-work/ndis-legislation-changes/amendments/ndis-amendment-securing-the- dis-for-future-generations-bill-2026/about-the-changes-to-the-ndis

5. NDIS, Annual Financial Sustainability Report 2024-25 (including the independent actuary peer review): httsp://www.ndis.gov.au/media/8187/download?attachment

6. NDIS Data and Insights, Summary of Statistics, reporting month May 2026: hhttp://dataresearch.ndis.gov.au/media/4540/download?attachment

7. Office of Impact Analysis, National Disability Insurance Scheme Reforms: https://oia.pmc.gov.au/published- impact-analyses-and-reports/national-disability-insurance-scheme-reforms

8. Royal Commission into the Robodebt Scheme, Report of the Royal Commission into the Robodebt Scheme: hhtps://robodebt.royalcommission.gov.au/system/files/2023-09/rrc-accessible-full-report.PDF

9. EUR-Lex, Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (General Data Protection Regulation), Article 22: httpp://eur- lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj/eng

10. Women With Disabilities Australia and joint disability representative organisations, Joint Statement: No cuts before alternative supports available (6 July 2026): hhhttps://wwda.org.au/2026/07/06/joint-statement-no- cuts-before-alternative-supports-available/

References

11. Justice and Equity Centre, Explainer on the 2026 NDIS Bill: https://jec.org.au/publication/explainer-national-disability-insurance-scheme-amendment-securing-the-ndis-for-future-generations-bill-2026/

12. Justice and Equity Centre, Submission on the National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026: https://jec.org.au/publication/submission-on-the-nationaldisability-insurance-schemeamendment-securing-the-ndis-forfuture-generations-bill-2026/

13. Marie Johnson, RoboNDIS: https://marie-johnson.com/robondis

14. People with Disability Australia, Submission on the NDIS Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026: https://pwd.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Submission-to-the-NDIS-Amendment-Securing-the-NDIS-for-Future-Generations-Bill-May-2026.pdf

15. Australian Greens, Greens secure longer inquiry into the NDIS: https://greens.org.au/news/media-release/greens-secure-longer-inquiry-ndis-government-support-failsafe-amendments-if

16. ABC News, Warning NDIS cuts could create unsafe environments (10 June 2026): [https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-06-10/ndis-cuts-could-create-unsafe-environments-inquiry-warned/106780028](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-06-10/ndis-cuts-could-create-unsafe-environment…

17. ABC News, Disability advocates welcome inquiry extension (23 June 2026): https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-06-23/ndis-bill-senate-inquiry-extended/106818164

18. Inclusion Australia, What we think about the NDIS Bill interim report (Easy Read): [https://www.inclusionaustralia.org.au/what-we-think-about-the-ndis-bill-interim-report-easy-read/](https://www.inclusionaustralia.org.au/what-we-think-a…

19. AbilityNews, Senate fractures over NDIS report: [https://www.abilitynews.org/p/senate-fractures-over-ndis-report](https://www.abilitynews.org/p/senat….

20. Powerd Media, NDIS inquiry report released, Greens secure amendments: [https://powerd.media/news/ndis-inquiry-report-released-greens-secure-amendments](https://powerd.media/new…

Appendix A. Clause-by-clause analysis of every tracked change

This appendix groups the 1,403 tracked insertions and deletions in the marked-up NDIS Act into substantive legal change groups. It does not treat government headings or explanatory claims as neutral. For each provision it identifies the legal mechanism, the operational pathway, the affected cohorts, the rights impact and the caveats and gaps.

Disabled People Against Cuts Australia | web www.dpacaustralia.net | email dpacaustralia@gmail.com

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risky or unacceptable to the illness, pain, trauma interfere with bodily personal delivered on a regular basis. person. history and complex autonomy. circumstances. medical needs. 5. Alternative New s 25B and The Bill permits People may be denied NDIS First Nations people Rights are weakened if Foundational and A person should not Justice and support excluded exclusion where the access or supports because aged 50 and over, actual availability, mainstream lose NDIS support Equity Centre requirements impairment Agency says another a theoretical health, aged older disabled quality and safety of supports are not yet because a different explainer; Joint concepts system is more care, education or people, children, alternatives are not built, funded, tested system is imagined DRO statement appropriate. mainstream service is said people in thin enforceable. or evaluated. on paper. to exist. markets and people in unsafe family settings. 6. Support tied to s 34(1)(aa) and Supports must be tied The Agency can separate a People with multiple Whole-person planning Disability impacts The Bill risks funding DPAC analysis eligible related support more directly to the person into eligible and disabilities, is undermined and are often interactive a diagnosis label, (attached as an impairment tests impairment that ineligible impairments and cumulative disability, participants may need and cannot be not the disabled appendix); qualified the person for refuse supports for the rest. psychosocial to relitigate which cleanly separated. person. PWDA the NDIS. disability, acquired impairment causes submission brain injury, chronic each need. illness and ageing effects. 7. Evidence s 34(1E) to s The Bill narrows Supports can be refused Rare disability, It may privilege Research evidence A support should not Justice and evidence hierarchy and 34(1F) reasonable and where peer-reviewed complex disability, published evidence is uneven across be refused merely Equity Centre value for money necessary supports evidence is thin even when psychosocial over disabled people, disability groups and because the submission; supports through through evidence and lived experience and treating disability, children, families and treating support types. evidence base SWAN evidence and value-for-money tests. evidence show the support regional participants professionals. ignores the cohort. submission is needed. and culturally specific supports. 8. Parental s 34(1G) to s The Bill hardens tests The Agency can assume Children, young It shifts public support The Bill does not The Bill risks making SWAN responsibility and 34(1J) about what parents, unpaid care should absorb people, single burdens to families and create a safe-care unpaid family labour submission; informal supports family or informal needs that are currently parents, exhausted can increase neglect, capacity test for a substitute for NDIS DPAC forum supports should funded. carers, families in crisis and each household. supports. report provide. poverty and family institutionalisation risk. violence survivors. 9. Other service s 34(1) The Bill strengthens NDIS support can be denied People in hospital, People can fall between Australian service No disabled person Justice and system more changes refusal where another because health, education, school, custody, systems when no other systems have should be cut off Equity Centre appropriate service system is said housing or justice is said to homelessness, aged service actually delivers known gaps and are because another explainer; Joint to be more appropriate. be responsible. the support. not enforceably department should DRO statement

Disabled People Against Cuts Australia | web www.dpacaustralia.net | email dpacaustralia@gmail.com

care, regional areas

available to all have helped but did and thin markets. participants. did not.

Support New s 34A

The Minister can reduce funding for classes of supports by percentage or other rules. The provision enables scheme-wide or cohort-level cuts to existing old framework plans. People relying on social, civic and community participation, therapy, psychosocial and capacity-building supports. Individualised funding is displaced by legislative instruments that may not be merits reviewable as individual decisions. Health page says social, civic and community participation budgets are to be reset by 50 percent and capacity building daily activities by 10 percent from October 2026. This is a statutory cut power, not just a planning clarification. Health changes page; Justice and Equity Centre explainer.

Plan caps on amount,

frequency,duration and ratios ss 33(2EA) and 33(2EB) The Bill permits caps on supports in old framework plans. Assessed need can be higher than the funded cap. Participants needing high-intensity support, therapy, communication, behaviour support and community participation. A person can be found to need a support but still not receive enough funding to buy it. The gap between assessed need and capped funding is not solved by saying providers cannot charge above a price limit. Appendix C: Copayment Mechanism; Health changes page

Reassessment restrictions

ss 48 and 48A The Bill restricts participant-initiated reassessment and creates delay windows. People who run out of funding or face sudden life changes may be unable to get a timely plan change. People with fluctuating disability, deteriorating conditions, family breakdown, hospitalisation or institutionalisation. Underutilisation can reflect market failure and crisis, not lower need. A plan that cannot change when life changes is not a safety plan. SWAN submission; Justice and Equity Centre explainer

Automatic renewal and old plans

ts 50A and transitional plan provisions The Bill allows old plans to be automatically renewed. A renewed plan may carry forward inadequate funding or apply new restrictions without a fresh individualised merits process. Current participants, especially those with old framework plans have practical review opportunities if no clear decision is made during transition to 2030. The transition period is long and overlaps with cuts, reassessments and new planning design. DPAC analysis (attached as an appendix); Health changes page

Non-contact suspension or revocation

provisions s 40A and related The Bill permits plan suspension or access consequences where a failure to navigate NDIA communication can become a pathway to loss of support. People with intellectual disability, psychosocial supports accessible administrative non-contact can become enforceable. The Bill does not create enforceable support because the person should not lose disability.

person cannot be disability, loss of support, not just communication, Agency failed to Villamanta contacted or homelessness, follow-up. advocacy and safety reach them safely. submission information is not hospitalisation, checks before provided. domestic violence, suspension. inaccessible

                                                                             communication
                                                                         needs and no
                       advocate.

15. Claims time s 45A The Bill reduces the Participants and providers Self-managers, plan A paperwork delay can Strict timeframes hit A 90-day rule Health changes limit claim period from two lose payment rights for late managers, small become unpaid people with punishes disability page; Villamarta years to 90 days. claims except where providers, regional support, provider executive function, administration failure submission; discretion applies. providers, people in withdrawal or debt trauma, language, as if it were fraud. crisis, hospital and pressure. digital and advocacy family violence barriers. situations. 16. Record s 45B and debt The Bill strengthens Participants can be required Self-managed The burden of proof Villamanta warns Debt should never Villamanta keeping and machinery record-keeping duties to prove claims after the participants, shifts towards disabled strict documentary be created from submission; debts and debt event or face repayment families, nominees people in a system rules can harm inaccessible Robodebt Royal consequences. pressure. and people using where records may not people who lack administration Commission informal or small exist or be recoverable. capacity or without proof of report providers. resources to obtain overpayment and records. fair review. 17. Information- s 53 changes The Bill expands The Agency can demand People with Privacy, procedural Australian privacy Information powers GDPR Article gathering powers and related information demands more information and cognitive disability, fairness and practical and ADM must be limited, 22; Marie powers on participants, connect non-compliance to psychosocial access are weakened if safeguards remain necessary, Johnson, nominees and others. plan or access disability, trauma, demands are broad or weaker than GDPR- accessible and RoboNDIS consequences. poverty, unstable inaccessible. style protections for independently housing and limited significant reviewable. advocacy. automated decisions. 18. Provider New s 10C The Bill creates a broad More people and services Small providers, sole Poorly sequenced Mandatory Provider regulation Health changes definition statutory provider can be brought into traders, peer regulation can shrink registration rolls out should not remove page; DPAC definition. compliance, pricing, supports, culturally thin markets and later, with design still the only support a analysis payment and record specific services, reduce real choice. in progress. person can actually (attached as an systems. regional workers use. appendix) Disabled People Against Cuts Australia | web www.dpacaustralia.net | email dpacaustralia@gmail.com

Page 22

and informal markets. 19. Inspectors, NDIA inspector The Bill adds integrity Fraud control powers are Participants, Anti-fraud framing can The OIA analysis did Fraud powers OIA inspectors and investigator and compliance machinery. Fraud control powers are bundled with eligibility cuts, nominees, self- to conceal broad coercive did not assess many should be split from assessment; call for compliance powers enforcement provisions provisions support caps and participant managers, providers fraud cases. The design and safeguards are not complete at passage. A panel is not choice if the person loses trust. (attached as an appendix)

Plan management ss 73EA and panel model for plan manager may be reduced through commissioned arrangements. trusted plan managers, people needing advocacy through plan management. support coordination and navigation connection changes movement towards commissioning support connection services. People with complex needs, psychosocial disability, housing risk, violence risk transition needs.

Support coordination and navigation commissioning changes supports movement toward commissioned support connection services. People with complex needs, psychosocial disability, housing risk, violence risk transition needs.

Pricing determinations s45C The Minister can make pricing determinations and provider price limits. Pricing can be used to control markets and participant purchasing in ways that affect supply and quality. All participants, with higher risk in thin markets and specialised supports. Price control without market evidence can remove providers or reduce service quality. Price caps do not protect a person if the funded amount is too low to buy the support. Create private payment pressure.

Self-managed carve-out s45C(2) Price caps do not apply in the same way to selfmanaged purchasing. Self managed people pay more than government price and therefore buy fewer supports from finite budget. This creates practical gap-payment pressure even if not labelled co-payment. Legal accuracy says Bill does not create formal provider copayment duty but can create underfunding and forced structure.

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private payment

pressure.

Automated decision-making (ss 59B to 59E)

The Bill authorises computerised decisions for designated provisions and allows expansion by instruments. Automation can enter claims, payments, plan approvals and later functions if designated. All participants, with greatest risk for people who cannot detect or challenge errors quickly. Review rights after harm do not prevent unsafe decisions at scale. Robodebt shows that automated welfare administration does not affect access, supports, payments, debts, suspension, review or safety without strong legal, audit and human safeguards can cause grave harm. No automated NDIS decision is acceptable where it still harms people first.

Standard operating procedure (ss 59B to 59E)\ninstruments for automation\nThe Government says a statement is not the same as independent audit, source-rule publication, merits review of logic or a right to human decision before effect.

People affected by automated claim rejection, payment delay, plan approval or debt processes. Transparency after system design does not ensure fairness, safety or legality. Seven days before tabling is not enough for disabled people and experts to test automated decision system effects. A published procedure is not a safeguard if the automated decision still harms people first.

Correcting automated decisions (ADM correction and review provisions)\nThe Bill contemplates correction and review pathways.

The burden may fall on disabled people to notice an error, gather evidence and appeal in time. People with cognitive disability, psychosocial disability, low literacy, no advocate or unstable housing. Post-decision review is weaker than a human decision made lawfully in the first place. GDPR Article 22 gives a right not to be subject to solely automated significant decisions, with human intervention and contest rights in limited exceptions. The NDIS should meet or exceed GDPR safeguards, not fall below them.

Nominee and compensation penalties (Nominee, compensation amendments)

The Bill strengthens compliance and penalty settings around nominees and compensation. Administrative or third-party issues can affect participant plans, debts or access. Participants under nomineeship, people with intellectual disability, acquired brain injury and psychosocial disability. Punished for failures by others or systems outside their control. The interaction with safeguarding, supported decision-making and violence risk is under-assessed. Compliance powers must not punish the disabled person for another person or institution failing.

New framework planning (Schedule 4 and transition provisions from 2027 to 2030.)

The Bill moves towards new framework plans standardised and budget-centred before foundational transitioning over several years. All current participants individualised review rights can be weakened if budgets are set by tools, caps or replacement architecture still incomplete. do not legislate the transition before the new planning\nHealth changes page; Justice and Equity Centre explainer

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supports and assessment instruments rather than system is public and tools are proven.

full merits assessment. tested.

29. Transitional Schedules and Henry VIII style powers transitional rule-making powers. Ministers can change practical legal effects through instruments during transition. All participants and prospective participants. Parliamentary scrutiny is reduced when major roadmap or EM is not legislation and is not an enforceable safeguard. Joint DRO statement; DPAC analysis

30. Commencement from 1 October 2026 to 2030 support budget resets begin 1 October 2026, claims limits begin 1 December 2026, new planning begins 1 April 2027 and eligibility reassessments begin 1 January 2028. Cuts and administrative restrictions begin before the alternative support system is complete. People relying on the targeted supports in 2026 and people moved through reassessment later. replacement support exists. The order of implementation creates foreseeable harm because support is reduced before replacement support exists. Foundational supports and Thriving Kids design sequencing problem is cut first, build later. Health changes page; Joint DRO statement

31. Inquiry process and consultation timing and interim report The Bill was introduced on 14 May 2026 and the committee process initially gave an extremely short submission period. The process did not allow adequate scrutiny of a large Bill and extensive explanatory material. Procedural fairness in law-making is weakened where affected people cannot reasonably analyse the law. All disabled people and organisations trying to understand and respond to the Bill. The inquiry was extended to 14 August 2026 but the interim majority still recommended passage until actual legal safeguards are in place according to public disability organisation summaries. APH Bill page; WWDA update;

32. Office of Impact Analysis and OIA adequacy rating Impact analysis rated as adequate, second lowest rating, corrections made after decision regarding percentage and fraud-indicator errors. Major legal powers proceeded without reliable public assessment of distributional, mortality, automation, debt and rights impacts hidden inside averages. Policy risk high when modelling corrected after assessment and not transparently reassessed. A corrected impact analysis must be published before Parliament votes.

33. Mortality and AFSR peer review

The reviewing actuary Mortality among high- SIL participants, Any claim that no one The peer review The evidence NDIS Annual safety evidence review and SIL dead for support participants is a known and modelled issue, support participants with high support needs withdrawal lacks an evidence base. deaths were risk of preventable Sustainability Financial Report 2024-25, is foreseeable risk, reduced before safe quarterly supplements; DPAC deaths analysis (attached as an appendix) of suicides and attempted suicides, as well as other deaths, including filicides

34. Submission DPAC analysis

DPAC’s analysis of the organisational submissions found an overwhelming majority opposed or heavily qualified the Bill, with unqualified support confined to its own authors, the Department of Health, Disability and Ageing together with the NDIA.

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Appendix B. How an impact analysis for this Bill should have been written

Purpose

This appendix analyses the government’s Impact Analysis submission to the Office of Impact Analysis and sets out the minimum standard for a corrected impact analysis.

The Bill is listed by the Parliament as the National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 and was introduced on 14 May 2026 (APH Bill page). The Department says the Bill clarifies eligibility and supports, addresses fraud and updates governance and administration (Health Bill page).

DPAC’s position is that the impact analysis must test the operative legal effect, not the Department’s description of the Bill.

Profile of the impact analysis evidence base

Submissions and lived evidence

Organisational and community evidence

Legal, clinical, lived-experience and The evidence base is large, urgent and The impact analysis must include

rights impacts not fully reflected in the majority interim distributional and rights impacts, not framing (ABC report on inquiry only fiscal savings. submissions; WWDA update).

Minimum standard for a corrected impact analysis

A corrected impact analysis must answer these questions before Parliament votes: e

1. What exact provisions cut, cap, delay or remove support, and who is exposed to each provision (NDIS Act 2013)? e
2. What are the expected exits, support reductions, underutilisation changes, appeal rates, debt creation, unpaid care shifts, provider exits, hospitalisations, homelessness, violece risks and mortality outcomes (SWAN submission; DPAC forum report)? e
3. What assumptions are made about foundational supports, Thriving Kids, mainstream health, education, housing, aged care and justice services, and are those services funded, operational, accessible and enforceable before any NDIS reduction occurs (Health changes page; Joint DRO statement)? e
4. What are the impacts by disability type, First Nations status, age, gender, remoteness, homelessness, family violence, SIL or SDA status, plan management status, support intensity and communication access need (SWAN submission)? e
5. What is the value of harm, including loss of life, serious injury, hospitalisation, institutionalisation, family breakdown, unpaid care, lost work, review burden and provider market loss (NDIS Annual Financial Sustainability Report 2024-25, actuarial peer review)? e
6. What automated decisions will be made, what data will feed them, what error rates are expected, how bias will be tested, who audits the logic and what happens before a wrong decision harms a person (Robodebt Royal Commission report; GDPR Article 22)? e
7. Which asserted safeguards are binding law, which are merely EM statements, which depend on later instruments and which depend on operational discretion (Justice and Equity Centre explainer)?

Why the existing impact process is not enough

The OIA entry states that an impact analysis was prepared and assessed as adequate, but it also records that the Department corrected errors after the assessment process (OIA assessment). A rating of adequate is not a finding that the proposal is safe, rights-compatible or properly sequenced. It is a procedural rating of the impact analysis process (OIA assessment).

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Required corrected impact analysis structure

Section What it must include Why it matters

• Clause inventory Every Bill item, grouped by legal mechanism and commencement Prevents selective analysis of only favourable parts of the Bill. date
• Cohort exposure table Number and characteristics of people exposed to each gate, cap, Shows who carries the risk, not only total scheme savings. automation power or debt power
• Distributional impact model Effects by disability, age, gender, First Nations status, remoteness, Prevents averages hiding severe harm to high-risk groups. support intensity, plan management and living setting
• Sequencing map Date each cut starts, date each replacement starts, funding status Tests whether people are cut before alternatives exist. and enforceability
• Mortality and serious harm model Deaths, serious injury, hospitalisation, homelessness, family violence, Life-and-death impacts cannot be treated as zero. institutionalisation and suicide risk
• Automation impact assessment Decision types, datasets, logic, errors, bias testing, human review, Robodebt-style failure risk must be assessed before automation is audit and redress authorised.
• Market impact model Provider exits, thin markets, self-management effects, price cap A funded plan is useless if no safe provider remains. effects and regional supply
• Rights and review assessment Which decisions remain reviewable, which are hidden in instruments Review rights are a core safeguard. and which are not individual merits decisions
• Alternatives analysis Split fraud bill, delayed eligibility bill, no-cuts-before-supports option OIA should compare real alternatives, not only the Government’s and co-designed replacement options chosen package.

The Department’s public implementation page shows that support budget resets start from 1 October 2026, the claims period changes from 1 December 2026, new framework planning starts from 1 April 2027 and eligibility reassessments start from 1 January 2028 (Health changes page). That timetable proves the sequencing problem: reductions and administrative barriers begin before replacement systems have been built, funded, tested and independently evaluated (Joint DRO statement).

The NDIS Summary of Statistics reports 779,210 participants at the end of May 2026 and 50.87 billion dollars in paid supports over the 12 months to May 2026 (NDIS Summary of Statistics). Those scheme-wide figures do not tell Parliament which participants will lose social participation support, therapy, support coordination, home support, behaviour support or access when caps, reassessments and support determinations apply (Health changes page).

The peer review evidence means mortality cannot be dismissed. The reviewing actuary recorded that deaths for participants with higher support needs were considerably higher than expected and that SIL mortality rates had increased (NDIS Annual Financial Sustainability Report 2024-25, actuarial peer review). The safe conclusion is not that every death was caused by the NDIS or that every death was preventable. The safe conclusion is that mortality is real, material and model-relevant, so Parliament cannot accept any categorical claim that support withdrawal has no life-and-death risk (NDIS Annual Financial Sustainability Report 2024-25, actuarial peer review).

Appendix Recommendation

The Committee should recommend that the Bill not proceed unless a corrected impact analysis is published, independently reviewed, consulted on with disabled people and disability representative organisations, and re-assessed by the OIA after all corrections and all draft rules, tools and SOPIs are public (OIA assessment; Joint DRO statement; Robodebt Royal Commission report).

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Appendix C

What the Bill Says About Co-Payments

Note: DPAC gave evidence at the Melbourne hearing. We were asked to clarify our testimony that in our view, the current of the wording of the Bill enabled co-payments to be implemented. This appendix is an explanation of that testimony and viewpoint.

The Explanatory Memorandum (EM) to the National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 (the Bill) uses the word “co-payment” in one relevant place - to say they are prohibited.

Proposed subsection 45C(7) states:

  "An NDIS provider must not charge more than the maximum amount prescribed in the pricing determination. The intent of this provision is to ensure the prohibition on private billing, or 'co-payments', which has existed since the Scheme commenced, is captured as part of these proposed amendments."\n

(Commonwealth of Australia, 2026a)

The Bill formally re-encodes the existing ban on providers privately billing above the price cap. That is the government’s stated public position.

The actual co-payment mechanism, however, is not named as such. It arises from the combination of three interlocking provisions, each of which is set out below.

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The Three Provisions That Create the Co-Payment Structure

1. Section 34A - Minister’s Power to Reduce Plan Funding Below the Cost of Supports [Schedule 1, Part 4, Item 34 of the Bill]

This is the core structural mechanism. The Minister may by legislative instrument cut funding for a group of supports by a set percentage (Department of Health and Aged Care, 2026a). The critical provision is proposed subsection 34A(5):

    "(5) To avoid doubt, the determination has effect even if the result is either or both of the following:
    (a) the funding provided under a participant's plan for a reasonable and necessary support is less than the total cost of the support;
    (b) the funding provided under a participant's plan for all reasonable and necessary supports funded under the plan taken as a whole is less than the total costs of the
   supports." 

(Commonwealth of Australia, 2026a)

This is a deliberate, explicit statutory acknowledgement that NDIS funding can be set below the actual price of a support - even one already assessed as reasonable and necessary for that participant. The Bill is silent on what fills that gap. The participant either goes without the support, sources it from elsewhere, or pays the difference personally. The EM does not use the word “co-payment” here and does not address the gap consequence (Commonwealth of Australia, 2026a).

The Ministerial trigger for this power is described in Government materials as “ensuring the financial sustainability of the Scheme” - a broad objective. The only procedural constraint, as described in the EM, is proposed subsection 34A(3): the Minister must “have regard to the safety of participants” (Commonwealth of Australia, 2026a).

People with Disability Australia (PWDA, 2026) stated in its submission to the Senate that this provision allows the Minister to reduce funding “without any consideration of individual needs” and with no clear avenue for individual merits review of the Ministerial determination itself and recommended its removal from the Bill entirely (PWDA, 2026, Recommendation 13).

As a practical example of how section 34A would operate if the Bill passes in its current form: from 1 October 2026, a participant’s plan may still show a dollar amount on paper for social and community participation, but a Ministerial instrument will reduce the amount the participant can actually spend within that category (Kindship, 2026). The plan amount and the spendable amount are different figures.

Sections 33(2EA) and 33(2EB)

Caps on Maximum Plan Funding Amounts

[Schedule 1, Part 6, Item 68 of the Bill]

These new subsections allow the Minister to specify, by determination, a maximum funding amount, maximum intensity (hours or frequency), and maximum worker-to- participant ratio for any support or class of supports, applying to participants generally or a defined cohort (Conway Group, 2026).

The EM is explicit that these caps apply regardless of actual support cost. Note 1 to proposed subsection 33(2EB) states:

   "Subsections (2E), (2EA) and (2EB) apply regardless of whether a funding component amount meets the actual cost of supports in the group of supports to which it
    relates." 

(Commonwealth of Australia, 2026a, p. 51, as cited in Conway Group, 2026)

The practical consequence is set out in the EM’s own worked example: a planner may assess 30 hours of therapy per discipline as reasonable and necessary for a participant. A group cap then limits the plan to 25 hours. The cap applies even though it does not meet the actual cost of the support (Conway Group, 2026). The NDIS has assessed the need. The NDIS has accepted the support as reasonable and necessary. It has still capped funding below what the support actually costs.

The same silence on consequences applies. Once the maximum is set, that is the ceiling on what can go into a plan - actual cost above that ceiling is unaddressed in the Bill.

A secondary concern is that if cap values are contained in referenced documents rather than in the primary legislative instrument itself, the Agency may update those numbers without any further parliamentary vote (PAIOR, 2026). Cap levels could therefore be reduced progressively through administrative action.

Section 45C

Minister’s Pricing Determination, with Self-Managed Carve-Out

[Schedule 3, Part 1, Item 4 of the Bill]

Proposed section 45C(1) gives the Minister power to set maximum prices for supports by legislative instrument, replacing the NDIA’s administrative Price Guide with a Ministerial determination (Department of Health and Aged Care, 2026a; Conway Group, 2026).

Proposed section 45C(2)** contains** the critical carve-out:

“(2) A determination under subsection (1) does not apply in relation to the acquisition or provision of a support or class of supports under a participant’s plan unless the funding for the support or class of supports is managed by: (a) a registered plan management provider; or (b) the Agency.”

(Commonwealth of Australia, 2026a)

The price cap does not apply to self-managed participants. The EM explains the consequence:

“This recognises that self-managed participants, as informed consumers, are empowered to make trade-offs within their NDIS budget and can elect to pay prices for supports above the maximum limit with the knowledge that this would reduce the volume of supports they could otherwise purchase.”

(Commonwealth of Australia, 2026a)

Self-managed participants can pay above the capped price - but only from within their NDIS budget, depleting it faster. Kindship Plan Management (2026), drawing on the Bill’s text, confirms that the price cap applies to plan-managed and Agency-managed supports but “not self-managed.”,

Proposed section 45C**(9)(b)(ii) then enables differentiated pricing between registered and unregistered providers:

“(b) different kinds of providers, including, without limitation, in relation to: (i) qualifications or experience; or (ii) whether the providers are registered NDIS providers.”

(Commonwealth of Australia, 2026a)

The government has separately announced consultation from July 2026 on implementing lower price caps for unregistered providers delivering social, community and capacity-building supports (PAIOR, 2026; Conway Group, 2026). If those lower caps are set, and a self-managed participant uses an unregistered provider who charges more than the lower cap, the participant’s NDIS budget is depleted faster to cover the difference. This is a functional co-payment drawn from within the participant’s own allocation.

What This Gives Rise To

Taken together, these three provisions create a de facto participant contribution structure without using the words “co-payment” or “out of pocket.” The legal structure is:

• Mechanism Provision Effect
• Plan funding cut below cost of support s.34A(5) Participant’s plan may explicitly not cover the full cost of a support. The gap is unaddressed in the Bill.
• Maximum caps on plan amounts s.33(2EA), Note 1 to Maximum applies even where it does not meet actual cost of supports regardless of cost s.33(2EB)
• Price caps do not apply to self-managed s.45C(2) Self-managed participants absorb above-cap costs from within their NDIS budget participants
• Differentiated lower prices for s.45C(9)(b)(ii) Enables a lower cap for unregistered providers, accelerating NDIS budget depletion for self- unregistered providers managed participants using those providers

The EM notes in its Regulatory Impact Statement that the Aged Care “Support at Home” program requires participants to contribute co-payments. That comparison is included in the EM’s background materials but explicitly stated to apply to aged care, not the NDIS. Its inclusion is notable (Commonwealth of Australia, 2026a).

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The Core Legal Concern

The combination of sections 34A(5) and 33(2EA)/(2EB) creates a structure identified by Advocacy for Inclusion (2026) as carrying a structural Robodebt-parallel risk, with PWDA (2026) raising analogous concerns about Ministerial instruments set outside Parliament and the absence of meaningful individual merits review: a determination can systematically reduce funding below the cost of supports across an entire cohort of participants, with no statutory obligation to address the resulting gap, no mandatory merits review, and no prescribed consequence for the participant when funded supports become unaffordable.

The Bill does not prohibit participants from paying the gap personally. It simply never says they must - and never says they do not have to.

The Explanatory Memorandum expressly states that NDIS funding “can be less than the actual cost of providing or acquiring the support” that a participant requires. At the Bill’s introduction press conference on 14 May 2026, the Minister was asked directly three times about gap payments. He responded “No” when asked whether participants would pay gap fees. When pressed to reconcile that denial with s.34A(5)’s explicit acknowledgement that funding can be set below cost, the Minister stated: “I don’t have anything to add to what I just said.” When asked a third time — “Who pays the gap?” — he did not answer the question, instead describing the differentiated pricing powers the Bill confers on the Minister (Department of Health and Aged Care, 2026b).

References

Advocacy for Inclusion. (2026). NDIS Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission to the Senate Community Affairs Legislation Committee.

Commonwealth of Australia. (2026a). National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026: Explanatory Memorandum. Parliament of Australia. https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=r7487

Conway Group. (2026, May 14). The NDIS Bill has landed. Here’s what’s actually in it for Allied Health providers. https://www.conwaygroup.com.au/insights/the-ndis-bill-has- landed-heres-whats-actually-in-it-for-allied-health-providers

Department of Health and Aged Care. (2026a). NDIS Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026: Fact sheet PDF

Disabled People Against Cuts Australia | web www.dpacaustralia.net | email dpacaustralia@gmail.com

Department of Health and Aged Care.

(2026b). Press conference with Minister Butler, Parliament House - 14 May 2026. Australian Government. https://www.health.gov.au/ministers/the-hon-mark-butler-mp/media/press-conference-with-minister-butler-parliament-house-14-may-2026

Kindship Plan Management. (2026, May 19). NDIS Reform Bill 2026: What it means for families with disabled kids. https://www.kindship.com.au/blog/ndis-reform-bill-2026- what-it-means-for-families-with-disabled-kids

PAIOR. (2026, May 22). Nine potential impacts on participants if the 2026 NDIS Bill is passed [LinkedIn post]. https://www.linkedin.com/posts/paior_this-video-goes- through9of-the-potential-activity-7463842620767653888-mvbA

People with Disability Australia (PWDA). (2026, May). Submission to the NDIS Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 [PDF]. https://pwd.org.au/wp- tent/uploads/2026/05/Submission-to-the-NDIS-Amendment-Securing-the-NDIS-for-Future-Generations-Bill-May-2026.pdf

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