Submission 2749
Submission on the NDIS Amendment Bill (2026)
Name: Jonathan Laloz
Role: Disabled person and peer support worker
- Introduction I am an autistic person (Level 2) with ADHD, and I run a small business supporting other autistic and neurodivergent people. I am also an NDIS participant myself, having waited three years to access the scheme despite significant day-to-day difficulties relating to my disability. I am submitting in my capacity as both a participant and a peer support worker with direct experience of how the NDIS functions - and fails - in practice.
I ask the committee to consider my lived and professional experience when reviewing this Bill.
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Overall Position I have serious concerns about this Bill in its current form and believe it should not be passed in its current form. I am not opposed to reform - the NDIS must evolve to remain sustainable and effective. However, reform of this magnitude must be done carefully, with genuine consultation with people with disability and those who support them. Changes that are poorly designed and/or rushed risk causing significant, and in some cases irreversible, harm to some of the most vulnerable people in Australia.
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Key Concerns 3.1 Broad funding adjustments without individualised consideration
The Bill’s provisions allowing funding adjustments across entire categories of supports, rather than through individualised decisions, is deeply concerning. Disability is not uniform. Two people with the same diagnosis can have vastly different support needs, and what may appear to be a non-essential support category on paper can be critical to an individual’s stability and wellbeing. Furthermore, a person’s support needs can vary significantly from day to day - a good day does not negate the need for support on a bad one. Episodic or fluctuating conditions, including many mental health conditions and neurodevelopmental disabilities, are particularly poorly served by a system that assesses need at a single point in time or adjusts funding based on broad categories rather than individual experience. Any funding decisions must account for this variability, or they will systematically underestimate the needs of some of the people the scheme exists to support.
Social and community access is a clear example. It may appear discretionary, but for many of the people I work with it is a primary means of reducing isolation, maintaining mental health, and building the skills needed for greater independence. Cutting this category broadly, without assessing individual impact, is likely to increase mental health crises and place greater pressure on hospital and emergency systems - a false economy that shifts costs rather than reducing them.
I have worked with people who ran out of funding mid-plan and regressed significantly while waiting for renewal. The support required to help them recover was far greater than what would have been needed had their funding been maintained. In the most serious cases, people have been hospitalised. I am also aware of a former client who died after losing access to adequate support. These are not hypothetical risks. They are real and documented outcomes of funding gaps.
Submission 2749
3.2 “Not contactable” provisions
The proposed provisions that allow supports to be paused or affected when a participant cannot be contacted are particularly dangerous for the people I work with. There are many legitimate reasons a person may not be reachable within a required timeframe - they may be in hospital, experiencing a mental health crisis, in a period of autistic burnout, or simply unable to communicate by phone due to the nature of their disability. The irony is that the NDIS agency will phone people who cannot use the phone, and then treat their non-response as non-engagement.
Removing or pausing support during these periods punishes people for their disability at precisely the moment they are most vulnerable. This provision should not proceed without robust protections and clearly defined exceptions for circumstances beyond a participant’s control.
3.3 Eligibility and assessment changes
Disability does not lend itself to a single standardised assessment tool. The functional impact of a condition varies enormously between individuals, and between the same individual across different days and circumstances. Any move toward a one-size-fits-all assessment model risks systematically excluding people whose needs are real but don’t present in a way the tool is designed to capture.
3.4 Automated decision-making and ministerial powers
The expansion of automated decision-making and ministerial discretion over the scheme is one of the most serious concerns raised by this Bill. The Robodebt scandal demonstrated in the starkest possible terms what happens when automated systems make consequential decisions about vulnerable people without adequate human oversight. The lesson from that catastrophe must not be forgotten.
There needs to be a human being responsible for every decision that affects a participant’s supports. Automation may appropriately play a role in informing those decisions, but it cannot replace human judgment and accountability. Equally, giving a minister unchecked power to set pricing creates a system where funding levels become subject to political priorities rather than the genuine needs of participants. The minister of the day will have their own agenda, and there is no guarantee that agenda will align with the wellbeing of people with disability.
3.5 Foundational supports and transitional arrangements
At the time of this submission, foundational supports have not yet been implemented in any meaningful way. Moving people off the NDIS before alternative supports are fully established, properly resourced, and proven to work is premature and risks serious harm. Any transition must be underpinned by clear, legislated arrangements that guarantee no one falls through the gap between the existing scheme and whatever replaces it.
The federal government must ensure that, as foundational supports are rolled out throughout the states and territories, there are clear national standards governing how providers are selected and funded. Early indications from some jurisdictions suggest a preference for not-for-profit providers, which risks excluding experienced providers from the private sector who have built genuine expertise in supporting specific disability cohorts. The Commonwealth has both the authority and the responsibility to ensure that provider selection across all jurisdictions is based on quality and outcomes, not organisational structure. This should be legislated or enshrined in national agreements, not left to the discretion of individual states.
Submission 2749
If foundational supports are delivered through a grants-based model, there is a real risk that providers who are already delivering these supports effectively will be forced to compete for the right to continue doing so. This creates unnecessary disruption for both providers and the participants who rely on them, and favours larger organisations with dedicated administrative capacity over smaller, specialist operators. Continuity of support matters - particularly for people with disability for whom changes in provider can be genuinely destabilising.
3.6 Workforce viability
The viability of the disability support workforce is directly tied to the health of the NDIS. When participants lose funding, have their plans disrupted, or disengage from the scheme due to administrative overwhelm, the providers and workers who support them are affected too. A scheme that systematically reduces participant access to supports will, over time, drive experienced and specialist workers out of the sector entirely. This loss of workforce capacity is not easily reversed - expertise built over years cannot be quickly replaced when demand returns. This Bill, if passed in its current form, risks destabilising not just participants but the workforce that serves them, ultimately reducing the quality and availability of supports for disabled people across the country.
3.7 Cumulative burden
It is also important to consider the cumulative effect of these changes. Taken individually, each additional administrative requirement may appear minor. Taken together, they represent a significant increase in bureaucratic burden - one that falls disproportionately on the people least equipped to carry it. For many participants, navigating paperwork, responding to requests within tight timeframes, and managing formal processes is not simply inconvenient - it is genuinely disabling. The NDIS was designed to support people whose disabilities create barriers to full participation in life. A reform package that adds to those barriers rather than reducing them is working against its own purpose.
- Recommendations 4.1 Independent pricing authority
Pricing for NDIS supports should be set and reviewed by an independent authority, operating at arm’s length from the government - similar to the model used in the aged care sector. The power for a minister to set or adjust prices should be removed or strictly limited. Independent pricing protects participants from politically motivated funding decisions and gives providers the certainty they need to deliver sustainable services. This aligns with Recommendation 11 of the NDIS Review (2023), and it is concerning that this Bill moves in the opposite direction by expanding rather than limiting ministerial control over pricing.
4.2 Proportional provider registration
Any mandatory registration requirements should be scaled proportionally to the complexity and risk level of the supports being delivered. A sole trader providing low-risk peer support should not face the same administrative burden as a large organisation delivering high-intensity clinical or residential supports. Disproportionate registration requirements will drive small and specialist providers out of the market, reducing choice and competition - particularly in areas and communities that are already underserved.
4.3 Independent oversight and transparency
The NDIA must be subject to genuine independent oversight, with clear mechanisms for accountability when decisions cause harm. Participants and their families deserve transparency around how decisions are made, what information was used, and how to meaningfully challenge outcomes.
Submission 2749
4.4 Continuity of provider access for foundational supports
Providers who are already delivering supports that will be classified as foundational supports should not be required to apply for grants or compete in a tender process simply to continue that work. The federal government should establish a pathway that recognises existing providers with a demonstrated track record, allowing them to transition into the foundational supports framework without unnecessary disruption to their business or the participants they serve. Any competitive funding processes that are introduced must be proportional in their administrative requirements, ensuring smaller and specialist providers are not disadvantaged relative to larger organisations.
- Conclusion The NDIS exists because Australia made a commitment to people with disability: that their needs would be met, their dignity respected, and their participation in society supported. This Bill, in its current form, risks walking back that commitment in ways that will cause real harm - and in some cases, cost lives.
Reform is absolutely necessary. However, history has shown us that when major changes are made to systems that vulnerable people depend on, without genuine collaboration with those people, the results can be catastrophic. The people who will be most affected by this Bill must have a meaningful seat at the table. Reform designed without the input of people with disability is reform that will fail people with disability.
Jonathan Laloz - Person with disability and peer support worker