Participants experience inconsistent plan funding reductions (Participant experience)

Submission to the Inquiry into the NDIS Amendment (Securing the NDIS for the Future) Bill 2026

The proposed reforms appear to shift increasing responsibility, scrutiny and risk onto participants while many of the underlying structural and administrative deficiencies within the Scheme remain unresolved.

Long-term  sustainability  will be  achieved  through improved  governance,  efficient  administration,

transparent decision-making and genuine co-design with people with disability—not by progressively

limiting participant choice and  control. The cumulative  effect of these reforms  risks undermining

participants’ confidence that they will continue to receive the care and supports they require over their lifetime, contrary to Principle 3 of the NDIS Act.

It is also concerning that, despite the significance of these reforms, participants have found it difficult to obtain clear information about precisely what is proposed and how the changes will operate in practice. This lack of transparency has been a recurring feature of the Scheme and makes it extremely difficult for

There is further concern that the Bill would confer significantly greater powers solely on the Minister and several proposed reforms appear inconsistent with the existing objects and principles of the NDIS Act.

Rather  than  strengthening  participant  confidence, many  of  the proposed measures  risk  further

undermining the principles Parliament has already established.

 The NDIS continues to be subject to major legislative reform before previous systemic issues have been resolved. The original implementation of the Scheme occurred before key risks had been adequately identified and mitigated, contributing to significant service gaps as state systems

withdrew,  for example. The current reforms appear to repeat  this pattern by progressing

substantial legislative change without sufficient evidence of comprehensive testing, stakeholder confidence or implementation readiness.

 Measures to combat fraud should not divert attention from the broader impact of the proposed reforms. While the Government’s public messaging has strongly emphasised fraud prevention and protecting the sustainability of the Scheme, this has had the effect of drawing public attention away from the substantial legislative changes affecting genuine participants. Fraud prevention is essential and enjoys overwhelming support from participants; however, the Government’s public handling of this Bill—placing significant emphasis on fraud while giving comparatively little attention to the impact of the reforms on people with disability—creates the perception that broad public support for anti-fraud measures is being used to reduce scrutiny of changes that fundamentally affect participant rights, choice and control. This approach appears inconsistent with the spirit of Principle 9A, which recognises that people with disability are central to the NDIS and should be included in genuine co-design, and Principle 8, which recognises their right to engage as equal partners in decisions that affect their lives.

   Participants have experienced  increasingly  inconsistent  and,  in many  cases, unexplained

reductions  in  plan  funding.  This has undermined  confidence  that  planning  decisions  are

transparent, evidence-based and consistent with the principles that participants should receive reasonable and necessary supports (Principle 5) and have certainty that they will receive the care and support they require over their lifetime (Principle 3).

 Administrative inefficiency remains one of the greatest threats to the long-term sustainability of

the  NDIS. Many  believe  that  significant  savings  could be  achieved  through  meaningful

administrative reform, including reducing unnecessary bureaucracy, duplicated processes, excessive administrative handling, poor communication, inconsistent decision-making, lengthy delays and IT systems that many participants find difficult to understand and navigate. The Scheme also relies

heavily on  multiple  administrative and outsourced  roles where  value  for money appears

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questionable. Many participants report that Support Coordinators and Local Area Coordinators provide limited practical assistance while adding additional layers of administration, delay and cost. This is inconsistent with Principle 9, which requires people with disability to be supported in their dealings with the Agency so that their capacity to exercise choice and control is maximised.

 Administrative reform should precede restrictions on participants. The Bill describes a number of amendments as merely “clarifying” existing legislative intent. This suggests that many current problems arise from inconsistent interpretation and administration rather than deficiencies in the

legislation  itself.  Before  reducing  participant  flexibility  or  introducing  further  restrictions,

Government should first demonstrate that it has addressed internal governance, decision-making

and administrative  inefficiencies, consistent with  Principle 17, which requires both  financial

sustainability and adherence to the principles of the Act.

 The NDIA itself must also be subject to scrutiny for efficiency. The Agency has continued to expand its workforce substantially, yet participants continue to report increasing administrative burden rather than improved service delivery. Many participants would describe the Agency as exhibiting the characteristics commonly associated with large government bureaucracies—high staffing levels, significant process complexity and poor frontline outcomes. This creates unnecessary stress for participants, families, providers and other stakeholders while diverting resources away from direct disability supports. Participants should not be expected to bear the consequences of organisational inefficiency.

 The Bill lacks sufficient transparency to enable informed public scrutiny. Access to substantial information regarding the proposed reforms in everyday, meaningful language has not been readily available to participants. Furthermore, many elements of the reforms remain high level, with significant operational detail yet to be determined. Participants are therefore being asked to comment on legislative changes without being able to fully understand how they will operate in practice or affect individual supports. This uncertainty is inconsistent with meaningful consultation and genuine co-design (Principle 9A) and contributes to increasing anxiety amongst participants and their families.

 Many participants and disability workers do not believe previous consultation has resulted in meaningful policy change. Extensive evidence has already been provided through reviews, inquiries and consultation processes, yet many longstanding concerns remain unresolved. There is also concern that this Inquiry has proceeded within an extremely compressed timeframe, limiting meaningful engagement. Many participants became aware of the Inquiry only by chance despite subscribing to NDIS communications such as newsletters and social media channels. This raises concerns about whether the principles of genuine co-design with people with disability (Principle 9A) have been achieved.

 Reliance on Functional Capacity Assessments is increasing despite the absence of nationally consistent standards. It is apparent that outcomes vary significantly depending on the assessor, methodology and interpretation, creating inequitable access to supports. If Functional Capacity

Assessments are to become  central to planning  decisions,  nationally  consistent  standards,

accreditation requirements and quality assurance mechanisms are essential. I am also aware of cases where participants assessed as having extremely low functional capacity have nevertheless experienced funding reductions of 50 per cent or more. In some cases this has reportedly resulted in parents leaving paid employment to provide full-time care because appropriate supports were no longer funded. Such outcomes undermine Principles 5, 11 and 12A while also reducing workforce participation, increasing financial pressure on families, increasing carer strain—including for carers who themselves live with disability—and potentially increasing demand on Australia’s health and social service systems.

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 The proposed introduction of automated assessment or decision-support processes raises

significant concerns regarding procedural fairness and individualised assessment. Disability is highly individual and cannot be accurately captured through standardised tools alone. There is particular concern for participants with psychosocial, intellectual and other hidden disabilities, whose impairments are often less visible and more difficult to demonstrate. These participants already report needing to repeatedly justify the legitimacy of their disability. Functional capacity is

influenced by the interaction of multiple  disabilities and health conditions, yet  participants

commonly report that planning processes  fail to view the  participant as a whole person.

Assessment processes that compartmentalise disability risk overlooking the cumulative impact of multiple impairments. Automated assessment processes that exclude he participant’s treating health professionals, existing supports and advocates, risk forcing people into predetermined categories rather than recognising the complexity of individual circumstances. There is also concern that these reforms represent a regression from the original vision of the NDIS. The Scheme has played an important role in promoting inclusion, independence and reducing stigma by recognising people with disability as individuals with diverse goals and aspirations. Any reforms that increase standardisation at the expense of individual circumstances risk reversing this progress and pushing people with disability back towards the more segregated, system-driven approaches that existed prior to the NDIS. This appears inconsistent with Principles 1, 2, 8 and 11.

 The proposed replacement of individual community participation funding with an Inclusive Communities Fund represents a significant departure from the foundational principles of the NDIS. Funding disability-specific group programs is not synonymous with community inclusion. Not every person with disability wishes to participate in organised disability social and activity groups, and many seek to engage in mainstream community activities alongside the broader community. Redirecting funding from individuals to organisations reduces participant choice and control and risks replacing personalised supports with provider-led models. This appears inconsistent with Principles 2, 4, 8, 11 and 15.

 The culture surrounding the Scheme has shifted from one of support to one of fear. Many participants—particularly those with psychosocial, intellectual and other hidden disabilities—now fear that requesting a review, questioning a decision or simply using their approved funding may result in reduced supports or loss of eligibility. A Scheme founded upon choice and control cannot function effectively where participants are reluctant to exercise their rights. This is inconsistent with Principles 7, 8 and 9.

 The promise of participant choice and control has never been fully realised. Participants continue to experience changing policy interpretations, inconsistent planning decisions, inadequate budgets, uncertainty regarding what may be purchased and significant administrative barriers to accessing supports that appear reasonable and necessary. For example, despite receiving hearing-related funding, I was advised that inexpensive hearing aid cleaning threads—required for the maintenance of my hearing aids because of my individual circumstances—would likely be difficult to justify under

my  existing Core budget. The  issue was not the cost of the item but the administrative

interpretation of the funding rules, compounded by the fact that very few Australian suppliers stocked the product and none could provide the required Australian Business Number for reimbursement. Such examples illustrate how participants increasingly encounter administrative, rather than practical, barriers when attempting to access supports that are clearly related to their disability.

 Participants strongly support responsible stewardship of public funds and expect the NDIA to exercise sound judgement when approving supports. Participants themselves have raised concerns about waste, inconsistent decision-making and poor governance for many years. For example, I was recently informed by a disability support worker of a participant whose NDIS funding reportedly

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covered the construction of an entirely new backyard swimming pool—not modifications to improve accessibility, nor access to an existing community facility, but a complete private swimming pool. While I cannot comment on the individual circumstances of that case, examples such as this have left many participants questioning how such decisions are approved while others struggle to obtain funding for comparatively modest supports that directly relate to their disability. Fraud is only one source of financial pressure on the Scheme. Poor administrative decision-making and inconsistent approval practices also contribute to unnecessary expenditure. The appropriate response is to improve staff training, decision-making, governance and accountability—not to impose increasingly restrictive policies on participants who rely on the Scheme appropriately. The overwhelming majority of participants simply want a fair, sustainable Scheme that delivers support according to the principles Parliament has already enacted.

While the Government may characterize these reforms as necessary to secure the long-term sustainability of the Scheme, the lack of detail surrounding many of the proposed changes makes it difficult for participants to properly assess their practical impact. From the perspective of many participants, the Bill appears to address failures of governance and administration by increasing restrictions on participants rather than by improving the performance and accountability of the NDIA itself. Greater transparency regarding both the intended operation and expected consequences of these reforms is therefore essential. Of particular concern are the provisions that would enable the Minister to determine or vary specified groups of NDIS supports through legislative instrument. This represents a significant concentration of decision-making power in a single office and raises concerns that one Minister may effectively alter the funding available for categories of disability supports with reduced parliamentary scrutiny and limited consultation with people with disability. Given that Principle 9A recognises that people with disability are central to the Scheme and should be included in a genuine co-design capacity, and Principle 8 recognises their right to engage as equal partners in decisions affecting their lives, such broad discretionary powers warrant careful reconsideration.

The long-term sustainability of the NDIS will not be secured by reducing participant autonomy or centralising decision-making. It will be secured by transparent governance, accountable administration and genuine partnership with people with disability and adherence to the principles Parliament has already embedded in the National Disability Insurance Scheme.

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