NDIA Accountability Project

Misleading claims regarding pricing and impact analysis in the Explanatory Memorandum for the NDIS Amendment Bill

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SENATE INQUIRY INTO NDIS AMENDMENT BILL 2026

MISLEADING CLAIMS IN PARLIAMENT IN EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM FOR NDIS

AMENDMENT BILL 2026

Rachael Slowik Co-Chair Disabilitywatch PO BOX 1058 ASHWOOD 3147

31 May 2026

Committee Secretary Senate Standing Committees on Community Affairs PO Box 6100 Parliament House Canberra ACT 2600

Dear Committee Secretary,

RE: SENATE INQUIRY INTO NDIS AMENDMENT BILL 2026 MISLEADING CLAIMS IN PARLIAMENT IN EXPLAINATORY MEMORANDUM FOR NDIS AMENDMENT BILL 2026

I am writing to inform you that one false claim and incorrect policy analysis have been identified by Disabilitywatch in the Explanatory Memorandum for National Disability Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 and supplementary documents submitted by Minister Butler to Parliament to support the passage of National Disability Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026.

  • Review Recommendations on Pricing Misconstrued for Political Gain The Explanatory Memorandum falsely claims that Action 11.3 of the NDIS Review Final Report (Working together to deliver the NDIS), ‘recommended that the Australian Government, not the Board of the Agency, should make the final determination on prices for NDIS supports’ (see Attachment A). This misconstrued recommendation is then used to justify that the NDIS Act 2013 should be amended so that the Minister for Aging– who has stated he intends to set up his own advisory committee on pricing– becomes the decision-maker on NDIS prices– a move which clearly politicizes price-setting.

What the NDIS Review actually recommended in Action 11.3 is that the Australian Government should transition responsibility for advising on NDIS pricing to the Independent Health and Aged Care Pricing Authority (IHACA) to strengthen transparency, predictability and alignment. NDIS Review’s recommendation seeks to transparency and predictability of price setting on NDIS, which stands in direct opposition to the Bill’s attempt to grant the Minister for Aging absolute power over pricing with his own committees– a move which would to politicise decision-making

Determining pricing limits

on pricing setting on NDS making it more opaque and arbitrary rather than transparent and predictable as recommended by the NDIS Review.

Determining pricing limits for the provision of NDIS services is a highly technical, rather than political decision, which requires knowledge of: industry standards, casual loading, insurance superannuation contributions costs and provider overheads. The politicisation of NDIS pricing limits appears to be a political attempt to drive down the NDIS budget which would result in NDIS providers becoming insolvent and cannot be considered an administratively sound method of determining pricing limits.

The making of false claims in a Parliamentary document regarding the recommendations of of a NDIS Review, namely: ‘Action 11.3 (of the NDIS Review Final Report) recommended that the Australian Government, not the Board of the Agency, should make the final determination on prices for NDIS supports’ in an attempt to to mislead the Parliament for political gain may constitute:

       ●​ Misconduct under section 4 of the Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987

       ●​ An offence under section 137.1 the Criminal Code Act Cth 1995 which criminalizes the giving of false or misleading information or omits any matter or thing without which the information is misleading and ii) the information is given to a person who is exercising powers or performing functions under, or in connection with, a law of the Commonwealth; or in compliance or purported compliance with a law of the Commonwealth. Absolute liability applies.

Recommendation: that the false claim on p.6 of Explanatory Memorandum for National Disability Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 be referred to overseeing bodies for consideration on whether further action is required.

  1. Incorrect Pricing Assumptions Made in Impact Analysis of Mandatory Registration

The Impact Analysis Equivalent: Mandatory Registration of all National Disability Insurance Scheme Providers, May 2026, a supporting document submitted with the Bill, incorrectly assumes uniform pricing across various NDIS providers, resulting in an incorrect assessment of the impacts of mandatory registration of NDIS providers. This has occurred because Minister Butler rejected the NDIS Provider and Worker Registration Taskforce Model and so sidelined NDIA (the disability experts) in the development of an alternative registration model (which will exclude sole traders whom he considers fraud risk)– which was instead developed by the, until recently named, Department of Health and Aging– who have since added ‘Disability’ to the Departments name for credibility.

  • However, unfortunately the now Department of Health, Disability and Aging– don’t administer NDIS and so lack the requisite knowledge of the disability market to safely design an alternative registration model for disability care and have failed to grasp the vast variation in pricing across different sized NDIS disability providers. This has resulted in the new mandatory registration model resting on the false assumption of uniform pricing across the disability sector–and the mistaken belief that the policy of mandatory registration will not drive up the market price of care support.

In reality, care companies price their services up to 35% higher than sole traders meaning that regulating sole traders out of providing care support services will have many unintended consequences. The government’s registration proposal intends to exclude sole traders out of providing care support services using this complex registration model do with the misleadingly named ‘highest-risk supports’ which only large providers will be able to register for, but which will in-fact be expansively defined to include all care in closed settings (Assistance with self-care and personal domestic activities) which is 85% of supports funded– out of fear of fraud.

Such an expansive and misleading definition of ‘highest-risk supports’ will regulate low cost providers out of the market, which will in turn will drive up the price of care for participants by up to 35% as they are forced to source care from large providers only, which will:

  • wipe any gains made from fraud reduction which stand at only 5-10%.
  • result in an insufficiency of care hours for NDIS participants who will have reduced purchasing power thus precipitate a crisis of neglect across the scheme
  • Create supply shortages across the care sector as 80% of the current workforce will be excluded from providing care services
  • Increase liability for NDIA as participants struggle to cover their essential care needs

In summary, because the Impact Analysis Equivalent: Mandatory Registration of all National Disability Insurance is based on an incorrect assumption of uniformly priced services across NDIS, the assessment of impacts of mandatory registration in the analysis submitted to Parliament is incorrect– by failing to take into account the increase that mandatory registration would have on the price care support and in-turn the impact that would have on the accessibility and sufficiency of care support on NDIS.

Due to the potential adverse impact that mandatory registration will have on both sufficiency of care and budget savings, Disabilitywatch will examine the impact of the government’s mandatory registration in an upcoming article which can be registered for www.disabilitywatch.org.

Recommendation: Reconstitute the NDIS Provider and Worker Registration Taskforce and refer the proposed registration model for independent assessment of impacts as well as economic modeling before the Bill is put to Parliament.

If you have any further queries please feel free to contact me Rachel Slowick at

Yours Sincerely,

Rachel Slowick Co-Chair Disabilitywatch

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  • Recomm ndation 17 called for the de clopmcnt f a ri k-proportionate mod I for regulation of all pr ider , and to trength n th regulatory r pon to long landing and em rging quality and aii guard i ndm ed in hedul 2 tr n th nth ability f th and Qua Ii guard ommi i n to ffe ti I manag th int grity of Lh 1mpr afi ty and quality.
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Th R gi trati wa tabli h d in bruary 2024 t • ad • n th d ign and impl m ntati raduat d r· rti nat r gulat ry m d I p d in ndati Re i w in tation ith th di ability c mmunity. The R gi trati n T r Or undt • ar fr m mmuniti on pe ific t p • o ran a public ubmi • om 2024 to Ma 2024 which re • 00 ub • • ns fr m p ith dj abiLity th ir familie and ad ate NDI pro ider r pr ther r I ant

The Regi tration Ta kforce wa ubject matter e p rt , including p ak b dy r pre entative and p pi with Ii p n n who formed fi e d i ory rking Group , including: participant and nominee • dj ability care worke and orgaru ation • pro ider and reguJator ; intergo emmental· and a ad mic and poLi y p rts.

From 19 December 2025 to 2 February 2026 the u stralian Go rnment held a pubLic consultation on the NDIS pro id r definition to inform future deci ion on amending or altering tru term a propo ed by th Regi tration Ta kforce. Th I pro ider definition recei ed 269 submi ion from a wide range of takehold r including p ople with di ability, carers peak bodies, commuruty orgaru ation regi tered and unregi tered groups and governments.

The Bill i a fir t step to securing the NDI for future generations. While e era) of the measures introduced by the Bill will commence in the hort term, many others will be implern nted over an extended period, allo ing for further consultation with people with di ability their families carers advocate and other key takeholder .

www.disabilitywatch.org
di ability their families carers advocate and other key takeholder .

6

Recommendation 11

Action 11.3*

The Australian Government should transition responsibility for advising on NDIS pricing to the Independent Health and Aged Care Pricing Authority to strengthen transparency, predictability and alignment. The Independent Health and Aged Care Pricing Authority (IHACPA) should be responsible for advising on suitable indicators of the market price and price caps for relevant NDIS supports. IHACPA should consult with the Department of Social Services, the NOIA, the National Disability Supports Quality and Safeguards Commission, state and territory governments, and the broader sector when advising the Australian Government on prices. Expanding the remit of IHACPA to include NDIS pricing would support greater alignment across the care and support sector and ensure government does not compete with itself and makes better use of its buying power across sectors.

Action 11.4

The Australian Government should review and refine the pricing and payments framework once underpinning reforms have been implemented This should consider the suitability of the framework based on changes in the NDIS market that result from implementing reforms to participant budget setting, dedicated and graduated assistance with navigating the NDIS, information including quality and safety measures, and improved incentives for providers. It should also evaluate the outcomes and functioning of the self-managed market, with improved data and market visibility through fully electronic payments (see Action 10.3).

Policy Options

3.1 Option 1 - Graduated Risk-Proportionate Regulatory Model

This policy option would deliver a mandatory provider registration model building on the recommendations of the NDIS Provider and Worker Registration Taskforce.

There are five core elements to this model:

  • Design and delivery of three graduated risk-proportionate registration categories:
    • Advanced
    • General
    • Self-directed
  • Amendments to the definition of a NDIS Provider in the NDIS Act
  • Implementation of a regulatory framework
  • Cost-recovery mechanism embedded into provider registration fees and an agreed Charging Framework with the Department of Finance at a later date
  • A self-directed su arts pilot program.

The implementation of a new risk-proportionate regulatory model, including mandatory registration for NDIS providers was one of the more publicised recommendations of the NDIS Review when it was made in December 2023. The NDIS Review proposed a new risk-based registration approach applying regulatory obligations to the highest risks supports and services while releasing lower risk supports and services from burdensome regulation.

This model was referred to the NDIS Provider and Worker Registration Taskforce which consulted widely to provide recommendations on how a new regulatory model could be implemented in a way which also upholds the rights of NDIS participants to choice and control. The model in this proposal is based on the Taskforce Advice, which was made public in August 2024. The Taskforce stated the framework provided in the NDIS Review was a useful framework for understanding risk, however recommended the addition of a self-directed supports registration category and amending the definition of a provider to refine its scope removing the need to enrol the large number of remaining unregistered providers. Instead, visibility of these providers would be made available through an improved payment system for NDIS su arts.

Amending the definition would address the current issue as outlined in the status quo section above where low-risk mainstream organisations are considered NDIS providers, regardless of their awareness or lack thereof. NDIS participants would still be able to use

Australian Government Department of Health and Aging

Appendix C

,. ,. Department or Heulth

Disobilit and Ageing

funds to purchase su orts from these providers and they would continue to be covered by consumer law and other regulatory protections. The inclusion of a self-directed su orts category, as indicated by the Taskforce, is critical to affording choice and control for participants who directly employ their supports to continue to use unregistered providers should they wish to do so under the new model within safeguarding parameters). Despite utilising a risk-proportionate approach to minimise unnecessary burden on providers offering lower-risk supports, some regulatory obligations would still be imposed on currently unregistered providers under this preferred policy option. The sector is already aware of this, and the government will continue to engage with the public to ensure appropriate transition arrangements are made to manage market exits and prevent disruption for participants. 3.2 Option 2 (Preferred) - Mandatory Registration of NDIS providers delivering the highest-risk supports in an advanced registration category. Option 2 would see the expansion of mandatory registration to highest risk supports only. This builds on the MYEFO 25-26 decision of overnment to require mandatory registration of supported independent living and digital platform providers commencing 1 July 2026. This would focus regulatory effort on those providers in the highest risk categories. Existing registered providers would expand their registration for these categories at their next review cycle. This would continue the NDIS Commission’s current regulatory transition of the highest risk categories of support to mandatory registration, where providers are not only assessed at the point of entry their ongoing adherence to practice standards, worker screening and participant safety requirements are enforced through mandatory reporting and ongoing engagement with the Commission. This ongoing visibility and enforcement through the Commission will enable early detection of risk of harm for participants and would provide a mechanism to prevent poor quality operators from providing services to NDIS participants. Under this option, the NDIS Commission would apply a risk-based approach to enforcement action, using advanced risk analytics to detect poor provider behaviour and targeting regulation at the highest risk providers in the market. A cost recovery process for registration applications applies to this o tio:t!n!‘-!.llll!IJ!!ll’ll!!II!! The “”’~’“o”v“ Model which was developed outside NDIS is based on the incorrect assumption of uniform pricing of services across the disability sector and so incorrectly assesses the impacts of the government’s www.disabilitywatch.orgregistration model which lacks any direct consultative underpinning {although still claims the democratic mandate of consultation process carried out by the NDIS Provider and Worker Registration Taskforce who’s model it rejected as its own {p.155 Explantory Memorandum) Office of Impact Analysis I Department of Health, D1sab11ity and Ageing I Mandatory Registration of all NDIS Providers6

Explanatory Memorandum

For the National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

By the NDIs Provider and Worker Registration Task Force

Whose Model It Rejected

As Consultative Footing for Its Own Model Which Lacked Consultation Which Misleads
Parliament

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Arti le 4 f th t n ultati m m nt f, p with di abilitie thr ugh th ir r pre ntati i • in th imp I m ntati n and m nit ring f legi lati n and p • that th m. ta 4( d e not r quire unanimity r agre m nt fr mall ted . The ritical i wh ther I gi I ti hang nd p licie ar d nd impl m nt d thr u h m anin ful n ultati n ith th di ability mmunity rather than ia uni) t ral d i ion making.

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of all pr ider pr iding erv1 e the 01 ha b en infi rrn d by th recommendation of the I and I Pr ider and orker Regi tration Ta kforc the Regi tration Ta kfi rcc .

he Ta kforce wa e tabli bed m February 202 to pro ide ad i e on the de ign and implernentati n of th n graduated ri k-pr portionate r gulat ry model prop ed in Re ommcndati n 17 of th DI R i in on ultation itb the di ability mmunity. The Ta kfor ho ted r 30 r undtable acr u stralia t h ar fr m c mmunitie on pe ifi topi in luding w men ith di ability and the u of main tr am ervi e . It al o ran a pub Ii ubmi ion pr from 6 Mar h 2024 to May 2024 hi h r i ed o r 700 ubmi ions from p opl itb di ability th ir famili and ad DI pro id rs, workfor e repre ntati e and oth r r I ant tak:eholders.

Th Taskforc wa upport d by ubj et matt r p rt including p ak body r pr ntativ s and p ople with Li ed exp rience who formed fi e Ad i ory orking Group to co-de ign pecific acti itie in area of concern including: participant and nominee • di ability care workers and organisations· pro ider and r gulator • intergo rnmentaJ; and academic and policy exp rt .

While other measur s introduc d by the Bill were not directly con ult don th y w re inform d by the NDIS Re iew and the Royal Commi ion. Both the NDIS R iew and the Royal Commi ion und rtook extensi e engagem nt and con ultation with th di ability community in th course of pub Ii rung th ir r sp cti r ports.

Articl 4(3) applies not only to th making of la s but also to their impl m ntation and www.disabilitywatch.org