NDIS Legislative Reforms and Psychosocial Disability: Human Impact, Clinical Risk, and Systemic Failure

Chair, thank you for receiving this submission. I ask that you consider the material that follows not only as evidence of administrative failure, but as a record of the profound human harm caused when the NDIS assessment process is applied without regard for psychosocial disability, trauma, or fluctuating functional capacity.

The first section is intentionally personal. It is short, but it is important. It describes the lived experience of my wife, who has complex PTSD and other psychosocial disabilities, and who is currently experiencing severe clinical deterioration after her NDIS supports were suddenly reduced without warning, without informed consent, and without consideration of the functional evidence provided. Her experience is not an isolated case. It is representative of a broader pattern affecting people whose disabilities make them uniquely vulnerable to abrupt administrative change.

I respectfully ask the Committee to read the human impact section in full before turning to the systemic analysis. The emotional and clinical consequences described there are not rhetorical devices; they are the real-world outcomes of procedural decisions made within the NDIS. They demonstrate how the current assessment model disproportionately harms people with psychosocial disability, and how the very nature of their disability prevents them from defending their rights when those rights are infringed.

This submission is offered in good faith, with the hope that the Committee will recognise the urgency of reform and the need to restore trauma-informed, evidence-based, and participant-centred decision making within the NDIS.

1. Lived Experience: A Short Narrative Illustrating Real-World Harm

My wife lives with complex PTSD, chronic pain, and functional neurological symptoms. For years she worked with clinicians to reduce and eventually eliminate high-impact psychiatric medications — progress made possible only through the stability and continuity of supports funded by the NDIS.

When her supports were abruptly reduced without warning, without a face-to-face

meeting, and without consideration of the functional evidence submitted, the consequences were immediate and severe. Her deterioration is ongoing. She has lost emotional regulation, daily functioning, and the stabilising routines that kept her safe. Suicidal ideation returned. She is currently in crisis, and the harm is not historical — it is happening now.

The administrative process intensified her decline. She was pressured into a scripted phone-based assessment while interstate and away from supports. Functional assessments submitted months earlier were ignored. A plan was uploaded as “agreed” without informed consent. Longstanding providers were removed without funded transition. She was told to repeat specialist neuropsychology assessments costing between $500 and $700 per hour and ongoing — costs I must carry as a pensioner because the NDIA rejected the evidence already provided.

This harm does not affect her alone. I also live with suicidality, and the stress of managing her crisis without support has worsened my own mental health. The NDIS is intended to reduce carer burden, yet the current system has left me carrying financial, emotional, and clinical load far beyond what is safe. The impact on carers is not theoretical; it is lived reality.

Her experience is not a complaint about individual staff. It is a clinical illustration of how sudden administrative change destabilises people with psychosocial disability, and how the new NDIS Bill will replicate this harm nationwide.

2. Psychosocial Disability Research: Why Sudden Administrative Change Causes Harm

Decades of research confirm that psychosocial disability affects:

• executive functioning (Snyder, 2013; Millan et al., 2012)
• working memory (Aupperle et al., 2012)
• information processing (Airaksinen et al., 2005)
• emotional regulation (van der Kolk, 2014) Page2

• stress tolerance (McEwen & Sapolsky, 1995)

• decision-making under pressure (Arnsten, 2009)

• trauma-related avoidance and dissociation (Foa & Kozak, 1986; Brewin et al., 1996)

Administrative instability triggers:

• hypervigilance

• shutdown

• dissociation

• panic

• depressive collapse

Administrative burden itself is recognised as a psychological stressor (Herd & Moynihan, 2019).

Sudden loss of supports increases:

• relapse rates (Robinson et al., 1990)

• depressive episodes (Kessler et al., 2003)

• hospitalisation (AIHW)

• suicidal ideation (Andrews et al., 2010)

These findings directly explain the deterioration experienced by my wife — and predict widespread harm under the new Bill.

3. Systemic Failures in the NDIS Process

3.1 Exclusion of Functional Evidence

Functional assessments submitted months earlier were not considered. LACs were directed not to read them.

3.2 Denial of Informed Consent

A plan was uploaded as “agreed” without providing a copy beforehand.

3.3 Forced Binary Assessments

Scripted phone interviews forced yes/no answers that erased nuance.

3.4 Misrepresentation of Participant Voice

Plan content was written in first person but did not reflect her voice.

3.5 Procedural Ambush

A scripted phone assessment was conducted while she was interstate and away from supports.

3.6 Financial Burden

She was told to obtain additional specialist assessments at significant personal cost.

3.7 Loss of Continuity of Care

Longstanding providers were removed without funded transition.

4. Structural Exclusion and Legislative Design

4.1 The ART Review System and Legislative Design: Structural Exclusion of

Psychosocial Disability

Although the new NDIS legislation does not formally remove access to the Administrative Review Tribunal (ART), the combined effect of the Bill and existing NDIA practices creates an environment in which meaningful access to external review is severely restricted. This restriction is not explicit; it is structural.

4.1 NDIA Patterns in Tribunal Outcomes

Publicly available ART/AAT data shows:

• Only 3–5% of NDIS appeals reach a full hearing.
• NDIA loses approximately 30–40% of cases that do reach hearing.

• Around 70% of early resolutions are settlements or NDIA concessions.

• Withdrawals and “abandoned” cases are disproportionately psychosocial.

These patterns show that NDIA decisions are frequently incorrect, but the system is structured so that only the most stable, resourced, and persistent participants ever reach correction.

• the most likely to deteriorate during the process

This is not incidental. It is structural exclusion.

4.3 How the New NDIS Bill Intensifies Structural Exclusion

The new NDIS Bill introduces changes that make ART access even harder:

• removal of diagnosis-based access
• mandatory functional capacity assessments
• reinforced boundaries with mainstream services
• increased automated decision-making
• tightened eligibility and reduced funding

Together, these changes create a high-volume, high-error environment where psychosocial disability participants are least able to seek correction.

4.4 A Conscious Structural Outcome

This submission does not allege individual intent or misconduct. Rather, it identifies a systemic pattern:

• NDIA knows psychosocial disability participants struggle with appeals.
• NDIA knows most appeals never reach hearing.
• NDIA knows it loses a large proportion of cases that do reach hearing.
• NDIA knows tightened eligibility will increase appeal volume.
• NDIA knows psychosocial disability is least compatible with functional assessments.
• NDIA knows mainstream mental health systems cannot absorb displaced participants.

Yet the new Bill intensifies all these pressures.

The foreseeable outcome is a system in which:

• fewer psychosocial participants gain access

• more psychosocial participants lose supports
• fewer psychosocial participants can challenge decisions
• more psychosocial participants deteriorate
• more psychosocial participants are pushed into crisis services
• more psychosocial participants rely on unpaid carers
• more psychosocial participants are excluded from the NDIS entirely

This is not accidental. It is the predictable consequence of legislative and procedural choices that prioritise cost containment over the safety of people with psychosocial disability.

Real-World Illustration

My wife’s case is not a complaint. It is a case study of what the new legislative environment will produce nationwide.

Her deterioration — and my own worsening suicidality as her unsupported carer — are not anomalies. They are predictable outcomes of the structural pressures described above.

Implications

• High reversal rates indicate poor initial decision making.
• Heavy settlement use obscures systemic problems.
• Psychosocial participants are least able to challenge decisions.
• NDIA litigation expenditure (~$170 million over three years) suggests inefficiency and systemic error.

Evidence of Increased Risk, Crisis, and Harm Under the New NDIS Bill

The new NDIS Bill creates conditions that increase the risk of deterioration, crisis presentations, and preventable harm for people with psychosocial disability. This is supported by clinical research, coronial findings, mental health peak body statements, administrative burden literature, and NDIS Quarterly Report indicators.

5.1 Clinical Research Demonstrates Heightened Vulnerability

Psychosocial disability is uniquely sensitive to administrative instability. Research shows:

• executive dysfunction (Snyder, 2013; Millan et al., 2012)
• impaired working memory (Aupperle et al., 2012)
• slowed information processing (Airaksinen et al., 2005)
• impaired emotional regulation (van der Kolk, 2014)
• reduced stress tolerance (McEwen & Sapolsky, 1995)
• impaired decision-making under pressure (Arnsten, 2009)
• trauma-related avoidance and dissociation (Foa & Kozak, 1986; Brewin et al., 1996)

Administrative burden itself is recognised as a psychological stressor (Herd & Moynihan, 2019).

Sudden withdrawal of supports increases:

• relapse rates (Robinson et al., 1990)
• depressive episodes (Kessler et al., 2003)
• hospitalisation (AIHW)
• suicidal ideation (Andrews et al., 2010)

These findings directly explain the deterioration experienced by my wife — and predict widespread harm under the new Bill.

5.2 Mental Health Organisations Warn of Increased Suicide Risk

Peak psychosocial disability organisations — MHCC, BEING, and VMIAC — have publicly stated: “The new NDIS reforms will increase suicide risk for people with psychosocial disability.”

This is not speculation. It is the position of the organisations representing the

affected cohort.

State Disability Ministers Warn of Increased Hospitalisations

All state and territory disability ministers have warned that displaced NDIS

participants will end up in:

- emergency departments

- psychiatric wards

- crisis accommodation

- unsafe environments

This is a direct indicator of increased mortality risk.

Coronial Findings and Disability Royal Commission Evidence

Coronial investigations in NSW, VIC, and QLD have found:

- inadequate community supports

- service withdrawal

- administrative failure

as contributing factors in deaths of people with psychosocial disability.

The Disability Royal Commission documented multiple cases where:

- lack of support

- service gaps

- administrative delays

contributed to preventable deaths.

These findings demonstrate that withdrawal of supports is not benign — it is

dangerous.

NDIA-Related Coronial Cases

There are coronial cases where: Page9

• delayed NDIS decisions

• lack of supports

• failure to approve essential services

were identified as contributing factors.

These cases do not say “NDIS caused the death,” but they do say “lack of supports contributed to the death.”

These changes create a high-volume, high-error environment where psychosocial

disability participants are least able to seek correction.

My wife’s deterioration — and my own worsening suicidality as her unsupported

carer — are real-world examples of the harm this legislative framework will produce

nationwide.

6. Documented Cases: Deaths Linked to Service Withdrawal or System Failure

While not attributed directly to the new Bill, there are documented cases where:

• withdrawal of disability supports
• failure to provide adequate services
• administrative delays
• lack of crisis intervention

have contributed to deaths.

6.1 Disability Royal Commission Findings

The Royal Commission documented multiple cases where:

• lack of support
• service withdrawal
• administrative failure

contributed to preventable deaths.

6.2 Mental Health System Coronial Findings

Coroners in NSW, VIC, and QLD have repeatedly found:

• inadequate community supports
• lack of continuity
• service gaps
• administrative failures

as contributing factors in deaths of people with psychosocial disability.

6.3 NDIA-Related Coronial Cases

There are coronial cases where:

• delayed NDIS decisions

• lack of supports

• failure to approve essential services

were identified as contributing factors.

These cases do not say “NDIS caused the death,” but they do say “lack of supports contributed to the death.”

7.3 Increased Reliability on Informal Supports

Quarterly Reports show:

• more plans relying on unpaid carers
• reduced funded supports
• increased expectations placed on families

Reliance on informal supports is a known risk factor for:

• relapse
• self-harm
• suicidal ideation
• carer burnout
• emergency presentations

7.4 Increased Review Requests and Deterioration Reports

Quarterly Reports show:

• more participants requesting reviews
• more participants reporting deterioration
• more participants reporting unmet needs

This is a direct indicator of harm occurring under the current system.

7.5 Increased Early Resolution of Appeals

Quarterly Reports show:

• most appeals are resolved early
• most early resolutions involve NDIA concessions
• very few cases reach ART hearing

This indicates:

• high rates of incorrect initial decisions

• systemic avoidance of precedents
• structural barriers preventing full review

7.6 Implications for Psychosocial Disability

Taken together, Quarterly Report trends show:

• increased instability in supports
• increased administrative burden
• increased reliance on informal care
• increased exclusion from funded supports
• increased pressure on mainstream mental health systems
• increased frequency of deterioration reports
• increased NDIA concessions indicating systemic errors

These conditions are clinically unsafe.

Research shows that sudden withdrawal of supports increases:

• relapse
• hospitalisation
• self-harm
• suicide risk

Quarterly Reports therefore provide strong evidence that the new legislative environment is increasing exposure to known mortality risk factors.

9. Ministerial Framing and Public Animosity Toward NDIS Participants

Minister Butler’s public assurances that “no one will die” under the NDIS reforms have not only lacked evidentiary support, they have also contributed to a damaging public narrative that people with disability — particularly psychosocial disability — is “rorting” or “overusing” the system.

Media coverage following his comments shows a clear pattern: Page14

• government messaging emphasising cost-cutting and participant exits has been interpreted by sections of the public as confirmation that NDIS participants are a financial burden or exploiting taxpayer funds.

• Reporting in Eureka Street notes that Minister Butler framed the NDIS as “costing too much and growing too fast,” while Treasury modelling revealed plans for more than 240,000 people to exit the scheme over four years.

• This cost-focused rhetoric has been amplified across social media, where disability advocates have documented a rise in hostile commentary portraying NDIS participants as undeserving or fraudulent — a narrative that directly contradicts the lived reality of psychosocial disability and the warnings of mental health organisations.

Mainstream media also reflects growing tension. The Sydney Morning Herald reported that all state and territory disability ministers warned of a “significant risk” than people removed from the NDIS would end up in hospitals or without services, contradicting Butler’s assurances and highlighting the real danger of the reforms.

ABC News coverage shows Minister Butler “hitting back” at criticism from disability ministers, reinforcing a public perception that concerns raised by the disability sector are exaggerated or politically motivated rather than grounded in evidence, “Mark Butler hits back after ‘extraordinary submission’ against NDIS changes - ABC News.”

This dynamic has fuelled online hostility toward NDIS participants, with disability advocates reporting increased stigma, accusations of misuse, and dismissive attitudes toward psychosocial disability — particularly on Facebook and community forums where cost-cutting narratives dominate discussions.

The result is a harmful public environment in which psychosocial disability participants are portrayed as part of the problem rather than a cohort at heightened clical risk.

Ministerial framing has therefore not only failed to acknowledge the evidence of increased harm but has also contributed to a climate of animosity that undermines public understanding of disability, reinforces stigma, and places already vulnerable people at greater risk. Ministerial framing has therefore contributed to a climate of

Policy Analysis and Recommendations

10.1 Improve NDIA Decision Quality

• Reinstate functional assessments as core evidence.
• Restore goal-based planning.
• Require planners to consider multidisciplinary reports.

10.2 Increase Transparency

• Publish anonymised settlement outcomes.
• Report concession rates.
• Document systemic issues identified through complaints.

10.3 Strengthen Participant Rights

• Guarantee informed consent.
• Prohibit marking plans “agreed” without explicit approval.
• Require face-to-face or virtual assessments when requested.

10.4 Reduce Administrative Harm

• Ban scripted binary assessments for psychosocial disability.
• Require trauma-informed assessment protocols.
• Provide funded transition support for provider changes.

10.5 Protect Psychosocial Disability

• Recognise fluctuating capacity.
• Allow related conditions (pain, sensory, cognitive) to be considered.
• Provide funded advocacy for vulnerable participants.

11. Conclusion

The NDIS procedural changes have caused severe harm to my wife, destabilised her

recovery, and placed her at clinical risk. Her experience demonstrates the broader

systemic failure of the current assessment model to protect people with psychosocial

disability. The harm extends to carers, including myself, who live with suicidality and

carry the financial burden of repeated specialist assessments as pensioners.

The Senate must act to ensure that the NDIS does not continue to harm the very

people it was created to support.

Christos Papadopoulos

10/07/2026

Page17

Submission on the National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment

     (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026

COLLEEN PAPADOPOULOS

31 May 2026

I make this submission as a person with disability, a long-standing contributor to Australian public life, and someone with professional expertise in governance, administrative justice and statutory decision-making. My experience with the NDIS—particularly the planning process imposed on me in June 2025—demonstrates systemic failures that this Bill risks entrenching rather than resolving.

The planning process I was subjected to was procedurally unfair, inconsistent with the requirements of the NDIS Act 2013 (Cth), and contrary to fundamental administrative law principles.¹ The process excluded me from meaningful participation, disregarded functional assessments commissioned and paid for by the NDIA, and resulted in a plan that bore no rational connection to my disability-related needs.²

The Bill now before Parliament would significantly expand administrative discretion, reduce transparency, weaken review rights, and reverse judicial interpretations that have clarified participant entitlements. While Parliament may legislate to override case law, doing so in a manner that diminishes rights and procedural fairness is a profound policy error that undermines the integrity of the Scheme.³

The NDIS was founded on the principles of choice, control, individualised support and the social model of disability.⁴ Many of the proposed amendments shift the Scheme back toward a medicalised, standardised, rationed model inconsistent with those founding principles.

PART 1: SCHEDULES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Schedule 1 – Item 66 (Repeal of Section 31)

Section 31 currently sets out mandatory components of a participant’s plan. While not itself a rights-conferring provision, it provides structural safeguards that ensure transparency,

Accountability and Participant Involvement

Removing s 31 without replacing it with equivalent safeguards risks enabling opaque, algorithm-driven planning processes that undermine procedural fairness.

⁵

Recommendation: Remove Item 66. Retain s 31 or replace it with an equivalent provision that preserves participant involvement and transparency.

Schedule 1 - Proposed Section 34A (Ministerial Funding Reductions)

Proposed s 34A would allow the Minister to issue legislative instruments that effectively cap or reduce funding for categories of supports. While Parliament may delegate powers, the High Court has repeatedly held that delegated legislation must not undermine statutory entitlements or permit arbitrary decision-making.

⁶

Section 34A risks:

• overriding individualised assessments required under s 34
• enabling budget-driven rather than needs-driven decisions
• displacing merits review by embedding funding limits in legislative instruments

Recommendation: Delete s 34A in full.

Schedule 1 - Proposed Section 25B (Alternative Supports)

The proposed provision allows exclusion from NDIS supports where “alternative supports” exist. Without strict criteria, this risks forcing participants into inadequate, inaccessible or non-existent services, particularly in rural, remote or culturally diverse communities.

Recommendation: Amend s 25B to require that alternative supports must be:

• available
• accessible
• culturally appropriate
• geographically reachable
• equivalent in quality and scope

• free or affordable
• not contingent on means testing

4. Schedule 1 - Proposed Section 9B (Functional Capacity)

The proposed definition artificially isolates impairments rather than recognising the whole-of-body, cumulative and interacting nature of disability. This contradicts the International Classification of Functioning (ICF) framework on which the NDIS is purportedly based. ⁷

Recommendation: Amend or remove s 9B to ensure functional capacity is assessed holistically.

5. Schedule 1 - Items 88–94 (Permanence and Treatment)

These provisions risk compelling participants to undergo treatment as a condition of Scheme access. This raises serious concerns under:

• the right to bodily autonomy
• informed consent principles
• medical ethics
• administrative law (unreasonableness and irrelevant considerations)

Recommendation: Amend to ensure participants cannot be compelled to undertake treatment that is not:

• evidence-based
• clinically appropriate
• reasonably available
• financially accessible
• freely consented to

Explicitly protect the right to decline treatment without losing eligibility.

6. Schedule 1 – Proposed Section 17B (Sustainability Principles)

While sustainability is a legitimate consideration, it must not override statutory entitlements under s

34. Courts have held that decision-makers must not elevate one factor above others unless the

statute expressly requires it.©

Recommendation: Amend s 17B to clarify that sustainability is relevant but cannot override

reasonable and necessary support entitlements.

7. Schedule 1 – Proposed Subsections 34(1G)–(1J) (Parenting and Family Responsibilities)

These provisions risk penalising parents with disability by narrowing supports related to parenting.

They fail to consider:

• cumulative caring burden
• parental disability
• child wellbeing
• social and economic consequences of withdrawing supports

Recommendation: Amend to require holistic assessment of family sustainability.

8. Schedule 1 – Reassessment and Suspension Powers

The Bill removes or restricts appeal rights and expands suspension powers. This is inconsistent with

administrative law principles requiring:

• accessible review
• procedural fairness
• proportionality
• transparency

Recommendation:

• Restore appeal rights removed by Items 21–25
• Narrow suspension powers

• Require demonstrable communication attempts
• Mandate safeguarding review before suspension
• Ensure deterioration or aggravated circumstances trigger reassessment

9. Schedule 2 – Fraud and Integrity

Fraud controls must not disproportionately harm participants whose disability affects communication, executive functioning or compliance.

Recommendation:

• Require proportionality
• Mandate trauma-informed administration
• Provide funded independent advocacy
• Require independent oversight
• Recognise disability-related compliance barriers

10. Schedule 3 – Automation and Algorithmic Decision-Making

Automated decision-making raises significant risks under administrative law, including:

• lack of transparency
• inability to understand reasons
• algorithmic bias
• unlawful delegation of power to non-human systems⁹

Recommendation:

• Prohibit fully automated eligibility or funding decisions
• Require publication of algorithms and methodologies
• Mandate human review rights
• Require independent audits

SUBMISSION ON THE NDIS AMENDMENT – COLEEN PAPADOPOULOS Page 5 of 16

• Ensure accountability remains with a human decision-maker

11. Schedule 4 - New Framework Planning

The proposed framework risks replacing individualised planning with standardised rationing.

Recommendation:

• Retain person-centred planning principles
• Prohibit standardised budgeting tools from overriding s 34
• Require transparency of assessment tools
• Preserve lived experience evidence

12. Schedule 5 - Transitional Powers

Transitional powers are broad and lack oversight.

Recommendation:

• Require parliamentary oversight
• Require public consultation
• Publish impact assessments
• Mandate independent review

SUBMISSION ON THE NDIS AMENDMENT - COLEEN PAPADOPOULOS Page 6 of 16

PART 2: Systemic failures that this Bill risks entrenching rather than resolving

Many of the structural mistakes that damaged the original NDIS risk being repeated in the new reforms, especially around rushed implementation, cost-containment overriding participant needs, algorithm-driven planning, and shifting responsibility to mainstream systems that are not ready.

Reforms introduced before the “replacement systems” exist

The Crikey analysis warns that the government is again proposing major changes before the alternative supports are built — a repeat of past policy failures where supports were removed faster than new systems were created. Crikey

This is exactly what happened with:

• Early intervention pathways
• ILC (Information, Linkages and Capacity Building)
• Mainstream responsibility agreements

The new reforms again rely heavily on “foundational supports” delivered by states, but these systems do not yet exist at scale.

Risk: People fall into service gaps — the same problem the NDIS was created to fix.

Over-reliance on algorithmic or standardised assessments

The new I-CAN tool and “trained assessor” model has been compared to the abandoned “independent assessments” proposal — widely criticised as “robo-planning.” ABC

The ABC reports that the new system is seen as a “souped-up version” of the old independent assessments, which:

• Ignored the expertise of treating clinicians
• Reduced complex needs to numerical scores
• Produced cookie-cutter plans

Risk: People with nuanced or fluctuating disabilities receive inappropriate or inadequate plans.

3. Cost-containment driving policy rather than participant outcomes

The government’s explicit goal is to reduce projected NDIS spending growth by $14.4 billion over four years.

Parliament of Australia Crikey notes that the reforms’ “operational logic” is primarily fiscal, not participant-centred. Crikey This mirrors earlier mistakes where:

• Plans were quietly cut to meet internal targets
• Reviews became adversarial
• Participants were pushed off the scheme into underfunded mainstream systems

Risk: Supports shrink not because needs changed, but because budgets did.

4. Shifting responsibility to mainstream systems that are unprepared

The new legislation clarifies that people should only access the NDIS if they require “NDIS supports,” pushing more responsibility to schools, health, and community services. National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) But the Parliamentary Library notes that mainstream systems are already strained and under-resourced. Parliament of Australia This repeats a long-standing issue: the NDIS was built assuming mainstream systems would lift their game — they didn’t.

Risk: People are denied NDIS access but receive no real support elsewhere.

5. Reduced transparency and limited detail about how cuts will occur

Stakeholders have raised concerns that the government has not explained how spending reductions will be achieved. Parliament of Australia This echoes earlier problems:

• Sudden plan cuts
• Inconsistent decision-making
• Lack of clear criteria for “reasonable and necessary”

Risk: Participants experience unpredictable decisions and have little recourse.

6. Centralising control and reducing participant choice

The reforms move away from the original “market-based” model toward:

• Provider panels
• Commissioned support coordination
• Consolidated plan management The Office of Impact Analysis

This mirrors earlier attempts to restrict choice and control, which:

• Reduced flexibility
• Favoured large providers
• Made it harder for participants to tailor supports

Risk: Participants lose autonomy and face a more bureaucratic, less personalised system.

SUBMISSION ON THE NDIS AMENDMENT – COLEEN PAPADOPOULOS Page 9 of 16

PART 3: Why These Mistakes Keep Repeating

Across the sources, a pattern emerges:

• Political pressure to control costs
• Technocratic tools replacing human judgement
• Underestimation of the complexity of disability support
• Failure to build mainstream capacity before shifting responsibility

These structural pressures existed in the original NDIS and remain unchanged - so the same outcomes are likely.

What This Means for Participants

Based on the evidence, participants should expect:

• More stringent access decisions
• Greater reliance on functional assessments over diagnosis
• Tighter budgets, especially for social/community participation
• More reassessments and fewer plan reviews
• Increased pressure to use mainstream services
• Less flexibility in choosing providers

These are not hypothetical - they are explicitly described in the reform documents and analyses. It is also reflected in my own experience, as these changes are already being implemented without the current proposed amendments.

PART 4: The impact of the planning process imposed upon me in June of 2025

I continued as a full time professional to work until the multiple functional setbacks imposed by my disability forced me to reshape my workplace participation with engagements were sufficiently flexible to permit me time to recover and stabilize between engagements. This was made much easier when I was afforded support as an NDIS participant, as the supports it provided allowed me to focus my precious few hours of productive energy into meaningful contributions through paid or volunteer work. Until June of 2025, when I was forced through a planning process that systematically denied my participation and even my informed consent, ignoring functional reports providing the basis for individualised reasonable and necessary support.

The so-called planning process was vague, remote and unsettling, designed to permit the scheme to replace my own narrative within the confines and parameters of a single impairment. Then the NDIS used that impairment to draft a plan of supports using a generic description of symptoms listed under that impairment and imposed upon me without any human contact or real-world reference to me and the whole of body and social environment in which I live and function. The new plan was built without reference or regard to the functional reports prepared at NDIS request and funding, by people who have, through the benefit of observation and relevant expertise, provided the basis on which reasonable and necessary supports should be allocated. Even the first-person narrative ‘About Me’ and the goals and commitments supposedly in my voice were drafted by someone fraudulently speaking as me. It was FICTION not fact.

The agency’s approach to planning seems to mistrust any functional and diagnostic assessments from people with the expertise, authority or knowledge of that person, on the basis that their human qualities may be manipulated. By doing this, participants like me are denied the application of the very aspects fairness and reason characterised in administrative justice and embodied by human empathy and judgement. The whole experience felt mechanised and nullifying because respect for self-agency and informed consent were flouted. The process denied me the presumption of fairness, my right to be heard, and failed to consider relevant factors.

The new plan and ‘budget build’ was conveyed to me via a phone call from a person who would not even provide her full name, let alone the authority in which she had made these decisions. Though she promised to provide me a written copy of the new plan she had presented prior to implementation, she instead implemented the new plan immediately after her phone call, disregarding even my right to informed consent.

• My plan was replaced instantly after phone call from a stranger whose full name and decision-
  • making authority were not given. The supports in the plan were not aligned with my individuated needs and circumstances, inadequate and underfunded. I was left with a little more than one third of my previous budget.

Since this process I have observed the government’s use of a certain perception in public and social media that the NDIS has lost its ‘social license’ to continue. It has framed its amendments as necessary to sustain the NDIS into the future but has coupled its allegations of provider fraud eroneously to cuts that imply the participants are to blame. It has created an environment of harm for people with disability through perceptions that help to bolster the savage cuts that are now proposed in this bill.

Recently I was at a local forum hosted by the current federal representative on the matter of the NDIS. He was quite overwhelmed by the distress and anger voiced by attendees. He voiced the message of the government faithfully, that the NDIS was broken and needed work to ensure its sustainability. When people in the room voiced their anger that the NDIS was now spending enormous sums of NDIS funding on legal defence against participants, the representative stated that the problem was, that “when participants go to tribunal they always win”. I found myself shocked with that statement, as he seemed to imply that the problem was one of tribunal bias rather than administrative failure to make decisions that were accountable to administrative justice principles.

The changes proposed in this bill only confirm this conclusion, as the changes seek to limit the practical effect of recent Tribunal and Federal Court decisions. These changes appear designed to reverse judicial interpretations that have expanded or clarified participant rights. These changes have sought to significantly reduce a partipant’s access to legal remedy while increasing power imbalances and administrative discretion. These changes seek to remove rights and agency from the participant that would protect them from arbitrary administrative action and unlawful decision- making.

Even as early as June of 2025 it was revealed that costs the NDIA were now incurring to fight participants in tribunal and in court were far outstripping the savings made by stripping the budgets allocated to participant’s plans. Participants, who already are vulnerable through their disability and their means, are facing an overwhelming power imbalance in courts trying to simply have supports and funding restored to a level that would not put their lives and liberty at risk.

The NDIA’s escalating litigation costs further demonstrate the systemic failure of current administrative practices and the profound risks posed by this Bill.

reporting show that the Agency now spends tens of millions of dollars each year defending decisions

that are overwhelmingly found to be unlawful or unreasonable, with participants succeeding in more

than 90 per cent of AAT matters. In many cases, the NDIA has spent $50,000–$100,000 in legal fees

to defend cuts worth only a fraction of that amount, confirming that the Agency’s approach is

economically irrational and administratively indefensible. This adversarial strategy—characterised by

delayed disclosure, late concessions, and the routine overturning of decisions—demonstrates that

the problem lies not with tribunal “bias” but with the quality and legality of NDIA decision-making

itself. Rather than addressing these failures, the Bill seeks to limit review rights, expand

unreviewable discretion, and entrench opaque decision-making processes, thereby increasing the

likelihood of further unlawful decisions while simultaneously restricting the mechanisms available to

correct them. Far from improving sustainability, this approach entrenches inefficiency, increases

costs, and deepens harm to participants.

Defending poorly made and erroneous decisions through legislation such as this will not save the

NDIS for future generations. It will harm people with disability. Citizens and members of society, like me. Please see that amendments to make changes to the NDIS are not made or implemented without first correcting NDIS errors in policy and administration.

PART 5: Effects of proposed legislation schedule by-schedule analysis

Schedule 1 – Core Amendments

Main risks:

• Weakening of participant rights
• Increased ministerial discretion
• Reduced transparency
• Narrowing of eligibility
• Standardisation of supports
• Reduced review rights

This schedule represents the most significant shift away from the original NDIS model.

Schedule 2 – Fraud and Integrity

Main risks:

• Over-policing of participants
• Disproportionate compliance burdens
• Failure to account for disability-related communication barriers
• Potential for traumatising investigations

Fraud controls must be proportionate and disability-aware.

Schedule 3 – Automation and Algorithmic Decision-Making

Main risks:

• Unlawful delegation of power
• Lack of transparency
• Algorithmic bias
• Inability to obtain meaningful reasons

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• Reduced human oversight

This schedule poses serious administrative law risks.

Schedule 4 - New Planning Framework

Main risks:

• Standardised budgets
• Reduced individualisation
• Loss of participant voice
• Opaque assessment tools

This schedule risks undermining the core purpose of the NDIS.

Schedule 5 - Transitional Provisions

Main risks:

• Excessive executive power
• Lack of oversight
• Potential for rushed implementation
• Insufficient consultation

Oversight and transparency are essential.

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LEGAL REFERENCES

• Kioa v West (1985) 159CLR 550 – procedural fairness is a fundamental requirement unless excluded by statute.

• NDIS Act 2013 (Cth) ss 33–34.

• Re Minister for Immigration; Ex parte Lam (2003) 214CLR 1.

• NDIS Act ss 3, 4.

• Annetts v McCann (1990) 170CLR 596 – fairness requires meaningful participation.

• Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211CLR 476 – limits on delegated legislation.

• WHO International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF).

• Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend (1986) 162CLR 24.

• Pintarich v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2018] FCAFC 79 – automated systems cannot constitute lawful decision-making without human engagement.