Submission 415
29 May 2026
Senator Dorinda Cox
Chair – Legislation Committee
Senate Standing Committees on Community Affairs
Parliament House
Canberra ACT 2600
Submitted via email — community.affairs.sen@aph.gov.au
Dear Senator,
Kismet Healthcare Submission to the Senate Community Affairs Legislation Committee
Inquiry into the National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment
(Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026
On behalf of Kismet, I am pleased to provide this submission to the Committee. Kismet welcomes this inquiry and supports the Government’s reform direction.
Launched in February 2023, Kismet is a digital platform operating across NDIS plan management, participant and provider connection, sector engagement and care-economy research. Kismet is a provider of NDIS plan management services via our portfolio companies.
Kismet’s experience spans:
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Over 150,000 NDIS participants and providers in our ecosystem.
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Processing more than 200,000 NDIS invoices per month, with a total annual value of more than $2 billion.
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A participant-facing marketplace connecting participants with providers and supports.
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Community engagement — Kismet runs over 130 disability engagement events every year, including the Australian Disability Services Awards (ADSA) and Ready-Set Connect.
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Data initiatives and sector research, including the Kismet Care Index, our partnership with e61 Institute on NDIS research, our work with Mandala Partners on Care Sector Innovation, and our Care Innovation Symposium at Australian Parliament House.
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Kismet has appeared at the Joint Standing Committee on the NDIS Inquiry into the Integrity of the Scheme.
Kismet has been public in our support for reforms that materially increase the governance requirements of plan managers. The NDIS is critical social infrastructure, and it needs associated transparency and governance to ensure it becomes sustainable.
Kismet is also an advocate for innovation and productivity in the care sector. We have some concerns that the Bill as currently drafted may inadvertently reduce competition, innovation and most importantly participant outcomes.
In this submission, we have outlined those concerns, as well as made recommendations for amendments that can best achieve the integrity objectives of the Bill without stifling innovation or participant experience.
Submission 415
SUBMISSION
- Kismet supports the reform direction Kismet supports higher integrity standards for plan managers. A competitive commissioning process with strong entry standards and ongoing performance requirements will address the quality and integrity concerns that have undermined the plan management market.
Under a commissioned model, the plan management licence is the provider’s most valuable asset. The threat of licence removal through suspension, non-renewal or decommissioning is a powerful and ongoing deterrent against poor conduct.
- Commissioning can address integrity risks with greater precision Four provisions in Schedule 2, Part 6 of the Bill, read together, appear to create a broad structural separation between plan management and other NDIS supports or services. The relevant provisions are Item 91, which defines “related party”, Item 95, new subsection 73E(2B), which creates the registration barrier, and Item 98, new paragraphs 73F(2)(j) and 73F(2)(k), which impose key personnel and non-plan-management activity restrictions.
Our view is that an effective commissioning process should remove the need for these provisions. The commissioning framework is a stronger and more adaptable mechanism than a blanket statutory prohibition, because it is continuous, performance-based and directly tied to the provider’s commercial survival.
The commissioning framework can and should include conditions around independence, conflict management and claims integrity. These conditions can be calibrated, monitored and enforced, and adjusted as the market matures. Integrity requirements that are not met should result in suspension, non-renewal or decommissioning.
The Bill itself recognises this through new section 73EA, which requires a deed of arrangement covering integrity, governance, claims verification and the management and divestiture of conflicts of interest. The blanket prohibition in 73F(2)(k) is layered on top of a framework already designed to manage these risks.
Where specific harmful conduct needs to be prohibited in legislation, it should target that conduct directly. Self-referral, kickbacks, undisclosed conflicts of interest, misuse of participant data and poor claims verification should all be explicitly prohibited. The legislation should then allow the Commissioner discretion to increase restrictions if future conduct warrants it.
- Current drafting risks plan manager homogeneity and lack of innovation The current drafting is broad and may inadvertently capture participant-facing marketplace tools, provider discovery, engagement events, comparative pricing information and sector innovation activity, even where those activities do not involve the behaviour that the Government rightly wishes to stamp out.
The practical consequence is that legitimate innovation a plan manager might undertake is prohibited unless specifically carved out. Innovation requires permission.
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We need to be careful that the reforms do not unintentionally create a static, homogeneous market where plan managers will be indistinguishable from one another and are discouraged from building better tools, improving participant experience, or driving efficiency across the scheme.
The experience of outsourced employment services shows the risk of over-standardisation. Commissioned markets can deliver poor participant outcomes where policy settings reward straight compliance at the expense of innovation, service quality and participant-centred improvement.
Research commissioned by Kismet and conducted by Mandala Partners found that productivity in the Australian care sector has declined by 5 per cent over the past 20 years. As a result, any reform to the NDIS should have a strong focus on enabling, not restricting, responsible care sector innovation and productivity.
Competition and innovation, when transparent and participant-focused, are good for NDIS sustainability and good for participants.
- Recommended refinements Kismet recommends that the Committee amend the structural separation provisions in Schedule 2, Part 6 so the Bill targets conflicted conduct, self-referral, kickbacks and poor disclosure, rather than imposing a blanket structural prohibition on plan managers and related parties undertaking any adjacent NDIS activity.
Kismet recommends the Committee consider the following refinements to the Bill:
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Replace the blanket prohibition with a targeted conduct prohibition. Amend paragraph 73F(2)(k) to prohibit specific harmful conduct; self-referral, kickbacks, undisclosed conflicts, data misuse and claims verification failures, rather than prohibiting all adjacent NDIS activity by plan managers and related parties.
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Replace the blanket registration barrier with a conflict management requirement. Amend subsection 73E(2B) so that applicants for plan management registration must satisfy the Commissioner that adequate conflict management arrangements are in place, rather than being automatically barred where a related party provides other NDIS supports.
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Include a discretionary adjustment mechanism. Insert a power for the Minister to prescribe, by NDIS Rules, additional prohibited activities or conditions for plan management providers, subject to consultation and parliamentary oversight. This preserves the Government’s ability to tighten restrictions if future conduct warrants it.
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Link commencement to the commissioned model. If structural separation provisions are retained, amend the commencement provisions so they take effect on the date the commissioned plan management model becomes fully operational, not on the current backstop date of 24 months after Royal Assent.
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Narrow the related party definition for plan management. Amend Item 91 so that the definition captures entities with a genuine commercial or governance relationship to the
Submission 415
plan management provider, rather than extending to passive investors, relatives with no operational involvement, or associated entities that do not provide funded NDIS supports to managed participants.
- Conclusion Kismet supports the objectives of this Bill. The NDIS needs stronger governance, higher integrity standards and a more accountable plan management market. We are committed to meeting and exceeding whatever standards the Government sets through the commissioning process.
Our concern is narrow. The structural separation provisions attempt to solve a problem that the commissioning process is already designed to address and may do so in a way that reduces participant outcomes.
The priority should always be improving outcomes for participants. The refinements above preserve the Government’s integrity objective while maintaining the conditions under which plan managers can invest in the integrity and innovation infrastructure that participants deserve.
Kismet would welcome the opportunity to provide further evidence to the Committee, including by appearing at a public hearing.