National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 781
APM Submission to the Community Affairs Legislation Committee inquiry on the National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026
Executive Summary Plan Management is an important part of the NDIS The NDIS can only be genuinely person-directed when those providing support understand disability not as a series of transactions but as a lived experience shaped by rights, relationships and personal autonomy.
Plan Managers need a deep understanding of disability, and of the needs of people living with disability, as well as robust governance and financial management to be able to provide a holistic, person-centred, fiscally responsible service.
A NDIS plan is not just a budget; it is a tool for autonomy, identity and life-building. A Plan Manager becomes an enabler of self-direction, not just a processor of invoices, ensuring that financial decisions are interpreted in the context of participant goals and choice and control, whilst at the same time protecting the integrity and financial accountability of the Scheme.
To fulfil this ambition, Plan Management providers need to be able to draw on the experience and expertise of high-quality service providers to help inform service design and delivery whilst ensuring that provider transactions are accurate, transparent and occur within the rules.
APM supports the government’s objective of strengthening integrity, accountability and payment oversight within the NDIS, and is broadly supportive of the intent of the legislation. We do, however, have concerns regarding the full implications of the conflict-of-interest provisions in the current Bill and how they will impact the person-centred principle the Scheme is built on.
Exclusion rather than management has impacts for both participants and Scheme integrity A singular focus on conflict of interest for Plan Management providers being addressed only through ownership structures/related entities has a potential threefold impact on participants:
- It may remove ‘disability’ expertise from the current marketplace
- It will significantly reduce choice and control for a high proportion of participants in the short to medium term with over 50% of participants utilising ‘at scale’ plan managers that may be a part of complex business structures.
- It will still expose participants to potential sharp practices from small operators who rely on informal referral arrangements that aren’t captured by the Corporations Act definitions.
The exclusionary approach the Bill proposes also means a loss of existing high-quality scaled providers who have the systems, workforce, governance and claims oversight needed to manage complex budgets, identify irregular claiming and support informed choice in a highly fragmented service-delivery market, and who play a significant role in not just transaction oversight but participant safeguarding.
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National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 781
APM advocates for a risk-based approach to managing conflicts of interest through an enhanced deed of agreement with the NDIA (section 73EA of the Bill), rather than a blanket ban on related entities as defined in sections 73C, 73E and 73F of the Bill.
We acknowledge that a risk-based approach requires stronger data management and reporting mechanisms to ensure there is absolute transparency on transactional data, an ability to track and manage referral patterns or relationships, and strict financial controls such as ABN and bank account matching to identify and remove any potential fraudulent or inappropriate practices.
We also note that the majority of quality, at-scale Plan Managers currently have these systems in place, and if forced to exit the Scheme this may jeopardise the quality and viability of the proposed panel of providers.
A revised approach is recommended Our submission makes several recommendations for changes to the proposed amendments to sections 73C, 73E and 73F of the Bill to ensure that it delivers on the intent of the legislation without limiting the ability of quality providers with robust operational and governance systems in place to address shared ownership or key personnel to continue delivering this vital service.
We would welcome the opportunity to support the government to work through the practical implications of the amendments and any associated changes in practice.
About APM APM Group is a team of 16,000 people in 11 countries with a global purpose - to enable better lives.
APM started in 1994 as an allied health and vocational rehabilitation provider based in Perth, Western Australia. Today we’re an international human services provider with more than 1,598 locations across Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States of America, New Zealand, Germany, Switzerland, Spain, Sweden, Singapore, and South Korea.
In Australia, our more than 6,353 strong team deliver key services across the social services and care economy, including assessments, early intervention, allied health treatment and therapy, employment supports, training, aged and disability care, community supports, psychological, health and wellbeing services, from 649 locations across the country.
Globally, APM supports more than 2.4 million people of all ages to live a better quality of life every year. We deliver tailored solutions that reflect the unique strengths, needs and aspirations of the people and communities we serve to create lasting social impact.
APM’s breadth of both services and footprint provides a unique vantage point in the ecosystem. As a registered provider within the NDIS market, our skilled, multi-disciplinary workforce (professional and paraprofessional) work with children, young people and adults, their families and carers to achieve outcomes in the areas of behaviour, social participation, life skills, communication, emotional development, education and employment success.
About our submission This submission focuses on the proposed amendments in the National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 as they relate to Plan Management providers. It does not seek to comment on the broader access, planning, pricing registration or governance measures in the Bill, except where those measures directly affect the proposed Plan Management framework.
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National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 781
Introduction APM supports the government’s objective of strengthening integrity, accountability and payment oversight in the NDIS. As the Explanatory Memorandum notes, Plan Management has an important role to play in achieving these objectives. It also provides an existing mechanism through which greater claims visibility, payment assurance and integrity controls can be built.
We support the proposed amendments that are designed to create a new approach to managing the Plan Management market through a deed of agreement with the Agency, creating a panel of approved providers.
This is a sensible evolution given the level of existing concentration of participants accessing high quality, scaled providers who have made significant investments in sophisticated systems, practice and governance to process invoices accurately and identify/address payment non-compliance, whilst at the same time taking a person-centred approach to building participant (and service provider) capacity and capability and supporting safeguarding and scheme integrity.
Risks and unintended consequences of the proposed amendments The proposed amendments shift the focus from conflict management to market exclusion APM recognises that conflicts of interest in Plan Management must be taken seriously.
Where a Plan Manager is connected through mutual ownership to another provider delivering supports to the same participant, the existence of a potential or perceived conflict does not mean that conflict cannot be effectively and proactively managed.
In its current form, the Bill takes a prohibition approach to conflicts of interest in Plan Management, even for high quality, scaled providers with significant experience and expertise in the disability sector who have independent operations, leadership and governance structures in place.
This approach is disproportionate to the issues it seeks to address. Rather than requiring that conflicts be identified, disclosed, managed and monitored, the Bill simply prohibits certain structural or related- party relationships from participating in the market.
Our understanding is that it is not the government’s intent to remove scaled, high-quality providers from the NDIS plan management market with this Bill. Rather, the Bill’s focus, as the Explanatory Memorandum sets out, was to strengthen integrity, accountability and payment oversight in the NDIS and the focus was on “… plan management providers [who] are more likely to exhibit risk factors for conflicts of interest, collusion, fraud and poor record-keeping.”1
However, proposed changes to sections 73C and 73E would restrict who can be registered as a Plan Management provider when there is a relationship to another NDIS service provider, even if the relationship was limited to owning multiple independent NDIS businesses with independent operations, leadership and governance.
Proposed s73F would then impose ongoing conditions preventing Plan Management providers, their Key Personnel and related parties from providing other NDIS supports or services. Taken together,
1 Page 70, Explanatory Memorandum
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National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 781
these provisions create a two-way structural separation between Plan Management and other NDIS service delivery.
This represents a significant shift from a conflict management framework to a market exclusion framework.
Exclusion impacts participants, the market, and Scheme integrity Excluding high-quality, scaled Plan Management providers from the market, as proposed in the Bill, risks reducing participant choice, disrupting continuity of service, significantly narrowing the Plan Management market and prioritising organisational form over provider capability, governance and integrity performance.
Loss of provider capability, scale and system integrity It may also remove those Plan Managers who have made the most significant technology investments to ensure payment integrity – with many having developed sophisticated technology platforms that ensure payment matching; identify any changes in billing or referral behaviours; and have built in anti- fraud controls (e.g. early identification of changes to participant plan details/key contacts/bank account etc) which have all resulted in high rates of fraud prevention – MyIntegra alone identified and terminated payment for 56,696 non-compliant invoices valuing $73,291,151.66 in the 12 months to 31 December 2025, effectively preventing non-compliant payments that may not otherwise have been reviewed.
Preliminary analysis, including that done by Disability Intermediaries Australia, indicates the approach set out in the Bill would impact the majority of the top ten Plan Managers and many beyond this, creating significant disruption in the market and for NDIS participants.
Reduced participant choice, control and service continuity The unintended consequences have significant reach. Plan Managers with deep disability expertise will be required to divest services to remain in the market. High quality, scaled providers are also more likely to be linked to an organisation that delivers multiple services and operate in areas that, without the economies of scale, other providers simply can’t (e.g. thin markets). Their exclusion risks not only disadvantaging participants through reduced provider options (either Plan Management or other NDIS services and supports depending on the divestment approach) but also risks removing the very capability the Scheme needs to strengthen integrity.
Participants will lose their ability to exercise choice and control, if they are left with too few providers who have the systems, workforce, governance and claims oversight needed to manage complex budgets, identify irregular claiming and support informed choice in a highly fragmented service- delivery market.
Integrity risks are not effectively addressed, and safeguarding is compromised It may also mean that the plethora of ‘informal’ relationships, including those with questionable referral and billing practices (that have been identified as an area of concern for the scheme), may simply be allowed to continue as they would not be captured under the Corporations Act definitions.
Critically, for many participants, Plan Management is not simply a payment processing function; it is a practical safeguard that helps them understand their budget, pay providers, monitor expenditure and identify issues before they escalate. It is often the first point of contact for a participant when they have issues with their service providers.
A well-designed regulatory framework should distinguish between unmanaged conflicts that create genuine integrity risks and provider models where conflicts are transparently disclosed, functionally
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National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 781
separated, independently monitored and subject to audit. The current proposal fails to make this distinction. As a result, the proposed provisions may exclude capable and well-governed providers solely because they, or a related party, also deliver other NDIS supports.
The impact of using the Related Parties definition The use of the Corporations Act definition of relatedparty(s50AAA of the Corporations Act) creates a very broad definition of related party. It captures as a related party:
• Direct relationships of control via ownership • Indirect relationships of control • Entities commonly controlled by a third party • Relationships of significant influence (due to an investment in a third party)
A wholly owned subsidiary company of a group would be captured as a related party of other group companies delivering NDIS services even though the Plan Manager:
• has a separate board of directors • is operationally (functionally) independent within the group • uses standalone systems • does not share participant data or service information with other group entities • operates under a strong policy framework that includes governance on conflict of interest.
We also note that the related-parties definition is likely to be ineffective in addressing the government’s intention of strengthening integrity, accountability and payment oversight in the NDIS as the provisions do not effectively address the plethora of informal relationships and the potential for sharp practices across smaller ‘independent’ providers.
Applying a definition of related parties to plan management regulation, without a risk-based conflict management overlay (outlined below), is ineffective in achieving the aims of the Bill.
A better model – risk-based conflict management The Bill already contains a more appropriate mechanism to address these risks for managing conflicts – the deed of arrangement between the Agency and registered Plan Management providers.
Proposed s 73EA enables the Agency to require Plan Management providers to enter a deed covering integrity and governance, claims handling, support verification, ICT systems, related parties, and managing or divesting conflicts of interest. This mechanism is more flexible, proportionate and enforceable than a blanket statutory prohibition as proposed under sections 73C, 73E and 73F.
APM strongly believes that a risk-based conflict management model would better support the Bill’s integrity objectives. Requiring Plan Management providers to identify, disclose, manage and report actual, potential and perceived conflicts of interest, including related party arrangements, supported by deed obligations requiring functional separation, participant facing disclosure, independent claim verification, related party transaction reporting, audit rights and escalation pathways makes far more sense and reduces risk of unintended consequences impacting participants and service continuity.
The reform should protect integrity without unnecessarily reducing participant choice. The objective should be to prevent poor practice, collusion and inappropriate claiming - not exclude organisations solely based on their structure. A proportionate model would allow the NDIA to take strong action where conflicts are unmanaged, while preserving the contribution of capable well governed providers that can support a more transparent, accountable and sustainable NDIS.
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National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 781
Additional measures to strengthen payment integrity including requirements around data systems, reporting and related party transaction reports would be welcome. Data analysis and reporting can already show referral and invoicing trends, and any future changes that would increase transparency in this area would benefit the Scheme. Replicating a national payments system such as Medicare, where all transactions are monitored and individual provider billing behaviour can be tracked would bring a level of necessary oversight to NDIS. Critically, quality, sophisticated Plan Management Providers provide existing infrastructure to deliver pre-payment integrity.
Recommended changes to the proposed amendments As noted at the outset of this submission, we support the introduction of stronger requirements for registered Plan Management providers, including the deed of arrangement model. To address unintended consequences, we recommend that proposed sections 73C, 73E and 73F be amended so the Bill establishes a risk-based conflict management framework rather than the current proposed blanket prohibition on Plan Management providers and related parties delivering other NDIS supports.
Recommended amendment 1: amend proposed s73C(1) (note) Current effect Proposed amendments to s73C(1) would add a note stating that a person may be registered to manage funding under participant plans only if they are not also registered, applying to be registered, or a related party of a person registered, or applying to be registered, to provide other supports or services – and vice versa. This frames the registration framework around mutual exclusivity between Plan Management and other NDIS supports.
Recommended change Remove the proposed note or replace it with wording that reflects a conflict-of-interest management approach.
Indicative replacement wording Note 2: A person seeking registration to manage the funding of supports under a participant’s plans must demonstrate arrangements to identify, disclose, manage and report actual, potential and perceived conflicts of interest, including conflicts involving related parties. See subsections 73E and 73EA.
Why this change is needed The note should not suggest that structural separation is the only permissible approach. The policy objective should be to ensure conflicts are effectively managed, not to prohibit participation solely because an applicant or related party provides other NDIS supports.
Recommended amendment 2: replace proposed s73E(2B) Current effect Proposed s 73E(2B) would prevent the Commissioner from registering a person to provide other NDIS supports if the person, or a related party, is registered or applying to be registered as a Plan Management provider. It would also prevent the Commissioner from registering a person as a Plan Management provider if the person, or a related party, is registered or applying to be registered to provide other NDIS supports.
This creates a two-way exclusion at the point of registration.
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National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 781
Recommended change Replace the current prohibition provision with a requirement for the Commissioner to assess whether the applicant has adequate conflict management arrangements.
Indicative replacement wording (2B) in deciding whether to register a person under subsection (2A), the Commissioner must be satisfied that the person has appropriate arrangements to identify, disclose, manage and report actual, potential and perceived conflicts of interest, including conflicts involving related parties.
(2C) For the purpose of subsection (2B), the Commissioner may have regard to: (a) the person’s governance arrangements; (b) arrangements for functional separation between Plan Management and other NDIS supports or services; (c) arrangements for identifying and monitoring claims from related parties; (d) arrangements for participant disclosure and informed choice; (e) arrangements for reporting related-party transactions to the Agency; (f) audit, monitoring and compliance arrangements; and (g) any other matter prescribed by the National Disability Insurance Scheme rules.
Why this change is needed This would allow the Commissioner to refuse registration where conflicts are unmanaged or inadequately controlled, while preserving the ability to register providers that can demonstrate robust safeguards. It would also align the registration decision with the broader integrity purpose of the Bill by focusing on actual risk and provider capability rather than corporate structure alone.
Recommended amendment 3: retain and strengthen proposed s73EA deed requirements Current effect Proposed s73EA requires a person to have a deed of arrangement with the Agency before they can be registered to manage participant funding. The deed must include requirements relating to integrity and governance, staff, claims handling, identity verification, verification of supports, ICT systems, related parties, and managing or divesting conflicts of interest.
Recommended change Retain the deed requirement but strengthen the wording so it clearly supports active conflict management, rather than divestment as the required action.
Indicative amended wording for s73EA(2)(e) (e) requirements to be met by the person in relation to related parties and the identification, disclosure, management, reporting, mitigation of conflicts of interest.
Additional deed requirements could include: • participant-facing disclosure of related-party arrangements; • functional separation between Plan Management and other service functions; • identification and monitoring of invoices from related parties; • reporting of related-party payments to the Agency; • audit rights for the Agency; • mandatory notification of new or changed conflicts; • remediation requirements where conflict controls are inadequate;
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National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 781
• suspension, variation or termination of the deed where conflicts are not effectively managed.
Why this change is needed The deed is the right mechanism for operationalising conflict controls. It allows the Agency to impose detailed, provider-specific and enforceable requirements that can be updated over time as risks, data and market conditions change. This is more flexible and proportionate than a blanket statutory prohibition.
Recommended amendment 4: replace proposed s73F(2)(k) Current effect Proposed s73F(2)(k) would make it a condition of registration that the registered Plan Management provider and any related party must not provide any supports or services other than Plan Management under the NDIS.
Recommended change Replace this with a positive conflict management condition.
Indicative replacement wording (k) if the person is a registered Plan Management provider – a condition that the person must have adequate policies, procedures and controls to ensure any conflicts of interest arising from the provision of other NDIS supports or services by the person or a related party are identified, disclosed, managed and reported to the Commissioner on terms set out in the person’s deed of arrangement under s73EA(2)
Why this change is needed This change aligns the proposed s73F(2)(k) with the changes proposed in s73E(2B) and s73EA.
Recommended amendment 5: include a regulation-making power for conflict management standards To support consistency, the Bill could allow NDIS rules of the deed framework to prescribe minimum conflict management standards for registered Plan Management providers.
Indicative wording The National Disability Insurance Scheme rules may prescribe requirements for the management of conflicts of interest by registered Plan Management providers, including requirements related to disclosure, participant consent, functional separation, claims verification, reporting audit and related- party transactions.
Why this change is needed This would allow the framework to evolve as the Agency gains better visibility or provider behaviour, payment patterns and integrity risks. It would also support a nationally consistent approach while avoiding overly prescriptive legislation.
Alternate amendment models While we have set out amendments above which we believe would assist the Bill achieve its objectives, we acknowledge that there are a range of possible approaches to amendments that could be applied to address the concerns we have raised and amend the Bill to reflect its intentions. We are willing to engage with the government and the Senate in connection with our submission.
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National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Securing the NDIS for Future Generations) Bill 2026 Submission 781
Conclusion APM supports the Government’s objective of strengthening integrity, accountability and payment oversight in the NDIS. Plan Management can play an important role in this reform task by supporting plan implementation, budget administration, provider payments, record keeping and claims visibility.
However, the Plan Management provisions in the Bill go further than is necessary to address conflicts of interest. Proposed sections 73C, 73E and 73F would create a two-way structural separation between plan management and other NDIS service delivery, potentially excluding capable and well governed providers solely because of the perception of potential conflict of interest.
The Bill should be amended to replace automatic exclusion with a positive duty to identify, disclose, manage and report conflicts of interest. This should be supported through the Deed of Arrangement, which provides a flexible and enforceable mechanism for setting provider-specific requirements.
A risk-based model would better protect participants and the Scheme by targeting the real risks of collusion, inappropriate claiming and poor governance, while preserving participant choice, provider capacity and continuity of services.
The Committee should recommend amendments to proposed sections 73C, 73E and 73F as outlined in this submission so that the Bill strengthens integrity through proportionate conflict management rather than blanket market exclusion.
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